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With the growing global acceptance of cannabis and its widespread use by eyewitnesses and suspects in legal cases, understanding the popular drug's ramifications for memory is a pressing need. In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled trial, we examined the acute and delayed effects of Δ9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) intoxication on susceptibility to false memory in 64 healthy volunteers. Memory was tested immediately (encoding and retrieval under drug influence) and 1 wk later (retrieval sober). We used three different methods (associative word lists and two misinformation tasks using virtual reality). Across all methods, we found evidence for enhanced false-memory effects in intoxicated participants. Specifically, intoxicated participants showed higher false recognition in the associative word-list task both at immediate and delayed test than controls. This yes bias became increasingly strong with decreasing levels of association between studied and test items. In a misinformation task, intoxicated participants were more susceptible to false-memory creation using a virtual-reality eyewitness scenario and virtual-reality perpetrator scenario. False-memory effects were mostly restricted to the acute-intoxication phase. Cannabis seems to increase false-memory proneness, with decreasing strength of association between an event and a test item, as assessed by different false-memory paradigms. Our findings have implications for how and when the police should interview suspects and eyewitnesses.

Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a different one? The answer: "No". In the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list learning paradigm, and an imagination inflation exercise) as well as completed several individual difference measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small, positive, significant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual difference variables significantly correlated with false memories, and any significant correlations were rather small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory "trait". In other words, no one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of memory distortion.

UnlabelledThe neural processes giving rise to human memory strength signals remain poorly understood. Inspired by formal computational models that posit a central role of global matching in memory strength, we tested a novel hypothesis that the strengths of both true and false memories arise from the global similarity of an item's neural activation pattern during retrieval to that of all the studied items during encoding (i.e., the encoding-retrieval neural global pattern similarity [ER-nGPS]). We revealed multiple ER-nGPS signals that carried distinct information and contributed differentially to true and false memories: Whereas the ER-nGPS in the parietal regions reflected semantic similarity and was scaled with the recognition strengths of both true and false memories, ER-nGPS in the visual cortex contributed solely to true memory. Moreover, ER-nGPS differences between the parietal and visual cortices were correlated with frontal monitoring processes. By combining computational and neuroimaging approaches, our results advance a mechanistic understanding of memory strength in recognition.Significance statementWhat neural processes give rise to memory strength signals, and lead to our conscious feelings of familiarity? Using fMRI, we found that the memory strength of a given item depends not only on how it was encoded during learning, but also on the similarity of its neural representation with other studied items. The global neural matching signal, mainly in the parietal lobule, could account for the memory strengths of both studied and unstudied items. Interestingly, a different global matching signal, originated from the visual cortex, could distinguish true from false memories. The findings reveal multiple neural mechanisms underlying the memory strengths of events registered in the brain.

Cognitive factors can mediate the tendency to create falsememory. We explored the role of the two systems ofreasoning in the production of false memories. Suchdifference can be assessed through the Cognitive ReflectionTest (CRT), a measure of the propensity to reflect rather thanproducing an intuitive response. By the use of a DRM-likeparadigm in a prose recognition memory task, we measuredCRT-related individual differences in producing falsememories. We observed that intuitive thinkers are more likelyto produce false memories.

The recent identification of highly superior autobiographical memory (HSAM) raised the possibility that there may be individuals who are immune to memory distortions. We measured HSAM participants' and age- and sex-matched controls' susceptibility to false memories using several research paradigms. HSAM participants and controls were both susceptible to false recognition of nonpresented critical lure words in an associative word-list task. In a misinformation task, HSAM participants showed higher overall false memory compared with that of controls for details in a photographic slideshow. HSAM participants were equally as likely as controls to mistakenly report they had seen nonexistent footage of a plane crash. Finding false memories in a superior-memory group suggests that malleable reconstructive mechanisms may be fundamental to episodic remembering. Paradoxically, HSAM individuals may retrieve abundant and accurate autobiographical memories using fallible reconstructive processes.

Previous research reported that serotonin receptor 2A gene (HTR2A) polymorphisms were associated with memory. However, it is unknown whether these genetic variants were associated with both true and false memories. The current study of 336 Han Chinese subjects tested 30 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) within the HTR2A gene for potential associations with true and false memories. False memories were assessed using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which people falsely remember semantically related (but unpresented) words. We found that 11 SNPs within the HTR2A gene were associated with true memory (p=0.000076-0.043). The associations between true memory and seven adjacent SNPs (i.e., rs1923888, rs1745837, rs9567739, rs3742279, rs655888, rs655854, and rs2296972) were still significant after multiple testing corrections. Haplotype-based association analysis revealed that, true memory was positively associated with haplotype A-C-C-G-C-T-A for these seven adjacent SNPs (p=0.000075), which was still significant after multiple testing correction. Only one SNP rs655854 was associated with false memory (p=0.023), and it was not significant after multiple testing correction. This study replicates, in an Asian population, that genetic variation in HTR2A is associated with episodic memory, and also suggests that this association is restricted to true memory.

This research investigated the relationship between false memories induced by two different paradigms (misinformation and Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM]). The misinformation effect refers to the phenomenon that a person's recollection of a witnessed event can be altered after exposure to misleading information about the event. DRM false memory represents the intrusion of words that are semantically related but not actually presented in the study session. Subjects (N = 432) completed both misinformation and DRM false memory tests. Results showed a small but significant correlation (r = .12, p = .02) between the misinformation and DRM false memories. Furthermore, using signal detection theory, we found that the discrimination ability index (d') was related to both the misinformation and DRM false memories (r = -.12 and -.13, p = .01), while the response bias was related only to DRM false memory (r = -.46, p < .001). These results suggest that misinformation and DRM false memories generally involve different mechanisms and that their shared mechanism may involve the global discrimination ability.

Interoperability is widely touted for its ability to spur incremental innovation, increase competition and consumer choice, and decrease barriers to accessibility. In light of these attributes, intellectual property law generally permits follow-on innovators to create products that interoperate with existing systems, even without permission. The anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) represent a troubling departure from this policy, resulting in patent-like rights to exclude technologies that interoperate with protected platforms. Although the DMCA contains internal safeguards to preserve interoperability, judicial misinterpretation and a narrow textual focus on software-to-software interoperability render those safeguards largely ineffective.Subjecting restrictions on interoperability to antitrust scrutiny, and the resulting mandatory disclosure of technical information, is one approach to holding anticircumvention law in check. But a number of considerations suggest antitrust is a poor tool for lessening the DMCA's impact on interoperability. Whether characterized as tying, denial of essential facilities, or refusal to deal, the use of anticircumvention law to impede interoperability is unlikely to consistently trigger antitrust enforcement. In part, the limits on the ability of antitrust to address the impact of the DMCA stem from its deference to the legislative process. Antitrust rarely interferes with the exercise of legitimately acquired IP rights.Rather than relying on antitrust to limit the DMCA's restriction of interoperability, this Article proposes a solution that addresses that restriction at its source. Expanding the DMCA's existing interoperability exemption would create an environment more hospitable to interoperable technologies. But in order to preserve the protections the DMCA offers copyright holders, this expanded exemption must disaggregate restrictions on the use of interoperable software and devices from the restrictions on access and copying that Congress intended to enable. The former can be ignored only to the extent the latter are respected.

Late in 2005, Sony BMG released millions of Compact Discs containing digital rights management technologies that threatened the security of its customers' computers and the integrity of the information infrastructure more broadly. This Article aims to identify the market, technological, and legal factors that appear to have led a presumably rational actor toward a strategy that in retrospect appears obviously and fundamentally misguided.The Article first addresses the market-based rationales that likely influenced Sony BMG's deployment of these DRM systems and reveals that even the most charitable interpretation of Sony BMG's internal strategizing demonstrates a failure to adequately value security and privacy. After taking stock of the then-existing technological environment that both encouraged and enabled the distribution of these protection measures, the Article examines law, the third vector of influence on Sony BMG's decision to release flawed protection measures into the wild, and argues that existing doctrine in the fields of contract, intellectual property, and consumer protection law fails to adequately counter the technological and market forces that allowed a self-interested actor to inflict these harms on the public.The Article concludes with two recommendations aimed at reducing the likelihood of companies deploying protection measures with known security vulnerabilities in the consumer marketplace. First, Congress should alter the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) by creating permanent exemptions from its anti-circumvention and antitrafficking provisions that enable security research and the dissemination of tools to remove harmful protection measures. Second, the Federal Trade Commission should leverage insights from the field of human computer interaction security (HCI-Sec) to develop a stronger framework for user control over the security and privacy aspects of computers.

The dawning of the digital age has brought the Supreme Court’s Sony “staple article of commerce” doctrine to center stage in legal and policy discussions about the proper role and scope of copyright protection. To technology companies, it represents a vital safe harbor for product design; to the content industries, this doctrine remains an Achilles heel. The origins of this doctrine have always been somewhat obscure. With nary a peak at the text or the legislative history of the then-recently enacted overhaul of the copyright system, the Supreme Court adverted to patent law to determine the scope of indirect liability – a fundamental issue that would loom large in the shift from the analog to the digital distribution platform for content. A slim majority of the Supreme Court justified this interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1976 on the basis of a vague assertion of “historic kinship” between patent and copyright.This article scrutinizes this critical logical premise. Part I exhaustively reviews the litigation and correspondence of the justices to understand why the Court paid so little attention to the legislative materials and so much to the patent law. It finds that gaps in the information provided to the Court, in conjunction with the justices’ lack of familiarity with copyright law generally and the Copyright Act of 1976 in particular, led the Court astray. Part II tests the “historic kinship” premise, finding that it cannot withstand scrutiny. Had the Court traced the origins of copyright and patent back to their source, it would have seen that they both derive from a common wellspring: tort principles. Concerns about patent misuse and improper leveraging of monopoly power led the courts, and later Congress, to carve out an express safe harbor in patent law for those selling “staple articles of commerce” – products suitable for substantial non-infringing uses. Part III demonstrates that the 1976 Copyright Act envisioned that courts would continue to use the traditional tort wellspring, informed by the distinctive challenges of copyright enforcement. This would have brought the reasonable alternative design framework of products liability law into play. The article shows that this approach would almost certainly have resulted in the same outcome that the Sony Court reached, but of critical importance, it would have provided a more sound and dynamic jurisprudential framework for calibrating liability as new technologies develop. Part IV examines Sony’s legacy, showing that subsequent legislative activity, court decisions, and the marketplace reflect a practical reality that lies closer to the reasonable alternative design standard than a broad “staple article of commerce” safe harbor. In reality, Sony’s “staple article of commerce” doctrine has proven largely symbolic and unworkable, as Congress, the courts, and businesses in the marketplace have sought to promote product innovation without unduly jeopardizing copyright protection. The failure to recognize that reality, however, breeds doctrinal confusion, distorts case law evolution, and stultifies the larger policy debate over copyright protection in the digital age.

The anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act penalize both the circumvention of technical protection measures, and supplying the means for such circumvention. These prohibitions are entirely separate from the exclusive rights under copyright, causing some commentators to dub the anticircumvention right as "paracopyright." Such paracopyright effectively grants copyright holders sweeping new ability to impose terms of access on content users: Consumers who access content without accepting the content owner's terms would violate the owner's paracopyright even if the material accessed is not itself copyrighted or copyrightable. Additionally, where a particular use would be permissible under copyright law, content owners may be able to exclude the use as a condition of access. For example, the content owner might require that users contractually agree not to engage in reverse engineering or fair uses as a condition for access to the material. Content owners may use "paracopyright" to require purchase or use of related products; for example, DVD access controls require that the disc be played on approved hardware, effectively dictating the consumer's purchase of playback equipment. At some point, such leveraging of access control seems certain to overstep the bounds militated by sound policy or intended by Congress. In the past, abuse of intellectual property rights has been curtailed under the doctrine of misuse. This Article argues that because DMCA "paracopyright" is ripe for abuse, limits on overreaching may be imposed by applying the misuse doctrine in this new area. Just as improper leveraging of patent and copyright may be curtailed by application of the misuse doctrine, so improper leveraging of paracopyright should be curtailed by application of misuse. This new application of misuse doctrine may be guided by the standards established in previous applications to patent and copyright law, and may serve a similar function in regulating the excesses invited by the anticircumvention right.