251. Call Me Maybe? The Effects of Exercising Contingent Capital
- Author
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Boris Vall, Groupement de Recherche et d'Etudes en Gestion à HEC (GREGH), Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC Paris)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), and HEC Paris Research Paper Series
- Subjects
Finance ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G0 - General/G.G0.G01 - Financial Crises ,business.industry ,Weighted average cost of capital ,media_common.quotation_subject ,Debt-to-GDP ratio ,Financial Institutions ,Monetary economics ,External debt ,Financial Distress ,Contingent Capital ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G14 - Information and Market Efficiency • Event Studies • Insider Trading ,Debt overhang ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages ,Debt ,[SHS.GESTION]Humanities and Social Sciences/Business administration ,JEL: G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G28 - Government Policy and Regulation ,Debt Overhang ,Internal debt ,Debt levels and flows ,business ,media_common ,Senior debt - Abstract
This paper empirically investigates the effects of banks triggering contingent capital instruments by studying liability management exercises, which bear comparable regulatory capital effects. These actions create core tier one capital by crystalizing losses on hybrid debt holders. Banks' use of liability management exercises, and the market reaction to them, are consistent with these exercises relaxing a regulatory capital constraint. The created value mainly accrues to debt holders, and does not generate a negative signal. Liability management exercises prove effective at improving bank capitalization levels. These findings strengthen the case for contingent capital instruments as an alternative to raising bank capital requirements.
- Published
- 2013
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