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The ability to remember, recognize and reconstruct places is a key component of episodic autobiographical memory. In this respect, place forms an essential basis for the unfolding of experiences in memory and imagination. The autobiographical memory is seen to contribute to a sense of self and place identity. The aim of this study was to concertedly analyze paintings, autobiographical narrations and places of birth and life of clients under treatment at a psychiatric clinic in Switzerland who were manifesting psychiatric disorders, e.g. depression, anxiety disorders, bipolar disorder, personality disorder, substance dependence, and dementia. Each client exhibited distinctive attitudes and approaches towards life characterized by unique personal mental constructs for living in given places of time episodes that worked towards shaping the development of their identities as well as the development of their health. For these clients, place and time function together to leave a mark, a trajectory, that can hinder or help the resolution of a psychiatric condition. Based on six representative cases, we illustrate how each painting, each biographical narration and each interview reveals deeper structures of individual perception, emotions, feelings, coping strategies, and capacities to reflect and identify with place-time trajectories. Based on this analysis, a place-time-identity model has been developed, which emphasizes the importance of narration, the structure of personality, and emotional experiences in the development of the 'relay station' of episodic autobiographical memory, self and autonoetic consciousness: these three elements are not only connected through their embeddedness in time, but also through their embeddedness in place. In this context, place provides an external fundus of memory, capable of supporting humans in healthy recollection and remembering. The process of placing appears to contribute to the creation of self-esteem and identity. This psycho-geographical place-life-time approach is contrasted to phenomenological place-space-time theories of Husserl, Heidegger, Bachelard, and Sloterdijk.

Alterations within consciousness in schizophrenia can be evidenced by impediments in self-awareness and loss of agency. Ned Block’s definition of access consciousness is applied in order to further delineate cognitive deficits involving reflective thought and autonoetic thinking in persons with schizophrenia. Current theories on the nature and functioning of consciousness are discussed, which include Global Workspace Theory and metarepresentational characterizations. These describe a recursive, integrative quality to consciousness, contributed to by the functions of access consciousness, that is relevant in examining cognitive deficits in schizophrenia. The integrative deficit that is described as operating in conscious process involves a failure to incorporate prior outputs from a separate cognitive task and integrate these into a novel working schema. The alterations in access consciousness in persons with schizophrenia appear to be a consequence of disrupted integrative cognitive functions. An anteceding problem with cortical circuits involving integrative functions related to access consciousness is therefore hypothesized to manifest as subsequent cognitive dysfunction that leads to symptoms of schizophrenia. Constitutive failures to integrate information in schizophrenia could lead to an inability to create experiential unity and manage content in autonoetic consciousness. Some of the aberrant reasoning manifested by persons with schizophrenia, including problems with hierarchical relational reasoning, model-based-learning, J-con, ipseity, and source monitoring, could also reflect alterations in access consciousness, and their investigation offers additional approaches for scientific inquiry.

Episodic memory (EM) is classically conceived as a memory for events, localized in space and time, and characterized by autonoetic consciousness (ANC) allowing to mentally travel back in time and subjectively relive an event. Building on recent evidence that the first-person visual co-perception of one's own body during encoding impacts EM, we used a scene recognition task in immersive virtual reality (VR) and measured how first-person body view would modulate peri-encoding resting-state fMRI, EM performance, and ANC. Specifically, we investigated the impact of body view on post-encoding functional connectivity in an a priori network of regions related either to EM or multisensory bodily processing and used these regions in a seed-to-whole brain analysis. Post-encoding connectivity between right hippocampus (rHC) and right parahippocampus (rPHC) was enhanced when participants encoded scenes while seeing their body. Moreover, the strength of connectivity between the rHC, rPHC and the neocortex displayed two main patterns with respect to body view. The connectivity with a sensorimotor fronto-parietal network, comprising primary somatosensory and primary motor cortices, correlated with ANC after - but not before - encoding, depending on body view. The opposite change of connectivity was found between rHC, rPHC and the medial parietal cortex (from being correlated with ANC before encoding to an absence of correlation after encoding), but irrespective of body view. Linking immersive VR and fMRI for the study of EM and ANC, these findings suggest that seeing one's own body during encoding impacts the brain activity related to EM formation by modulating the connectivity between the right hippocampal formation and the neocortical regions involved in the processing of multisensory bodily signals and self-consciousness.

One of Endel Tulving's most important contributions to memory research is the coupling of self-knowing consciousness (or "autonoesis") with episodic memory. According to Tulving, autonoetic episodic memory enables the uniquely human neurocognitive operation of "mental time travel", which is the ability to deliberately "project" oneself to a specific time and place to remember personally experienced events that occurred in the past and simulate personal happenings that may occur in the future. These ideas ignited an explosion of research in the years to follow, leading to the development of several related concepts and theories regarding the role of the human self in memory and prospection. In this paper, we first explore the expansion of the concept of autonoetic consciousness in the cognitive neuroscience literature as well as the formulation of derivative concepts and theories. Subsequently, we review such concepts and theories including episodic memory, mental time travel, episodic simulation, scene construction and self-projection. In view of Tulving's emphasis of the temporal and spatial context of the experience, we also review the cognitive operation involved in "travel" (or "projection") in these domains as well as in the social domain. We describe the underlying brain networks and processes involved, their overlapping activations and involvement in giving rise to the experience. Meta-analysis of studies investigating the underlying functional neuroanatomy of these theories revealed main overlapping activations in sub-regions of the medial prefrontal cortex, the precuneus, retrosplenial cortex, temporoparietal junction and medial temporal lobe. Dissection of these results enables to infer and quantify the interrelations in between the different theories as well as with respect to Tulving's original ideas.

This study investigated the mechanisms behind episodic autobiographical memory (EAM) development in school-age children. Thirty children (6-11years) performed a novel EAM test. We computed one index of episodicity via autonoetic consciousness and two indices of retrieval spontaneity (overall and EAM-specific) for a recent period (previous school year) and a more remote one (preschool years). Executive functions, and episodic and personal semantic memory were assessed. Results showed that recent autobiographical memories (AMs) were mainly episodic, unlike remote ones. An age-related increase in the indices of episodicity and specific spontaneity for recent AMs was mainly mediated by an age-related increase in the efficiency of the three cognitive abilities. Remote AMs varied only slightly with age (overall spontaneity), reflecting improvements in semantic abilities. Thus, EAM development in school-age children is essentially bound up with the increasing efficiency of cognitive abilities. Results are discussed in the light of models of childhood amnesia.

In recent years there has been an expansion of scientific work on consciousness. However, there is an increasing necessity to integrate evolutionary and interdisciplinary perspectives and to bring affective feelings more centrally into the overall discussion. Pursuant especially to the theorizing of Endel Tulving (1985, 2004, 2005), Panksepp (1998a, 2003, 2005) and Vandekerckhove (2009) we will look at the phenomena starting with primary-process consciousness, namely the rudimentary state of autonomic awareness or unknowing (anoetic) consciousness, with a fundamental form of first-person 'self-experience' which relies on affective experiential states and raw sensory and perceptual mental existences, to higher forms of knowing (noetic and autonoetic) and self-aware consciousness. Since current scientific approaches are most concerned with the understanding of higher declarative states of consciousness, we will focus on these vastly underestimated primary forms of consciousness which may be foundational for all forms of higher 'knowing consciousness'.

The critical attributes of episodic memory are self, autonoetic consciousness and subjectively sensed time. The aim of this paper is to present a theoretical overview of our already published researches into the nature of episodic memory over the course of time. We have developed a new method of assessing autobiographical memory (TEMPau task), which is specially designed to measure these specific aspects, based on the sense of re-experiencing events from across the entire lifespan. Based on our findings of cognitive, neuropsychological and neuroimaging studies, new insights into episodic autobiographical memories are presented, focusing on the effects of age of the subjects interacting with time interval in healthy subjects and lesioned patients. The multifaceted and complex nature of episodic memory is emphasized and it is suggested that mental time travel through subjective time, which allows individuals to re-experience specific past events through a feeling of self-awareness, is the last feature of autobiographical memory to become fully operational in development and the first feature to go in aging and most amnesias. Our findings highlight the critical role of frontotemporal areas in constructive autobiographical memory processes, and especially hippocampus, in re-experiencing episodic details from the recent or more distant past.

Recent research on autonoetic consciousness indicates that the ability to remember the past and the ability to project oneself into the future are closely related. The purpose of the present study was to confirm this proposition by examining whether the relationship observed between personality and episodic memory could be extended to episodic future thinking and, more generally, to investigate the influence of personality traits on self-information processing in the past and in the future. Results show that Neuroticism and Harm Avoidance predict more negative past memories and future projections. Other personality dimensions exhibit a more limited influence on mental time travel (MTT). Therefore, our study provide an additional evidence to the idea that MTT into the past and into the future rely on a common set of processes by which past experiences are used to envision the future.

Research on autobiographical memory (AM) and the ability to retrieve specific autobiographical events in euthymic depressed patients yielded divergent results. The main goal of the present study was to further explore episodic specificity of AM among fully remitted depressed patients. Twenty euthymic depressed patients and 20 matched healthy controls were given a semi-structured interview, which assesses episodic specificity of positive and negative autobiographical memories regarding event and details' specificity, autonoetic consciousness (remember/know procedure) and visual perspective (field/observer procedure). Results showed an impairment of episodic specificity of AM in euthymic depressed patients. This impairment was explained by a field perspective deficit for positive memories only. These results suggest that euthymic patients continue to exhibit discrepancy between their current self and their self for positive past behaviors, which maintains an unfavorable view of their current self. Specific cognitive interventions may improve the self-relevance of their positive memories.

Patients suffering from frontal variant of frontotemporal dementia (fv-FTD) undergo autobiographical amnesia encompassing all time periods. We previously demonstrated in a group of 20 fv-FTD patients that this impairment involved deficits in executive function and semantic memory for all periods as well as new episodic learning and behavioural changes for the most recent period covering the last 12 months [Matuszewski, V., Piolino, P., de la Sayette, V., Lalevée, C., Pélerin, A., Dupuy, B., et al. (2006). Retrieval mechanisms for autobiographical memories: Insights from the frontal variant of frontotemporal dementia, Neuropsychologia, 44, 2386-2397]. The aim of the present study was to unravel the neural bases of this impairment by mapping in a subgroup of patients correlations between resting-state brain glucose utilization measured by FDG-PET and measures of autobiographical memory (AM) using the TEMPau task which is designed to gauge personal event recollection across five life time periods. Like in our previous report, the group of patients was impaired regardless of time periods compared to healthy subjects providing generic memories instead of event specific sensory-perceptual-affective details, i.e., episodic memories. New data showed that the patients were also impaired in sense of reliving and self-perspective during retrieval. The cognitivo-metabolic correlations between the AM score and resting normalized FDG-Uptake were computed using statistical parametric mapping (SPM2) and controlling for age and dementia severity. They revealed that AM deficits were mainly subserved by the dysfunction of left-sided orbitofrontal and also temporal neocortical areas whatever the period. Additional analysis showed that specific memories were associated with left orbitofrontal areas whereas generic memories were mainly associated with the left temporal pole. This study supports the view that fv-FTD patients undergo a breakdown of generative processes which relies regardless of the remoteness on the left orbitofrontal cortex and temporal neocortex to gain access to AM.

Alexithymia is a multifaceted personality construct that is thought to reflect a deficit in the cognitive processing of emotions. The effects of low vs. high Alexithymia, neutral vs. positive vs. negative words processed, and perceptual vs. semantic processing on memory were investigated in a group of 82 students using the levels of processing paradigm and the Remember/Know procedure. No differences were observed between low and high Alexithymia students when neutral material was considered. However, for both levels of processing, high Alexithymia students recalled fewer emotion words (both positive and negative) when "Remember" responses were considered. "Know" responses were comparable across Alexithymia groups. The deficit in the ability to consciously access emotional material (the "Remember" responses) may help explain the impaired regulation of intense emotional states by high Alexithymia individuals. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Three-, 4- and 5-year-old children were asked to report something that they did do yesterday and something that they were going to do tomorrow. They were also asked to recall events that had not occurred yesterday, and predict events that would not occur tomorrow. In two studies these simple questions revealed striking age differences in the ability to report personal events from the past and the future. Only a minority of 3-year-olds but a majority of the older children were able to appropriately answer these questions. These findings substantiate the proposal that the ability to recall past events and the ability to predict future events (i.e., mental time travel), emerge in tandem between the ages of 3 and 5 years. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Functional MRI was used to investigate the role of medial temporal lobe and inferior frontal lobe regions in autobiographical recall. Prior to scanning, participants generated cue words for 50 autobiographical memories and rated their phenomenological properties using our autobiographical memory questionnaire (AMQ). During scanning, the cue words were presented and participants pressed a button when they retrieved the associated memory. The autobiographical retrieval task was interleaved in an event-related design with a semantic retrieval task (category generation). Region-of-interest analyses showed greater activation of the amygdala, hippocampus, and right inferior frontal gyrus during autobiographical retrieval relative to semantic retrieval. In addition, the left inferior frontal gyrus showed a more prolonged duration of activation in the semantic retrieval condition. A targeted correlational analysis revealed pronounced functional connectivity among the amygdala, hippocampus, and right inferior frontal gyrus during autobiographical retrieval but not during semantic retrieval. These results support theories of autobiographical memory that hypothesize co-activation of frontotemporal areas during recollection of episodes from the personal past.

The time-scale of medial temporal lobe (MTL) involvement in storage and retrieval of episodic memory is keenly debated. To test competitive theories of long-term memory consolidation, the present work aimed at characterizing which cerebral regions are involved during retrieval of recent and remote strictly episodic autobiographical memory. Using positron emission tomography (PET), we examined mental retrieval of recent (0-1 year) and remote (5-10 years) autobiographical memories, controlling for the nature of the autobiographical memories (i.e., specificity, state of consciousness, vividness of mental visual imagery, emotion) retrieved during scanning by behavioral measures assessed at debriefing for each event recalled. Cognitive results showed that specificity and emotion did not change with time interval although both autonoetic consciousness and mental image quality were significantly higher for recent memories, suggesting an underlying shift in the phenomenal experience of remembering with the passage of time. The SPM analysis revealed common activations during the recollection of recent and remote memories that involved a widespread but mainly left-sided cerebral network, consistent with previous studies. Subtraction analysis demonstrated that the retrieval of recent (relative to remote) autobiographical memories principally activated the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex whereas the retrieval of remote (relative to recent) autobiographical memories activated the inferior parietal cortex bilaterally. ROIs analysis revealed more hippocampal activity for remote memories than for recent ones and a preferentially right-sided involvement of the hippocampal responses whatever the remoteness of autobiographical memories. New insights based on higher hippocampal response to the remoteness of episodic autobiographical memories challenge the standard model and are less discrepant with the multiple trace theory.

Episodic memory is a neurocognitive (brain/mind) system, uniquely different from other memory systems, that enables human beings to remember past experiences. The notion of episodic memory was first proposed some 30 Years ago. At that time it was defined in terms of materials and tasks. It was subsequently refined and elaborated in terms of ideas such as self, subjective time, and autonoetic consciousness. This chapter provides a brief history of the concept of episodic memory, describes how it has changed (indeed greatly changed) since its inception, considers criticisms of it, and then discusses supporting evidence provided by (a) neuropsychological studies of patterns of memory impairment caused by brain damage, and (b) functional neuroimaging studies of patterns of brain activity of normal subjects engaged in various memory tasks. I also suggest that episodic memory is a true, even if as yet generally unappreciated, marvel of nature.

Although the anatomical and functional substrates subserving face recognition have been subject to extensive investigation, the underpinnings of self-face recognition are not well understood. Given the evidence that own-face recognition has been demonstrated by a select number of species, it is intriguing to speculate whether self-face recognition is accomplished via a ‘self-network' or simply a ‘face-network' within the brain. Furthermore, the relationship of self-recognition to other self-processes, such as self-evaluation and autobiographical retrieval, are not clearly defined. However, data from fMRI, ERPs and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation as well as from split-brain studies and patients with focal lesions, indicate that the prefrontal cortex, with possible right hemisphere lateralization, may be a preferential component in self-recognition. Studies using these methods, as well as PET, have indicated that the self-processes of self-evaluation and autobiographical memory preferentially engage networks within the right fronto-temporal region. Although it is highly improbable that there is a ‘self-recognition' or ‘self' center, it appears that there may be a bias for the processing of ‘self' within the right prefrontal cortex.

Introduction: Functional amnesia refers to various forms of amnesia, which have no direct organic brain basis. Psychological stress and trauma were etiologically linked to its development across various cultures. Methods: We have studied several patients With functional amnesia, employing neuropsychological and neuroimaging methods. Herein we provide a review of the current understanding of the phenomenology, neuropsychology and neurobiology of functional amnesia, which we illustrate by reference to five own case descriptions and other cases presented in the literature. Results: Functional amnesia is mostly of retrograde nature and presents in the form of a memory blockade or repression to recollect episodic-autobiographical events, which may cover the whole past life. Sometimes, the recollection impairment is localized to certain time epochs. In comparison to functional retrograde amnesia, functional isolated anterograde amnesia is much rarer and data on its neurobiology are scant. In patients with functional amnesia with pronounced retrograde episodic-autobiographical memory impairments, we identified changes in brain metabolism, above all reductions in the temporo-frontal regions of the right hemisphere. Recently, even subtle structural changes in the white matter of the (right) frontal cortex were described in functional retrograde amnesia by other researchers Conclusions: The disruption in recollection in functional amnesia is often accompanied by changes in personality dimensions, pertaining to cognition (self-related processing, theory of mind), autonoetic consciousness and affectivity. This suggests that functional amnesia is a multifaceted condition. We hypothesize that the recollection deficit in functional retrograde amnesia primarily reflects a desynchronization between a frontal lobe system, important for autonoetic consciousness, and a temporo-amygdalar system, important for evaluation and emotions. Despite assumptions that functional amnesia can always be reversed, several cases of functional amnesia were found to follow a chronic course, suggesting a need for longitudinal prospective studies to quantify possible global cognitive deterioration over time and its neural underpinnings. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

The experience of remembering past events carries with it such an intense sensation of past experience that it has been called ‘mental time travel’1xToward a theory of episodic memory: the frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Wheeler, M.A. et al. Psychol. Bull. 1997; 121: 331–354Crossref | PubMedSee all References1. Indeed, it is a quite different experience to ‘remember’ rather than to ‘know’ that something is from the past. Given the strength of this phenomenon, it seems reasonable to expect that neuroimaging studies of memory would reveal changes in brain activity specifically associated with the experience of successfully retrieving information about previously experienced episodes or events.Yet, surprisingly, a study of recognition memory by Henson et al.2xRecollection and familiarity in recognition memory: An event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Henson, R.N.A. et al. J. Neurosci. 1999; 99: 3962–3972See all References2 reveals the first clear evidence that fMRI is sensitive to the different experiences associated with mental time travel. That is, it demonstrates the existence of brain activity that distinguishes successful from unsuccessful explicit memory retrieval. It is true that many fMRI studies have revealed neural correlates of memory retrieval. However, no previous study has demonstrated neural correlates that are specifically associated with the subjective experience of remembering (or not remembering) individual test items.Henson et al. employed event-related fMRI procedures, which allow data to be analysed contingent upon subject performance. Subjects studied a series of words, and were then required to judge whether test items were recollected as being old (consciously remembered), known to be old (familiar, but not recollected) or new (not seen at study). The findings revealed that there are fMRI correlates of retrieval success (differences between old and new items) and moreover that the pattern of neural activity is sensitive to differences in the experience of mental time travel that subjects report (i.e. remembering versus knowing). As the authors claim, event-related fMRI procedures, combined with behavioral measures of performance, herald an exciting future for the neuroimaging of human memory.