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Many studies have suggested that the concept of "number" is relatively independent from linguistic skills, although an increasing number of studies suggest that language abilities may play a pivotal role in the development of arithmetic skills. The condition of bilingualism can offer a unique perspective into the role of linguistic competence in numerical development. The present study was aimed at evaluating the relationship between language skills and early numeracy through a multilevel investigation in monolingual and bilingual minority children attending preschool. The sample included 156 preschool children. Of these, 77 were bilingual minority children (mean age D 58.27 ± 5.90), and 79 were monolinguals (mean age D 58.45 ± 6.03). The study focused on three levels of analysis: group differences in language and number skills, concurrent linguistic predictors of early numeracy and, finally, profile analysis of linguistic skills in children with impaired vs. adequate numeracy skills. The results showed that, apart from the expected differences in linguistic measures, bilinguals differed from monolinguals in numerical skills with a verbal component, such as semantic knowledge of digits, but they did not differ in a pure non-verbal component such as quantity comparison. The multigroup structural equation model indicated that letter knowledge was a significant predictor of the verbal component of numeracy for both groups. Phonological awareness was a significant predictor of numeracy skills only in the monolingual group. Profile analysis showed that children with a selective weakness in the non-verbal component of numeracy had fully adequate verbal skills. Results from the present study suggest that only some specific components of language competence predict numerical processing, although linguistic proficiency may not be a prerequisite for developing adequate early numeracy skills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When participants rapidly switch between tasks that share the same stimuli and responses, task confusions (i.e., the accidental application of the wrong task) can occur. The present study investigated whether these task confusions result from failures of endogenous control (i.e., from ineffective task preparation) or from failures of exogenous control (i.e., from stimulus-induced task conflicts). The frequency of task confusions was estimated by considering the relative proportion of distractor errors, that is, errors that result when participants erroneously respond to the distractor associated with the alternative task. In Experiment 1, the efficiency of exogenous control was manipulated by varying the temporal order of target and distractor presentation. In Experiment 2, the efficiency of endogenous control was manipulated by varying the time available for preparing the task in advance. It turned out that only the efficiency of exogenous control but not the efficiency of endogenous control influenced the proportion of distractor errors. Accordingly, task confusions are more related to failures in exogenous control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study investigates the representations(s) underlying positional priming of visual 'pop-out' search (Maljkovic and Nakayama, 1996). Three search items (one target and two distractors) were presented at different locations, in invariant (Experiment 1) or random (Experiment 2) cross-trial sequences. By these manipulations it was possible to disentangle retinotopic, spatiotopic, and object-centered priming representations. Two forms of priming were tested: target location facilitation (i.e., faster reaction times - RTs- when the trial n target is presented at a trial n-1 target relative to n-1 blank location) and distractor location inhibition (i.e., slower RTs for n targets presented at n-1 distractor compared to n-1 blank locations). It was found that target locations were coded in positional short-term memory with reference to both spatiotopic and object-centered representations (Experiment 1 vs. 2). In contrast, distractor locations were maintained in an object-centered reference frame (Experiments 1 and 2). We put forward the idea that the uncertainty induced by the experiment manipulation (predictable versus random cross-trial item displacements) modulates the transition from object- to space-based representations in cross-trial memory for target positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sequential modulations of conflict effects, like the reduction of the Simon effect after incompatible trials, have been taken to reflect the operation of a proactive control mechanism commonly called conflict monitoring. However, such modulations are often contaminated by episodic effects like priming and stimulus-response feature integration. It has previously been observed that if the episodic representation of a conflicting trial is altered by rotating the stimulus framing 180° around its axis, the subsequent "conflict adaptation" pattern is eliminated. In Experiment 1, we replicate the findings and provide the basic episodic interpretation. In Experiment 2, we extend the framework to include rotations of 90°, and verify that the episodic effects generalize to scenarios of neutral compatibility. Finally, in Experiment 3, we add complete, 360° rotations, and show that the episodic manipulation by itself does not eliminate the conflict adaptation patterns -- as long as conditions favor episodic retrieval. The experiments are argued to demonstrate that an episodic account of the conflict adaptation effect can most parsimoniously account for the behavioral effects without relying on higher order cognition. Accordingly, we conclude that conflict adaptation can be understood either as critically depending on episodic retrieval, or alternatively reflecting only episodic retrieval itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key feature of the human cognitive system is its ability to deal with an ever-changing environment. One prototypical example is the observation that we adjust our information processing depending on the conflict-likelihood of a context (context-specific proportion congruency effect, CSPC, Crump et al., 2006). Recently, empirical studies started to question the role of consciousness in these strategic adaptation processes (for reviews, see Desender and Van den Bussche, 2012; Kunde et al., 2012). However, these studies have not yielded unequivocal results (e.g., Kunde, 2003; Heinemann et al., 2009; Van Gaal et al., 2010a; Desender et al., 2013; Reuss et al., 2014). In the present study, we aim at replicating the experiment of Heinemann et al. (2009) in which the proportion of congruent and incongruenttrials between different contexts was varied in a masked priming task. Their results showed a reduction of the congruency effect for the context with more incongruent trials. However, this CSPC effect was only observed when the prime-target conflict was conscious, rather than unconscious, suggesting that context-specific control operates within the boundaries of awareness. Our replication attempt however contrasts these findings. In the first experiment we found no evidence for a CSPC effect in reaction times (RTs), neither in the conscious nor in the unconscious condition. The error rate analysis did show a CSPC effect, albeit not one modulated by consciousness. In the second experiment we found an overall CSPC effect in RTs, independent of consciousness. The error rates did not display a CSPC pattern. These mixed results seem to nuance the findings of Heinemann etal. (2009) and highlight the need for replication studies in psychology research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When using lever tools, subjects have to deal with two, not necessarily concordant effects of their motor behavior: the body-related proximal effects, like tactile sensations from the moving hand, and/or more external distal effects, like the moving effect points of the lever. As a consequence, spatial compatibility relationships between stimulus (S; at which the effect points of the lever aim at), responding hand (R) and effect point of the lever (E) play a critical role in response generation. In the present study we examine whether the occurrence of compatibility effects needs real tool movements or whether a similar response pattern can be already evoked by pure mental imaginations of the tool effects. In general, response times and errors observed with real and imagined tool movements showed a similar pattern of results, but there were also differences. With incompatible relationships and thus more difficult tasks, response times were reduced with imagined tool movements than compared with real tool movements. On the contrary, with compatible relationships and thus high overlap between proximal and distal action effects, response times were increased with imagined tool movements. Results are only in parts consistent with the ideomotor theory of motor control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The human cognitive system is equipped with various processes for dealing with everyday challenges. One of such processes is the inhibition of currently irrelevant goals or mental task-sets, which can be seen as a response to the critical event of information overflow in the cognitive system and challenging the cognitive system's ability to keep track of ongoing demands. In two experiments, we investigate the flexibility of the inhibitory process by inserting rare non-critical events (25% of all trials), operationalized as univalent stimuli (i.e., unambiguous stimuli that call for only one specific task in a multitasking context), and by introducing the possibility to prepare for an upcoming task (Experiment 2). We found that the inhibitory process is not influenced by a cue informing subjects about the upcoming occurrence of a univalent stimulus. However, the introduction of univalent stimuli allowed preparatory processes to modify the impact of the inhibitory process. Therefore, our results suggest that inhibitory processes are engaged in a rather global manner, not taking into account variations in stimulus valence, which we took as operationalization of critical, conflict-inducing events in the ongoing stream of information processing. However, rare uncritical events, such as univalent stimuli that do not cause conflict and interference in the processing stream, appear to alter the way the cognitive system can take advantage of preparatory processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]