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Introduction: Top-down mechanisms that regulate attentional control are influenced by task demands and individuals' goals, while bottom-up processes are influenced by salient stimuli. Analogous networks are involved in both processes (e.g., frontostriatal areas). However, they are affected differently by the emotional salience of stimuli, which determines the allocation of attention. This study aims to determine whether the recent pandemic experience continues to exert an influence on cognitive processes. To this end, the study will determine attentional biases toward pandemic-related stimuli compared to negative and neutral stimuli. Furthermore, the study will investigate whether pandemic-related stimuli influence top-down and bottom-up attentional processes and whether the latter affect autonomic control as indexed by Heart Rate Variability (HRV)., Methods: Ninety-six undergraduate students completed a Flicker Task with stimuli categorized by emotional valence (neutral, negative non-COVID, negative COVID-related). This paradigm involves the presentation of two different pictures, which are identical except for a specific detail. The task required to detect the specific detail that has been changed. Given that the task employs images of natural scenes, participants tend to focus more on specific areas of the scene than others. As a result, changes in central interest (CI) areas are detected more rapidly than changes in marginal interest (MI) areas. Participants' response times (RTs) at the task and their HRV data were used to assess attentional performance and the associated autonomic nervous system activity., Results: The results indicate slower responses to COVID-related stimuli than negative and neutral stimuli for both CI and MI changes, requiring the involvement of bottom-up (CI changes) and top-down (MI changes) processes. The HRV was associated with a slower detection of CI changes in COVID-related scenes., Discussion: These findings highlight the intricate interplay between emotional salience, attentional mechanisms, and physiological responses to threatening stimuli. Contextual factors, particularly those related to pandemic-related stress, influence attentional processing and its relationship with autonomic activity., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2024 Favieri, Troisi, Forte, Corbo, Marselli, Blasutto, Ponce, Di Pace, Langher, Tambelli and Casagrande.)

Despite the remarkable advances in behavioral and brain sciences over the last decades, the mind-body (brain) problem is still an open debate and one of the most intriguing questions for both cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind. Traditional approaches have conceived this problem in terms of a contrast between physicalist monism and Cartesian dualism. However, since the late sixties, the landscape of philosophical views on the problem has become more varied and complex. The Multiple Realization Thesis (MRT) claims that mental properties can be (or are) realized, and mental processes can be (or are) implemented by neural correlates of different kinds. Thus, MRT challenges the psychoneural type-identity theory and the corresponding reductionism. Many philosophers have acknowledged the a priori plausibility of MRT. However, the existence of empirical evidence in favor of intraspecific, human multiple realizations of mental processes and properties is still controversial. Here, we illustrate some cases that provide empirical evidence in support of MRT. Recently, it has been proposed that foveal agnosic vision, like peripheral vision, can be restored by increasing object parts' spacing (Crutch and Warrington, 2007; Strappini et al., 2017b). Agnosic fovea and normal periphery are both limited by crowding, which impairs object recognition, and provides the signature of visual integration. Here, we define a psychological property of restored object identification, and we cross-reference the data of visually impaired patients with different etiologies. In particular, we compare the data of two stroke patients, two patients with posterior cortical atrophy, six cases of strabismic amblyopia, and one case with restored sight. We also compare these patients with unimpaired subjects tested in the periphery. We show that integration (i.e., restored recognition) seems to describe quite accurately the visual performance in all these cases. Whereas the patients have different etiologies and different neural correlates, the unimpaired subjects have no neural damage. Thus, similarity in the psychological property given the differences in the neural substrate can be interpreted in relation to MRT and provide evidence in its support. Finally, we will frame our contribution within the current debate concerning MRT providing new and compelling empirical evidence., (Copyright © 2020 Strappini, Martelli, Cozzo and di Pace.)

The distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness has been influential in the field of consciousness studies. Both Block and Lamme proposed that access consciousness, or narrow cognitive accessibility, is related to a limited capacity working memory, and that phenomenal consciousness, or broad cognitive accessibility, is related to iconic memory or, more recently, to a fragile (intermediate) short-term memory store with a larger capacity than working memory. They have also highlighted the preattentive nature of phenomenal consciousness and of the related iconic and fragile visual short-term stores, thus selectively linking attention with access consciousness, in line with Baars and Dehaene, among others. However, a range of electrophysiological and neurophysiological studies suggest that visual attention can affect early responses of neurons in visual cortex, before conscious access. Furthermore, some theories and neurocomputational models suggest earlier attentional biases related to phenomenal consciousness. To solve this controversy, and to shed light on the relationships of attention with iconic memory and subsequent stages of visual maintenance, we conducted an experiment with a novel procedure of change detection based on delayed cueing of the target for report with high- and low-priority objects marked by color. In line with our hypothesis, the results show an attentional bias toward high-priority objects in the memory array with the longer (600 and 1,200 ms) cueing delays associated with a fragile (intermediate) visual short-term memory, but not with the shorter cueing delays (16.6 and 200 ms) associated with iconic memory. These findings therefore suggest two stages of phenomenal consciousness before access consciousness: a first preattentive stage related to iconic memory and a second stage related to fragile visual short-term memory intermediate between iconic and visual working memory, which is modulated by visual attention in a time-dependent manner. Finally, our results suggest the dissociation between a mid-level visual attention modulating phenomenal consciousness and a central attention directing access consciousness., (Copyright © 2019 Simione, Di Pace, Chiarella and Raffone.)