1. Dutch shared savings program targeted at primary care: Reduced expenditures in its first year
- Author
-
Michael J. van den Berg, Arthur P. Hayen, Gerard Pieter Westert, and Jeroen N. Struijs
- Subjects
media_common.quotation_subject ,Control (management) ,Healthcare improvement science Radboud Institute for Health Sciences [Radboudumc 18] ,03 medical and health sciences ,All institutes and research themes of the Radboud University Medical Center ,0302 clinical medicine ,Patient satisfaction ,Cost Savings ,Health care ,Humans ,Quality (business) ,030212 general & internal medicine ,health care economics and organizations ,Netherlands ,media_common ,Primary Health Care ,Public economics ,business.industry ,030503 health policy & services ,Health Policy ,Payment reform ,Primary care ,Payment ,Incentive ,Value (economics) ,Global Positioning System ,Health Expenditures ,0305 other medical science ,business ,Delivery of Health Care ,Shared savings - Abstract
In countries where GPs fulfill a central role in the health care system, like in the Netherlands, the lack of value-based incentives in GP payment systems may have negative consequences for value delivered in other parts of the health care spectrum. We evaluate an experiment in which GPs were allowed to share in savings in total health care expenditures, conditionally on achieving quality targets. At least in theory, these so-called 'shared savings contracts' incentivize GPs to become critical gatekeepers, coordinate the provision of care and substitute for specialist services when appropriate. This study evaluates a Dutch shared savings program targeted at GPs. This study employs a difference-in-differences design using a regional control group of non-participating GPs. We find that program participation led to savings in health care expenditures (-2%), while patient satisfaction was unaffected and while the results for other quality indicators were ambiguous. Additional analyses show that savings have been predominantly realized by lowering the volume of specialist care, and that almost every participating GP displayed cost-saving behavior. This finding suggests that shared savings contracts, even when added as a mere complemented to existing volume-based payment models, already elicit substantive effort to increase the value of health care provided.(c) 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).In countries where GPs fulfill a central role in the health care system, like in the Netherlands, the lack of value-based incentives in GP payment systems may have negative consequences for value delivered in other parts of the health care spectrum. We evaluate an experiment in which GPs were allowed to share in savings in total health care expenditures, conditionally on achieving quality targets. At least in theory, these so-called ?shared savings contracts? incentivize GPs to become critical gatekeepers, coordinate the provision of care and substitute for specialist services when appropriate. This study evaluates a Dutch shared savings program targeted at GPs. This study employs a difference-in-differences design using a regional control group of non-participating GPs. We find that program participation led to savings in health care expenditures (-2%), while patient satisfaction was unaffected and while the results for other quality indicators were ambiguous. Additional analyses show that savings have been predominantly realized by lowering the volume of specialist care, and that almost every participating GP displayed cost-saving behavior. This finding suggests that shared savings contracts, even when added as a mere complemented to existing volume-based payment models, already elicit substantive effort to increase the value of health care provided. ? 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
- Published
- 2021