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Scholars have argued for centuries that affective states involve interoception, or representations of the state of the body. Yet, we lack a mechanistic understanding of how signals from the body are transduced, transmitted, compressed, and integrated by the brains of humans to produce affective states. We suggest that to understand how the body contributes to affect, we first need to understand information flow through the nervous system's interoceptive pathways. We outline such a model and discuss how unique anatomical and physiological aspects of interoceptive pathways may give rise to the qualities of affective experiences in general and valence and arousal in particular. We conclude by considering implications and future directions for research on interoception, affect, emotions, and human mental experiences., Competing Interests: Declaration of interests No interests are declared., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Emotions are often assumed to manifest in subcortical limbic and brainstem structures. While these areas are clearly important for representing affect (e.g., valence and arousal), we propose that the default mode network (DMN) is additionally important for constructing discrete emotional experiences (of anger, fear, disgust, etc.). Findings from neuroimaging studies, invasive electrical stimulation studies, and lesion studies support this proposal. Importantly, our framework builds on a constructionist theory of emotion to explain how instances involving diverse physiological and behavioral patterns can be conceptualized as belonging to the same emotion category. We argue that this ability requires abstraction (from concrete features to broad mental categories), which the DMN is well positioned to support, and we make novel predictions from our proposed framework., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

The 'faculty psychology' approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in terms of categories that reflect modular 'faculties', such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions, has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology approach, this 'constructionist' approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

In the blink of an eye, people can easily see emotion in another person's face. This fact leads many to assume that emotion perception is given and proceeds independently of conceptual processes such as language. In this paper we suggest otherwise and offer the hypothesis that language functions as a context in emotion perception. We review a variety of evidence consistent with the language-as-context view and then discuss how a linguistically relative approach to emotion perception allows for intriguing and generative questions about the extent to which language shapes the sensory processing involved in seeing emotion in another person's face.