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International audience; The COVID-19 information epidemic, or "infodemic," demonstrates how unlimited access to information may confuse and influence behaviors during a health emergency. However, the study of infodemics is relatively new, and little is known about their relationship with epidemics management. Here, we discuss unresolved issues and propose research directions to enhance preparedness for future health crises.

Background: In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the UK first adopted physical distancing measures in March, 2020. Vaccines against SARS-CoV-2 became available in December, 2020. We explored the health and economic value of introducing SARS-CoV-2 immunisation alongside physical distancing in the UK to gain insights about possible future scenarios in a post-vaccination era. Methods: We used an age-structured dynamic transmission and economic model to explore different scenarios of UK mass immunisation programmes over 10 years. We compared vaccinating 75% of individuals aged 15 years or older (and annually revaccinating 50% of individuals aged 15–64 years and 75% of individuals aged 65 years or older) to no vaccination. We assumed either 50% vaccine efficacy against disease and 45-week protection (worst-case scenario) or 95% vaccine efficacy against infection and 3-year protection (best-case scenario). Natural immunity was assumed to wane within 45 weeks. We also explored the additional impact of physical distancing on vaccination by assuming either an initial lockdown followed by voluntary physical distancing, or an initial lockdown followed by increased physical distancing mandated above a certain threshold of incident daily infections. We considered benefits in terms of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) and costs, both to the health-care payer and the national economy. We discounted future costs and QALYs at 3·5% annually and assumed a monetary value per QALY of £20 000 and a conservative long-run cost per vaccine dose of £15. We explored and varied these parameters in sensitivity analyses. We expressed the health and economic benefits of each scenario with the net monetary value: QALYs × (monetary value per QALY) – costs. Findings: Without the initial lockdown, vaccination, and increased physical distancing, we estimated 148·0 million (95% uncertainty interval 48·5–198·8) COVID-19 cases and 3·1 million (0·84–4·5) deaths would occur in the UK over 10 years. In the best-case scenario, vaccination minimises community transmission without future periods of increased physical distancing, whereas SARS-CoV-2 becomes endemic with biannual epidemics in the worst-case scenario. Ongoing transmission is also expected in intermediate scenarios with vaccine efficacy similar to published clinical trial data. From a health-care perspective, introducing vaccination leads to incremental net monetary values ranging from £12·0 billion to £334·7 billion in the best-case scenario and from –£1·1 billion to £56·9 billion in the worst-case scenario. Incremental net monetary values of increased physical distancing might be negative from a societal perspective if national economy losses are persistent and large. Interpretation: Our model findings highlight the substantial health and economic value of introducing SARS-CoV-2 vaccination. Smaller outbreaks could continue even with vaccines, but population-wide implementation of increased physical distancing might no longer be justifiable. Our study provides early insights about possible future post-vaccination scenarios from an economic and epidemiological perspective. Funding: National Institute for Health Research, European Commission, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Background: National immunisation programmes globally are at risk of suspension due to the severe health system constraints and physical distancing measures in place to mitigate the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. We aimed to compare the health benefits of sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa with the risk of acquiring severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection through visiting routine vaccination service delivery points. Methods: We considered a high-impact scenario and a low-impact scenario to approximate the child deaths that could be caused by immunisation coverage reductions during COVID-19 outbreaks. In the high-impact scenario, we used previously reported country-specific child mortality impact estimates of childhood immunisation for diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, hepatitis B, Haemophilus influenzae type b, Streptococcus pneumoniae, rotavirus, measles, meningitis A, rubella, and yellow fever to approximate the future deaths averted before 5 years of age by routine childhood vaccination during a 6-month COVID-19 risk period without catch-up campaigns. In the low-impact scenario, we approximated the health benefits of sustaining routine childhood immunisation on only the child deaths averted from measles outbreaks during the COVID-19 risk period. We assumed that contact-reducing interventions flattened the outbreak curve during the COVID-19 risk period, that 60% of the population will have been infected by the end of that period, that children can be infected by either vaccinators or during transport, and that upon child infection the whole household will be infected. Country-specific household age structure estimates and age-dependent infection-fatality rates were applied to calculate the number of deaths attributable to the vaccination clinic visits. We present benefit–risk ratios for routine childhood immunisation, with 95% uncertainty intervals (UIs) from a probabilistic sensitivity analysis. Findings: In the high-impact scenario, for every one excess COVID-19 death attributable to SARS-CoV-2 infections acquired during routine vaccination clinic visits, 84 (95% UI 14–267) deaths in children could be prevented by sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa. The benefit–risk ratio for the vaccinated children is 85 000 (4900–546 000), for their siblings (60 years) is 96 (14–307). In the low-impact scenario that approximates the health benefits to only the child deaths averted from measles outbreaks, the benefit–risk ratio to the households of vaccinated children is 3 (0–10); if the risk to only the vaccinated children is considered, the benefit–risk ratio is 3000 (182–21 000). Interpretation: The deaths prevented by sustaining routine childhood immunisation in Africa outweigh the excess risk of COVID-19 deaths associated with vaccination clinic visits, especially for the vaccinated children. Routine childhood immunisation should be sustained in Africa as much as possible, while considering other factors such as logistical constraints, staff shortages, and reallocation of resources during the COVID-19 pandemic. Funding: Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance; Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Background: Several countries have controlled the spread of COVID-19 through varying combinations of border restrictions, case finding, contact tracing and careful calibration on the resumption of domestic activities. However, evaluating the effectiveness of these measures based on observed cases alone is challenging as it does not reflect the transmission dynamics of missed infections. Methods: Combining data on notified local COVID-19 cases with known and unknown sources of infections (i.e. linked and unlinked cases) in Singapore in 2020 with a transmission model, we reconstructed the incidence of missed infections and estimated the relative effectiveness of different types of outbreak control. We also examined implications for estimation of key real-time metrics — the reproduction number and ratio of unlinked to linked cases, using observed data only as compared to accounting for missed infections. Findings: Prior to the partial lockdown in Singapore, initiated in April 2020, we estimated 89% (95%CI 75–99%) of the infections caused by notified cases were contact traced, but only 12.5% (95%CI 2–69%) of the infections caused by missed infectors were identified. We estimated that the reproduction number was 1.23 (95%CI 0.98–1.54) after accounting for missed infections but was 0.90 (95%CI 0.79-1.1) based on notified cases alone. At the height of the outbreak, the ratio of missed to notified infections was 34.1 (95%CI 26.0–46.6) but the ratio of unlinked to linked infections was 0.81 (95%CI 0.59–1.36). Our results suggest that when case finding and contact tracing identifies at least 50% and 20% of the infections caused by missed and notified cases respectively, the reproduction number could be reduced by more than 14%, rising to 20% when contact tracing is 80% effective. Interpretation: Depending on the relative effectiveness of border restrictions, case finding and contact tracing, unobserved outbreak dynamics can vary greatly. Commonly used metrics to evaluate outbreak control — typically based on notified data — could therefore misrepresent the true underlying outbreak. Funding: Ministry of Health, Singapore. Declaration of Interests: None to declare.

The SARS-CoV-2 lineage B.1.617.2, also known as the delta variant, was declared a variant of concern by WHO on the basis of preliminary evidence suggesting faster spread relative to other circulating variants. However, the epidemiological factors contributing to this difference remain unclear. In particular, an increase in observed growth rate of COVID-19 cases could be the result of a shorter generation interval (i.e., the delay from one infection to the next) or an increase in the effective reproduction number, R, of an infected individual (i.e., the average number of secondary cases generated by an infectious individual), or both. Whereas a shorter generation interval would increase the speed but not the number of individual-level transmissions, a larger value of R would require both faster and wider coverage of outbreak control measures such as vaccination or physical distancing to suppress transmission.

Background: The isolation of symptomatic cases and tracing of contacts has been used as an early COVID-19 containment measure in many countries, with additional physical distancing measures also introduced as outbreaks have grown. To maintain control of infection while also reducing disruption to populations, there is a need to understand what combination of measures—including novel digital tracing approaches and less intensive physical distancing—might be required to reduce transmission. We aimed to estimate the reduction in transmission under different control measures across settings and how many contacts would be quarantined per day in different strategies for a given level of symptomatic case incidence. Methods: For this mathematical modelling study, we used a model of individual-level transmission stratified by setting (household, work, school, or other) based on BBC Pandemic data from 40 162 UK participants. We simulated the effect of a range of different testing, isolation, tracing, and physical distancing scenarios. Under optimistic but plausible assumptions, we estimated reduction in the effective reproduction number and the number of contacts that would be newly quarantined each day under different strategies. Results: We estimated that combined isolation and tracing strategies would reduce transmission more than mass testing or self-isolation alone: mean transmission reduction of 2% for mass random testing of 5% of the population each week, 29% for self-isolation alone of symptomatic cases within the household, 35% for self-isolation alone outside the household, 37% for self-isolation plus household quarantine, 64% for self-isolation and household quarantine with the addition of manual contact tracing of all contacts, 57% with the addition of manual tracing of acquaintances only, and 47% with the addition of app-based tracing only. If limits were placed on gatherings outside of home, school, or work, then manual contact tracing of acquaintances alone could have an effect on transmission reduction similar to that of detailed contact tracing. In a scenario where 1000 new symptomatic cases that met the definition to trigger contact tracing occurred per day, we estimated that, in most contact tracing strategies, 15 000–41 000 contacts would be newly quarantined each day. Interpretation: Consistent with previous modelling studies and country-specific COVID-19 responses to date, our analysis estimated that a high proportion of cases would need to self-isolate and a high proportion of their contacts to be successfully traced to ensure an effective reproduction number lower than 1 in the absence of other measures. If combined with moderate physical distancing measures, self-isolation and contact tracing would be more likely to achieve control of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 transmission. Funding: Wellcome Trust, UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council, European Commission, Royal Society, Medical Research Council.

Background: In December 2019, a novel strain of SARS-CoV-2 emerged in Wuhan, China. Since then, the city of Wuhan has taken unprecedented measures and efforts in response to the outbreak. Methods: We quantified the effects of control measures on population contact patterns in Wuhan, China, to assess their effects on the progression of the outbreak. We included the latest estimates of epidemic parameters from a transmission model fitted to data on local and internationally exported cases from Wuhan in the age-structured epidemic framework. Further, we looked at the age-distribution of cases. Lastly, we simulated lifting of the control measures by allowing people to return to work in a phased-in way, and looked at the effects of returning to work at different stages of the underlying outbreak. Findings: Changes in mixing patterns may have contributed to reducing the number of infections in mid-2020 by 92% (interquartile range: 66–97%). There are benefits to sustaining these measures until April in terms of reducing the height of the peak, overall epidemic size in mid-2020 and probability that a second peak may occur after return to work. However, the modelled effects of social distancing measures vary by the duration of infectiousness and the role school children play in the epidemic. Interpretation: Restrictions on activities in Wuhan, if maintained until April, would likely contribute to the reduction and delay the epidemic size and peak, respectively. However, there are some limitations to the analysis, including large uncertainties around estimates of R0 and the duration of infectiousness. Funding: KP, YL, MJ, and PK were funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (grant number INV003174), YL and MJ were funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) (16/137/109), TWR and AJK were funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant number 206250/Z/17/Z), RME was funded by HDR UK (grant number MR/S003975/1), and ND was funded by NIHR (HPRU-2012-10096).This research was partly funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) (16/137/109) using UK aid from the UK Government to support global health research. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the NIHR or the UK Department of Health and Social Care. We would like to acknowledge (in a randomised order) the other members of the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine COVID-19 modelling group, who contributed to this work: Stefan Flasche, Samuel Clifford, Carl A B Pearson, James D Munday, Sam Abbott, Hamish Gibbs, Alicia Rosello, Billy J Quilty, Thibaut Jombart, Fiona Sun, Charlie Diamond, Amy Gimma, Kevin van Zandvoort, Sebastian Funk, Christopher I Jarvis, W John Edmunds, Nikos I Bosse, and Joel Hellewell. Their funding sources are as follows: Stefan Flasche and Sam Clifford (Sir Henry Dale Fellowship [grant number 208812/Z/17/Z]); Billy J Quilty, Fiona Sun, and Charlie Diamond (NIHR [grant number 16/137/109]); Joel Hellewell, Sam Abbott, James D Munday, and Sebastian Funk (Wellcome Trust [grant number 210758/Z/18/Z] ); Amy Gimma and Christopher I Jarvis (Global Challenges Research Fund [grant number ES/P010873/1]); Hamish Gibbs (Department of Health and Social Care [grant number ITCRZ 03010]); Alicia Rosello (NIHR [grant number PROD-1017-20002]); Thibaut Jombart (RCUK/ESRC [grant number ES/P010873/1], UK PH RST, NIHR HPRU Modelling Methodology); Kevin van Zandvoort (Elrha’s Research for Health in Humanitarian Crises (R2HC) Programme, UK Government (DFID), Wellcome Trust, NIHR). Declaration of Interest: The authors declare no competing interests.

Unlike the patchy, delayed numbers in the existing database, CHESS provided a comprehensive overview of COVID-19 patients needing critical care. In Covid by Numbers: Making Sense of the Pandemic with Data, Spiegelhalter and Anthony Masters tour the wide range of COVID-19 statistics that have since accumulated, with a focus on the UK. When I teach students outbreak analysis, many are surprised to discover the ambiguities and assumptions behind oft-quoted “facts” about novel pathogens.

BACKGROUND: In March, 2016, a flare-up of Ebola virus disease was reported in Guinea, and in response ring vaccination with the unlicensed rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine was introduced under expanded access, the first time that an Ebola vaccine has been used in an outbreak setting outside a clinical trial. Here we describe the safety of rVSV-ZEBOV candidate vaccine and operational feasibility of ring vaccination as a reactive strategy in a resource-limited rural setting. METHODS: Approval for expanded access and compassionate use was rapidly sought and obtained from relevant authorities. Vaccination teams and frozen vaccine were flown to the outbreak settings. Rings of contacts and contacts of contacts were defined and eligible individuals, who had given informed consent, were vaccinated and followed up for 21 days under good clinical practice conditions. FINDINGS: Between March 17 and April 21, 2016, 1510 individuals were vaccinated in four rings in Guinea, including 303 individuals aged between 6 years and 17 years and 307 front-line workers. It took 10 days to vaccinate the first participant following the confirmation of the first case of Ebola virus disease. No secondary cases of Ebola virus disease occurred among the vaccinees. Adverse events following vaccination were reported in 47 (17%) 6-17 year olds (all mild) and 412 (36%) adults (individuals older than 18 years; 98% were mild). Children reported fewer arthralgia events than adults (one [ INTERPRETATION: The results show that a ring vaccination strategy can be rapidly and safely implemented at scale in response to Ebola virus disease outbreaks in rural settings. FUNDING:WHO, Gavi, and the World Food Programme.

Watching how computers play poker can teach us fundamental lessons about life, says Adam Kucharski

Highlights • We revisited data from the first known Ebola outbreak in Zaire in 1976. • Using a mathematical model, we estimated transmission rates in different settings. • Analysis suggests the person-to-person R0 was 1.34 (95% CI: 0.92–2.11). • Epidemiological conditions in 1976 could have generated a larger outbreak., Outbreaks of Ebola virus can cause substantial morbidity and mortality in affected regions. The largest outbreak of Ebola to date is currently underway in West Africa, with 3944 cases reported as of 5th September 2014. To develop a better understanding of Ebola transmission dynamics, we revisited data from the first known Ebola outbreak, which occurred in 1976 in Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo). By fitting a mathematical model to time series stratified by disease onset, outcome and source of infection, we were able to estimate several epidemiological quantities that have previously proved challenging to measure, including the contribution of hospital and community infection to transmission. We found evidence that transmission decreased considerably before the closure of the hospital, suggesting that the decline of the outbreak was most likely the result of changes in host behaviour. Our analysis suggests that the person-to-person reproduction number was 1.34 (95% CI: 0.92–2.11) in the early part of the outbreak. Using stochastic simulations we demonstrate that the same epidemiological conditions that were present in 1976 could have generated a large outbreak purely by chance. At the same time, the relatively high person-to-person basic reproduction number suggests that Ebola would have been difficult to control through hospital-based infection control measures alone.