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Purpose: Section 177 of the Company Act 2013 and Regulation 18 of the Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements 2015 allow the audit committee to invite firm executives to participate in the audit committee meetings. In this study, we investigate the negative impact of the presence of invitees in the audit committee on firm value. Design/methodology/approach: The study uses the Propensity Score Matching and Difference-In-Difference methodology (henceforth, PSM-DID) to establish a causal relationship between the presence of invitees and firm value. The final sample consists of 24,232 firm-year observations representing 4,493 distinct firms from 2016 to 2021. We also address the endogeneity and autocorrelation issues using the system-generalized method of moments (henceforth, GMM) as a robustness test. Findings: We find that the presence of invitees in the audit committee decreases the firm value because investors consider this an alarming signal. We further find that the firms, audited by the Big 4, do not experience a decrease in firm value due to higher audit quality, whereas the firms with high promoter ownership experience a decrease due to the presence of agency cost. Originality/value: We contribute to the literature on firm value and strengthen the literature on the importance of good governance in a developing nation using the signalling theory. This study adds to the understanding of firm value. The findings have implications for management literature and are valuable for policymakers and standard setters in evaluating the impact of disclosures in the capital market. The managerial implications emphasize the need for careful consideration of invitees in audit committees, considering industry, regulatory environment, and firm goals. Firms are advised to assess the benefits and costs, monitor the impact regularly, and strengthen internal controls. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to exploit Tobin's Q model of investment to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green innovation. Design/methodology/approach: The study is based on a sample of 3,896 firms from 2002 to 2021, covering 45 countries worldwide. The authors adopt Tobin's Q model to conceptualize the relationship between corporate governance and investment in green research and development (R&D). The authors argue that agency costs and financial market frictions affect corporate investment and are fundamental factors in R&D activities. By limiting agency conflicts, effective governance favors efficiency, facilitates access to external financing and encourages green innovation. The authors analyzed the causal effect by using the system-generalized method of moments (system-GMM). Findings: The results reveal that the better the corporate governance, the more the firm invests in green R&D. A 1%-point increase in the corporate governance ratings leads to an increase in green R&D expenses to the total asset ratio of about 0.77 percentage points. In addition, an increase in the score of each dimension (strategy, management and shareholder) of corporate governance results in an increase in the probability of green product innovation. Finally, green innovation is positively related to firm environmental performance, including emission reduction and resource use efficiency. Practical implications: The findings provide implications to support managers and policymakers on how to improve sustainability through corporate governance. Governance mechanisms will help resolve agency problems and, in turn, encourage green innovation. Social implications: Understanding the impact of corporate governance on green innovation may help firms combat climate change, a crucial societal concern. The present study helps achieve one of the precious UN's sustainable development goals: Goal 13 on climate action. Originality/value: This study goes beyond previous research by adopting Tobin's Q model to examine the relationship between corporate governance and green R&D investment. Overall, the results suggest that effective corporate governance is necessary for environmental efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Growing social concerns and ecological issues accelerate firms' environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement. Hence, this study aims to advance the existing literature by focusing on the interplay between institutional and firm governance mechanisms for greater ESG engagement. More specifically, the authors investigate whether public governance stimulates excessive ESG engagement and whether corporate governance moderates this relationship. Design/methodology/approach: Using a sample of 43,803 firm-year observations affiliated with 41 countries and 9 industries, the authors adopt a country, industry and year fixed-effects regression analysis. Findings: The authors find that public governance strength via its six dimensions stimulates excessive ESG engagement. This implies that firms in countries with strong voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption are more motivated for ESG engagement. Furthermore, corporate governance negatively moderates the relationship between all public governance dimensions (except political stability) and excessive ESG engagement. This implies that public governance and corporate governance are substitutes for encouraging firms to commit to ESG. Further tests reveal that whereas these results in the baseline analyses are valid for developed countries, they are not valid in emerging markets. Research limitations/implications: The findings support the interplay between institutional and agency theories. In countries with strong (weak) institutional mechanisms, corporate governance becomes weak (strong) in inciting greater stakeholder engagement. This implies that the public governance mechanism alleviates agency costs, rendering internal mechanisms of corporate governance noncompulsory for ESG engagement. Practical implications: The findings suggest that emerging countries need to reinforce their institutions for greater accountability, regulatory quality and control of corruption, which will have a domino effect on firms in addressing stakeholder expectations. The results also advise emerging country firms to augment their internal monitoring mechanisms for greater stakeholder engagement, such as structuring boards and establishing corporate social responsibility mechanisms, committees and policies. Originality/value: This study contributes to the recent literature investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms in excessive ESG engagement. The study also explores whether public governance is associated with greater ESG involvement and provides a comprehensive analysis of the association between six indicators of public governance quality and excessive ESG practices in developed and emerging economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Joint board management meetings bring boards of directors and top management teams together to share information and discuss company matters. The authors investigate whether these joint meetings are associated with higher agency costs or information sharing benefits in the context of firm earnings management. Design/methodology/approach: Using publicly disclosed data on the frequency of joint board management meetings in Indonesian firms, the authors examine the relationship between joint board management meetings and earnings management during 2010–2017. Findings: The authors find that more joint board management meetings are associated with lower earnings management. This is consistent with joint board management meetings providing net information sharing benefits. Additional testing indicates that the results are the strongest when firms hold more joint board management meetings than regular board meetings. Originality/value: The findings suggest that in addition to holding regular board and audit committee meetings, formal meetings between boards of directors and top management teams are beneficial to shareholders by restricting opportunistic accounting choices by firm management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to analyse the effect of borrower's countries on syndicated loan spreads, featuring countries according to institutional factors, namely, financial systems and corporate governance systems. Design/methodology/approach: This study is an empirical investigation based on a unique sample of more than 85,000 syndicated loans from 122 countries. The paper uses standard and two-stage least squares regression analysis to test whether the types of financial and corporate governance systems affect loan spreads. Findings: The paper finds that borrowers from countries with financial systems oriented towards the banking-based paradigm pay lower interest rate spreads than those from countries with financial systems oriented towards the market-based paradigm. In addition, there is evidence that borrowers from countries with more developed financial systems pay lower spreads. The results also show that borrowers from countries with an Anglo-Saxon governance system pay higher spreads than borrowers from countries with a Continental governance system. Research limitations/implications: This study does not consider potential promiscuous relationships that can arise at the ownership structure and governance level between banks and borrowers and may affect loan spreads. Practical implications: This study suggests that financial and corporate governance systems are essential factors in the financial intermediation process. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that corporates with higher potential agency costs and higher potential information asymmetry are requested to pay higher spreads. Therefore, the opportunities to such corporates invest optimally tend to be scarcer. Originality/value: The paper highlights the impact of institutional factors on the cost of financing, characterising the countries according to the type of financial system and the type of corporate governance system. The study finds that borrowers from countries with bank-based financial systems pay lower interest rate spreads than those from countries with market-based financial systems. The paper also highlights how the level of financial development affects the cost of financing. The paper focusses on non-financial firms, unlike financial firms, which have been the focus of several empirical studies on topics relating to the cost of funding and corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to discuss whether a new accounting policy can help enterprises withstand operating risks and whether corporate governance can play a supervisory role. Taiwan took the lead worldwide in allowing companies to distribute cash dividends from capital reserves. Compared with traditional cash dividends distributed from retained earnings, this move was aimed at maintaining the stability of cash dividends and helping listed companies address the risks of temporary downturns. However, the distribution of cash dividends from capital reserves may violate the principle of capital maintenance and damage creditors' equity. The authors sought to examine whether corporate governance could play a supervisory role. Design/methodology/approach: The present study targeted Taiwanese listed companies and cited data from the Taiwan Economic Journal. The study period was from 2011–2019. The authors tested the hypotheses using the least square method. Findings: The results showed that ultimate controlling shareholders of listed companies can maximize their own interests through ownership arrangements, whereas corporate governance cannot play a supervisory role nor protect creditors' equity. The findings provide insight on whether, in the development process of corporate governance, appropriate measures are taken to protect creditors' equity in addition to shareholders' equity, or achieve a good coordination of interests among all stakeholders. Originality/value: The ultimate controlling shareholders or directors of a listed company would seek to maximize their own interests, and transfer the operating risks to creditors through the arrangement of dividend policy, thus harming creditors' equity. However, independent directors cannot play a supervisory role. The authors inferred that corporate governance standards previously focused on the shareholder level or alleviation of the agency problem between controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders but ignored creditors' equity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to contribute to the debate in the literature about generalist CEOs by exploring the effect of board governance on CEO general managerial ability, focusing on one of the most crucial aspects of the board of directors, board size. Prior research shows that smaller boards constitute a more effective governance mechanism and therefore are expected to reduce agency costs. Design/methodology/approach: The authors estimate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability, using a fixed-effects regression analysis, propensity score matching, as well as an instrumental-variable analysis. These techniques mitigate endogeneity greatly and make the results much more likely to show causality. Findings: The results show that firms with smaller board size are more likely to hire generalist CEOs. Specifically, a decline in board size by one standard deviation raises CEO general managerial ability by 15.62%. A lack of diverse experiences in a small board with fewer directors makes it more necessary to hire a CEO with a broad range of professional experiences. Furthermore, the agency costs associated with generalist CEOs are greatly diminished in firms with a smaller board. Hence, firms with a smaller board are more inclined to hire generalist CEOs. Originality/value: Although prior research has explored the effects of board size on various corporate outcomes, strategies and policies, this study is the first to investigate the effect of board size on CEO general managerial ability. This study contributes to the literature both in corporate governance and on CEO general managerial ability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of product market competition on dividend payout and share repurchases in Australia in which a full dividend imputation system has been in place since 1987. Design/methodology/approach: Panel data estimation with industry and year-fixed effects is employed to examine the role of industry competition on dividend payout and share repurchases. The paper uses a sample of ASX200 non-financial firms, including 4,272 observations over the period 1992–2015. To address the endogeneity problem, the authors utilize the event of Australia–United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA), which became effective on 01 January 2005, and perform a difference-in-difference analysis. Findings: The authors find that firms operating in competitive markets are likely to pay more dividends and repurchase more shares to reduce agency costs. The positive relation between industry competition and dividends is stronger among firms where the CEO and the Chairman of the Board are the same person and among firms with higher market-to-book ratio and higher standard deviation of stock returns. The study results are robust when the authors account for the impact of franking credit on dividend payment. In the difference-in-difference analysis, the authors find strong evidence of a casual relation that product competition drives changes in dividend policy. Practical implications: The findings are consistent with the notion that intense product market competition can mitigate agency conflicts between managers and shareholders and with the information signalling explanation of market competition. As such, regulators may want to introduce policies that encourage more market competition (e.g. market deregulation) to enhance market efficiency. Originality/value: This study incorporates product market competition in explaining the firm payout policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This study aims to examine whether co-opted directors influence analysts' recommendations. As information intermediaries, financial analysts should incorporate the quality of corporate governance into their valuation because well-governed firms are associated with lower agency costs and better performance. Co-opted directors are those appointed after the incumbent chief executive officer assumes office. The authors investigate whether board co-option has an effect on analyst recommendations. Design/methodology/approach: The present study uses univariate analysis, multi-variate regression analysis and conduct a natural experiment using the Sarbanes-Oxley as an exogenous shock. Findings: The results show that firms with fewer co-opted directors tend to receive more favorable recommendations, suggesting that analysts favor firms with strong corporate governance. The results hold even after controlling for various firm characteristics, including the traditional measures of board quality, i.e. board size and independent directors. Originality/value: The paper is the first of its kind and offers evidence on the effect of co-opted directors on analyst recommendations. The results contribute to the literature both in corporate governance and in financial intermediaries, where analysts play a crucial role in providing information to the various participants in financial markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the effect of Shariah Advisory Panel (SAP) on both the level of agency cost and fund performance against conventional corporate governance, within corporate and Shariah governance settings, between Shariah and conventional mutual fund (CMF), in an emerging economy of Malaysia during the period 2008-2015. Design/methodology/approach: Panel data regression is appropriately used within corporate governance research because of empirical issues of unobserved heterogeneity effects to avoid spurious evidence. The secondary data of 172 CMFs and 80 Shariah mutual funds are gathered hand-collected from annual reports and master prospectuses for the purpose of analysis between the period 2008 and 2015, generating 2,016 fund-year observations. Findings: SAP is found to have a positive effect on agency costs. Consequently, it leads to empirical evidence that substantiates a negative and marginally significant association with fund performance when designated by accounting measure. Thus, the Shariah monitoring proxy is not a good mechanism for controlling agency costs inconsistent with performance maximizing (agency cost minimizing) outcomes. Research limitations/implications: The unique data set of mutual funds used in this research may restrict the generalization of the findings unless mentioned and explained specifically the data characteristics. The single proxy for Shariah monitoring could be better off by having a list of different measures. Practical implications: The paper highlights and suggests a consistent improvement in regulation that could be performed by policymakers pertaining to the non-trivial additional cost of implying Shariah governance. Originality/value: This paper provides empirical evidence of the SAP effects from the view of a more complex monitoring structure in consequence of having an additional layer of governance, devoting on the trade-off between benefit and cost to shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: On the basis of corporate governance and agency cost theory, using the fifth sub-indicator of Fan et al. China Marketization Index as the regional investor protection index (IPI), the purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate payout policies and corporate performance. Design/methodology/approach: This paper establishes ordinary least squares regression model to examine interactions between the effects of equity incentives and regional investor protection upon firms' dividend payouts. In addition, the authors also explore whether the joint effects on payouts are altered in the presence of growth opportunities, and investigate the effects of interactions between equity incentives and regional investor protection on corporate performance. Findings: The authors observe that firm managers appear to abuse equity incentives by increasing dividend payouts. However, regional investor protection can potentially restrain such behavior. The restraining effect depends on the firms' growth opportunities, on the basis of which the effect on cash (stock) dividends is found to be weaker (stronger) in high-growth firms – and stronger (weaker) in low-growth firms. Further evidence indicates that the restraining effect of regional investor protection on selfish dividend-related behavior encouraged by equity incentives may also prove valuable in encouraging exploitation of these incentives so as to enhance corporate performance. Practical implications: Since reforming investor protection laws and improving judicial quality are difficult and lengthy at a country level. Improving regional levels of investor protection, however, seems more feasible and effective. Through measures encouraging the development of intermediaries, increases in the number of lawyers – all of which seem likely to constrain behavior harmful to the interests of investors – the provincial administrations can reasonably expect to contribute toward improvements in the performance of firms and the development of the economy in their region. This paper provides encouragement to regional policy makers in China and in other developing countries. Originality/value: This paper uses a regional index of investor protection to study the impact on corporate dividends and performance, in contrast with most previous studies, which have examined these issues at country or individual firm levels. The use of a regional-level investor IPI in this paper therefore fills a gap by coming in between the country- and firm-level indicators typically used in previous research, thus providing a new perspective on investor protection issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Many farm producer organizations pursue growth and complexity in response to price volatility, industry consolidation and other external developments. Consequently, as ownership is dispersed and control is delegated, members may face increasing agency cost. In spite of the potential to impact performance and even survival, empirical attention to agency problems in farm producer organizations is limited. The purpose of this paper is to address the gap in the literature with an empirical study. Design/methodology/approach: With survey responses from 365 farm producer organizations in the USA, the author uses a two-limit tobit model to estimate the relationships of six ownership and governance characteristics (i.e. board size, management size, director independence, manager independence, CEO independence and non-member ownership) to agency cost, which is proxied by the operating expense ratio. Findings: While controlling for heterogeneity in scale and technology, the author finds positive relationships of board size, management size and CEO independence to agency cost. The novel result illustrates there is a significant cost to the adoption of non-traditional ownership and governance characteristics by farm producer organizations. Practical implications: The presence of agency cost serves as motivation to farm producer organizations to implement new or adapt old agency mechanisms. One recommendation is to reconsider the payment structure of non-member CEOs. There may not be enough incentive to inspire an upstream bias, which is perhaps possible by linking CEO performance to price, patronage and member-oriented performance measurements. Originality/value: Agency cost is rarely studied in relation to farm producer organizations. Recent contributions in the empirical literature lacked an explicit connection of ownership and governance characteristics to agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to explore the effect of interlocking directorates on agency conflicts and corporate performance in the shipping industry. Design/methodology/approach: The authors use social network analysis to discover central nodes in the network of personal and corporate connections in an international sample of 110 listed shipping companies. Findings: Assessing network structure, the authors find that the network of corporate leaders is denser than the network of shipping companies. The network of shipping companies is populated with many isolated nodes; the network of shipping executives and directors is populated with many cohesive groups in which the longest distance between two corporate leaders is two companies. The authors find that interlocking corporate leadership can help resolve agency conflicts in the shipping industry, bearing a negative effect on the magnitude of agency costs. The extent of leadership overlaps is associated with board size, financial leverage and profitability. The relationship between profits and interlocks is bidirectional, implying that interlocking directorates bear a positive effect on asset returns. Originality/value: The authors map the relational structures in the social networks of companies and company leaders in the shipping industry and discover the cross-sectional determinants of interlocks in the shipping industry. The finding about the effect of interlocks on profitability and agency costs bears policy implications for the design of corporate governance in the shipping industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of political connections surrounding an exogenous Supreme Court decision (Citizens United) that lifted long-standing restrictions on corporate political contributions. Design/methodology/approach: This study examines key characteristics of politically connected firms compared to non-politically connected firms, including their market reaction to Citizens United, as well as cash holdings levels and governance characteristics before vs after the landmark decision. Findings: The results indicate a significant negative market reaction to politically connected firms surrounding the announcement of Citizens United. Additionally, there is a significant increase in the cash holdings of politically connected firms relative to before the event and relative to non-politically connected firms. For politically connected firms, this result is exacerbated by poor corporate governance quality. Collectively, these findings are consistent with a positive association between agency costs and political connections. Originality/value: This study provides novel evidence by exploiting an exogenous enhancement in the implications of political connections that accompanied the Citizens United decision. The use of this quasi-natural experiment offers an ideal research setting to extract fresh insights into the effects of corporate political connections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is not clear. By integrating resource dependence and agency theories, this paper aims to focus on how prestigious CEOs affect firm performance and how informal relations between the CEO and outside directors affect agency costs and resource benefits associated with prestigious CEOs.Design/methodology/approach The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze their data set, which is conducted by a sample of 4,226 Chinese listed firms from 2009 to 2013. The authors also use OLS regression to assess the sensitivity and robustness of their findings.Findings The findings indicate that prestigious CEOs are significantly and positively associated with firm performance. Moreover, the authors find the effect of prestigious CEOs on firm performance is more pronounced when prestigious outside directors interact with prestigious CEOs. Guanxi – a Chinese concept similar to camaraderie – attenuates this association, particularly when the CEO and outside directors share the same surname.Research limitations/implications Future research should consider whether there is a mediating link between prestigious affiliates (i.e. CEOs) and firm performance.Practical/implications This paper provides two practical implications. First, China Securities Regulatory Commission policymakers should pay more attention to outside directors’ quality and ability and their informal guanxi with the CEO. Second, prestigious CEOs may also have potential costs.Originality/value This study contributes to corporate governance literature and CEO-board relations literature by shedding light on how resource dependence and agency theories apply to corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the influence of institutional investors’ investment horizons (IIIH) on a wide variety of key corporate policies.Design/methodology/approach The authors perform regression analysis to a panel data set of quarterly financial statement data for US firms over the 1981-2014 using several measures of IIIH.Findings The authors argue that an increase in the presence of long-term investors contributes to more effective monitoring and information quality. This results in a reduction in agency costs and informational asymmetry problems for firms that are more heavily influenced by long-term investors, which in turn influences the corporate policies they pursue. Consistent with these arguments, the evidence suggests that firms with a greater long-term institutional investor base maintain lower investment outlays, higher dividend payments, lower levels of cash and higher levels of leverage. All results hold after controlling for potential endogeneity issues.Originality/value The authors show that a greater presence of long-term institutional investors leads to higher dividends, lower investment outlays, lower cash holdings and higher leverage. The comprehensive nature of the predictions with respect to overall corporate finance policies and the supporting evidence provided represents an important contribution, as previous studies have tended to focus on one specific area of corporate behavior (i.e. such as cash holdings). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and firms’ bond recovery rates (RRs). The authors hypothesize that governance features impact RRs by controlling agency costs that result from conflicts between bondholders and shareholders. The authors also test the relationship between CG and RRs during the last crisis. Design/methodology/approach – The authors use a generalized method of moments regression model to test the relationship between CG and firms’ bond RRs. The authors employ a direct measure of recoveries rates from Moody’s ultimate recovery database covering the period from 2003 to 2012. Both firm-level CG and country-level variables are used to examine the determinants of corporate bonds RRs. Findings – The results support a significant impact of CG mechanisms on bond RRs mainly during crisis period. The authors find that firms operating with CEO-Duality decrease their bond RRs during financial crisis. This implies wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders and provides one explanation why some firms operate with weak governance. Originality/value – This paper provides the first direct evidence that corporate bond RRs are directly related to CG mechanisms. The authors combine firm-level CG and country-level variables to examine the determinants of corporate bonds RRs. Earlier studies focussed on financial firm-level data and macro-economic variables. The authors also test the impact of board composition and ownership structure on bond recoveries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether specific corporate governance mechanisms, such as board size, board composition, leverage and firm size, tend to mitigate agency cost occurrence in the USA, Russia and Norway.Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze the sample of 243 US, 196 Russian and 175 Norwegian joint stock companies for the period 2004-2012. The regression analysis is applied to test the models.Findings It is revealed that larger boards increase agency costs (measured by asset utilization ratio and asset liquidity ratio) in all sample companies. The proportion of female members has a very slight positive effect in US companies, a negative influence on agency costs in the Norwegian sample and is not significant in the Russian market. The authors find that the big Russian and US companies in the samples of this paper have lower agency costs.Practical implications The results of this paper show which agency-mitigation mechanisms work more effectively in companies operating in the analyzed countries characterized by specific corporate governance models.Originality/value The main contribution of this paper to the empirical literature is that it extends the stream of agency research by introducing new, emerging markets: represented by Scandinavian (depicted by the Norwegian sample) and Russian companies. Considering that each market – US, Norwegian and Russian – represents significant distinguishing features in their institutional framework, the paper provides an important research setting in which corporate governance mechanisms can be analyzed from the perspective of a country’s peculiar characteristics. Unlike other agency cost studies, this paper accounts for the gender diversity component in the companies and contributes to gender diversity issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how investors’ valuation of cash holdings is related to firm-level investment. Design/methodology/approach – As prior studies note that holding excess cash serve as a driver to would be over-investing, and that over-investment imposes substantial agency costs on shareholders, the authors focus on the value implications of holding cash in the presence of over-investment from the perspective of shareholders. Findings – By examining the publicly traded companies on Taiwan stock market, the authors uncover that cash is valued less in firms with over-investment than in those with under-investment and the magnitude of over-investment is negatively related to the marginal value of cash holdings (MVCH). It reveals that investment activities impact the value that shareholders place on cash holdings. Moreover, further tests indicate that higher block holdings and the presence of independent directors on boards can effectively mitigate the negative impact of over-investment on the MVCH. Practical implications – This paper enhances the understanding of the valuation implications of cash reserves held by firms with over-investment and the effectiveness of governance structures in containing the detrimental effect of investment-related agency costs on the value of holding cash. Originality/value – This paper provides pioneering evidence that outside investors discount cash assets in over-investing firms to reflect their expectations that they will not receive the full benefit of these assets; and this paper extends the literature on corporate governance by assessing the role of governance mechanisms in reversing the negative relation between over-investment and the MVCH. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - This paper aims to furnish incremental insights on dividends and corporate governance (CG) by addressing the relationship between board meeting frequency and board independence with dividend payout. In particular, this study aims to investigate whether CG attributes are substitutes to control agency problem within the Malaysian context. Design/methodology/approach - This paper examines panel data on a sample of 114 Malaysian firms (798 observations) for seven years from 2002 to 2008. Findings - Based on 798 firm-year observations for the period from 2002 to 2008, the results show significant negative relationship between CG (board independence, board meeting frequency) and dividend payout. This suggests that CG and dividend payout are substitutes in reducing agency costs. Our study provides empirical evidence consistent with the "substitution argument", indicating that firms with weak CG need to establish reputation by paying more dividends. Specifically, the findings indicate that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors and boards of director that meet more frequent pay lower dividends. Originality/value - This paper provides evidence on previously untested governance characteristics in relation to how they act as substitute mechanisms with dividends for reducing agency costs. The results builds a strong case for the fresh strand of knowledge on dividends and CG which tests each CG variables to understand each of its unique relationship with dividends in line with the dividends outcome or substitute theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose -- The agency problem inherent in governing public corporations predicts a management not acting in shareholders' best interest. The purpose of this paper is to use the Green Bay Packers' unique ownership structure as a case study to show that a disperse shareholder base does not necessarily lead to failures in corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach -- The Packers have been run by a great management team since 1992. The authors argue that the new management has become the de facto owners of the Packers organization and dealt away the agency costs as a result. This argument is in line with the Coase Theorem. Findings -- The ownership of the Packers is a property. As would be argued with the Coase Theorem, if the property right is well defined, who controls the property, under certain circumstances, is irrelevant in regard of maximizing ownership value. Research limitations/implications -- With only one sample point, the authors, however, cannot rule out the randomness of the Packers' stellar performance and also the possibility that the new management acts in the best interest of Packers shareholders because they have well-designed employment contracts. Originality/value -- Nevertheless, the findings offer a new perspective to the corporate governance literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to identify the extent to which the company's post- initial public offering (IPO) outcome varies, along with the determinants of the post-IPO outcomes. Design/methodology/approach -- The authors use Cox proportional hazards models to examine what determines the company's post-IPO transition to one of the classified outcomes, delisting, acquisition due to strong performance, and acquisition due to weak performance. The authors develop models taking in a range of information concerning pre-IPO characteristics, offering characteristics, financial indicators, company specifics, industry features, and corporate ownership and governance. Findings -- Delisting is predominantly influenced by the company' pre-IPO operating performance, as well as financial indicators and governance structure at the time of the IPO. Sound governance structure and good financial standing of the company aid it to achieve its goal. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of both forms are distinguished most significantly by ownership structure and industry features, which is consonant with the position that M&As are majorly motivated by social concerns and corporate control considerations. Centrally, corporate evolution is jointly shaped by market force and state control. Practical implications -- The findings can inform public policy decisions. There is a case for gradual introduction of institutional changes which facilitate, regulate, and monitor orderly market operations in line with the market mechanism and sound corporate governance. Originality/value -- The study is among the first efforts to examine what determines the company's transition to one of the post-IPO states following the IPO in China's stock market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of corporate governance practised by co-operatives and mutual societies in New Zealand and whether there is any relationship between co-operatives’ ownership structure, capital structure and agency costs. The study also explores whether the capital structure and the ownership structure changed during the period 2005-2011. Design/methodology/approach – Panel data for the period 2005-2011 are analysed using ordinary least squares regression and the Tobit model regression. The authors have used operating expense to sales, asset utilisation and ROA as the dependent variables. Findings – The findings indicate that an increase in independent directors, board member experience and size (measured by total annual sales) reduces agency costs in co-operatives and mutuals in New Zealand. Also, borrowing from members rather than banks reduces agency cost and increases profitability in co-operatives and mutuals. Research limitations/implications – Caution should be exercised when generalising the findings of the study as it is restricted to New Zealand environment and the sample size used is relatively small. Practical implications – This study offers insights for policy makers internationally who are interested in adopting similar corporate governance practices in their own countries. Within New Zealand, the corporate governance debate associated with co-operatives and mutual societies will be better informed as a direct consequence of this research. Originality/value – This is the first study that extends the research undertaken by Ang et al. (2000) and Singh and Davidson (2003) to the cooperative and mutual business model in New Zealand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between dominant shareholders, whose voting rights exceed cash flow rights (excess control), and firms’ cost of capital, including both equity capital and debt. Design/methodology/approach – This research is conducted in Canada over a four-year period from 2002 to 2005 and uses panel data of 155 S&P/TSX firms. The weighted average cost of capital is regressed on excess control using fixed-effect regressions in a two-stage least squares framework. Findings – The paper finds evidence that the cost of capital increases with excess control. The paper also confirms that for firms incorporated under the less protective Quebec incorporation law the excess control and, therefore, cost of capital is higher than for firms incorporated in the other provinces under the common law regime. Originality value – Prior work examined the relationship between excess control and firm value, mostly Tobin's Q. By using cost of capital, the study explores another channel through witch excess control may affect firm value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of managerial ownership in relation to agency theory in the Malaysian business environment. In addition to examining the total managerial shareholdings, this study also investigates the association between direct and indirect managerial shareholdings with agency costs. Design/methodology/approach - The data for the study is obtained from two sources, namely primary (questionnaire) and secondary (annual reports) data. The sample companies are 235 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ended 2006. Multiple regression analysis is used to estimate the relationship between the variables. Findings - The results of the study indicate that managerial ownership in various segments has an inverse relationship with total monitoring costs as predicted in agency theory. This finding is consistent with earlier studies in western countries and supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. Originality/value - This study gives a unique contribution to corporate governance studies relating to the effect of ownership structure in relation to agency theory in Malaysian companies, one of the countries in Asia. Previous studies claimed that it is unknown whether the agency theory findings in western countries have equal impact in Asian organizations. Previous literature also indicates that there is a possibility that given the cultural differences, the typical nature of agents in agency theory may not be the case with regard to non-western countries. Thus, this study provides evidence that support prior research findings in western countries relating to the effect of managerial ownership on the agency relationship which is reflected in its agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and agency costs of family and non-family ownership of public listed companies in Malaysia. It presents a longitudinal study of the 290 publicly listed companies in the Main Board of the Bursa Malaysia over the period 1999-2005.The study applies the governance mechanisms such as board size, independent director and duality as a tool in monitoring agency costs based on asset utilization ratio and expense ratio as proxy for agency costs. There is strong evidence that larger board size has a significant effect as a device in mitigating agency costs. The study supports that independent directors and duality are viewed differently by family and non-family ownership. The evidence shows that an independent director in family ownership does not influence agency costs. But non-family ownership needs more independent directors to counsel and monitor the company and thus reducing the agency conflict with shareholders. The study also finds that family ownership experiences less agency conflicts when duality role exists. Contrary, non family ownership experiences high agency costs when duality exists on board. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a study on the empirical relationship between corporate governance control mechanisms and direct equity agency cost measures for the control of equity agency costs. The study used univariate and multivariate tests to measure the three direct agency cost proxies, such as asset turnover, the operating expense, and selling, general and administrative (SGA) ratios. Results show that the best cross-sectional proxy for the direct agency costs of equity is the asset turnover ratio.

Many scholars have found a negative relationship between a firm's size and its value, as measured by Tobin's q. This result is called the size discount. There are hypotheses about why the size discount exists, but none have been rigorously empirically tested. This paper argues that the size discount is created by the inability of shareholders to minimize agency costs in larger companies. Statistical tests suggest that the size discount only appears in large firms with managers that impose excessive agency costs upon their shareholders. Empiricists who use Tobin's q to proxy for growth opportunities may need a different proxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]