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For treatment effects—one of the core issues in modern econometric analysis—prediction and estimation are two sides of the same coin. As it turns out, machine learning methods are the tool for generalized prediction models. Combined with econometric theory, they allow us to estimate not only the average but a personalized treatment effect—the conditional average treatment effect (CATE). In this tutorial, we give an overview of novel methods, explain them in detail, and apply them via Quantlets in real data applications. We study the effect that microcredit availability has on the amount of money borrowed and if 401(k) pension plan eligibility has an impact on net financial assets, as two empirical examples. The presented toolbox of methods contains meta-learners, like the doubly-robust, R-, T- and X-learner, and methods that are specially designed to estimate the CATE like the causal BART and the generalized random forest. In both, the microcredit and 401(k) example, we find a positive treatment effect for all observations but conflicting evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity. An additional simulation study, where the true treatment effect is known, allows us to compare the different methods and to observe patterns and similarities.

The Senate Finance Committee’s hearing on July 28, 2021 -- "Building on Bipartisan Retirement Legislation: How Can Congress Help?" -- spotlighted “mega-IRAs”: individual retirement accounts with balances of $5 million or more. An analysis by the Joint Committee on Taxation in advance of the July 28 hearing found that the number of taxpayers with mega-IRAs now exceeds 28,000. The hearing followed a June 2021 report by the nonprofit investigative journalism organization ProPublica, which revealed—based on leaked IRS files—that a handful of high-net-worth individuals had accumulated massive IRA balances. The Senate Finance Committee hearing and the ProPublica report emphasized one way that taxpayers amass mega-IRAs: by “stuffing” an account with undervalued assets such as pre-IPO stock and investment-fund carried interests. “Stuffing” no doubt occurs in some instances, and Congress could take steps to stop it (e.g., by prohibiting IRAs from holding non-publicly traded assets). However, it is unlikely that most mega-IRAs result from abusive stuffing tactics. Individuals engaged in stuffing would generally want to convert their IRAs from traditional to Roth accounts quickly. Yet JCT’s analysis found that 85 percent of mega-IRA owners hold only traditional accounts. How, then, have tens of thousands of high-income individuals created mega-IRAs? As our submission shows, existing rules allow high-income taxpayers to amass mega-IRAs straightforwardly—and legally—by “maxing out” 401(k) defined contribution plans, potentially combining defined contribution plans with defined benefit plans, and investing in S&P 500 index funds or other publicly traded assets. Mega-IRAs are indeed a problem, but they are a problem primarily caused by laws that lavish excessive tax benefits on high-income individuals. This statement for the record begins by illustrating how high-income individuals can create mega-IRAs through entirely legal means. Next, we review the choices that Congress has made over the last quarter-century that opened a wide door to mega-IRAs. We then explain why the JCT data and other sources strongly suggest that most mega-IRAs do not reflect stuffing. We conclude with concrete policy recommendations to stem the tide of mega-IRAs and other mega-retirement arrangements, which undermine the progressivity and revenue-raising potential of the federal income tax system.

On March 10, 2021, our journal partnered with the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law and Policy to host a symposium addressing the role and impact of U.S. innovation policy on access to medicine. Our 2021 Symposium Issue—Volume 11, Issue 1—captures that event. This article represents the first of four panels. This panel considered what role governments should play in setting rewards for medical innovation. It was moderated by Professor Lisa Ouellette of Stanford Law School. The panelists included Professor Michael Abramowicz of George Washington University Law School, Professor Daniel Hemel of the University of Chicago Law School, and Professor Bhaven Sampat of the Columbia Mailman School of Public Health.

Congress first enacted the generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax in 1976 to protect the estate and gift tax base and to ensure that extraordinary fortunes would bear their fair share of the transfer tax burden. Nearly a half-century into the life of the GST tax, those goals remain unrealized. In recent decades, high-net-worth individuals have succeeded in shifting hundreds of billions of dollars to “dynasty trusts” that—under current law—are poised to escape federal wealth transfer taxation indefinitely. The rise of dynasty trusts reduces the revenue-raising potential of the estate and gift taxes and allows a privileged class to exert vast economic and political power based solely on an accident of birth. This white paper presents a legislative reform agenda designed to reinvigorate the GST tax, stem the rise of dynasty trusts, and bring hundreds of billions of dollars back within the federal transfer tax base. We highlight three flaws in current law that account for the GST tax’s failure: (1) very high exemption amounts; (2) loopholes that allow high-net-worth taxpayers to stuff GST-exempt trusts with assets worth many multiples of the exemption amount; and (3) the lack of any durational limit on dynasty trusts in states that have abolished the rule against perpetuities. Our three-part reform agenda addresses each of these flaws. First, we propose a reduction in the GST exemption from the current level ($11.7 million) to the 2009 level ($3.5 million). A $3.5 million GST exemption still would be higher, in inflation-adjusted terms, than the exemption amount advocated by the Reagan administration. Second, we propose a set of common-sense loophole closers that would prevent high-net-worth taxpayers from stuffing GST-exempt trusts with assets worth far more than the exemption amount. Third, we propose to limit the maximum duration of a trust’s GST exemption to two generations, with an exception that would allow tax-free distributions to beneficiaries who were alive at the time of the trust’s inception. Our plan would shore up the estate and gift tax base and stem the rise of dynasty trusts while allowing more than 99 percent of American families to pass wealth across multiple generations tax-free.

The COVID-19 pandemic is probably not the last time that a new and deadly infectious disease will sweep the planet. What can the United States do to improve its changes of averting large-scale loss of life the next time? This essay—prepared for The University of Chicago Legal Forum’s symposium issue on “Law for the Next Pandemic”—envisions four “futures” for the United States’ pandemic response and considers the advantages and drawbacks of each. One approach, the Mass Surveillance strategy, relies on widespread population monitoring, rigorous contact tracing, and enforced isolation of the infected. That strategy has enabled several East and Southeast Asian countries to keep case counts low without instituting long lockdowns. In the United States, the Mass Surveillance approach would face surmountable constitutional hurdles but potentially insurmountable cultural obstacles. A second option, the Fortress strategy, combines lockdowns to stop community transmission with border closures to prevent reintroduction of the infection. Australia and New Zealand illustrate the Fortress approach’s lifesaving potential, but their examples will be difficult to replicate in a country with a much larger population and long land borders. A third approach, the Internationalist strategy, emphasizes global cooperation with the goal of preventing animal-to-human transmission and containing any outbreak quickly. That approach is appealing—and worth pursuing—but it faces the high probability that it won’t work. A fourth approach, the Early Vaccination strategy, would truncate the clinical trial process and boost vaccine production capacity so that a large portion of the U.S. population could be vaccinated within several months of an outbreak. This, too, is worth a try, but even a rapidly developed vaccine is unlikely to protect us from a pandemic’s first wave. Ultimately, the essay recommends that the United States follow an all-of-the-above approach—preparing to pursue the Mass Surveillance, Fortress, Internationalist, and Early Vaccination strategies—without being overly optimistic about the prospect that any single one of these strategies will succeed.

The “tax gap”—the difference between the amount of “true tax” and the amount of tax actually paid—has garnered widespread attention in recent months. Much of the commentary on the subject equates the tax gap with “tax evasion,” a term broadly understood to connote intentional (and potentially criminal) underreporting. This paper cautions against conflating the tax gap with tax evasion. The tax gap includes substantial gray areas where the law is ambiguous and the IRS’s determination of “true tax” is debatable. On top of that, the IRS’s methodology for measuring the tax gap includes upward adjustments that are recommended by front-line examiners but reversed on administrative appeal or judicial review. Moreover, a substantial portion of the estimated tax gap is derived from a statistical technique called “detection controlled estimation” that potentially magnifies the impact of later-reversed recommendations on the ultimate tax gap measure. Weighing in the opposite direction, the IRS’s approach to measuring the tax gap excludes some amounts that clearly constitute tax evasion (most significantly, underreporting of tax on illegal-source income). Understanding the tax gap’s shades of gray can inform discussions of tax law and policy. We explain how proposals to use the tax gap as a performance target may produce perverse incentives for the IRS. We further explain how additional IRS funding—though necessary to improve the agency’s ability to enforce the tax laws—may have counterintuitive effects on the estimates of the tax gap. We also illustrate—using examples from the taxation of passthrough entities—how legislative reforms can reduce the size and scope of legal gray areas that contribute to the tax gap. Our analysis highlights the importance of increased IRS funding levels and substantive tax law changes as complementary strategies for improving tax compliance.

A central question in law and economics is whether non-tax legal rules should be designed solely to maximize efficiency or whether they also should account for concerns about the distribution of income. This question takes on particular importance in the context of cost-benefit analysis. Federal agencies apply cost-benefit analysis when writing regulations that generate multibillion dollar impacts on the US economy and profound effects on millions of Americans’ lives. In the past, agency cost-benefit analyses typically have ignored the income-distributive consequences of those regulations. That may soon change: On his first day in office, President Biden instructed his Office of Management and Budget to propose procedures for incorporating distributive considerations into cost-benefit analysis, thus bringing renewed relevance to a long-running law-and-economics debate. This article explores what it might mean in practice for agencies to incorporate distributive considerations into cost-benefit analysis. It uses, as a case study, a 2014 rule promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) requiring new motor vehicles to have rearview cameras that reduce the risk of backover crashes. As with most major federal regulations that impose large dollar costs, the principal benefit of the rear visibility rule is a reduction in premature mortality. Quantitative cost-benefit analysis typically translates mortality reductions into dollar terms based on the “value of a statistical life,” or VSL. Any distributive evaluation of the rule will depend critically on a parameter known as the “income elasticity of the VSL,” which reflects the relationship between an individual’s income and her willingness to pay for mortality risk reductions. Although agency cost-benefit analyses use the same VSL for all individuals regardless of income, the Department of Transportation—of which NHTSA is a part—has issued guidance on the income elasticity of the VSL for other purposes. When this article applies the Department of Transportation’s income-elasticity guidance in its distributive analysis, the rear visibility rule appears to be “regressive”: it generates net costs for lower-income groups and net benefits for higher-income groups. Rerunning the distributive analysis with equal dollar VSLs at all income levels, the rule appears to be “progressive”: lower-income individuals are the primary beneficiaries and higher-income individuals are the losers. The article goes on to explain why assumptions about the relationship between income and the VSL will have important implications for distributive analyses of other lifesaving regulations. The article then asks what agencies ought to do: should they incorporate distributive objectives into cost-benefit analysis by assigning greater weight to dollars in lower-income individuals’ hands, and should they assign different dollar VSLs to individuals with different incomes? The two questions are closely linked. Incorporating distributive objectives into cost-benefit analysis of lifesaving regulations while maintaining equal dollar VSLs for rich and poor will potentially produce perverse outcomes that—according to standard economic thinking—actually redistribute from poor to rich. After canvassing options, this article ultimately concludes that the status quo approach—equal weights for low-income and high-income individuals’ dollars, equal dollar VSLs for low-income and high-income individuals—makes practical sense in light of expressive concerns, informational burdens, and institutional constraints. The article ends by reflecting on the case study’s lessons for broader debates over legal system design, and it explains why the issues that arise in the rear visibility case study are likely to affect other efforts to redistribute through non-tax legal rules.

This policy brief highlights flaws in the current federal tax treatment of stock buybacks and proposes to address those flaws by equalizing the tax treatment of buybacks and dividends. (We explore the proposal in greater detail in Hemel & Polsky, Taxing Buybacks, 38 Yale J. on Reg. 246 (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3764112.) Stock buybacks allow foreign shareholders to avoid U.S. withholding tax on corporate cash distributions. Stock buybacks also allow U.S. taxable investors to reduce or eliminate shareholder-level tax on corporate cash distributions through a combination of deferral, loss harvesting, and stepped-up basis at death. Our proposal—based on an idea first suggested by Marvin Chirelstein a half century ago—would plug these gaps in the tax base by treating stock buybacks as imputed dividends. We explain the mechanics of the proposal and the principal design choices facing policymakers. We also estimate—conservatively—that the proposal would raise more than $500 billion over the 10-year budget window.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has led to acute supply shortages across the country as well as concerns over price increases amid surging demand. In the process, it has reawakened a debate about whether and how to regulate “price gouging.” Animating this controversy is a longstanding conflict between laissez-faire economics (which champions price fluctuations as a means to allocate scarce goods) and perceived norms of consumer fairness (which are thought to cut strongly against sharp price hikes amid shortages). This article provides a new, empirically grounded perspective on the price gouging debate that challenges several aspects of conventional wisdom. We report results from a survey experiment administered to a large, nationally representative sample during the height of the pandemic’s initial wave. We presented participants with a variety of vignettes involving price increases, eliciting their reactions along two dimensions: the degree of unfairness they perceived, and the legal response they favored. Overall, we find that participants are more tolerant of price increases than either the existing behavioral economics literature predicts or most state price gouging statutes countenance. But we also find that price fairness perceptions can be highly sensitive to context. For example, participants are much more tolerant of moderate price increases if they previously are asked to contemplate large price increases. Moreover, participants are substantially more willing to accept a price increase when it is accompanied by an apology and/or a public-minded rationale (such as supporting furloughed employees). We explore the implications of our findings for behavioral economics, pricing practices, and legal reform.

Three transfer tax minimization mechanisms—zeroed-out grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs), intentionally defective grantor trusts (IDGTs), and family-controlled entities with steep valuation discounts—significantly shrink the federal estate and gift tax base. This white paper explains how Congress can close all three loopholes. We estimate that these actions—along with complementary base-protecting and base-expanding proposals—would raise more than $65 billion over the fiscal year 2022 to fiscal year 2031 window (and possibly much more than $65 billion). They also would enhance the progressivity of the federal tax system and bolster the long-term revenue-raising capacity of the estate and gift taxes. To summarize key conclusions: — Congress should repeal section 2702(b)(1), the provision that enables high-net-worth individuals to achieve extraordinary transfer tax savings via GRATs; — Congress should harmonize the income tax and transfer tax treatment of IDGTs, preferably by treating these trusts as nongrantor trusts for income tax purposes; — Congress should limit lack-of-marketability discounts and eliminate lack-of-control discounts with respect to transfers of interests in family-controlled entities; and — Congress should supplement these three reforms with additional base-protecting and base-broadening measures: shifting to a tax-inclusive base for gift taxes; limiting the gift tax annual exclusion for transfers in trust; and expanding the requirement of consistency in value for transfer and income tax purposes. All of these steps remain relevant—and in some respects, even more urgent—if Congress enacts the Biden-Harris administration’s capital income tax reform proposal, which would limit the tax-free step-up in basis at death to the first $1 million of unrealized gains ($2 million per couple). Unless Congress secures the estate and gift tax base, high-net-worth taxpayers will respond to stepped-up basis reform by exploiting transfer-tax loopholes even more aggressively. For this reason, estate and gift tax loophole closers and stepped-up basis reform should be considered complements, not substitutes.

Resume L’utilisation de la salle d’isolement en psychiatrie demeure controversee et plusieurs milieux travaillent a la supprimer. L’etude visait a comparer les perceptions de patients et d’infirmier(e)s vis-a-vis d’une nouvelle salle d’isolement sur une unite psychiatrique au Quebec, examiner les fondements du processus decisionnel infirmier relatif a l’isolement, et determiner son impact sur les dynamiques de soins. Un devis de type descriptif qualitatif a ete utilise. Des entrevues individuelles ont ete menees avec six patients et douze infirmier(e)s. Une analyse thematique a ete realisee. Trois categories ont emerge des donnees : l’isolement comme strategie d’intervention ; l’impact sur les patients ; la negociation des relations patients–personnel infirmier. Tous les participants soulignent les avantages securitaires et therapeutiques de l’isolement. Toutefois, des perceptions negatives dominent les propos des patients, meme chez ceux n’en ayant jamais fait l’experience. Plusieurs patients expriment des craintes vis-a-vis de l’isolement comme punition. La salle d’isolement demeure un symbole anxiogene pour les patients, qui modifient leurs comportements et « jouent le jeu » pour satisfaire aux attentes du personnel.

In recent years, trademark scholars have come to recognize that the supply of words, sounds, and symbols available to designate new goods and services is an exhaustible resource. In certain sectors, the most common Eng-lish words and syllables and the most common U.S. surnames are almost all claimed as marks. Some firms have responded by resorting to ever-more-unusual brand names so as to avoid trademark disputes. Scholars have pro-posed solutions ranging from raising registration fees to narrowing the scope of trademark rights. In this Article, we frame trademark law’s governance of “linguistic space” as a balancing act between what we term proximity costs and distance costs. Proximity costs, the conventional focus of trademark doctrine, occur when different firms use marks that are close in linguistic space—think Zan-tac (for heartburn) versus Xanax (for anxiety). Distance costs arise when firms use marks that are difficult to remember because of their length or their far remove from the core of semantic signifiers familiar to most consumers—staying in the medicine cabinet, think Valsartan (for high blood pressure) or Namzaric (for memory loss). Although conceptually different, proximity costs and distance costs both create similar practical problems. Both make it more difficult for consumers to purchase and communicate about brands, and both make it harder for new entrants to establish and defend their market share. Our proximity-distance framing has conceptual payoffs for trademark law. We explain why responses to the crowding of linguistic space internal to trademark law cannot escape some tradeoff between proximity costs and dis-tance costs. Allowing mark holders to control a larger swath of linguistic space reduces proximity costs, but at the expense of pushing other firms to the periphery of linguistic space, increasing distance costs. Similarly, weak-ening trademark protection to allow more firms to locate their marks in the linguistic core reduces distance costs, but with some increase in proximity costs. Our framing thus shows how the policy problems of trademark law parallel the challenges of managing scarcity in real property. As we draw in-spiration from solutions to urban congestion and sprawl, we suggest how nontrademark interventions can lead to more efficient use of linguistic space, promoting product identification without raising proximity or distance costs. Our approach thus points to the possibility of using a plurality of legal and policy tools to address the proximity-distance dilemma at trademark law’s heart. And by relieving some of the pressure on trademark law to resolve the proximity-distance dilemma on its own, our approach frees trademark law to pursue a wider range of goals and to vindicate a broader variety of values.

This is a case about tax shelters. It presents a narrow legal question: May people and companies that promote abusive tax shelters sue to block enforcement of monetary penalties for failing to disclose those tax avoidance transactions to the IRS? But the practical question is far broader. At stake is whether the tax-shelter industry will be permitted to use waves of strategic pre-enforcement lawsuits to hobble the IRS’s efforts to combat abusive tax shelters. The narrow legal question can and should be decided based on the plain statutory text. Petitioner seeks to permanently restrain the IRS from imposing penalties for failure to disclose certain “micro-captive insurance” transactions that taxpayers use to claim losses. Petitioner has advertised these transactions as “tax shelters.” Congress has deemed these penalties to be “taxes” for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. And that Act expressly bars any “suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax” by “any person.” Petitioner’s suit therefore seeks to “restrain” the “assessment” of a penalty that Congress has defined as a “tax.” That alone is enough to resolve this case. But, as this brief shows, broader historical context and practical consequences confirm why it is important for this Court to follow the plain statutory text. This case does not arise in a vacuum. It arises against the backdrop of a decades-long struggle between the federal agency charged with responsibility for administering and enforcing the internal revenue laws and an industry consisting of accountants, lawyers, bankers, insurance companies, and others working in concert to defeat those laws. A ruling for petitioner would mark a resounding win for the tax-shelter industry and a significant setback for the government in its ongoing effort to reveal and challenge abusive tax shelters. It could cost the federal treasury billions of dollars annually. Petitioner’s effort to frustrate tax assessment is exactly the kind of demand that the Anti-Injunction Act seeks to prevent. Rather than hand the tax-shelter industry a powerful new tool to thwart the assessment of taxes on a massive scale, this Court should apply the statute as written and affirm. AMICI: Lily Batchelder: Majority Chief Tax Counsel, Senate Committee on Finance (2010–2014) and Deputy Director, National Economic Council (2014–2015). Mark Mazur: Staff Economist, Joint Committee on Taxation (1989–1993); Director of Research, Analysis, and Statistics of Income, IRS (2001–2009); Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Analysis (2009–2012); and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (2012–2017). Eileen J. O’Connor: Assistant Attorney General of the United States, responsible for the Tax Division of the Department of Justice (2001–2007). Leslie Samuels: Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy (1993–1996). Stephen Shay: International Tax Counsel, U.S. Department of the Treasury (1986–1987) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Tax Affairs (2009–2011). George Yin: Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation (2003–2005).

The idea of using “immunity passports” to restart the economy before the arrival of a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine has attracted increasing attention as the Covid-19 cris

Non-tax legal rules regulating the workplace, the financial sector, real property, and many other areas affect the ability of governments to collect revenues and provide public goods. Yet tax-collection considerations rarely enter into economic analyses of non-tax legal rules. Usually, tax-collection concerns are shunted aside to separate studies (and separate law-school courses) rather than being integrated into debates in non-tax spheres. This separation between non-tax legal rules and tax-collection considerations bears significant negative consequences for the ability of law and economics to generate descriptively accurate and normatively attractive accounts of important non-tax legal questions. This Article takes a step toward remedying that oversight. We present an analytic framework for understanding the interaction between non-tax legal rules and tax collection. This framework—which we call the Legal Envelope Theorem—demonstrates that legal rules should systematically deviate from simple notions of efficiency to take stock of tax effects. We then provide a series of examples applying the Legal Envelope Theorem, illustrating how the non-tax legal system ought to be (and, on occasion, actually is) designed with tax effects in mind. These examples range from parental-leave mandates to bank capital requirements to centuries-old property and contract rules regularly taught in introductory law-school courses. We illustrate how a framework that is attentive to tax-collection considerations can enhance the government’s capacity to redistribute resources and address wealth inequality.

The metaphor of a ‘marketplace of ideas’ has long pervaded discussions of free speech in and beyond the United States. For early scholars of law and economics, including Aaron Director and Ronald Coase, the similarities and differences between the metaphorical marketplace for ideas and literal markets for goods and services were subjects of much attention. More recently, however, while the law-and-economics movement has flourished, economic analysis of free speech has lagged. Although law and economics has branched out from its traditional emphasis on private law to topics such as criminal law, judicial behavior, and agency structure, free speech has faded from its focus. The leanness of the law-and-economics literature on free speech should not be understood to imply that economics has little to say on the topic. Perhaps most significantly, the ‘new information economics’ for which George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz won the Nobel prize in 2001 carries profound implications for free speech — implications noted by a handful of legal scholars but not exhaustively explored. The new information economics challenges the faith in free markets reflected in the writings and thinking of early law and economics scholars, and — though less directly — the faith in a free marketplace of ideas reflected in much of US First Amendment jurisprudence. It suggests that under certain circumstances, the regulation of speech not only can protect individuals and societies from speech-related harms but also can promote speech itself. This chapter provides an introduction to the economic analysis of free speech, with special attention to the new information economics perspective. Section 1 critically summarizes the small law-and-economics literature on free speech. Section 2 offers an overview of the new information economics. Section 3 applies insights from the new information economics to free speech subjects.

We present a new framework for analyzing defamation liability that serves both to clarify and complicate understandings of the law’s consequences for speakers, victims, and the marketplace of ideas. In addition to the familiar deterrence and chilling effects, we show how defamation liability can generate a “warming effect,” making statements more credible and potentially raising both the quality and quantity of speech. We also explain how a more plaintiff-friendly liability regime may exacerbate harms to defamation victims. We end by considering the possibility of “self-tailored” defamation law, with victims or speakers selecting the defamation liability regime that applies to them.

Background High-quality and relevant nursing education is needed to ensure graduates meet entry to practice competencies. Despite the important role of curricula in the development of nurses and the nursing profession, there does not appear to be a consistent or widely accepted approach to nursing curriculum renewal. Objective To identify and synthesize existing curriculum renewal/redesign practices, create an aggregated logic model depicting an evidence-informed process for nursing curriculum renewal, and stimulate dialogue about how to keep nursing curricula relevant in an ever-changing healthcare context. Design An integrative review, modeled on the Joanna Briggs Methodology of Systematic Reviews, of the available published articles, including empirical research and discussion articles. Data sources We searched for quantitative, qualitative, and non-research literature (English and French) on full nursing programs or curriculum revisions for pre-licensure nursing students enrolled in an undergraduate or associate degree program. Databases included CINAHL, Nursing and Allied Health, and Medline from January 2010 to January 2017. We then did a hand search for articles from January 2017 to April 2019. Synthesis Extracted data were synthesized into an aggregated logic model based on Yin's method of cross-case analysis. Data included information about the internal context, the external context, drivers, the preparatory phase, the active phase, outcomes, and evaluation methods of the described curriculum renewal process. Results Twenty articles were included, which were published between 2010 and 2018. The resulting logic model, The Ottawa Model for Nursing Curriculum Renewal, includes information on the context, process and outcomes of the renewal process, and how and when to evaluate curricula. Conclusion This synthesis aids in defining the process of curriculum renewal for undergraduate nursing education. It stimulates systems level thinking and reveals gaps, such as the need for further research into curriculum evaluation. The Ottawa Model for Nursing Curriculum Renewal is a usable template to aid educators undertaking their own process of curriculum renewal.

The Trump Administration faces mounting pressure from conservative thinkers and activists — including calls from its own National Economic Council director — to promulgate a U.S. Treasury Department regulation that indexes capital gains for inflation. Proponents of such a move — which is sometimes called “presidential indexation” — make three principal arguments in favor of the proposal: (1) that inflation indexing would be an economic boon; (2) that the President and his Treasury Department have legal authority to implement inflation indexing without further congressional authorization; and (3) that in any event, it is unlikely that anyone would have standing to challenge such an action in court. This Article evaluates the proponents’ three arguments and concludes that all are faulty. First, whatever the merits of comprehensive legislation that adjusts the taxation of capital gains and various other elements of the Internal Revenue Code for inflation, rifle-shot regulatory action that targets only the capital gains tax would be costly and regressive, would open a number of large loopholes that allow for rampant tax arbitrage, and would be unlikely to significantly enhance growth. Second, the legal authority for presidential indexation simply does not exist. The Justice Department under the first President Bush reached the conclusion in 1992 that the Executive Branch cannot implement inflation indexing unilaterally, and doctrinal developments in the last quarter century have — if anything — strengthened that conclusion. Third, a number of potential plaintiffs — including a Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, certain states, brokers subject to statutory basis reporting requirements, and investment funds whose tax liability could rise as a result of the regulation — would likely have standing to challenge presidential indexation in federal court. In sum, the promise of presidential indexation turns out too hollow, and calls for unilateral action should be spurned.

This paper summarizes the current federal income tax treatment of charitable contributions where the gift entitles the donor to a state tax credit. Such credits are very common and are used by the states to encourage private donations to a wide range of activities, including natural resource preservation through conservation easements, private school tuition scholarship programs, financial aid for college-bound children from low-income households, shelters for victims of domestic violence, and numerous other state-supported programs. Under these programs, taxpayers receive tax credits for donations to governments, government-created funds, and nonprofits. A central federal income tax question raised by these donations is whether the donor must reduce the amount of the charitable contribution deduction claimed on her federal income tax return by the value of state tax benefits generated by the gift. Under current law, expressed through both court opinions and rulings from the Internal Revenue Service, the amount of the donor’s charitable contribution deduction is not reduced by the value of state tax benefits. The effect of this "Full Deduction Rule" is that a taxpayer can reduce her state tax liability by making a charitable contribution that is deductible on her federal income tax return. In a tax system where both charitable contributions and state/local taxes are deductible, the ability to reduce state tax liabilities via charitable contributions confers no particular federal tax advantage. However, in a tax system where charitable contributions are deductible but state/local taxes are not, it may be possible for states to provide their residents a means of preserving the effects of a state/local tax deduction, at least in part, by granting a charitable tax credit for federally deductible gifts, including gifts to the state or one of its political subdivisions. In light of recent federal legislation further limiting the deductibility of state and local taxes, states may expand their use of charitable tax credits in this manner, focusing new attention on the legal underpinnings of the Full Deduction Rule. The Full Deduction Rule has been applied to credits that completely offset the pre-tax cost of the contribution. In most cases, however, the state credits offset less than 100% of the cost. We believe that, at least in this latter and more typical set of cases, the Full Deduction Rule represents a correct and long-standing trans-substantive principle of federal tax law. According to judicial and administrative pronouncements issued over several decades, nonrefundable state tax credits are treated as a reduction or potential reduction of the credit recipient’s state tax liability rather than as a receipt of money, property, contribution to capital, or other item of gross income. The Full Deduction Rule is also supported by a host of policy considerations, including federal respect for state initiatives and allocation of tax liabilities, and near-insuperable administrative burdens posed by alternative rules. It is possible to devise alternatives to the Full Deduction Rule that would require donors to reduce the amount of their charitable contribution deductions by some or all of the federal, state, or local tax benefits generated by making a gift. Whether those alternatives could be accomplished administratively or would require legislation depends on the details of any such proposal. We believe that Congress is best situated to balance the many competing interests that changes to current law would necessarily implicate. We also caution Congress that a legislative override of the Full Deduction Rule would raise significant administrability concerns and would implicate important federalism values. Congress should tread carefully if it seeks to alter the Full Deduction Rule by statute.

This Article considers the distributional consequences of the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence over the past quarter century, focusing specifically on the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines. The first of these doctrines prevents Congress from compelling the states to administer federal programs; the second prevents Congress from achieving the same result through offers that for practical purposes the states cannot refuse; the third prohibits Congress from abrogating state sovereign immunity outside a limited class of cases. These doctrines vest the states with valuable entitlements and allow the states to sell those entitlements back to Congress for a price. In this respect, the doctrines have an intergovernmental distributional effect, shifting wealth from the federal government to the states. The distributional consequences of the anti-commandeering, anti-coercion, and state sovereign immunity doctrines are not purely intergovernmental, however. The doctrines also have potential implications for the distribution of wealth across individuals and households. By forcing Congress to bear a larger share of the costs of federal programs, and by shifting some of the costs of liability-imposing statutes from the states to Congress, these doctrines allow the states to raise less revenue and compel Congress to raise more. For a number of historical as well as structural reasons, the federal tax system is dramatically more progressive than even the most progressive state tax systems, and so the reallocation of fiscal responsibility resulting from these federalism doctrines causes more revenue raising to occur via the more progressive system. The likely net effect is a shift in wealth from higher-income households (who bear a larger share of the federal tax burden) to lower- and middle-income households (who would have borne a larger share of the burden of state taxes). This conclusion comes with a number of caveats. The distributional consequences of the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines may be moderated—or magnified—by differences in federal and state spending priorities. Moreover, the doctrines may affect the size of government as well as the allocation of fiscal responsibility across levels of government (though the net effect on government size is ambiguous). And the doctrines may have distributional consequences that are not only interpersonal, but also intergenerational. What seems clear from the analysis in this Article is that federalism doctrines affect the distribution of income and wealth in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways, and that a comprehensive understanding of wealth inequality in the United States requires careful attention to key features of our fiscal constitution.

Proposals for a universal basic income are generating interest across the globe, with pilot experiments underway or in the works in California, Canada, Finland, Italy, Kenya, and Uganda. Surprisingly, many of the most outspoken supporters of a universal basic income have been self-described libertarians — even though libertarians are generally considered to be antagonistic toward redistribution and a universal basic income is, at its core, a program of income redistribution. What explains such strong libertarian support for a policy that seems so contrary to libertarian ideals? This Article seeks to answer that question. We first show that a basic safety net is not only consistent with, but likely required by, several strands of libertarian thought. We then explain why libertarians committed to limited redistribution and limited government might support a system of unconditional cash transfers paid periodically. Delivering benefits in cash, rather than in-kind, furthers autonomy by recognizing that all citizens — even poor ones — are the best judges of their needs. Decoupling such transfers from a work requirement acknowledges that the state lacks the ability to distinguish between work-capable and work-incapable individuals. Providing payments periodically, rather than through a once-in-a-lifetime lump sum grant, ensures that all individuals can receive a minimum level of support over lifespans of variable lengths, while also allowing individuals to adjust payment flows through financial market transactions. Although our main objective is to assess the fit between libertarian theory and a universal basic income, we also address various design choices inherent in any basic income scheme: who should receive it?; how large should it be?; which programs might it replace?; and should it phase out as market income rises? Lastly, we consider the relationship between a basic income and the political economy of redistribution. We find that the case for a basic income as a libertarian “second-best” is surprisingly shaky: libertarians who oppose all redistribution but grudgingly accept a basic income as the least-worst form of redistribution should reconsider both aspects of their position. We conclude by drawing out lessons from our analysis for non-libertarians, regardless of whether they are supportive or skeptical of basic income arguments.

Institutional rules of courts often draw status distinctions among members, assigning certain statuses to different judges (e.g., “chief judge,” “presiding judge”) and allocating particular powers on the basis of status. We investigate the influence of intra-court and intra-panel status distinctions on judicial behavior in the U.S. federal courts of appeals. We exploit cross-case variation in judicial status and cross-circuit differences in institutional procedures that relate status to particular powers. Analyzing cases published between 1993 and 2007, we find that presiding-judge status reduces the probability that a judge dissents by 16 percent. We find evidence suggesting that this effect operates entirely through the presiding judge’s power to assign the panel opinion, and that it is not a product of strategic voting by presiding judges seeking to retain opinion-assignment authority by siding with the majority. These results illustrate the importance to voting patterns of institutional rules governing judicial status and intra-panel powers.

Congressional Republicans and Trump administration officials have said that they plan to repeal the deduction for nonbusiness state and local taxes (SALT) as part of a comprehensive tax reform package. This essay critically examines the major arguments for repealing the SALT deduction. Repealing the deduction and using the resulting revenues to reduce federal rates across the board would likely lead to greater tax-induced deadweight loss overall. Repealing the deduction also would distort decisions about the financing of education and health care, which together account for more than half of all state and local government spending. Repeal would further encourage a shift from nonbusiness to business taxes at the state and local level, and potentially would result in more borrowing by subnational governments in the short and medium term. It would have ambiguous effects on the progressivity of the overall tax system, and it would exacerbate existing differences in federal tax burdens across states. The essay concludes that the case against the SALT deduction fails on its own terms, and that the status quo of partial deductibility offers a number of underappreciated advantages vis-a-vis the alternative of full repeal.

Federal obstruction of justice statutes bar anyone from interfering with law enforcement based on a “corrupt” motive. But what about the president of the United States? The president is vested with “executive power,” which includes the power to control federal law enforcement. A possible view is that the statutes do not apply to the president because if they did they would violate the president’s constitutional power. However, we argue that the obstruction of justice statutes are best interpreted to apply to the president, and that the president obstructs justice when his motive for intervening in an investigation is to further personal or narrowly partisan interests, rather than to advance the public good.

The 2017 tax legislation brought sweeping changes to the rules for taxing individuals and business, the deductibility of state and local taxes, and the international tax regime. The complex legislation was drafted and passed through a rushed and secretive process intended to limit public comment on one of the most consequential pieces of domestic policy enacted in recent history. This Article is an effort to supply the analysis and deliberation that should have accompanied the bill’s consideration and passage and describes key problem areas in the new legislation. Many of the new changes fundamentally undermine the integrity of the tax code and allow well-advised taxpayers to game the new rules through strategic planning. These gaming opportunities are likely to worsen the bill’s distributional and budgetary costs beyond those expected in the official estimates. Other changes will encounter legal roadblocks, while drafting glitches could lead to uncertainty and haphazard increases or decreases in taxes. This Article also describes reform options for policymakers who will inevitably be tasked with enacting further changes to the tax law in order to undo the legislation’s harmful effects on the fiscal system.

This report describes various tax games, roadblocks, and glitches in the tax legislation currently before Congress, titled the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). The complex rules proposed in the House and Senate bills will allow new tax games and planning opportunities for well-advised taxpayers, which will result in unanticipated consequences and costs. These costs may not currently be fully reflected in official estimates already showing the bills adding over $1 trillion to the deficit in the coming decade. Other proposed changes will encounter legal roadblocks that will jeopardize critical elements of the legislation. Finally, in other cases, technical glitches in the legislation may improperly and haphazardly penalize or benefit individual and corporate taxpayers. This report highlights particular areas of concern that have been identified by a number of leading tax academics, practitioners, and analysts. An updated report, reflecting analysis of the conference bill released on December 15th, has been posted here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3089423.

Roughly half of U.S. states allow labor unions and public-sector employers to establish “agency shop” arrangements that cover state and local government workplaces. These arrangements require employees to pay agency fees to cover their local union’s collective-bargaining costs, regardless of whether the employee joins the union. Agency shop supporters justify these arrangements as a means of preventing non-union members from free-riding off the union’s bargaining efforts, while opponents contend that agency shop arrangements violate the First Amendment rights of non-union members forced to pay the agency fee. Although the Supreme Court permitted agency fees over First Amendment objections in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education (1977), the Court will reconsider that ruling in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association in early 2016. Many observers predict the Court may use Friedrichs as an opportunity to overrule Abood, with the consequence that public-sector unions will lose the ability to deter free-riding by nonmembers.We take no position on whether Abood will, or ought to, survive. Instead, we present a novel alternative mechanism to address the free-rider problem in public-sector workplaces — a mechanism that could be utilized even if Abood is overturned. We suggest that if a public-sector employer wants to make sure that a labor union is compensated for the cost of representing nonmembers, the employer can reimburse the union for those expenses directly. To offset the cost of this direct payment, the employer can reduce each employee’s salary by the employee’s pro rata share of the union’s bargaining expenses, while also freeing employees from the obligation to pay agency fees. This “direct payment alternative” would seem to accomplish the same objective as existing agency shop arrangements: it would prevent non-union members from reaping the benefits of union representation without sharing the costs. And while the wages of public-sector employees would be reduced by their pro rata share of their union’s bargaining costs, existing agency shop arrangements already reduce wages by that amount, because employees must pay their pro rata share in the form of union dues or agency fees.In fact, our direct payment alternative might leave public-sector employers and employees better off than existing agency shop arrangements. First, the direct payment alternative eases the First Amendment concerns raised in Friedrichs: a direct payment to the union would likely qualify as “government speech,” and would thus be subject to less stringent scrutiny under present First Amendment doctrine. Second, the direct payment alternative would bring with it favorable federal tax consequences for state and local government employees. An employee’s pro rata share of union bargaining expenses would not be included in gross pay for purposes of Social Security and Medicare taxes, and would not be included in adjusted gross income for purposes of personal federal income taxes. Most public-sector employees would fare better on an after-tax basis if their employers adopted the direct payment alternative instead of the agency shop arrangement.In this short essay, we compare and contrast the basic features of the agency shop and the direct payment alternative, considering the constitutional, economic, and political factors that might lead state and local governments and public-sector unions to choose one approach over the other. We present several hypotheses drawn from behavioral economics and political psychology — and, in particular, from the emerging literature on the “salience” of taxes and fees — that might explain why employers and unions have thus far opted for agency shops. We close by considering the practical consequences of a possible Supreme Court decision overruling Abood. We conclude that while Abood is not entirely irrelevant, the availability of the direct payment alternative suggests that the impact of overruling Abood may be muted.