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What is missing in our understanding of the stagnation and/or regression in the Europeanisation of the Western Balkan candidate countries? The current paper aims to present a conceptual novelty, coined as 'state-captured Europeanisation', which is based on rational choice institutionalism (RCI). The proposed alternative concept traces its origins to the literature on state capture and the episodes observed in the Western Balkan (WB) countries through state capture assessment diagnostics (SCAD). Designed as an article, this paper offers an in-depth literature review of the main concepts surrounding Europeanisation and state capture. It examines corruption from the perspective of the literature on rational choice institutionalism. In this theoretically inclined research paper, the references to the Western Balkans reveal a resistance to Europeanisation. In fact, Europeanisation in the WB countries can be, and has been, hijacked or manipulated by vested interests within the state apparatuses, resulting in what we have termed as 'state-captured Europeanisation'. State capture can be described as an evolutionary institutionalisation of corruption relations. Adapting the conceptualisation that explains how Europeanisation is seized by an illegitimate monopoly on the governance and economy of the countries on track to EU accession, the paper builds on the literature that explored the rationale behind the institutionalisation of corruption to advance an additional view about the effects of state capture on Europeanisation. The methodological framework used is that of rational choice institutionalism, focused on unveiling the causes of stabilitocracy, stagnation, and regression in Europeanisation. To contrive arguments and identify the episodes of state-captured Europeanisation, the article uses SCAD, bringing into the spotlight several instances in which political elites, bureaucratic agencies, and interest groups have acted as driving forces for mimicking Europeanisation (with examples from Serbia between 2007 and 2018). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is missing in our understanding of the stagnation and/or regression in the Europeanisation of the Western Balkan candidate countries? The current paper aims to present a conceptual novelty, coined as ‘state-captured Europeanisation’, which is based on rational choice institutionalism (RCI). The proposed alternative concept traces its origins to the literature on state capture and the episodes observed in the Western Balkan (WB) countries through state capture assessment diagnostics (SCAD). Designed as an article, this paper offers an in-depth literature review of the main concepts surrounding Europeanisation and state capture. It examines corruption from the perspective of the literature on rational choice institutionalism. In this theoretically inclined research paper, the references to the Western Balkans reveal a resistance to Europeanisation. In fact, Europeanisation in the WB countries can be, and has been, hijacked or manipulated by vested interests within the state apparatuses, resulting in what we have termed as ‘state-captured Europeanisation’. State capture can be described as an evolutionary institutionalisation of corruption relations. Adapting the conceptualisation that explains how Europeanisation is seized by an illegitimate monopoly on the governance and economy of the countries on track to EU accession, the paper builds on the literature that explored the rationale behind the institutionalisation of corruption to advance an additional view about the effects of state capture on Europeanisation. The methodological framework used is that of rational choice institutionalism, focused on unveiling the causes of stabilitocracy, stagnation, and regression in Europeanisation. To contrive arguments and identify the episodes of state-captured Europeanisation, the article uses SCAD, bringing into the spotlight several instances in which political elites, bureaucratic agencies, and interest groups have acted as driving forces for mimicking Europeanisation (with examples from Serbia between 2007 and 2018).

Based on current paradigmatic, programmatic and operational changes, which oversee how global systems were transformed through inter-actor dynamics and systemic rifts, we can underline the necessity for an in-depth comprehension of the political and economic interactions between regional actors, especially within CEE and the EU’s Neighbouring areas. Thus, as the present paper seeks to address this knowledge hiatus found in the field, there is an extrapolation and interpretation of the Visegrád Group’s (V4) collaborative and cooperative patterns during the last full presidential cycle (Slovak Republic – 2018 to Slovak Republic – 2023). As such, this analysis is aimed at deciphering some of the ways used by the V4 to employ economic measures, as part of collective or individual foreign policy approaches, to further enhance Western Balkan partners’ European trajectories and regional integratory processes, alongside their respective geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. When it comes to the methods utilised in this study, the primary and secondary questions are answered through an extensive collection, selection, and inspection of data produced throughout the V4 presidencies, including: official statements and papers (V4 memorandums, meeting minutes, declarations during the Balkan Forum, official statistics, etc.), specialist literature (academic articles and books, policy analysis, etc.) or related sources (expert groups, op-eds, think-tank reports, etc.). Based on these procedures and forthcoming findings, we can highlight a noticeable increase in the constant economic flows both between the V4 - WB6 (Western Balkans 6) corridor per se and amongst their members, although collective efforts remain highly volatile due to variations in chairmanship. Moreover, the presidencies’ core priorities towards the WB6 seem to follow the general continental pivot regarding the area, with several larger initiatives being spearheaded to optimise interconnectedness between both regions, especially in complementarity with other EU and pan-European projects (e.g., EUSDR, EaP, 3SI, B9). Assuming that the socio-cultural and economic contexts amongst V4 countries are historically close, it is possible to underline that their political environment allows for shared foreign policies to be created, particularly when it comes to enhancing well-founded neighbourhood relations, expanding towards other spheres of interest or assisting non-EU partners in their transition period (driven by their own development processes and good practices).

Based on current paradigmatic, programmatic and operational changes, which oversee how global systems were transformed through inter-actor dynamics and systemic rifts, we can underline the necessity for an in-depth comprehension of the political and economic interactions between regional actors, especially within CEE and the EU's Neighbouring areas. Thus, as the present paper seeks to address this knowledge hiatus found in the field, there is an extrapolation and interpretation of the Visegrád Group's (V4) collaborative and cooperative patterns during the last full presidential cycle (Slovak Republic - 2018 to Slovak Republic - 2023). As such, this analysis is aimed at deciphering some of the ways used by the V4 to employ economic measures, as part of collective or individual foreign policy approaches, to further enhance Western Balkan partners' European trajectories and regional integratory processes, alongside their respective geostrategic and geoeconomic interests. When it comes to the methods utilised in this study, the primary and secondary questions are answered through an extensive collection, selection, and inspection of data produced throughout the V4 presidencies, including: official statements and papers (V4 memorandums, meeting minutes, declarations during the Balkan Forum, official statistics, etc.), specialist literature (academic articles and books, policy analysis, etc.) or related sources (expert groups, op-eds, think-tank reports, etc.). Based on these procedures and forthcoming findings, we can highlight a noticeable increase in the constant economic flows both between the V4 - WB6 (Western Balkans 6) corridor per se and amongst their members, although collective efforts remain highly volatile due to variations in chairmanship. Moreover, the presidencies' core priorities towards the WB6 seem to follow the general continental pivot regarding the area, with several larger initiatives being spearheaded to optimise interconnectedness between both regions, especially in complementarity with other EU and pan-European projects (e.g., EUSDR, EaP, 3SI, B9). Assuming that the socio-cultural and economic contexts amongst V4 countries are historically close, it is possible to underline that their political environment allows for shared foreign policies to be created, particularly when it comes to enhancing well-founded neighbourhood relations, expanding towards other spheres of interest or assisting non-EU partners in their transition period (driven by their own development processes and good practices). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although China attempts to present itself as a leader of the fight against climate change – and, in some aspects, is taking initiative in this respect – through the Belt and Road Initiative the country has lent support to many ‘dirty’ projects in the energy infrastructure sector. This is also the case in the Western Balkans, where Chinese banks and energy companies have invested in coal power plants. Western Balkan countries need to improve their energy infrastructure and build new capacities. An obvious solution to this issue is the extension of their coal mines and plants, but this comes with complications. They do not have the capital to invest in these projects themselves, and international monetary institutions do not support these types of investments. In contrast to this, China can offer soft loans and expertise to realise the projects. Although many of the projects that Chinese banks have invested (or intend to invest) in are delayed or only in the planning phase, it seems that some of them can be realised despite the resistance of the Energy Community and various environmentalist groups.

The aim of the paper is to investigate if the Western Balkan countries converge towards the new Member States of the European Union, the EU-13. The analysis is focused on beta convergence, defined as a tendency of poor countries to grow faster than rich countries. The analysed period is 2004-2017, with two sub-periods; 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. The subdivision is made in order to test the research hypotheses that the recent financial crisis negatively affected the absolute and conditional convergence process of the Western Balkans towards the EU-13. The relationships between per capita GDP growth rate and selected macroeconomic variables are econometrically tested and the empirical results support the convergence hypothesis. The convergence rates range 1.3%-3.6%. The negative effects of the crisis on convergence are not confirmed, i.e., the convergence rates during the crisis period are the highest among the analysed periods. The poorer countries should open their economies and maintain stable inflation and debt, as economic openness and inflation have a positive impact on per capita growth in the analysed countries, while general government debt has a negative impact.

In February 2018, the European Union (EU) announced the Strategy for the Western Balkans’ European integration that introduced a new momentum in the conditionality policy, which has the potential to decisively impact the pace and success of enlargement process. That addition to the conditionality policy concerns requirement to settle any open border issues prior to accession to the EU. Thus, this paper is assessing how border disputes could impact the integration processes of countries of the region in the light of the new conditionality. In addition, it will discuss one particular open border dispute in the Western Balkans involving the most advanced candidate country in the accession process (Montenegro) and the youngest member country (Croatia) over the Prevlaka peninsula.

Although China attempts to present itself as a leader of the fight against climate change - and, in some aspects, is taking initiative in this respect - through the Belt and Road Initiative the country has lent support to many 'dirty' projects in the energy infrastructure sector. This is also the case in the Western Balkans, where Chinese banks and energy companies have invested in coal power plants. Western Balkan countries need to improve their energy infrastructure and build new capacities. An obvious solution to this issue is the extension of their coal mines and plants, but this comes with complications. They do not have the capital to invest in these projects themselves, and international monetary institutions do not support these types of investments. In contrast to this, China can offer soft loans and expertise to realise the projects. Although many of the projects that Chinese banks have invested (or intend to invest) in are delayed or only in the planning phase, it seems that some of them can be realised despite the resistance of the Energy Community and various environmentalist groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In February 2018, the European Union (EU) announced the Strategy for the Western Balkans' European integration that introduced a new momentum in the conditionality policy, which has the potential to decisively impact the pace and success of enlargement process. That addition to the conditionality policy concerns requirement to settle any open border issues prior to accession to the EU. Thus, this paper is assessing how border disputes could impact the integration processes of countries of the region in the light of the new conditionality. In addition, it will discuss one particular open border dispute in the Western Balkans involving the most advanced candidate country in the accession process (Montenegro) and the youngest member country (Croatia) over the Prevlaka peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the paper is to investigate if the Western Balkan countries converge towards the new Member States of the European Union, the EU-13. The analysis is focused on beta convergence, defined as a tendency of poor countries to grow faster than rich countries. The analysed period is 2004-2017, with two sub-periods; 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. The subdivision is made in order to test the research hypotheses that the recent financial crisis negatively affected the absolute and conditional convergence process of the Western Balkans towards the EU-13. The relationships between per capita GDP growth rate and selected macroeconomic variables are econometrically tested and the empirical results support the convergence hypothesis. The convergence rates range 1.3%-3.6%. The negative effects of the crisis on convergence are not confirmed, i.e., the convergence rates during the crisis period are the highest among the analysed periods. The poorer countries should open their economies and maintain stable inflation and debt, as economic openness and inflation have a positive impact on per capita growth in the analysed countries, while general government debt has a negative impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Cold War, the Western Balkan countries have become an important laboratory for the EU, able to exert its EU crises management and transformative power. Through restoring stability in the region, overcoming ethno–territorial and inter–ethnic conflicts, improving regional cooperation, consolidating democracy, building democratic institutions and promoting market economy, EU’s goal was to make war unthinkable in this region. Referring to the definition of peacebuilding as ‘action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflicts’, this paper tries to explore whether, how and to what extent, EU has contributed as a peacebuilder in the Western Balkans, using crises management operations and mission and enlargement policy. It argues that both these instruments can be considered equally relevant as, on the one hand they create favourable conditions for lasting peace, security and stability in the region and on the other hand, through enlargement policy they push this region towards political and institutional reform, economic reforms and regional cooperation.

The process of democratization in Western Balkans is connected with the process of state-building before and after the reconstruction. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the region became a brutal battleground as different nation-based groups fought to define the boundaries of a set of new states in the Balkans. One of the key challenges related to the democratization of the Western Balkan countries is resolving the issues with their neighbours. However, political pragmatism and bilateral relations between the countries of the Balkans, including their internal conflicts do not exclude informal alliances, but as a temporary form of exploitation of the current political and security situation or in order to achieve their own national interests. One of the key tools in the achievement of national interests, especially expressed in the Balkan countries is represented by the ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities in the Balkans cannot be overlooked and most of them are seen as a destabilizing factor in the countries in which minorities live. Without overcoming prejudices and differences of the past, the Western Balkans could not continue their independent development. Democratization of the Western Balkans means that improving the peace and coexistence should not be viewed in the past, but in the current process of cooperation. The EU integration process of Western Balkan countries and the democratization process of the region will have to be implemented in the future if the political elites in Western Balkan countries wish to achieve security, stability and prosperity of their societies.

It became a shared opinion among European policy-makers to state that without a serious commitment from the European Union (EU), the Western Balkans (WB) will find itself increasingly isolated from the unfolding developments around it and this may endanger the stability of the entire continent. The scope of this paper is two folded: first, to examine the role of the EU in the WB with a focus on democratic institution-building; second, taking Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) as a case study, the article aims to determine whether there is a need for a new theoretical framework in order to more accurately define the specific process of the Europeanisation in the WB. In this regard it proposes the term “limited Europeanisation”. The main theoretical aim of the article is to identify some clear-cut criteria of this phenomenon in the last 14-year evolution of BiH in relation with the EU.

How can small states contribute to the overall normative power of the European Union (EU)? In this article we assess how much Slovenia, a small EU Member State with limited financial and human resources, contributes to this normative power. We do this by analysing its foreign policy, which consists of three main guiding principles: internationalism, the desire to solve all outstanding issues with its neighbour Croatia, and an attempt to present itself as a bridge between the EU and the Western Balkans. We discover that, while these principles exist on paper, they are often not consistently carried out in practice, which is a symptom of the still-ongoing reorientation of the country’s foreign policy, after successfully joining the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. Slovenian decision makers all too often remain reactive, and prefer to support the initiatives of others. When the country does act on its own initiative, its actions can be seen as too individualistic and uncoordinated, both within its own borders, and with its EU partners, as was the case when Slovenia launched the so-called Brdo Process, aimed at promoting cooperation between countries of former Yugoslavia. The conduct of Slovenian foreign policy is, all too often left, to the initiative and ingenuity of individuals, and such an uncoordinated approach hinders Slovenian efforts to become a normative power and to increase its influence in the Western Balkans. Finally, we argue that Slovenia’s Presidency of the EU Council in 2008 was a unique opportunity to contribute to the EU’s normative power. Slovenia managed to accomplish this only in part; despite the fact that the Presidency was an organisational success, most of its goals was too broadly defined and lacked ambition.

Confronting an increasing EU opposition from a number of influential member states to its membership the AKP government adopted a multilateral approach to its foreign policy making resulting in dynamic economic and diplomatic policies with the countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Balkans region. In this article we analyzed the effects and consequences of a paradigmatic shift in Turkish foreign policy in the Western Balkans in relation to the country's EU membership prospects. Through its pro-active economic and diplomatic initiatives in the region Turkey has been proving itself as indispensable country for the European Union membership. Thus, if the Turkish government concentrates more on solving its internal problems and continues its pro-active diplomacy in Western Balkans, among other regions, it could become not only a regional but also a global power.

The European Union faces unprecedented difficulties in its integration of the Western Balkans in terms of the requirements for change by countries in that region wishing to join. In order to meet this challenge, the EU’s political conditionality has moved significantly beyond its demands made on the post-Communist entrants of 2004 and 2007. But its effort to bridge the gap between the ability or political will of Balkan countries to adapt to European modernisation and uncertainties about EU commitment created by “enlargement fatigue” among Member States is vulnerable to weak consensus on both sides. Accordingly, the dynamic behind further enlargement is not comparable with the historic drive that impelled the enlargement of 2004. At the same time, there are strong geopolitical arguments on grounds of stabilising the Balkans for going ahead with integrating the Western half of this region.

The fragmentation of Yugoslavia has wrought extensive political and social changes in the Balkans and Europe more generally. After the collapse of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia, many Balkan countries have transformed their political system and have begun to forge new foreign and security policy. Some of them have already joined the EU and NATO, and some are about to access these organizations. But the Western Balkan states seem to be farther in the future. In regard to the former Yugoslavia, the United States, European states and international organizations, such as the EU, NATO and UN, have attempted to engage and manage this breakup on an individual and collective basis. They have greatly influenced the process of the post-conflict nation building of this region. From this viewpoint, the paper discusses the political and social transformation of the Balkans after the breakup of the Yugoslav conflict, and the role of the EU and NATO in the process of the democratization and nation building in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, attention is paid to the features of the involvement of the EU and NATO in the former Yugoslav conflict. In the process of Yugoslav fragmentation one can see the ‘Eastern Question’ revisited and the ‘Powder keg of Europe’ once again rising to its brim.

After the Cold War, the Western Balkan countries have become an important laboratory for the EU, able to exert its EU crises management and transformative power. Through restoring stability in the region, overcoming ethno-territorial and inter-ethnic conflicts, improving regional cooperation, consolidating democracy, building democratic institutions and promoting market economy, EU's goal was to make war unthinkable in this region. Referring to the definition of peacebuilding as 'action to identify and support structures which tend to strengthen and solidify peace to avoid a relapse into conflicts'2, this paper tries to explore whether, how and to what extent, EU has contributed as a peacebuilder in the Western Balkans, using crises management operations and mission and enlargement policy. It argues that both these instruments can be considered equally relevant as, on the one hand they create favourable conditions for lasting peace, security and stability in the region and on the other hand, through enlargement policy they push this region towards political and institutional reform, economic reforms and regional cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The process of democratization in Western Balkans is connected with the process of state-building before and after the reconstruction. After the break-up of Yugoslavia, the region became a brutal battleground as different nation-based groups fought to define the boundaries of a set of new states in the Balkans. One of the key challenges related to the democratization of the Western Balkan countries is resolving the issues with their neighbours. However, political pragmatism and bilateral relations between the countries of the Balkans, including their internal conflicts do not exclude informal alliances, but as a temporary form of exploitation of the current political and security situation or in order to achieve their own national interests. One of the key tools in the achievement of national interests, especially expressed in the Balkan countries is represented by the ethnic minorities. Ethnic minorities in the Balkans cannot be overlooked and most of them are seen as a destabilizing factor in the countries in which minorities live. Without overcoming prejudices and differences of the past, the Western Balkans could not continue their independent development. Democratization of the Western Balkans means that improving the peace and coexistence should not be viewed in the past, but in the current process of cooperation. The EU integration process of Western Balkan countries and the democratization process of the region will have to be implemented in the future if the political elites in Western Balkan countries wish to achieve security, stability and prosperity of their societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the role of the European Union (EU) in the Western Balkans (WB). It looks at the role of the EU in the WB by focusing on democratic institution-building. It aims to identify criteria of a limited Europeanisation in the last 14-year evolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in relation with the EU. By looking at BiH, it also seeks to know if there is a need for a new theoretical framework to more accurately define the specific process of the Europeanisation of the WB.

The article focuses on how Slovenia, a small European Union (EU) member state, has contributed to the normative power that is inherent in the EU. It examines the foreign policy including internationalism, the desire to solve its problems with Croatia and the desire to serve as a connecting link between EU and the Western Balkans. The country is reportedly still in the early stages of its independence that mistakes often are apparent.

The article discusses efforts by the Turkish government to gain membership with the European Union (EU) whose final membership has been stalled by several domestic and external problems. It cites the issue of Cypris as a major external obstacle to full EU membership and other EU members such as Germany, France and Austria wants to grant only a privileged partnership. It suggests that Turkey can become a global power if it solves it internal problems and helps resolve the Balkan deadlock.