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Over the past three decades, a sustained surge in inflation has been absent in developed markets. As a result, investors face the challenge of having limited experience and no recent data to guide the repositioning of their portfolios in the face of heighted inflation risk. We provide some insight by analyzing both passive and active strategies across a variety of asset classes for the U.S., U.K., and Japan over the past 95 years. Unexpected inflation is bad news for traditional assets, such as bonds and equities, with local inflation having the greatest effect. Commodities have positive returns during inflation surges but there is considerable variation within the commodity complex. Among the dynamic strategies, we find that trend-following provides the most reliable protection during important inflation shocks. Active equity factor strategies also provide some degree of hedging ability. We also provide analysis of alternative asset classes such as fine art and discuss the economic rationale for including cryptocurrencies as part of a strategy to protect against inflation.

Over the 2016-2019 period, we released a series of research papers on the topic of “strategic risk management”, or the embedding of risk management into investm

In the late stages of long bull markets, a popular question arises: What steps can an investor take to mitigate the impact of the inevitable large equity correction? However, hedging equity portfolios is notoriously difficult and expensive. We analyze the performance of different tools that investors could deploy. For example, continuously holding short-dated S&P 500 put options is the most reliable defensive method but also the most costly strategy. Holding ‘safe-haven’ US Treasury bonds produces a positive carry, but may be an unreliable crisis-hedge strategy, as the post-2000 negative bond-equity correlation is a historical rarity. Long gold and long credit protection portfolios sit in between puts and bonds in terms of both cost and reliability. Dynamic strategies that performed well during past drawdowns include: futures time-series momentum (which benefits from extended equity sell-offs) and a quality strategy that takes long/short positions in the highest/lowest quality company stocks (which benefits from a ‘flight-to-quality’ effect during crises). We examine both large equity drawdowns and recessions. We also provide some out-of-sample evidence of the defensive performance of these strategies relative to an earlier, related paper.

Recent studies show that volatility-managed equity portfolios realize higher Sharpe ratios than portfolios with a constant notional exposure. We show that this result only holds for “risk assets”, such as equity and credit, and link this to the so-called leverage effect for those assets. In contrast, for bonds, currencies, and commodities the impact of volatility targeting on the Sharpe ratio is negligible. However, the impact of volatility targeting goes beyond the Sharpe ratio: it reduces the likelihood of extreme returns, across all asset classes. Particularly relevant for investors, “left-tail” events tend to be less severe, as they typically occur at times of elevated volatility, when a target-volatility portfolio has a relatively small notional exposure. We also consider the popular 60-40 equity-bond “balanced” portfolio and an equity-bond-credit-commodity “risk parity” portfolio. Volatility scaling at both the asset and portfolio level improves Sharpe ratios and reduces the likelihood of tail events.

Hedging equity portfolios against the risk of large drawdowns is notoriously difficult and expensive. Holding, and continuously rolling, at-the-money put options on the S&P 500 is a very costly, if reliable, strategy to protect against market sell-offs. Holding ‘safe-haven’ US Treasury bonds, while providing a positive and predictable long-term yield, is generally an unreliable crisis-hedge strategy, since the post-2000 negative bond-equity correlation is a historical rarity. Long gold and long credit protection portfolios appear to sit between puts and bonds in terms of both cost and reliability. In contrast to these passive investments, we investigate two dynamic strategies that appear to have generated positive performance in both the long-run but also particularly during historical crises: futures time-series momentum and quality stock factors. Futures momentum has parallels with long option straddle strategies, allowing it to benefit during extended equity sell-offs. The quality stock strategy takes long positions in highest-quality and short positions in lowest-quality company stocks, benefitting from a ‘flight-to-quality’ effect during crises. These two dynamic strategies historically have uncorrelated return profiles, making them complementary crisis risk hedges. We examine both strategies and discuss how different variations may have performed in crises, as well as normal times, over the years 1985 to 2016.

The fraction of newly-originated mortgages that are of the adjustable-rate (ARM) versus the fixed-rate (FRM) type exhibits a surprising amount of time variation. A simple utility framework of mortgage choice points to the bond risk premium as theoretical determinant: when the bond risk premium is high, FRM payments are high, making ARMs more attractive. We confirm empirically that the bulk of the time variation in household mortgage choice can be explained by time variation in the bond risk premium. This is true regardless of whether bond risk premia are measured using forecasters' data, a VAR term structure model, or a simple rule-of-thumb based on adaptive expectations. This simple rule-of-thumb moves in lock-step with mortgage choice, thereby lending further credibility to a theory of strategic mortgage timing by households.

We study time-series momentum (trend-following) strategies in bonds, commodities, currencies and equity indices between 1960 and 2015. We find that momentum strategies performed consistently both before and after 1985, periods which were marked by strong bear and bull markets in bonds respectively. We document a number of important risk properties. First, that returns are positively skewed, which we argue is intuitive by drawing a parallel between momentum strategies and a long option straddle strategy. Second, performance was particularly strong in the worst equity and bond market environments, giving credence to the claim that trend-following can provide equity and bond crisis alpha. Putting restrictions on the strategy to prevent it being long equities or long bonds has the potential to further enhance the crisis alpha, but reduces the average return. Finally, we examine how performance has varied across momentum strategies based on returns with different lags and applied to different asset classes.

We analyse and contrast the performance of discretionary and systematic hedge funds. Systematic funds use strategies that are rules-based, with little or no daily intervention by humans. In our experience, some large allocators shy away from systematic hedge funds altogether. A possible explanation for this is what the psychology literature calls “algorithm aversion”. We find that, for the period 1996-2014, systematic equity managers underperform their discretionary counterparts in terms of unadjusted (raw) returns, but that after adjusting for exposures to well-known risk factors, the risk-adjusted performance is similar. In the case of macro, systematic funds outperform discretionary funds, both on an unadjusted and risk-adjusted basis. It is sometimes claimed that systematic funds’ returns have a greater exposure to well-known risk factors. We find, however, that for discretionary funds (in the aggregate) more of the average return and the volatility of returns can be explained by risk factors.

Motivated by the explosive growth in CTA assets under management, in combination with the recent poor performance of many managers in this sector, we explore whether the trend-following trading style employed by many CTAs has become crowded. Explicitly, we test for market impact using the following hypothesis: around the turn of the month (TOM), trend-following (MOM) strategies digest sizeable inflows, causing the managers to trade up their existing positions, thereby pushing prices temporarily in their favor. The main empirical test is whether there is an above average return for MOM strategies on TOM days, which we refer to as the MOM-TOM effect. We found a very strong MOM-TOM effect in the Newedge Trend Index returns, with 90% of cumulative returns since 2000 being realized on the three TOM days. In addition, a replicating strategy we designed to closely track the Newedge Trend Index displayed a strong MOM-TOM effect.

I investigate household interest rate risk management by solving a life-cycle asset allocation model that includes mortgage and bond portfolio choice. I find that most investors prefer an adjustable-rate mortgage, and thereby save on the bond risk premium that is contained in fixed-rate mortgage payments. Only older, risk-averse investors hold some fixed-rate mortgage debt. Together with a position in short-term bonds this enables them to hedge against changes in the real interest rate, while the inflation exposure of the debt and bond positions cancel out. Hedging house price changes with bonds only occurs at the end of the life cycle. Early in the life cycle short-sale constraints prevent an effective hedge.