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Cognitive explanations raise epistemological problems not faced by accounts confined to observable variables. Many explanatory components of cognitive models are unobservable: beliefs, attitudes, and intentions, for instance, must be made empirically available to the researcher in the form of measures of observable behavior from which the latent variables are inferred. The explanatory variables are abstract and theoretical and rely, if they are to enter investigations and explanations, on reasoned agreement on how they can be captured by proxy variables derived from what people say and how they behave. Psychometrics must be founded upon a firm, intersubjective agreement among researchers and users of research on the relationship of behavioral measures to the intentional constructs to which they point and the latent variables they seek to operationalize. Only if these considerations are adequately addressed can we arrive at consistent interpretations of the data. This problem provides the substance of the intentional behaviorist research programme which seeks to provide a rationale for the cognitive explanation. Within this programme, two versions of the Behavioral Perspective Model (BPM), an extensional portrayal of socioeconomic behavior and a corresponding intentional approach, address the task of identifying where intentional explanation becomes necessary and the formit should take. This study explores a third version, based on neurophysiological substrates of consumer choice as a contributor to this task. The nature of "value" is closely related to the rationale for a neurophysiological model of consumer choice. The variables involved are operationally specified and measured with high intersubjective agreement. The intentional model (BPM-I), depicting consumer action in terms of mental processes such as perception, deliberation, and choice, extends the purview of the BPM to new situations and areas of explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cognitive explanations raise epistemological problems not faced by accounts confined to observable variables. Many explanatory components of cognitive models are unobservable: beliefs, attitudes, and intentions, for instance, must be made empirically available to the researcher in the form of measures of observable behavior from which the latent variables are inferred. The explanatory variables are abstract and theoretical and rely, if they are to enter investigations and explanations, on reasoned agreement on how they can be captured by proxy variables derived from what people say and how they behave. Psychometrics must be founded upon a firm, intersubjective agreement among researchers and users of research on the relationship of behavioral measures to the intentional constructs to which they point and the latent variables they seek to operationalize. Only if these considerations are adequately addressed can we arrive at consistent interpretations of the data. This problem provides the substance of the intentional behaviorist research programme which seeks to provide a rationale for the cognitive explanation. Within this programme, two versions of the Behavioral Perspective Model (BPM), an extensional portrayal of socioeconomic behavior and a corresponding intentional approach, address the task of identifying where intentional explanation becomes necessary and the form it should take. This study explores a third version, based on neurophysiological substrates of consumer choice as a contributor to this task. The nature of “value” is closely related to the rationale for a neurophysiological model of consumer choice. The variables involved are operationally specified and measured with high intersubjective agreement. The intentional model (BPM-I), depicting consumer action in terms of mental processes such as perception, deliberation, and choice, extends the purview of the BPM to new situations and areas of explanation.

Inconsistency between intention and behavior is very common in daily life. This study explored the intention-behavior relationship in exercise, focusing on the mediating effect of action planning and the moderating effects of habit strength and gender. For the purpose of providing theoretical reference for the implementation of intervention strategies in the volitional phase, a total of 489 college students (M-age = 20.61, 57.46% female) from Hubei Province, China, were recruited to complete the questionnaire at two time points. The findings showed that exercise intention could positively predict exercise behavior via the mediating effect of action planning, with the mediating effect accounting for 48.52% of the total effect. The predictive effect of action planning habit strength interaction on exercise behavior was statistically significant. As individuals' levels of habitual strength increased, so did the relationship between action plans and exercise behavior. The action planning- exercise behavior relationship was stronger in males than in females. In summary, action planning is a very important predictor of the post-intentional phase and has many advantages. For individuals whose exercise has become habitualized, forming a plan is not counterproductive and can still promote more exercise rather than in a mutually compensating manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Co-creativity focuses on how individuals produce innovative ideas together. As few studies have explored co-creativity using standardized tests, it is difficult to effectively assess the individual’s creativity performance within a group. Therefore, this study aims to develop a platform that allows two individuals to answer creativity tests simultaneously. This platform includes two divergent thinking tasks, the Straw Alternative Uses Test and Bottle Alternative Uses Test, and Chinese Radical Remote Associates Test A and B, which were used to evaluate their openand closed-ended creative problem-solving performance. This platform has two modes: single-player mode and paired-player mode. Responses from 497 adults were collected, based on which the fluency, flexibility, and originality of divergent thinking were measured. This study also developed a computer scoring technique that can automatically calculate the scores on these creativity tests. The results showed that divergent thinking scores from computer-based calculation and manual scoring were highly positively correlated, suggesting that the scores on a divergent thinking task can be calculated through a system that avoids timeconsuming, uneconomical manual scoring. Overall, the two types of tests on this platform showed considerable internal consistency reliability and criterionrelated validity. This advanced application facilitates the collection of empirical evidence about co-creativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Impulsivity may lead to several unfortunate consequences and maladaptive behaviors for both clinical and nonclinical people. It has a key role in many forms of psychopathology. Although literature has discussed the negative impact of impulsivity, few have emphasized the relationship between cognitive impulsiveness and decision making. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of cognitive impulsiveness on decision making and explore the strategies used by participants to solve problems. For this purpose, we apply two measures of impulsivity: the self-report Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) and the performance based Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Moreover, we evaluate participants' reasoning processes employed to answer CRT questions based on the calculation expressions, data organization, and erasures they made while answering the CRT (note that we utilized the instruments using pen and paper). These reasoning processes are related to the role of executive functions in decision making, and its relationship with impulsiveness. The sample consists of 191 adults, who were either professionals or undergraduate students from the fields of business, management, or accounting. The results show that cognitive impulsiveness may negatively affect decision making, and that those who presented the calculation to answer the CRT questions made better decisions. Moreover, there was no difference in the strategies used by impulsive vs. nonimpulsive participants during decision making. Finally, people who inhibited their immediate answers to CRT questions performed better during decision making.

Impulsivity may lead to several unfortunate consequences and maladaptive behaviors for both clinical and nonclinical people. It has a key role in many forms of psychopathology. Although literature has discussed the negative impact of impulsivity, few have emphasized the relationship between cognitive impulsiveness and decision making. The aim of this study is to investigate the effects of cognitive impulsiveness on decision making and explore the strategies used by participants to solve problems. For this purpose, we apply two measures of impulsivity: the self-report Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11) and the performance based Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Moreover, we evaluate participants' reasoning processes employed to answer CRT questions based on the calculation expressions, data organization, and erasures they made while answering the CRT (note that we utilized the instruments using pen and paper). These reasoning processes are related to the role of executive functions in decision making, and its relationship with impulsiveness. The sample consists of 191 adults, who were either professionals or undergraduate students from the fields of business, management, or accounting. The results show that cognitive impulsiveness may negatively affect decision making, and that those who presented the calculation to answer the CRT questions made better decisions. Moreover, there was no difference in the strategies used by impulsive vs. nonimpulsive participants during decision making. Finally, people who inhibited their immediate answers to CRT questions performed better during decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Physical activity is partially regulated by non-conscious processes including automatic evaluations – the spontaneous affective reactions we have to physical activity that lead us to approach or avoid physical activity opportunities. A sound understanding of which words best represent the concepts of physical activity and pleasantness (as associated with physical activity) is needed to improve the measurement of automatic evaluations and related constructs (e.g., automatic self-schemas, attentional biases). The first aim of this study was to establish population-level evidence of the most common word stimuli for physical activity and pleasantness. Given that response latency measures have been applied to assess automatic evaluations of physical activity and exercise, the second aim was to determine whether people use the same behavior and pleasant descriptors for physical activity and exercise. Australian adults (N = 1,318; 54.3% women; 48.9% aged 55 years or older) were randomly assigned to one of two groups, through a computer-generated 1:1 ratio allocation, to be asked to list either five behaviors and pleasant descriptors of physical activity (n = 686) or of exercise (n = 632). The words were independently coded twice as to whether they were novel words or the same as another (i.e., same stem or same meaning). Intercoder reliability varied between moderate and strong (agreement = 50.1% to 97.8%; κ = 0.48 to 0.82). A list of the 20 most common behavior and pleasantness words were established based on how many people reported them, weighted by the ranking (1-5) people gave them. The words people described as physical activity were mostly the same as those people used to describe exercise. The most common behavior words were ‘walking,’ ‘running,’ ‘swimming,’ ‘bike riding,’ and ‘gardening’; and the most common pleasant descriptor words were ‘relaxing,’ ‘happiness,’ ‘enjoyment,’ ‘exhilarating,’ ‘exhausting,’ and ‘good.’ These set of stimuli can be utilized as a resource for response latency measurement tasks of automatic evaluations and for tools to enhance automatic evaluations of physical activity in evaluative conditioning tasks.

Physical activity is partially regulated by non-conscious processes including automatic evaluations - the spontaneous affective reactions we have to physical activity that lead us to approach or avoid physical activity opportunities. A sound understanding of which words best represent the concepts of physical activity and pleasantness (as associated with physical activity) is needed to improve the measurement of automatic evaluations and related constructs (e.g., automatic self-schemas, attentional biases). The first aim of this study was to establish population-level evidence of the most common word stimuli for physical activity and pleasantness. Given that response latency measures have been applied to assess automatic evaluations of physical activity and exercise, the second aim was to determine whether people use the same behavior and pleasant descriptors for physical activity and exercise. Australian adults (N D 1,318; 54.3% women; 48.9% aged 55 years or older) were randomly assigned to one of two groups, through a computer-generated 1:1 ratio allocation, to be asked to list either five behaviors and pleasant descriptors of physical activity (n D 686) or of exercise (n D 632). The words were independently coded twice as to whether they were novel words or the same as another (i.e., same stem or same meaning). Intercoder reliability varied between moderate and strong (agreement D 50.1 to 97.8%; k D 0.48 to 0.82). A list of the 20 most common behavior and pleasantness words were established based on how many people reported them, weighted by the ranking (1-5) people gave them. The words people described as physical activity were mostly the same as those people used to describe exercise. The most common behavior words were 'walking,' 'running,' 'swimming,' 'bike riding,' and 'gardening'; and the most common pleasant descriptor words were 'relaxing,' 'happiness,' 'enjoyment,' 'exhilarating,' 'exhausting,' and 'good.' These sets of stimuli can be utilized as resources for response latency measurement tasks of automatic evaluations and for tools to enhance automatic evaluations of physical activity in evaluative conditioning tasks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive basis of prosocial behaviour has received considerable recent attention. Previous work using economic games has found that in social dilemmas, intuitive decisions are more prosocial on average. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) explains this result by contending that strategies which are successful in daily life become automatized as intuitions. Deliberation then causes participants to adjust to the self-interested strategy in the specific setting at hand. Here we provide further evidence for the SHH by confirming several predictions regarding when and for whom time pressure/delay will and will not alter contributions in a Public Goods Game (PGG). First, we replicate and extend previous results showing that (as predicted by the SHH) trust of daily-life interaction partners and previous experience with economic games moderate the effect of time pressure/delay in social dilemmas. We then confirm a novel prediction of the SHH: that deliberation should not undermine the decision to benefit others when doing so is also individually payoff-maximizing. Our results lend further support to the SHH, and shed light on the role that deliberation plays in social dilemmas.

The cognitive basis of prosocial behavior has received considerable recent attention. Previous work using economic games has found that in social dilemmas, intuitive decisions are more prosocial on average. The Social Heuristics Hypothesis (SHH) explains this result by contending that strategies which are successful in daily life become automatized as intuitions. Deliberation then causes participants to adjust to the self-interested strategy in the specific setting at hand. Here we provide further evidence for the SHH by confirming several predictions regarding when and for whom time pressure/delay will and will not alter contributions in a Public Goods Game (PGG). First, we replicate and extend previous results showing that (as predicted by the SHH) trust of daily-life interaction partners and previous experience with economic games moderate the effect of time pressure/delay in social dilemmas. We then confirm a novel prediction of the SHH: that deliberation should not undermine the decision to benefit others when doing so is also individually payoff-maximizing. Our results lend further support to the SHH, and shed light on the role that deliberation plays in social dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an influential dual-process model, a moral judgment is the outcome of a rapid, affect-laden process and a slower, deliberative process. If these outputs conflict, decision time is increased in order to resolve the conflict. Violations of deontological principles proscribing the use of personal force to inflict intentional harm are presumed to elicit negative affect which biases judgments early in the decision-making process. This model was tested in three experiments. Moral dilemmas were classified using (a) decision time and consensus as measures of system conflict and (b) the aforementioned deontological criteria. In Experiment 1, decision time was either unlimited or reduced. The dilemmas asked whether it was appropriate to take a morally questionable action to produce a greater good outcome. Limiting decision time reduced the proportion of utilitarian (yes) decisions, but contrary to the model’s predictions, (a) vignettes that involved more deontological violations logged faster decision times, and (b) violation of deontological principles was not predictive of decisional conflict profiles. Experiment 2 ruled out the possibility that time pressure simply makes people more like to say no. Participants made a first decision under time constraints and a second decision under no time constraints. One group was asked whether it was appropriate to take the morally questionable action while a second group was asked whether it was appropriate to refuse to take the action. The results replicated that of Experiment 1 regardless of whether yes or no constituted a utilitarian decision. In Experiment 3, participants rated the pleasantness of positive visual stimuli prior to making a decision. Contrary to the model’s predictions, the number of deontological decisions increased in the positive affect rating group compared to a group that engaged in a cognitive task or a control group that engaged in neither task. These results are consistent with the view

In the ultimatum-game, as in many real-life social exchange situations, the selfish motive to maximize own gains conflicts with fairness preferences. In the present study we manipulated the availability of cognitive-control resources for ultimatum-game proposers to test whether preference for fairness is a deliberative cognitive-controlled act or an automatic act. In two experiments we found that a shortage of cognitive control (ego depletion) led proposers in the ultimatum game (UG) to propose significantly more equal split offers than non-depleted proposers. These results can be interpreted as resulting from an automatic concern for fairness, or from a greater fear of rejection, which would be in line with a purely self-interested response. To separate these competing explanations, in Experiment 2 we conducted a dictator-game in which the responder cannot reject the offer. In contrast to the increased fairness behavior demonstrated by depleted ultimatum-game proposers, we found that depleted dictator-game allocators chose the equal split significantly less often than non-depleted allocators. These results indicate that fairness preferences are automatically driven among UG proposers. The automatic fair behavior, however, at least partially reflects concern about self-interest gain. We discuss different explanations for these results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]