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Since 2007, the Center for Army Leadership (CAL) has reported that a large percentage of soldiers do not perceive their immediate supervisor as "effective" in demonstrating the leader competency Develops Others. How are Army leaders to interpret this finding? This thesis investigates why the phenomenon has so persistently occurred by analyzing the potential for misalignment between doctrine, approaches to measurement, and how Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) students articulate the Develops Others competency. Using a qualitative comparative case study design, this thesis suggests that the Develops Others doctrinal description is mostly represented in CAL's measurement approach and in the students' description of the competency. However, three significant challenges to the common interpretation that leaders are failing to develop their subordinates exist. These challenges are high performance in Building team skills and processes, competency spillover, and the aspect of time. This finding is important as it increases understanding in how to measure an important part of the Army Leader Requirements Model more effectively.

US civil-military relations encompasses a variety of relationships, one of which is the engagement of senior military leaders with policy-making civilians at the strategic level. Many studies analyze what constitutes healthy civil-military relations between these specific actors, but none that isolate what military leaders can do to better contribute to strategic decisions with civil leaders. This study examines much of the literature related to civil military relations at the strategic level and analyzes how the military performed across several of these key factors during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War. This study finds that senior military leaders often provided a number of military options to civilian leaders, but that these options did not adequately increase the range of decision space for the civilian authorities and often expressed opposing views through inaction rather than voiced dialogue, which is of ethical concern. The study makes recommendations for establishing Army and Joint Doctrine for civil-military relations and proposes a framework for key concepts that should be included.

The leadership of the U.S. Army is often criticized for its failure to anticipate the next conflict and structure itself accordingly. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan serve to many as examples of conflicts for which the U.S. Army was woefully unprepared and forced to pay a steep price in terms of blood and treasure for that unpreparedness. Additionally, many assert that we are at an historical inflection point and the U.S. Army should divorce itself from Cold War thinking and organize to meet these new threats. Are such claims valid or are they merely the flavor of the day? This paper explores recent scholarship on the future of conflict to attempt to discern if the character of warfare is indeed changing and what those changes mean. It then continues to consider how those charged with providing for our nation's defense view future threats to U.S. security. Lastly, based on this exploration, it considers various threat orientations upon which to base the structure of the U.S. Army and some of their implications. This paper is written during a time of budgetary austerity and decreased funding for our nation's military. This austerity requires important decisions on the part of our military and national leaders. However, as resources remain finite under all economic circumstances, this paper seeks to address questions of capability as opposed to those of capacity. The capacity of the U.S. Army can and will fluctuate with the strategic and economic times. But capabilities are the important question here. Can the army of the most powerful nation in the world afford to seek efficiencies of cost and scale by eliminating its ability to conduct certain kinds of conflict? Or is it required instead to maintain the ability to act across the entire continuum of conflict?

Large-scale combat and multi-domain operations in the Knowledge Era will require Army leaders to manage linear combat operations while maintaining an entirely separate operational approach in the complex consolidation areas. Within the Army's tactical formations, units' abilities to rapidly transition from counterinsurgency or stability operations to offensive or defensive decisive operations, and across multiple domains will pose a significant organizational challenge. No amount of materials, planning, or leader traits will ever mitigate these challenges. Complex challenges require leadership that enables emergent solutions, but the Army's current leader-centric, top-down approach perpetuates risk averse, zero-defect cultures. The Army must change its leadership doctrine. Transformational change to leadership doctrine will allow leaders at all levels to learn to embrace complexity and team-based approaches, fostering emergent solutions to complex problems. The trait-based leader-centric approach is archaic, inefficient, and promotes a risk-averse culture that will not prevail in large scale combat or multi-domain operations.

In the air domain of warfare, adversary capabilities have dramatically increased due to lessons learned from US dominance in the air in 2003. As threat capabilities have increased in range, sophistication, command and control, and their ability to defeat or disrupt US ground maneuver, two significant gaps emerged. The first gap, the growth in adversary capabilities, is being addressed by the reintroduction of M-SHORAD Battalions with greater capability that SHORAD battalions from before the divestiture in 2003-2005. The other divide is how the US army air defense branch should conduct positive and procedural control of air defense fires to bridge the gap between division and EAC air defense units to support theater integrated air and missile defense while developing AMD officers to meet a diverse set of missions. This paper will provide a historical analysis covering US army capabilities and adversary capabilities from 2003 to today using OIF in 2003 as our focal point. We will then focus on the doctrine separating HIMAD and SHORAD perspectives and their recommended changes to facilitate integration. We will then look at some of the cultural issues that historically have divided the ADA branch and recommendations for talent management.

This monograph explores the hypothesis that a dogmatic focus on tactics inhibits the commander's understanding in the context of a more information-centric, cognitive operational environment and prevents the development of an internally coherent and externally relevant operational approach. It seeks to understand the cognitive limitations of the current paradigm, to propose that it risks relevancy in competition, and to demonstrate the importance of thinking beyond the point of contact within the contemporary context. This monograph is divided into three sections, the first of which seeks to understand the origin of the current paradigm and its internal logic. The second section seeks to demonstrate the limitations of the current paradigm within a contemporary context and the resulting risk to external relevance. The third section considers a need to adapt the US Army's mode of thinking to re-establish equilibrium between theory, doctrine, practical experience, and context to create a context-based paradigm.

Intelligence dissemination and battle damage assessments are critical components of success during large-scale combat operations. This monograph studied the First Gulf War in 1990-1991 to determine what did and did not work with intelligence dissemination and damage assessments at the operational level. During Operation Desert Shield, intelligence dissemination overcame manning deficiencies, interoperability problems, and a lack of communications architecture. During the war of maneuver in Operation Desert Storm, a lack of communications architecture hampered communication. Battle damage reporting was inaccurate because the Army lacked doctrine and an effective method to measure appropriately. Failure to understand and correct the deficiencies from the First Gulf War could lead to further problems in the immediate environment.

A recent, and underappreciated, development is occurring in the space domain with the ability of Malicious Non-State Actors (MNSA) to harness space-based capabilities to conduct operations. MNSA uses technologies such as Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and the Global Position System (GPS) to increase their operational reach by using the space domain to link small operations across multiple domains. The use of space for warfighting has been the traditional realm of powerful nation-states such as the United States. This monograph investigates how current US spacepower concepts and doctrine is insufficient to respond to MNSA using space-enabled capabilities. The advent of MNSA use of space requires a shift in American operational and doctrinal thinking of what or who constitutes a spacepower. MNSA such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have demonstrated an ability to adopt space capabilities to conduct operations to achieve their organizational goals. The examples of Hezbollah, LeT, and ISIS, when compared to current US spacepower concepts and doctrine, shows a gap in the current spacepower theory paradigm. This gap in thinking suggests that a change is needed in current US doctrine and concepts to better prepare for the emergence of new hostile space powers.

As the US Army solidifies the Multi-Domain Operations concept, it is essential to keep leadership development relevant towards the future operational environment. Near-peer adversaries will continue to compete below the threshold of conflict increasing complexity and uncertainty in multi-domain operations. While it is common to evaluate the Army Leadership Requirements Model, how can the Army leaders build upon core attributes and competencies to thrive in multi-domain operations? The Army Leadership Requirements Model, combined with developing a multi-domain mentality, enables effective leadership in multi-domain operations. The theoretical approach expands on the leadership core competencies and attributes, providing three additional leadership characteristics. The ability to anticipate near-peer actions, leverage available capabilities and people, and persevere through complexity and uncertainty formulate a multi-domain mentality. By implementing a multi-domain mentality through education and training, Army leaders will be effective against near-peer adversaries in multi-domain operations.

During the conflict in Northern Ireland from 1968-1998, the United Kingdom and the Irish Republican Army used the law to further their objectives, a practice known as lawfare. Examining how the antagonists used the law to further their objectives will show how lawfare fits into information operations. The paper will explore how the Irish Republican Army successfully used the law to gain an information advantage over a more powerful enemy. Conversely, the paper will explore how the United Kingdom's misuse of the law worsened the conflict and helped turn disorder into an insurgency.

From 1946 to 1960, the College debated how to develop doctrine for the atomic age. However, consensus remained as elusive in 1960 as it did in 1946. Why did the Command and General Staff College leaders struggle to develop doctrine and instruction from 1946 to 1960? Doctrine development and instruction remained nebulous throughout the 1950s because the uncertainty of limited war's feasibility made CGSC commandants hesitant to direct doctrinal changes that disrupted the curriculum. CGSC commandants developed doctrine and instruction cautiously. Only directives from higher headquarters drove significant change. After writing a new atomic-focused curriculum in 1956, CGSC leaders continued to question the feasibility of limited war. The College's challenge was a microcosm of the debate among senior leaders of the US Army. Examining the complex and nebulous nature of doctrine development in the 1950s demonstrates the important connection between tactical doctrine and strategic context, and how professional military education supports that connection.

Peer competitors, such as China and Russia, have developed robust anti-access, area denial systems after studying U.S. military operations. In response, the Army updated its operating concept to "Multidomain Operations" (MDO) and is implementing a force design update titled WayPoint 2028 (WP28) to ensure that divisions are "multidomain capable" by 2028. This study evaluates the assigned forces in WP28's Joint Forcible Entry Division during a Joint Forcible Entry Operation against a People's Liberation Army Army Combined Arms Brigade in a denied, degraded, or latent communications environment. Using a Comparison of Forces and Means analysis, the research emphasizes the importance of resilient communications across the Joint Force during MDO.

Billions of dollars are at stake in the Army procurement arena where strategic decisions have lasting national security consequences. The misalignment of executive and legislative priorities creates friction between the military and congressional overseers. This ultimately results in inconsistent procurement outcomes- impeding the Army's ability to effectively modernize and meet evolving threats. This qualitative research analyzed senior Army leaders' engagements with Congress during the procurement process. Using the Stryker, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, and Gray Eagle platforms as case studies, this thesis seeks to understand how senior Army leader engagements impact programmatic funding during the procurement process. A key finding suggests that senior Army leaders and policymakers adhere to normative civil-military lanes during public hearings, but senior Army leaders' testimony does not consistently convey procurement priorities. As the Army seeks to modernize the force understanding how senior leader interaction with Congress during the procurement process impacts programs outcomes is imperative for future program resourcing and long-term viability.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a region of ever-growing importance. It is a major trade route and has seen major infrastructure developments in the past few decades. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has increased its presence in the IOR. India is strategically located in the heart of the Indian Ocean with its long coastal territory jutting into it. The location of India in the IOR and the presence of smaller neighbors define the requirements of having a strong maritime force not only to be a credible deterrence but also to be a regional security provider. The increased assertiveness nature of the PRC and the hostile India-PRC relationship adds to the environmental threats. This research highlights the threats based on the activities of the PRC in India's neighborhood and the decline in the Sino-India relationship. The literature review identifies the Chinese encirclement term 'Strings of Pearls' and India's counter to it known as "Necklace of Diamonds'. This research also analyses the Indian policies directed toward India's neighbors and global powers in the world and identifies shortcomings/ vulnerabilities from the diplomatic and military perspectives. The research found that there is a huge credibility gap between the navies of India and China. This coupled with the presence of hostile neighbors and neighbors economically dependent on the PRC poses strategic problems for India. The Indian military is generally biased towards the active and contested northern border. There is a need for stronger diplomatic relations with international partners and a renewed focus on the development of maritime force for India to be a credible regional security provider.

The United States Army's ability to maintain large regular army divisions is difficult during times of peace. This study examines the techniques used to expand the United States Army to execute LSCO leading to and during WWII in the European Theater of Operations and what techniques the United States Army retains to this day. In 1939, the Army employed pre-establish and ad hoc Cadre, the activation of reserve headquarters, and prewar mobilization plans to expand the army from 188,563 to 8,291,336 soldiers. This study specifically examines the impacts of each technique on creating infantry divisions for the ETO; Regular Army, National Guard, Organized Reserves, and Army of the United States divisions. This Study shows that the United States Army retains many cadre and reserve units capable of supporting LSMO for full mobilization but maintains limited doctrine to support full mobilization. Also, the United States Army maintains limited regulation to support Army expansion for full and total mobilization but lacks the doctrine to build divisions for mobilization.

First articulated to his staff in November 2021, the Commander of the United States Army Special Operations Command, Lieutenant General Jonathan Braga envisioned a new deterrence mechanism, one in which the space, cyber, and special operations communities have symbiotic relationships to converge effects throughout the competition continuum. As a homage to the nuclear Triad, this Special Operations Forces-Cyberspace-Space Triad would provide policy makers additional options to campaign against our adversaries. While the Triad has made substantial headway, no existing literature delineates the nexus of the SOF-Space relationship. Doctrine is quick to point out that SOF receives effects from space, but only a few student theses and authors tangentially describe how SOF can create effects in the space domain. In this study, the author elucidates the SOF-Space segment of the Triad, and recommends that SOF conduct preparation of the environment, special reconnaissance, and military information support operations to set the conditions to influence, deceive, or degrade adversarial, terrestrial-based, space-enabling infrastructure.

A small team of field grade officers assigned to the Army Air Forces Air War Plans Division drafted two documents, AWPD/1 and AWPD/42, in August 1941 and September 1942, respectively, which translated the doctrine of unescorted, high-altitude precision daylight bombing into practice as the air service's strategic plans for World War II. Their challenges provide a case study of the dynamics of strategic planning for great power conflict during periods of doctrinal innovation involving new warfare domains. This thesis analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the Air War Plans Division officers through an evaluation of their shared intellectual heritage, how well they nested their planning within available strategic guidance, the soundness of the methodologies they employed for targeting and production estimates, and the extent to which they adapted in light of British, German, and the Army Air Force's own limited combat experiences. While the officers aligned the documents to the available strategic direction, their planning deficiencies resulted in a near catastrophe for the Eighth Air Force. The plans resulted from an insular intellectual culture that proved unable to evaluate the interdependencies between fundamental assumptions and was captive to Army Air Force institutional desires for independence. Moreover, their flawed use of data, mirror imaging, confirmation bias, and under-appreciation for adversary adaptation induced critical flaws. The planners' experiences suggest caution and humility for American military practitioners as many of the same tendencies remain in joint service cultures.

The Trinidad and Tobago Defence Force (TTDF) and Trinidad and Tobago Regiment (TTR) face several challenges impacting their ability to conduct operations. As one of the larger regional forces, there is an urgent need to improve local capacity and the ability to operate within the Caribbean and the wider Western Hemisphere. The TTDF is tasked to defend the sovereign good of Trinidad and Tobago, conduct search and rescue, border protection, and Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, as well as assist in Aid to the Civil Power operations. As a Caribbean Community member, the TTDF also conducts regional Internal Security and HADR operations in other states; however, these missions are affected by personnel and resource shortages, lack of organization and policy, poor internal administration, and a lack of continuity. This research examines the TTDF, specifically focusing on the TTR, and compares it to other forces successfully performing similar roles to determine the adjustments needed to build a Force capable of successfully executing local, regional, and international missions.

Strategic competitors have significantly increased their influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in ways that jeopardize US influence and threaten democratic governance. The People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia do this by exploiting the ambiguity of gray zone activities, such as predatory, opaque lending practices and the spreading of disinformation. US Forces, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) builds resiliency against these gray zone activities through transparency, which it promotes through cooperation activities to strengthen partnerships and build trust in LAC. SOUTHCOM accomplished this, in part, through Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force – Southern Command (SPMAGTF-SC), whose mission was to conduct mutually beneficial engagements with partner nations (PN) to address shared challenges in the region. SPMAGTF-SC 15, 16, and 17 were US-only task forces. SPMAGTF-SC 18, however, became the first multinational task. SPMAGTF-SC 19 grew on this by integrating ten PN officers from Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Belize, and the Dominican Republic. The author found that integrating PN officers into SPMAGTF-SC 18 and 19 exponentially strengthened partnerships in LAC at a relatively insignificant cost. This paper examines the degree to which integrating PN officers into SPMAGTF-SC 18 and 19 strengthened partnerships, and then compares those findings with theories on narrative and culture. In conclusion, the author presents the concept of a shared regional narrative and illuminates asymmetric characteristics of strategic competition in LAC.

The operational environment (OE) is increasingly congested and contested across all domains as emerging technologies mature, competition for resources intensifies, and networks proliferate. Despite the growth of complex relationships and interdependencies across the globe, intelligence professionals continue to rely on linear processes and frameworks to assess the OE. Due to the intricate connections among state and non-state actors, inaccurate assessments, or a failure to account for cascading effects presents strategic, operational, and tactical risks. This study analyzes shortcomings in current Army doctrine and how adjusting processes and frameworks can better account for complex networks and the rapid tempo of change in the OE. As the Joint Force seeks relative advantages to shape the environment in support of national objectives, it must advance its cognitive and functional ability to understand, visualize, and describe complex environments. Incorporating sensemaking into IPB allows intelligence professionals to better account for surprises and can strengthen the validity of intelligence assessments.

This monograph examines the concept of operational risk through the lens of readiness. Joint and Army doctrines do not provide a succinct definition of operational risk but do indirectly caution planners to consider readiness as a factor when planning at the operational level of war. The monograph considers readiness through the lens of doctrine, equipment, and training and applies the framework to three case studies to demonstrate the relevance of readiness to operational risk. Each case study explores operational risk by analyzing unit readiness. The 24th Infantry Division's delaying actions in the Korean War represent a situation where doctrine, equipment, and training readiness did not support operations. Next, the 1st Cavalry Division's (airmobile) operations within the Pleiku Campaign demonstrate an organization that ignored its doctrine and produced unintended consequences. Finally, the 18th Airborne Corps' actions within Operation Desert Storm reflect the efforts of a twenty-year modernization program that aligned all three factors and subsequently reduced operational risk. This analysis is relevant today as Army planners adapt to increasingly complex operational environments and modernization efforts impacting readiness.

The introduction of the railroad into military operations in the mid-nineteenth century allowed armies to maneuver and extend operations in locations that previously would have been inaccessible to large formations of soldiers. The United States' prosecution of the Civil War set the standard for using this new technology to support operations. Other nations observed the American example, including Prussia, which also had substantial rail assets and a strategic capability gap that locomotives could fulfill. This thesis examined three campaigns of the mid-nineteenth century, the U.S. capture of Atlanta in 1864, the Prussian invasion of Bohemia in 1866, and the Prussian invasion of France in 1870. These three case studies illustrated that the U.S. Army's experiences in the Civil War offered valuable lessons in using railroads that could have addressed strategic risks assumed by Prussia in the prosecution of its wars with Austria and France. However, differences in geography, limitations in time, lack of experience, and divergent approaches to war meant that Prussia only appreciated and absorbed those lessons in part and resorted to past expedients rather than full adoption of the American model.

As the US Army solidifies the Multi-Domain Operations concept, it is essential to keep leadership development relevant towards the future operational environment. Near-peer adversaries will continue to compete below the threshold of conflict increasing complexity and uncertainty in multi-domain operations. While it is common to evaluate the Army Leadership Requirements Model, how can the Army leaders build upon core attributes and competencies to thrive in multi-domain operations? The Army Leadership Requirements Model, combined with developing a multi-domain mentality, enables effective leadership in multi-domain operations. The theoretical approach expands on the leadership core competencies and attributes, providing three additional leadership characteristics. The ability to anticipate near-peer actions, leverage available capabilities and people, and persevere through complexity and uncertainty formulate a multi-domain mentality. By implementing a multi-domain mentality through education and training, Army leaders will be effective against near-peer adversaries in multi-domain operations.

As the United States enters a new era of strategic competition, it must effectively use all of its tools to successfully apply the instruments of national power for successful competition against rising and resurgent world powers. Unfortunately, the United States has historically not used one of its most flexible tools, US Coast Guard Cutters (USCGC), to their full extent. Following the Second World War, the potential value of cutter operations outside of US waters was often ignored or, at best, only recognized in reaction to a national crisis. Case studies involving cutter operations during the Vietnam Conflict (1965-1975), in the European Theater (1995-2008), and the Arabian Gulf (2002-2016) illustrate views towards overseas cutter operations by the US, the impact of cutter operations on US foreign policies, and the value of proactive planning for the overseas use of cutters. Implications of the case studies and analysis of major strategic competitors offer potential US methods and insights regarding future USCGC employment to increase US competitiveness in the twenty-first century.

The Joint Force has acknowledged that despite regular operational and tactical victories, enduring US strategic successes have remained mostly elusive. These shortcomings have been partially attributed to an emphasis on the physical destruction of enemy means as the primary goal for military operations rather than the will to use these means. In response, the US military has placed new importance on the potential for affecting the most basic underlying motivation for adversaries to reconstitute and fight. This monograph seeks to answer the question on how psychological factors have been incorporated as a part of military strategy through an exploration of the concept of psychological warfare. It challenges the assumption that psychological warfare is analogous to Military Information Support Operations (MISO) as an information support mechanism. This monograph therefore reinterprets psychological warfare based on the historical accounts of psychological factors in theories, strategies, policy, and doctrine. It shows that war is composed of more than the physical aspects of battle and that the psychological components are just as, if not more, important in war. This monograph proposes that psychological warfare is instead an approach to wage war with morale and will as drivers for operations outside of the information domain.

The Brazilian Army has been working closely with civilian agencies since the end of the United Nations Mission for Stabilization in Haiti in 2017. The Army has conducted several kinds of Interagency Operations, enabling it to develop capabilities such as doctrine, organization, training, education, and personnel. This study analyzes how the Brazilian Army has improved its capabilities to interact with civilian partners in Interagency Operations to carry out its constitutional missions. Understanding the civilian perspective and international organizations and relevant nations helps us see how important both components' integration is. Using the lessons learned in Haiti and Operation Acolhida as a case study, it specifically examines if the Brazilian Army has improved its capabilities and if they have contributed to the Army to be successful. The analysis demonstrates that the Brazilian Army has leveraged experience in MINUSTAH and Operation Acolhida to improve its capabilities related to civil-military interaction in the Interagency Operations context through the DOTMLPF lens because of the presented pieces of evidence.

In 2019, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, outlined Russia's concept of Active Defense. The new doctrine asserts that Russia should attempt to draw an opposing force into an offense against Russia. Russia will employ fires and other assets to disaggregate the attack and then defeat it with a counterattack. General Gerasimov believes this is a new approach to Russian warfare, however there are several examples throughout Russia' military history of attempts at such an approach. Historically, the Russian military has struggled to implement this complex strategy due to gaps between the intent of the commanding officer and the ability of his troops and staff to realize that intent. Military planners can exploit these gaps and transform them into vulnerabilities to defeat the Russian doctrine of Active Defense.

Doctrine in the United States Army enjoys a tortured existence. While it may be the "heart of everything we do as an Army," doctrine occupies a space for scorn and derision by its end users if its ineffective. Some commonly adopted views about US Army doctrine production and revision indicate that doctrine is something that happens in isolation, something that comes from "the leather chair in the front office," or is written by "English majors with no military experience." However, such views diminish doctrine's true form: a knowledge production system. In this system, various knowledge nodes including individual leaders connect with each other through formal, semi-formal, and informal means to bring about doctrinal revision. Since the end of the Vietnam, knowledge nodes have taken new forms and new interfaces with doctrine writers. This monograph explores the nature of these knowledge networks through three different case studies beginning in 1973 and ending in the present day. The case studies yield the conclusions that doctrine is an open system where its end users can improve it, and that its end users have a professional responsibility to improve doctrine even if they fall outside the formalized doctrinal production hierarchy. Additionally, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command should seek methods to improve the doctrinal discourse by making their revision process more transparent and accessible.

The Marine Corps' Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) highlights potential challenges for mortuary affairs. Because EABO mortuary affairs requirements are not defined anywhere, this monograph first determines what they are by exploring the major Department of Defense issuances governing mortuary affairs and the EABO characteristics of stand-in forces, mobility, persistence, low signature, and integrated naval force. The resulting requirements are examined against current Marine Corps doctrine, organization, training, and personnel aspects of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and communication, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) framework. This study ultimately reveals that mortuary affairs in the Marine Corps is currently resourced almost entirely as a combat service support subfunction of logistics, conducted by the Marine logistics group (MLG) in support of the Marine air-ground task force. Few DOTMLPF-P resources are directed towards any aspects of mortuary affairs outside of the MLG and their single mortuary affairs unit, Personnel Retrieval and Processing (PRP) Company. The Marine Corps' current paradigm fails to recognize and adequately resource mortuary affairs as an integrated process, fundamentally dependent upon actions at the units where the casualties occur and requiring staff planning and coordination across all levels of command. DOTMLPF-P resources must be rebalanced, with the view that PRP Company is a specialized and intermediate capability that complements and supports the broader mortuary affairs process, whose success begins with the plans and actions of the supported force.

Over the past three decades, the United States took advantage of advanced technological systems against enemies that do not have the capabilities to deter them. The success of the United States systems led the Army to focus on increased development and commitment to digital systems to increase speed and lethality. That focus also led to the atrophy of manual capabilities and skills. Current potential enemies of the United States possess the technology and capabilities to deny, degrade, and disrupt digital systems across the battlefield. The emergence of electronic and cyber warfare in the Russo-Ukraine conflict demonstrates the capabilities to locate and destroy field artillery systems reliant on digital systems to operate. The monograph examines how to prepare a Field Artillery Paladin battery to prevail in a denied, degraded, disrupted space operating environment (D3SOE). The DOTMLPF-P framework is used to analyze the current issues within doctrine, leader development, and training. Training solely on digital systems caused the manual skill sets required to operate in a D3SOE to perish. Currently, a field artillery Paladin battery is not trained and does not have the appropriate skills or equipment (FDC) to successfully operate in a degraded operational environment. To overcome these challenges, doctrine must incorporate Paladins operating in a D3SOE, professional military education (PME) should increase the emphasis on manual or degraded operations and update current training requirements to account for D3SOE in training certifications and qualifications. Paladin units must also incorporate manual fire mission training into the deliberate training plan to regain and master these skills which are essential for the Paladin battery to survive and provide fire support within a D3SOE.

This monograph explores the hypothesis that a dogmatic focus on tactics inhibits the commander's understanding in the context of a more information-centric, cognitive operational environment and prevents the development of an internally coherent and externally relevant operational approach. It seeks to understand the cognitive limitations of the current paradigm, to propose that it risks relevancy in competition, and to demonstrate the importance of thinking beyond the point of contact within the contemporary context. This monograph is divided into three sections, the first of which seeks to understand the origin of the current paradigm and its internal logic. The second section seeks to demonstrate the limitations of the current paradigm within a contemporary context and the resulting risk to external relevance. The third section considers a need to adapt the US Army's mode of thinking to re-establish equilibrium between theory, doctrine, practical experience, and context to create a context-based paradigm.

The US Army has an information systems data gap, caused by the inability to automate equipment sensory data, and compounded by a fundamental misunderstanding of what information the commander needs to make decisions in time and space. How can we integrate logistics data into the common operating picture (COP) to achieve sustainment convergence in multi-domain operations (MDO)? Commanders, through their staffs, share their understanding of the COP with subordinate and higher commands to facilitate synchronization and parallel planning. Staffs incorporate PowerPoint presentations, charts, and graphs to build analog and digital imagery overlays in parallel to share the commander's visualization. The commander's visualization must modernize to include key data provided by logistics to address the missing elements of operational art as the US Army continues to employ emerging technologies. The sustainment warfighting function provides the capability to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. However, these three sustainment objectives are achieved only if the mission command system enables the commander to see relevant information on sustainment capability. Resolving this issue requires identification and elimination of the problematic information gaps with respect to the time and manpower it takes to get readiness, fuel, and ammunition data from the tactical edge.

In the last century, the role of the National Guard has increased when supporting civil authorities. During this time, successful units applied operational art for large-scale (company-sized or larger) activations of the National Guard in support of civil authorities during civil unrest. Although typical activations may not have a defined strategy, National Guard and civilian planners apply operational art through contingency planning and the adaptation of joint operations' principles while identifying effectiveness measures within lines of effort. These measures of effectiveness help to determine when the National Guard is hurting the situation more than it helps quell the civil unrest. Case studies of the campus unrest at Kent State University, the Los Angeles Riots, and the 2020 Minneapolis, Minnesota riots assist in identifying how operational art played a positive and negative role. Regardless of the size of activation, National Guard leaders can learn to apply operational art to achieve the desired future state quickly by accepting missions that release law enforcement to police the streets.

This monograph reexamines the principle of surprise and its priority in US military doctrine. The principle of surprise has been discussed by military theorists for centuries but changes in the operational environment have impacted how cultures approach achieving surprise and dedicating resources for deception. Current US Army doctrine subordinates surprise to other principles of war largely due to its conceptual approach to military conflict thereby limiting the imagination of military planners. History provides significant examples of what surprise can achieve at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war often achieving greater results with less resources. As the United States continues to compete with global powers, a focus on surprise forces planners to enter the cognitive space of the adversary and thus facilitates the design of operations that are relevant to the operational environment.

Intelligence dissemination and battle damage assessments are critical components of success during large-scale combat operations. This monograph studied the First Gulf War in 1990-1991 to determine what did and did not work with intelligence dissemination and damage assessments at the operational level. During Operation Desert Shield, intelligence dissemination overcame manning deficiencies, interoperability problems, and a lack of communications architecture. During the war of maneuver in Operation Desert Storm, a lack of communications architecture hampered communication. Battle damage reporting was inaccurate because the Army lacked doctrine and an effective method to measure appropriately. Failure to understand and correct the deficiencies from the First Gulf War could lead to further problems in the immediate environment.

Since 2010, US Marine Corps and Navy leadership have updated strategy, operating concepts, and force design guidance to reflect the challenges of the modern operating environment characterized by a return to great power competition. These capstone documents have identified the need for deception to gain an advantage over an adversary and increase the survivability of forces in conflict. This monograph identifies recommendations for improvements in the planning and execution of military deception operations by conducting an analysis of military and deception theory, service guidance, doctrine, and historical case studies. The historical case studies include the US Marines' deception operations in support of the Bougainville amphibious assault in 1942 and the British campaign to retake the Falkland Islands in 1982. These case studies share many similarities with the new US Marine Corps operating concepts focused on expeditionary operations against a peer adversary in a contested littoral environment. Research and analysis led to the identification of five recommendations for the Marine Corps to improve its use of military deception. The recommendations are informed by the case study analysis and draw heavily from the theories of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, Colonel John Boyd, and Barton Whaley. The central theme of the recommendations is a focus on the development of cognitive skills over technological capability. Improving the Marine Corps' education and training to develop the creative and critical thinking skills necessary to effectively understand an adversary and craft a deception plan that achieves the desired objective at the lowest cost in resources.

In the air domain of warfare, adversary capabilities have dramatically increased due to lessons learned from US dominance in the air in 2003. As threat capabilities have increased in range, sophistication, command and control, and their ability to defeat or disrupt US ground maneuver, two significant gaps emerged. The first gap, the growth in adversary capabilities, is being addressed by the reintroduction of M-SHORAD Battalions with greater capability that SHORAD battalions from before the divestiture in 2003-2005. The other divide is how the US army air defense branch should conduct positive and procedural control of air defense fires to bridge the gap between division and EAC air defense units to support theater integrated air and missile defense while developing AMD officers to meet a diverse set of missions. This paper will provide a historical analysis covering US army capabilities and adversary capabilities from 2003 to today using OIF in 2003 as our focal point. We will then focus on the doctrine separating HIMAD and SHORAD perspectives and their recommended changes to facilitate integration. We will then look at some of the cultural issues that historically have divided the ADA branch and recommendations for talent management.

This monograph analyzes the Army's training and holistic health and fitness doctrine, as well as enterprise level leaders' major objectives for the new ReARMM cycle: eliminating sexual misconduct, suicide, discrimination, and extremism; building multidomain capacity and capability; and remaining responsive to competition, crisis, conflict, and change. It identifies opportunities to apply doctrinally compatible gamification concepts to meet senior leaders' intent. The monograph first discusses how the Army defines and measures readiness, and the doctrine associated with generating training readiness and holistic health and fitness. It then provides a historical context for the current period of comprehensive modernization by reviewing lessons the Army learned during its last major modernization effort in the 1970s and 1980s. Next, the monograph explores Self Determination Theory (SDT) and Gamification, discussing the key concepts of each theory and describing relevant findings on their efficacy. This research suggests that incorporating the tenants of SDT into training and holistic health and fitness doctrine, and training leaders, especially junior noncommissioned officers, to foster need-supportive environments will better enable Army organizations to meet senior leaders' objectives. Furthermore, developing a mobile and web-based application would provide the Army with an intuitive environment for digital natives to give and receive need-supportive feedback, manage workflows, track readiness, and more.

A recent, and underappreciated, development is occurring in the space domain with the ability of Malicious Non-State Actors (MNSA) to harness space-based capabilities to conduct operations. MNSA uses technologies such as Satellite Communication (SATCOM) and the Global Position System (GPS) to increase their operational reach by using the space domain to link small operations across multiple domains. The use of space for warfighting has been the traditional realm of powerful nation-states such as the United States. This monograph investigates how current US spacepower concepts and doctrine is insufficient to respond to MNSA using space-enabled capabilities. The advent of MNSA use of space requires a shift in American operational and doctrinal thinking of what or who constitutes a spacepower. MNSA such as Lebanese Hezbollah, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have demonstrated an ability to adopt space capabilities to conduct operations to achieve their organizational goals. The examples of Hezbollah, LeT, and ISIS, when compared to current US spacepower concepts and doctrine, shows a gap in the current spacepower theory paradigm. This gap in thinking suggests that a change is needed in current US doctrine and concepts to better prepare for the emergence of new hostile space powers.

India has a large number of varied types of Special Forces (SF) units. In the absence of a centralized organization for command and control, these units are not employed to optimally exploit their potential. This study proposed a reorganization of SF in India with the overall aim of elevating the status of SF by placing it at the right level of chain of command. The author utilized qualitative research methodology and studied the special operations command structures of USA, Russia, and China to understand how these countries organize their SF. The analysis revealed that India cannot singularly follow any of these countries and lessons can be learnt from all three organizations. The most important recommendation is the creation of a functional tri services Indian Special Operations Command (ISOC). ISOC will be the sole organization responsible for executing special operation missions in support of national and theater strategic objectives. It will have service like authorities and responsibilities and will be responsible for training and administration of Indian Special Operations Forces.

Ronald Reagan's Star Wars speech on 23 March 1983, announced to the world the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) where an umbrella technology would protect the United States from Intercontinental and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles. SDI has evolved into the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense wherein the U.S. Navy, Army, and Air Force have key architectures and missile defense capabilities. With U.S. personnel stationed in 160 countries throughout the world, it is imperative for an integrated missile defense system to counter the ballistic missiles from theater to global ranges to maximize the defense of the United States and her allies. In the fiscally constrained Department of Defense, these high-demand yet low-density extremely expensive systems must be joint and integrated where possible to maximize their contribution to national defense. This study provides a qualitative DOTMLPF-based analysis of what gaps exist within Ballistic Missile Defense, which are causing limited joint integration.

The Canadian Army acknowledges the importance of Artificial Intelligence in its modernization strategy. Still, it lacks focus on what functions of AI need to be pursued in the short, mid, and long-term. Focus is particularly critical to the Canadian Army as it has more limited human and financial resources to invest in research than its main ally and adversaries. Therefore, prioritization is needed for research and investments to ensure the Canadian Armed Forces and Canada's Army do not fall behind. This study examines various promising applications of artificial intelligence, reviews the Canadian Army modernization strategies, and investigates what Canada's main ally and adversaries are currently focusing on to make practical recommendations for decision-makers and staff working on modernization. Using a ranking system to predict the ability to impact the Canadian Army operations, the conclusions recommend pursuing nine specific AI-enabled applications for land warfare and offer recommendations for operationalizing artificial intelligence within the next 15 years. Ultimately, this study is relevant for any military professionals, Defence team members, and researchers interested in the potential applications of AI and ML in land warfare.

This thesis examines differences between the command philosophies of the British and American armies in the light of the Anglo-American interoperability agenda, identifying points of difference between the philosophies and implications for interoperability. Both British and American armies adopted the German command philosophy of Auftragstaktik in establishing their own philosophies of mission command. Using the principles of Auftragstaktik as a lens, a doctrinal comparison of the two armies identifies several differences between the command philosophies, notably in their understanding of intent, approach to decision-making, and attitude to delegation. The result is that British subordinates have more freedom of action than their American counterparts. Through an examination of the military culture of the British and American armies, it is determined that the difference in command philosophy was driven by cultural differences; each command philosophy is a reflection and representation of its army's national military culture, and it is not possible to simply change doctrine without an concomitant cultural change. While it is possible to mitigate tensions in interoperability through an awareness of the other's differences, and by a degree of compromise, full interoperability could not be achieved without considerably greater alignment of both doctrine and culture.

This thesis explores the puzzling history of Army information operations in order to understand why an enduring information doctrine has proven so elusive. It argues that Army information doctrine evolved in three phases, each of which corresponded to a unique set of strategic, organizational, and technological challenges. Internal organizational dynamics, rather than external strategic coherence, served as the primary determinant of an information doctrine's success or failure at any given point in history. Future information doctrine, to include future iterations of the current draft ADP 3-13, must address the Army's central strategic challenge in a way that acknowledges the complexity of the Army's organizational interests, and it must do so via a concept whose demonstrated effectiveness is visible, measurable, and compelling.

The U.S. Army's Multi-Domain Operations operating concept is meant to solve the problem of anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) threats posed by peer adversaries. The primary means of defeating these threats is the Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), but the MDTF has potential beyond penetrating A2/AD spaces. This is significant amid the ongoing debate about the U.S. Army's role in the Indo-Pacific. This study examines the capabilities of the MDTF and how it can contribute to the Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific by using a reverse version of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process. This process analyzes MDTF's capabilities based on requirements documents, determines the potential gaps those capabilities can fill, examines how the MDTF can fill those gaps at three key locations in the Indo-Pacific. This study demonstrates that the MDTF has a unique and flexible mix of capabilities that allow it to perform multiple tasks beyond penetrating enemy A2/AD spaces. These include generating its own A2/AD space to serving as a deterrent to enemy escalation and assisting in maintaining operational access for follow-on forces. The MDTF can also isolate enemy forces and delay or disrupt enemy movements and massing of forces, while providing early warning and targeting information. This enables the MDTF to contribute to Joint Force operations in the Indo-Pacific across all phases of competition and conflict if used to its full potential.

Global climate change is increasing access to previously closed sea lanes and land masses to exploitation by interested countries. Increasing challenges in the Arctic from countries like the Russian Federation and People's Republic of China threaten stability and access in the Arctic. The US commitment to presenting a credible military deterrence in the Arctic demands an Arctic capable force that can operate in a variety of Arctic conditions, including Arctic islands. The Aleutian Islands Campaign as a case study, can provide examples, lessons, and insights into sustaining modern Arctic operations.

Combat operations in the Pacific Theater during World War II presented unique challenges to the United States Marine Corps. The complexity of routing Japanese forces from the many, and heavily defended, islands of the Western Pacific required a specialized force trained and equipped in the employment of amphibious operations. However, existing amphibious doctrine developed between the 1920s and 1930s failed to fully address the evolving tactics of island defense employed by the Japanese Imperial Army. Additionally, amphibious doctrine lagged behind in light of new advancements in equipment such as the fielding of the M4 median tank (Sherman). The Sherman had seen little action in the Pacific up to 1944, but was fielded at a critical time when Japanese island defense tactics had significantly matured. The amphibious assaults of 1944 and 1945 were much different than the unopposed landings in earlier years. Moreover, the Marine crews who served on the Sherman faced additional challenges as they adjusted from operating the M2/3 light tank (Stewart) to the heavier M4. Although most commonly studied and debated for its strategic significance, the battle of Peleliu offers a unique examination of the employment of the M4 Sherman tank in relation to the challenges of amphibious operations and Japanese island defense tactics.

While the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942 were eventually successful, the lack of preparation before World War II for amphibious operations prolonged Operation Torch longer than was necessary. Between the Spanish American War and the outbreak of World War II, the United States military advanced its doctrine, training, organization, and equipment, but failed to apply sufficient emphasis on sustainment support to project large mechanized forces over the shore. During the 1920s and 1930s the Army, the Navy, and the Marine Corps conducted training, many times jointly, but did not resource the exercises to an adequate scale to validate doctrine, support organizations, and equipment to sustain the force. Neglecting to integrate these factors together before the war led to rushed and incomplete advancements during mobilization in early 1942 and limited the operational reach of the United States military during Operation Torch.

The United States is returning to a strategy of great power competition against rising and revisionist states. As the executive produces strategic guidance and initiatives movement across the whole of government, departments and agencies must determine how best to apply their means in an integrated fashion to achieve the directed ends. The joint force is still developing concepts and terms to address great power rivalry while competing through integrated campaigning. The existing doctrine and capabilities are suitable for employment in competition against adversaries, but there are no models that adequately depict actions below the threshold of armed conflict. This thesis identifies relevant aspects of great power rivalry and models them as a competitive wargame. Critical elements of U.S. and Chinese strategies are discussed at length to identify current methods of implementation and fundamental aspects of competition. Modeling techniques are detailed so they can be replicated and proofed by other wargame designers. Although this model has achieved a modicum of success in the current international security environment, it will need to be revisited and updated to remain relevant as actors modify the means and ways of competition.

In February 1991, the U.S. VII Corps conducted the "Hail Mary" flank attack against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command. During the operation, the 1st Infantry Division and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment conducted both a deliberate and hasty passage of lines. A passage of lines is a complex operation to allow commanders to maintain or regain the tempo of an operation. The 1st Infantry Division breached an Iraqi obstacle belt established lanes and passed the 1st Armored Division from the United Kingdom to their objectives. Once complete with the deliberate passage, the 1st ID moved 130 kilometers to meet with and pass through the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment amidst the Battle of 73 Easting. The sequence of events occurred in an environment with just under six hours to plan with little knowledge of the Iraqi disposition. The U.S. Army modernized the force, developed proficiency with doctrine, and developed proactive leaders which set conditions for the 1st ID and 2 ACR's success in complex operations during Desert Storm.