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Examines the attractiveness of Belgium's economy for foreign investments. Job creation in Brussels that attracts labor-intensive service sector firms; Growth of business specialization in the country's various economic regions; Stability of the country's economic structure.

Discusses the transformation of the economy of Wallonia, Belgium, from a rust belt to an industrial boom. Pros and cons of investing in Wallonia; Investors' perception of Wallonia; Information on Wallonia's industries.

Focuses on the economic conditions in Belgium. Status of the Dutch market in the country; Closure of a United States (US) leasehold for a steel mill facility in Belgium; Main challenge for structuring a US leasehold for a university campus in Brussels. INSET: Real estate and US leaseholds.

Last week’s delivery of more than 60,000 tonnes of zinc into Antwerp’s LME-listed warehouses, the largest single inflow since May 2013, has sent the zinc price spiralling lower to fresh 2018 troughs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European zinc premiums were largely flat in the week to May 1 despite significant deliveries of ingots into London Metal Exchange-approved warehouses in Antwerp; meanwhile, worries over disrupted Iranian lead supply have pushed up lead premiums in India which is a traditional importer of Iranian units. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the information on the economic condition of Belgium. It states that Belgians, who are target for terrorists and taxes, are cutting back on spending and concentrating on their domestic markets. The author states that Belgium has been weighed down by the public debt burden. A 25 % withholding tax is levied on any investment made in Belgium, but this income cannot be taxed again and so represents good value. This has attracted back into the country some of the capital, which had been escaping abroad. The result is that the Belgian government has been able to switch its funding away from the international markets and tap the prolific savings of its own countrymen. The government virtually monopolises the domestic bond market. It now takes $10 billion out of total savings of $13 billion. In this way the Kingdom of Belgium hopes to avoid raising any new finance internationally. More money has been kept in the country by tax concessions known as the Cooremans-de Clercq laws. The system allowed thousands of small investors to buy Belgian equity and deduct proceeds from their income tax up to a ceiling of Bfr40,000. Now, with growth slow and corporate demand for funds low, these concessions have been dropped.

This article reports on the problems and opportunities for Belgian ministers, bankers and treasurers as Belgium is preparing for economic recovery. Belgians have saved substantial amounts of money even in the face of a crippling tax system and huge state spending. These personal savings underpin the Belgian banking system and support the government's ever-deepening budget deficits. Some of the money finds its way into the Eurobond market. The outlook for Belgian banking is bound up with the performance of the Belgian economy. Over 65 percent of Belgium's GNP comes from exports, over a third of the banks' profits come from international business. As world trade picks up banks will make the profitable switch from financing the Belgian Government's deficit to financing Belgian exports.

The article reports that proposed new rules for packaged retail and insurance-based investment products directive (Priips) have created a rift in Brussels and beyond. Zak de Mariveles, chairman of the British Structured Products Association said the rejection of the regulatory technical standards (RTS). The new rules' approach to past and future performance has been central to the debate.

This article explains that since the stock market crash of 1987, the Brussels Bourse has recovered much better than most. The General Return Index has staged a remarkable recovery, and by January 18, 1989 had outdone its pre-Crash high. The recovery of the Brussels Bourse was achieved on a turnover of Bfr425 billion, with average daily transaction volume up: Bfr141.5 billion from Bfr130 billion in 1987. The market capitalization of the Bourse reached Bfr2.1 billion from the 1987 figure of Bfr1.4 billion. After several years of severe underperformance this burst of activity is seen by some as a natural correction. Renewed confidence in the Belgian economy also partly explains this buoyancy.

Belgium's domestic capital market is brimming with funds, as evidenced by the success of the Kingdom's Bfr190 billion domestic bond issue. The renewed confidence of Belgian investors in their country and currency means that the Kingdom would not have to borrow any new money from the international capital markets in 1985. For the first time in seven years, Belgium registered a current account surplus in 1984, a far cry from the Bfr200 billion deficit of 1981. The most visible obstacle to Belgium's economic rehabilitation is its public debt and foreign debt. Belgium will continue to borrow privately among the domestic banks and will refinance in the currencies that it knows.

This article points out that Robert Gryson, inspector general at the Belgian treasury, and Emile Kestens, directory general at the Treasury, have guided Belgium through an eruption in its foreign debt with a virtually unscathed credit rating. Since 1978 the Kingdom of Belgium's foreign debt has multiplied more than three hundred-fold from just over Bfr3 billion to almost Bfr900 billion. Gryson and Kestens are retiring in 1984 after a lifetime of service in the Treasury. But before they retire, they have to raise a similar amount to that raised in 1983. They have to find a grand total of Bfr 752 billion, of which Bfr507 billion is new money.

Apart from some well-publicized swap operations that may have turned sour, Belgium's treasury has reduced the kingdom's cost of borrowing dramatically. But, as the article reports, potential losses on contracts signed in the early 1990s have raised important questions for all sovereigns trying to balance market confidentiality with public accountability. Under the terms of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, prospective entrants to European economic and monetary union must meet, or make satisfactory progress towards meeting, a ration of debt to gross domestic product of 60 percent. They must also convince the European Commission, and ultimately the council of ministers and heads of state, that the debt levels are sustainable.

Presents news briefs on issues related to structured finance deals in Europe as of November 26, 2004, with emphasis on the return of Swiss boutique Capital Efficiency Group (CEG) to the Preps program of Mittelstand mezzanine financing it opened with HVB in May 2004. Deal transactions of CEG; Consideration of a pilot securitization deal by the Belgian government to address its budget deficit; Launch of a structured bond for Minicentrales Dos by Caja Madrid in Spain.

The article reports on the long end of the euros for the Kingdom of Belgium in 2017.

Reports on the effects of the advent of euro in Belgium. Rating of Fitch IBCA; Resistance encountered by Finland; Plan of Deutsche Telekom to create a corporate bond in the currency; Government bond market of Euroland.

Eurogroup to hold emergency meeting tomorrow to debate an extension for Greece; Argentina's government faces mounting protests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on Belgium's bond markets. Market developments; Variable-rate bonds; Floating-rate bonds; Strip market; Issuance procedure; Reverse auctions; Secondary market trading.

This article points out that the Societe Generale de Belgique (SGB) starts 1989 with every chance of becoming a huge pan-European holding company, ready to take advantage of 1992. The great takeover battle which began in January 1988 has trebled the market value to more than $5 billion. Its capital has increased 40 percent by the creation of 12 million new shares, and its shareholders include some of the biggest names in European finance. However, the end of the takeover battle was only the beginning of the struggle to reorganize SGB's ramshackle holdings. The company accounts for some 30 percent of the Belgian economy, and has stakes in 1,300 companies in 70 countries. But its archaic structure, formed under the Dutch company law of 1822, has to be modernized.

The article focuses on the economic condition of Belgium. It states that Belgian appetite for Eurobonds is huge. Belgians prefer saving to consuming, even rivalling the Japanese. Despite high taxes and an economy as precarious as any in Europe, finance minister Mark Eyskens recently declared that citizens were still spending too much. An increasing proportion of income, about 15%, is now being stashed away in banks and other savings institutions to be channelled into investments. In control of one such fund is Staf Van den Bergh, an ex-bond trader and syndicate man at Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA (BBL), one of the big three Belgian commercial banks. He manages $250 million equivalent in bond portfolios for bank clients, of which 80% goes into Eurobonds. His job is to provide a dividend once a year and to make a reasonable capital gain. Diversity is another way of keeping risks to a minimum in Belgium. Belgian law dictates that no more than 10% of any fund can be invested in a single borrower or in non-listed securities, and no fund may contain more than 10% of a single issue. This is known as the three times 10 rule. Last year it replaced the much stricter three times five rule.

Belgium's economic plans rest on successful entry into European monetary union. Talk of Emu has scarcely been off Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene's lips since his center-left coalition returned to power in the May 1995 elections. Compliance with the Maastricht criteria is more important to the Belgian government than any other objective during this four-year term of office. Dehaene is passionately keen to ensure that Belgium is included in the first group of countries to adopt a single currency perhaps as early as 1999. Belgium's achievements on three standards, price stability, interest rates and stable exchange rates are so solid they are dull. Consumer prices rose by just 1.5% last year and the Belgian franc is so closely aligned with the Deutschmark that the Belgian National Bank is in danger of losing its credibility as an independent entity. The National Bank has scarcely broken step with the Bundesbank over the past year as the Germans have eased their repo rate downwards in many tiny steps.

Belgium's economic plans rest on successful entry into European monetary union (Emu). It's well on its way but it doesn't meet Maastricht's debt criteria. There is a sense of now-or-never in Brussels. The Belgian government believes that without fundamental reforms its small economy will not operate effectively in Europe which has introduced a single currency and thrown open regional marketplaces to foreign competition. Limited ambitions which were realistic 10 years ago now look inadequate against economic and market changes Belgium is about to face. Belgium's economy and local capital markets stand to lose substantially from Emu unless they change now. The Belgium government, led by prime minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, has realized that, if Belgium does not act quickly, its economy could fall so far out of step with the rest of Europe that Belgium will not be able to join European monetary union. If this happens the Brussels stock exchange would lose business so fast that it might not survive. Even the country's bond market could collapse in the face of speculation against the Belgian franc. But the present Belgian government is noteworthy for its apolitical and single-minded approach to monetary union.