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PurposeFinancial analysts have been found to be overconfident. The purpose of this paper is to study the ramifications of that overconfidence on the dispersion of earnings estimates as a predictor of the US business cycle.Design/methodology/approachWhether aggregate analyst forecast dispersion contains information about turning points in business cycles, especially downturns, is examined by utilizing the analyst earnings forecast dispersion metric. The primary analysis derives from logit regression and Markov switching models. The analysis controls for sentiment (consumer confidence), output (industrial production), and financial indicators (stock returns and turnover). Analyst data come from Institutional Brokers Estimate System, while the economic data are available at the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Data site.FindingsA rise in the dispersion of analyst forecasts is a significant predictor of turning points in the US business cycle. Financial analyst uncertainty of earnings estimate contains crucial information about the risks of US business cycle turning points. The results are consistent with some analysts becoming overconfident during the expansion period and misjudging the precision of their information, thus over or under weighting various sources of information. This causes the disagreement among analysts measured as dispersion.Originality/valueThis is the first study to show that analyst forecast dispersion contributions valuable information to predictions of economic downturns. In addition, that dispersion can be attributed to analyst overconfidence.

PurposeThis paper scrutinizes the impact of socioeconomic, political, legal and religious factors on the internal ethical values of human rights organizations (HROs) worldwide. The authors aim to examine the Code of Ethics for 279 HROs in 67 countries and the social and legal settings in which they operate.Design/methodology/approachUsing the framework of protect, respect and remedy, the authors look for keywords that represent the human rights lexicon in these three areas. In the protection of human rights, the authors select the terms: peace, transparency, freedom and security. For the respect of humans, the authors use the terms: dignity, equality, respect and rights. Sources of remedies come from justice and ethics. The analysis seeks to determine what political economy settings drive the ethical value choices of the organizations. Those choices are proxied by those keywords they mention in their Code of Ethics.FindingsThe analysis show that the scope of ethical values mentioned are higher when the HRO is in a country with more domestic violence, lower income inequality, French civil or Islamic legal origin and higher trust in politicians. In regard to the determinants of the ten keywords individually, the authors conclude that the status of the socioeconomic, political, religious and legal settings impact with local HROs mention each of the keywords: peace, justice, transparency, dignity, equality, ethics, respect, freedom, security and rights.Research limitations/implicationsThe analysis is based on HROs that have a webpage in English and list the employee Code of Conduct.Originality/valueThis study is the first to examine the Code of Ethics for HROs. The authors demonstrate that country-specific characteristics help to drive their internal ethical values.

Purpose – The authors examine whether the stronger information content of chief financial officer (CFO) insider trading relative to that of chief executive officers (CEOs) results from a different willingness to exploit the information asymmetry that exists between executives and outside shareholders (scrutiny hypothesis) or from differing financial acumen between CFOs and CEOs (financial acumen hypothesis). The authors consider the information content of equity purchases for CEOs and CFOs. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examine purchase-based insider trading portfolio returns before and after the implementation of SOX in firms with high versus low regulation, for routine and opportunistic managers, and in samples of CEOs with prior CFO experience. Findings – The authors provide evidence that SOX affected executives differently and provide support for the scrutiny hypothesis. CFO-based portfolios remain the most profitable post-SOX, but the magnitude of returns has fallen in absolute and relative terms compared to returns for CEOs. Superior financial acumen of CFOs does not appear to be supported. CEO purchase trade returns appear to be lower than CFO returns because CEOs face greater visibility and scrutiny and thus limit their own trading aggressiveness. Originality/value – This research contributes to the literature in explaining why CFOs best CEOs in their insider trading purchases and documents that in the post-SOX period, CFO insider trading superiority disappears.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to introduce a non‐normality premium (NNP) to identify the extra return that will compensate an investor for a non‐normal return distribution. The NNP quantifies the economic significance of non‐normality to complement a statistical significance test of non‐normality, such as the Jarque‐Bera test.Design/methodology/approachThe NNP is patterned after the risk premium, the amount that compensates an investor for the risk of an investment. The theoretical NNP is examined on the margins with Taylor series approximation and applied to hedge fund data.FindingsAn increase of 1 in the skewness has the same effect on an investor as an increase in the mean of 2.5 basis points per month. An increase of 1 in the kurtosis has the same effect on an investor as a decrease in the mean of 0.15 basis points per month. A sample of 716 hedge funds revealed that while 72 per cent statistically reject normality, only 29 per cent require more than a single basis point per month difference in the mean to compenscate an investor for the non‐normality.Originality/valueThe NNP allows for a valuation on the higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) of an investor's return distribution. The evaluation is tailored to the individual through use of a utility function. Once applied to an alternative investment vehicle, it is learned that rejecting normality is not sufficient grounds to suspect that the non‐normality is important to investors.