1. The Paradox of Power: Principal-agent problems and administrative capacity in Imperial China (and other absolutist regimes)
- Author
-
Jared Rubin and Debin Ma
- Subjects
Economics and Econometrics ,05 social sciences ,Principal–agent problem ,Commit ,HJ Public Finance ,JN Political institutions (Europe) ,Investment (macroeconomics) ,JA Political science (General) ,Rule of law ,Power (social and political) ,0502 economics and business ,Confiscation ,Limited government ,Economics ,Revenue ,JQ Political institutions Asia ,050207 economics ,050205 econometrics ,Law and economics - Abstract
Tax extraction is often low in absolutist regimes. Why are absolutists unable to convert power into revenue? Supported by evidence from Imperial China, we explain this puzzle with a principal-agent model which reveals that absolutists, unconstrained by rule of law and unable to commit to not predating on their tax-collecting agents (and the masses), may find it optimal to settle for a low wage-low tax equilibrium, while permitting agents to keep extra, unmonitored taxes. Our analysis suggests that low investment in administrative capacity is a conscious choice for an absolutist since it substitutes for credible commitment to refrain from confiscation from its agents.
- Published
- 2019
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