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Dishonesty, including lying, cheating, deception, and deviating from societal norms, has far-reaching implications across various aspects of modern society. From minor consequences like social discontent to severe outcomes such as economic damage through tax evasion, dishonest behavior aects us in multiple ways. This study investigates whether gender and psychological traits contribute to dishonest behavior, and whether unethical conduct is stable across diverse tasks. We examined 63 participants using a “Dierence Spotting Task” (DST) and two motor tasks (1. coordinative throwing; 2. isometric strength). Dishonesty was measured by comparing self-reported performance with actual performance, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of both occurrence and extent of dishonesty. Our findings indicate that gender does not significantly influence the occurrence or extent of dishonest behavior. Moreover, we discovered that “Social Desirability” positively influences the extent of dishonesty, while “Task Orientation” increases the likelihood of engaging in dishonest acts. The study also reveals that the level of dishonesty remains relatively stable across all three tasks at an intrapersonal level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Investigating the effects of monetary incentives on dishonest behavior provides valuable insights into human integrity and ethical decision-making processes. This study is conducted through the lens of self-concept maintenance theory. Aim: The aim of this study is to examine the influence of different types of rewards (score-based vs. monetary) and their magnitude on dishonest behavior within a gender judgment task. Method: Using a quantitative experimental design, this study involved 116 participants who were randomly assigned to conditions that differed in reward type (score or money) and magnitude (10 yuan vs. 50 yuan). Dishonest behavior was assessed using a gender judgment task with mechanisms to simulate conditions conducive to planned cheating. Results: Results revealed significant differences in dishonesty rates between score and money conditions, with a higher proportion of dishonest participants observed in the score condition compared to the money condition. The timing of initial cheating was earlier in the score condition compared to the money condition. No significant differences were found in the proportion of dishonest participants, the cheating rate, or the timing of initial cheating across reward levels within either condition. The rate of cheating increased over time, suggesting a temporal dynamic in unethical decision making. Conclusion: The study demonstrates that the nature of rewards significantly influences the likelihood of dishonest behavior, with intangible score-based rewards facilitating rationalizations for dishonesty more readily than tangible financial incentives. These findings enrich the understanding of moral psychology by highlighting the complex interplay between reward types, ethical rationalization, and the dynamics of dishonest behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the role of cognitive control in moral decision-making, focusing on conflicts between financial temptations and the integrity of honesty. We employed a perceptual task by asking participants to identify which side of the diagonal contained more red dots within a square to provoke both honest and dishonest behaviors, tracking their reaction times (RTs). Participants encountered situations with no conflict, ambiguous conflict, and clear conflict. Their behaviors in the clear conflict condition categorized them as either “honest” or “dishonest.” Our findings suggested that, in ambiguous conflict situations, honest individuals had significantly longer RTs and fewer self-interest responses than their dishonest counterparts, suggesting a greater need for cognitive control to resolve conflicts and a lesser tendency toward self-interest. Moreover, a negative correlation was found between participants’ number of self-interest responses and RTs in ambiguous conflict situations (r = −0.27 in study 1 and r = −0.66 in study 2), and a positive correlation with cheating numbers in clear conflict situations (r = 0.36 in study 1 and r = 0.82 in study 2). This suggests less cognitive control was required for self-interest and cheating responses, bolstering the “Will” hypothesis. We also found that a person’s self-interest tendency could predict their dishonest behavior. These insights extend our understanding of the role of cognitive control plays in honesty and dishonesty, with potential applications in education, policy-making, and business ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dishonesty, including lying, cheating, deception, and deviating from societal norms, has far-reaching implications across various aspects of modern society. From minor consequences like social discontent to severe outcomes such as economic damage through tax evasion, dishonest behavior affects us in multiple ways. This study investigates whether gender and psychological traits contribute to dishonest behavior, and whether unethical conduct is stable across diverse tasks. We examined 63 participants using a “Difference Spotting Task” (DST) and two motor tasks (1. coordinative throwing; 2. isometric strength). Dishonesty was measured by comparing self-reported performance with actual performance, allowing for a comprehensive analysis of both occurrence and extent of dishonesty. Our findings indicate that gender does not significantly influence the occurrence or extent of dishonest behavior. Moreover, we discovered that “Social Desirability” positively influences the extent of dishonesty, while “Task Orientation” increases the likelihood of engaging in dishonest acts. The study also reveals that the level of dishonesty remains relatively stable across all three tasks at an intrapersonal level.

Introduction: Technological advancements have transformed our business as well as social interactions. A recent trend is the increasing use of smartphones for work and customer engagement. Given that smartphones have been associated with a heightened sense of personal ownership and moral disengagement we argue that this may have negative implications for ethical behavior. Method: To evaluate this conjecture we ran an experiment comparing dishonesty when using pen and paper, a desktop computer, or a smartphone. We make this comparison in both a setting where dishonesty benefits another (mutual-gain) and one where it harms another (constant-sum). Results: We find higher levels of dishonesty when using a smartphone than pen and paper. We find relatively high levels of dishonesty when using a desktop computer in the mutual-gain setting but low levels in the constant-sum setting. Discussion: Our results are consistent with the conjecture that smartphone use can lead to less ethical behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dishonesty has an enormous impact on all aspects of our society. It causes huge financial losses annually, so efforts to understand dishonest behavior have increased. However, one of the main questions yet to be answered is whether dishonesty varies according to gender. Do men behave more dishonestly than women? Although the literature points to a yes, there is still no consensus on the matter. We examined gender differences in dishonesty in a large sample (N = 2,452) using a model recently developed by Pascual-Ezama et al. It is a variation of the classic die-under-the-cup task. It enabled us to identify individual dishonesty profiles and look for gender differences between them. The results show that the men were more prone to behave dishonestly than women with small rewards, who seem satisfied without maximizing the potential reward. However, the differences vanished when there was no reward. The men also showed more radical dishonest behavior than the women. The results also suggest that gender differences might be shaped by factors other than gender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dishonesty has an enormous impact on all aspects of our society. It causes huge financial losses annually, so efforts to understand dishonest behavior have increased. However, one of the main questions yet to be answered is whether dishonesty varies according to gender. Do men behave more dishonestly than women? Although the literature points to a yes, there is still no consensus on the matter. We examined gender differences in dishonesty in a large sample (N = 2,452) using a model recently developed by Pascual-Ezama et al. It is a variation of the classic die-under-the-cup task. It enabled us to identify individual dishonesty profiles and look for gender differences between them. The results show that the men were more prone to behave dishonestly than women with small rewards, who seem satisfied without maximizing the potential reward. However, the differences vanished when there was no reward. The men also showed more radical dishonest behavior than the women. The results also suggest that gender differences might be shaped by factors other than gender.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the use of foreign languages affects individuals' dishonesty. We recruited native Chinese speakers who can speak English as a foreign language at universities in China, and they were randomly assigned to a native language (NL) or foreign language (FL) condition. Participants in each condition were required to finish the same tasks, in which they would benefit more from lying; the tasks were administered in either Chinese or English. We conducted one die-roll game in Study 1 and one cheap-talk sender-receiver game in Study 2. In both Study 1 and Study 2, we found that the proportion of lying was significantly lower in the FL condition than in the NL condition. Our results imply that the FL effect on dishonesty may be due to the cognitive load of communicating in a FL. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the previous literature, only a few papers found better accuracy than a chance to detect dishonesty, even when more information and verbal cues (VCs) improve precision in detecting dishonesty. A new classification of dishonesty profiles has recently been published, allowing us to study if this low success rate happens for all people or if some people have higher predictive ability. This paper aims to examine if (dis)honest people can detect better/worse (un)ethical behavior of others. With this in mind, we designed one experiment using videos from one of the most popular TV shows in the UK where contestants make a (dis)honesty decision upon gaining or sharing a certain amount of money. Our participants from an online MTurk sample (N = 1,582) had to determine under different conditions whether the contestants would act in an (dis)honest way. Three significant results emerged from these two experiments. First, accuracy in detecting (dis)honesty is not different than chance, but submaximizers (compared to maximizers) and radical dishonest people (compare to non-radicals) are better at detecting honesty, while there is no difference in detecting dishonesty. Second, more information and VCs improve precision in detecting dishonesty, but honesty is better detected using only non-verbal cues (NVCs). Finally, a preconceived honesty bias improves specificity (honesty detection accuracy) and worsens sensitivity (dishonesty detection accuracy). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the use of foreign languages affects individuals’ dishonesty. We recruited native Chinese speakers who can speak English as a foreign language at universities in China, and they were randomly assigned to a native language (NL) or foreign language (FL) condition. Participants in each condition were required to finish the same tasks, in which they would benefit more from lying; the tasks were administered in either Chinese or English. We conducted one die-roll game in Study 1 and one cheap-talk sender-receiver game in Study 2. In both Study 1 and Study 2, we found that the proportion of lying was significantly lower in the FL condition than in the NL condition. Our results imply that the FL effect on dishonesty may be due to the cognitive load of communicating in a FL.

According to the previous literature, only a few papers found better accuracy than a chance to detect dishonesty, even when more information and verbal cues (VCs) improve precision in detecting dishonesty. A new classification of dishonesty profiles has recently been published, allowing us to study if this low success rate happens for all people or if some people have higher predictive ability. This paper aims to examine if (dis)honest people can detect better/worse (un)ethical behavior of others. With this in mind, we designed one experiment using videos from one of the most popular TV shows in the UK where contestants make a (dis)honesty decision upon gaining or sharing a certain amount of money. Our participants from an online MTurk sample (N = 1,582) had to determine under different conditions whether the contestants would act in an (dis)honest way. Three significant results emerged from these two experiments. First, accuracy in detecting (dis)honesty is not different than chance, but submaximizers (compared to maximizers) and radical dishonest people (compare to non-radicals) are better at detecting honesty, while there is no difference in detecting dishonesty. Second, more information and VCs improve precision in detecting dishonesty, but honesty is better detected using only non-verbal cues (NVCs). Finally, a preconceived honesty bias improves specificity (honesty detection accuracy) and worsens sensitivity (dishonesty detection accuracy).

The present study examines whether collaborative situations make individuals more dishonest in face-to-face settings. It also considers how this dishonesty unfolds over time. To address these questions, we employed a sequential dyadic die-rolling task in which two participants in a pair sitting face-to-face received a payoff only if both reported the same outcome when each one rolled their die. In each trial, one participant (role A) rolled a die first and reported the outcome. Then, the second participant (role B) was informed of A’s reported number, rolled a die as well, and reported the outcome. If their reported outcomes were identical, both of them received a reward. We also included an individual condition in which an individual subject rolled a die twice and received a reward if he/she reported the same die-roll outcome. We found that B lied significantly more than participants in the individual condition, whereas A lied as much as participants in the individual condition. Furthermore, when collaborating, more and more participants (both A and B) became dishonest as the game progressed, whereas there was no such trend among participants in the individual condition. These findings provide evidence indicating that collaborative settings increase dishonesty and that this effect becomes more evident as the collaboration progress.

The present study examines whether collaborative situations make individuals more dishonest in face-to-face settings. It also considers how this dishonesty unfolds over time. To address these questions, we employed a sequential dyadic die-rolling task in which two participants in a pair sitting face-to-face received a payoff only if both reported the same outcome when each one rolled their die. In each trial, one participant (role A) rolled a die first and reported the outcome. Then, the second participant (role B) was informed of A's reported number, rolled a die as well, and reported the outcome. If their reported outcomes were identical, both of them received a reward. We also included an individual condition in which an individual subject rolled a die twice and received a reward if he/she reported the same die-roll outcome. We found that B lied significantly more than participants in the individual condition, whereas A lied as much as participants in the individual condition. Furthermore, when collaborating, more and more participants (both A and B) became dishonest as the game progressed, whereas there was no such trend among participants in the individual condition. These findings provide evidence indicating that collaborative settings increase dishonesty and that this effect becomes more evident as the collaboration progress. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual’s moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm.

There is a long-standing debate regarding the cognitive nature of (dis)honesty: Is honesty an automatic response or does it require willpower in the form of cognitive control in order to override an automatic dishonest response. In a recent study (Speer et al., 2020), we proposed a reconciliation of these opposing views by showing that activity in areas associated with cognitive control, particularly the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), helped dishonest participants to be honest, whereas it enabled cheating for honest participants. These findings suggest that cognitive control is not needed to be honest or dishonest per se but that it depends on an individual's moral default. However, while our findings provided insights into the role of cognitive control in overriding a moral default, they did not reveal whether overriding honest default behavior (non-habitual dishonesty) is the same as overriding dishonest default behavior (non-habitual honesty) at the neural level. This speaks to the question as to whether cognitive control mechanisms are domain-general or may be context specific. To address this, we applied multivariate pattern analysis to compare neural patterns of non-habitual honesty to non-habitual dishonesty. We found that these choices are differently encoded in the IFG, suggesting that engaging cognitive control to follow the norm (that cheating is wrong) fundamentally differs from applying control to violate this norm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this perspective article is to show that current experimental evidence on factors influencing dishonesty has limited external validity. Most of experimental studies is built on random assignments, in which control/experimental groups of subjects face varied sizes of the expected reward for behaving dishonestly, opportunities for cheating, means of rationalizing dishonest behavior etc., and mean groups’ reactions are observed. The studies have internal validity in assessing the causal influence of these and other factors, but they lack external validity in organizational, market and other environments. If people can opt into or out of diverse real-world environments, an experiment aimed at studying factors influencing real-life degree of dishonesty should permit for such an option. The behavior of such self-selected groups of marginal subjects would probably contain a larger level of (non)deception than the behavior of average people. The article warns that there are not many studies that would enable self-selection or sorting of participants into varying environments, and that limits current knowledge of the extent and dynamics of dishonest and fraudulent behavior. The article focuses on suggestions how to improve dishonesty research, especially how to avoid the experimenter demand bias.

Parents around the world engage in the practice of parenting by lying, which entails lying to manipulate children’s emotional states and behavior. The current study is the first to examine whether exposure to parenting by lying in childhood is associated with later dishonesty and psychosocial maladjustment in adulthood. Female undergraduate adults retrospectively reported their experiences of parenting by lying during childhood, the current frequency at which they lie to their parents, and their current psychosocial functioning. We found that adults who recalled relatively high levels of parenting by lying during childhood both lie to their parents more often and experience greater psychosocial adjustments problems in adulthood than adults who recalled relatively low levels of parenting by lying during childhood. This study is the first to suggest that parenting by lying during childhood may be associated with negative moral and social outcomes later in life.

Neuroscience has identified brain structures and functions that correlate with psychopathic tendencies. Since psychopathic traits can be traced back to physical neural attributes, it has been argued that psychopaths are not truly responsible for their actions and therefore should not be blamed for their psychopathic behaviors. This experimental research aims to evaluate what effect communicating this theory of psychopathy has on the moral behavior of lay people. If psychopathy is blamed on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic tendencies and therefore may be more likely to display those tendencies. An online study will provide participants with false feedback about their psychopathic traits supposedly based on their digital footprint (i.e., Facebook likes), thus classifying them as having either above-average or below-average psychopathic traits and describing psychopathy in cognitive or neurobiological terms. This particular study will assess the extent to which lay people are influenced by feedback regarding their psychopathic traits, and how this might affect their moral behavior in online tasks. Public recognition of these potential negative consequences of neuroscience communication will also be assessed. A field study using the lost letter technique will be conducted to examine lay people's endorsement of neurobiological, as compared to cognitive, explanations of criminal behavior. This field and online experimental research could inform the future communication of neuroscience to the public in a way that is sensitive to the potential negative consequences of communicating such science. In particular, this research may have implications for the future means by which neurobiological predictors of offending can be safely communicated to offenders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one’s own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance.

Cheating for material gain is a destructive phenomenon in any society. We examine the extent to which people care about the victims of their unethical behavior—be they a group of people or an individual—and whether they are sensitive to the degree of harm or cost that they cause to these victims. The results of three studies suggest that when a group (rather than a single individual) is the victim of one’s behavior, the incidence of cheating increases only if the harm to the group is presented in global terms—such that the cheating might be justified by the relatively minor harm caused to each individual in the group (Study #1 and #3). However, when the harm or cost to each individual in the group is made explicit, the tendency to cheat the group is no longer apparent and the tendency to cheat increases when the harm caused is minor—regardless of whether the victim is an individual or a group of people (Study #2). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking appear to play different roles in the decision to cheat different type of opponents: individual opponents seem to trigger the subject’s intuitive thinking which restrains the urge to cheat, whereas groups of opponents seem to trigger the subject’s rational mode of thinking which encourage cheating.

Organizational monitoring relies frequently on self-reports (e.g., work hours, progress reports, travel expenses). A one-by-one policy requires employees to submit a series of reports (e.g., daily or itemized reports). An all-at-once policy requires an overall report (e.g., an annual or an overview report). Both policies use people’s self-reports to determine their pay, and both allow people to inflate their reports to get higher incentives, that is, to cheat. Objectively, people can cheat to the same extent under both reporting policies. However, the two policies differ in that the segmented one-by-one policy signals closer monitoring than the all-at-once policy. We suggest here that lie aversion may have a paradoxical effect on closer monitoring and lead people to cheat more. Specifically, reporting a series of segmented units of performance (allowing small lies) should lead to more cheating than a one-shot report of overall performance (that require one larger lie). Two surveys indicated that while people perceive the all-at-once policy as more trusting, they still expected people would be equally likely to cheat in both policies. An experiment tested the effects of the two reporting policies on cheating. The findings showed that contrary to the participants' intuition, but in line with research on lie aversion, the one-by-one policy resulted in more cheating than the all-at-once policy. Implications for future research and organization policy are discussed.

The question of what deters crime is of both theoretical and practical interest. The present paper focuses on what factors deter minor, non-violent crimes, i.e. dishonest actions that violate the law. Much research has been devoted to testing the effectiveness of legal sanctions on crime, while newer models also include social sanctions (judgment of friends or family) and internal sanctions (feelings of guilt). Existing research suggests that both internal sanctions and, to a lesser extent, legal sanctions deter crime, but it is unclear whether this pattern is unique to Western countries or robust across cultures. We administered a survey study to participants in China, Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and USA, five countries from distinct cultural regions of the world. Participants were asked to report the likelihood of engaging in seven dishonest and illegal actions, and were asked to indicate the probability and severity of consequences for legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions. Results indicated that across countries, internal sanctions had the strongest deterrent effects on crime. The deterrent effects of legal sanctions were weaker and varied across countries. Furthermore, the deterrent effects of legal sanctions were strongest when internal sanctions were lax. Unexpectedly, social sanctions were positively related to likelihood of engaging in crime. Taken together, these results suggest that the relative strengths of legal and internal sanctions are robust across cultures and dishonest actions.

We hypothesize that when honesty is not motivated by selfish goals, it reveals social preferences that have evolved for convincing strategically vigilant partners that one is a person worth cooperating with. In particular, we explain how the patterns of dishonest behavior observed in recent experiments can be motivated by preferences for social and self-esteem. These preferences have evolved because they are adaptive in an environment where it is advantageous to be selected as a partner by others and where these others are strategically vigilant: they efficiently evaluate the expected benefit of cooperating with specific partners and attend to their intentions. We specify the adaptive value of strategic vigilance and preferences for social and self-esteem. We argue that evolved preferences for social and self-esteem are satisfied by applying mechanisms of strategic vigilance to one's own behavior. We further argue that such cognitive processes obviate the need for the evolution of preferences for fairness and social norm compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fraud is a pervasive and challenging problem that costs society large amounts of money. By no means all fraud is committed by 'professional criminals': much is done by ordinary people who indulge in small-scale opportunistic deception. In this paper, we set out to investigate when people behave dishonestly, for example by committing fraud, in an online context. We conducted three studies to investigate how the rejection of one's efforts, operationalized in different ways, affected the amount of cheating and information falsification. Study 1 demonstrated that people behave more dishonestly when rejected. Studies 2 and 3 were conducted in order to disentangle the confounding factors of the nature of the rejection and the financial rewards that are usually associated with dishonest behavior. It was demonstrated that rejection in general, rather than the nature of a rejection, caused people to behave more dishonestly. When a rejection was based on subjective grounds, dishonest behavior increased with approximately 10%, but this difference was not statistically significant. We subsequently measured whether dishonesty was driven by the financial loss associated with rejection, or emotional factors such as a desire for revenge. We found that rejected participants were just as dishonest when their cheating did not led to financial gain. However, they felt stronger emotions when there was no money involved. This seems to suggest that upon rejection, emotional involvement, especially a reduction in happiness, drives dishonest behavior more strongly than a rational cost-benefit analysis. These results indicate that rejection causes people to behave more dishonestly, specifically in online settings. Firms wishing to deter customers and employees from committing fraud may therefore benefit from transparency and clear policy guidelines, discouraging people to submit claims that are likely to be rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cheating for material gain is a destructive phenomenon in any society. We examine the extent to which people care about the victims of their unethical behavior--be they a group of people or an individual--and whether they are sensitive to the degree of harm or cost that they cause to these victims. The results of three studies suggest that when a group (rather than a single individual) is the victim of one's behavior, the incidence of cheating increases only if the harm to the group is presented in global terms--such that the cheating might be justified by the relatively minor harm caused to each individual in the group (Studies #1 and #3). However, when the harm or cost to each individual in the group is made explicit, the tendency to cheat the group is no longer apparent and the tendency to cheat increases when the harm caused is minor--regardless of whether the victim is an individual or a group of people (Study #2). Individual differences in rational and intuitive thinking appear to play different roles in the decision to cheat different type of opponents: individual opponents seem to trigger the subject's intuitive thinking which restrains the urge to cheat, whereas groups of opponents seem to trigger the subject's rational mode of thinking which encourage cheating. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Organizational monitoring relies frequently on self-reports (e.g., work hours, progress reports, travel expenses). A "one-by-one" policy requires employees to submit a series of reports (e.g., daily or itemized reports). An "all-at-once" policy requires an overall report (e.g., an annual or an overview report). Both policies use people's self-reports to determine their pay, and both allow people to inflate their reports to get higher incentives, that is, to cheat. Objectively, people can cheat to the same extent under both reporting policies. However, the two policies differ in that the segmented one-by-one policy signals closer monitoring than the all-at-once policy. We suggest here that lie aversion may have a paradoxical effect on closer monitoring and lead people to cheat more. Specifically, reporting a series of segmented units of performance (allowing small lies) should lead to more cheating than a one-shot report of overall performance (that require one larger lie). Two surveys indicated that while people perceive the all-at-once policy as more trusting, they still expected people would be equally likely to cheat in both policies. An experiment tested the effects of the two reporting policies on cheating. The findings showed that contrary to the participants' intuition, but in line with research on lie aversion, the one-by-one policy resulted in more cheating than the all-at-once policy. Implications for future research and organization policy are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The question of what deters crime is of both theoretical and practical interest. The present paper focuses on what factors deter minor, non-violent crimes, i.e., dishonest actions that violate the law. Much research has been devoted to testing the effectiveness of legal sanctions on crime, while newer models also include social sanctions (judgment of friends or family) and internal sanctions (feelings of guilt). Existing research suggests that both internal sanctions and, to a lesser extent, legal sanctions deter crime, but it is unclear whether this pattern is unique to Western countries or robust across cultures. We administered a survey study to participants in China, Colombia, Germany, Portugal, and USA, five countries from distinct cultural regions of the world. Participants were asked to report the likelihood of engaging in seven dishonest and illegal actions, and were asked to indicate the probability and severity of consequences for legal, friend, family, and internal sanctions. Results indicated that across countries, internal sanctions had the strongest deterrent effects on crime. The deterrent effects of legal sanctions were weaker and varied across countries. Furthermore, the deterrent effects of legal sanctions were strongest when internal sanctions were lax. Unexpectedly, social sanctions were positively related to likelihood of engaging in crime. Taken together, these results suggest that the relative strengths of legal and internal sanctions are robust across cultures and dishonest actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Disgust modulates moral decisions involving harming others. We recently specified that this effect is bi-directionally modulated by individual sensitivity to disgust. Here, we show that this effect generalizes to the moral domain of honesty and extends to outcomes with real-world impact. We employed a dice-rolling task in which participants were incentivized to dishonestly report outcomes to increase their potential final monetary payoff. Disgust or control facial expressions were presented subliminally on each trial. Our results reveal that the disgust facial expressions altered honest reporting as a bi-directional function moderated by individual sensitivity. Combining these data with those from prior experiments revealed that the effect of disgust presentation on both harm judgments and honesty could be accounted for by the same bidirectional function, with no significant effect of domain. This clearly demonstrates that disgust facial expressions produce the same modulation of moral judgments across different moral foundations (harm and honesty). Our results suggest strong overlap in the cognitive/neural processes of moral judgments across moral foundations, and provide a framework for further studies to specify the integration of emotional information in moral decision making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses research on cultural norms on behavior using indirect method. It references the study "Business Culture and Dishonesty in the Banking Industry," by A. Cohn et al. in the 2014 issue of "Nature." Several variables are considered in this study including dishonesty among bank employees, the rates of cheating among bankers and dishonesty rates in samples of bank employees, non-banking employees and students.

The authors present a study on dishonest behavior, from theory to practice. They say that recent works in the behavioral ethics field have made advances in comprehending the causes of dishonesty and describing the contextual and social factors that promote or block it. They add that one of the major insights is that people value morality and attempt to resist the temptation to act dishonestly.