1. Bertrand competition with capacity constraints: mergers among parking lots
- Author
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Froeb, Luke, Tschantz, Steven, and Crooke, Philip
- Subjects
Automobile parking -- Supply and demand ,Acquisitions and mergers -- Research ,Industrial capacity -- Research ,Demand (Economics) -- Research ,Business ,Economics - Abstract
To analyze the effects of mergers among firms facing capacity constraints, we develop a numerical model of price-setting behavior among multi-product firms differentiated by location and capacity. We perform a number of computational experiments designed to inform merger policy, with specific reference to the Central Parking-Allright merger of 1999. The experiments show that capacity constraints on merging firms attenuate merger effects by much more than capacity constraints on non-merging firms amplify them. The experiments also highlight the dependence of merger welfare effects on parking demand. In preparation for further industry consolidation, we propose estimators of parking demand to more precisely estimate the costs and benefits of future mergers. JEL classification: L41; C63; C35 Keywords: Capacity constraints; Parking; Merger; Demand estimation
- Published
- 2003