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The computation of the signature of a complex system is often challenging, as it may involve a large number of components and a complex architecture. In this study, we propose a novel approach to computing the signature of a system consisting of subsystems with shared components. The proposed approach relies on a new concept called decomposed survival signatures. This new concept can be efficiently used to compute the signature of a modular system with an arbitrary organizing structure and to provide explicit formulas for computation. Applications in cyber systems, transportation systems, and branched oil pipeline systems are highlighted.

Due to the increasing reliance on networks, defending a cyber system is of vital importance. In this paper, we consider an important mechanism of early warning for defending a cyber system that has become a key component of constructing network defense in practice. We study the reliability of a system under attack from single or multiple sources. In particular, we discuss the effect of an early warning mechanism on the system reliability. We then propose the optimal strategy for defending a cyber system with early warning components in the worst attack scenario. The theoretical results are further validated by simulation evidence.

The online storage of sensitive data enjoys many benefits such as flexibility, cost-savings, scalability, and convenience but it also poses a big concern on the data confidentiality and availability. To ensure the confidentiality and availability of sensitive data over a network system, the data partition technique is often employed. We study the optimal data partition strategy over an arbitrary network under cyber threats. Both the outside attack and the risk propagation (i.e., inside attack) are considered for the data partition. The data breach probability and retrieve probability are discussed under both limited and unlimited risk propagation for various scenarios. It is discovered that the risk propagation can have much more impact on the optimal partition strategy than that of outside attacks, and the unlimited risk propagation leads to more severer cyber risk. The network topology significantly impacts the partition strategy which hints that the network topology should never be overlooked in practice. The corruption due to compromise can lead to different partition strategies. An optimal partition model is developed for determining the optimal strategy and the pareto non-dominated solutions are recommended for practical use.

Phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been integrated into the smart grid for monitoring the operational state of system and improving the reliability. Due to the high cost of PMU installment, the optimal placement strategies have attracted considerable attention in the literature. However, the impacts of cyber threats on the placement have been largely ignored owing to the cyber complexities. This paper initializes the study on the optimal PMU placement in a smart grid under the cyber threats. A probabilistic model is developed for assessing the unobservable risk of the power grid. We characterize the impacts of several cyber factors on the PMU placements including the number of directly attacked PMUs, the dependence among attack outcomes, and risk propagation. We further study the impacts of cyber attacks on the allocation strategies under a bi-level placement model. In particular, a novel ‘greedy’ algorithm for PMU placement is introduced with the presence of cyber risks. Our studies show that the cyber risk can significantly increase the unobservability risk of a power system which in turn requires additional PMU allocations, and the dependence among cyber attacks can lead to more unobservable risk.

In this paper we investigate a cybersecurity model: An attacker can launch multiple attacks against a target with a termination strategy that says that the attacker will stop after observing a number of successful attacks or when the attacker is out of attack resources. However, the attacker's observation of the attack outcomes (i.e., random variables indicating whether the target is compromised or not) has an observation error that is specified by both a false-negative and a false-positive probability. The novelty of the model we study is the accommodation of the dependence between the attack outcomes, because the dependence was assumed away in the literature. In this model, we characterize the monotonicity and bounds of the compromise probability (i.e., the probability that the target is compromised). In addition to extensively showing the impact of dependence on quantities such as compromise probability and attack cost, we give methods for finding the optimal strategy that leads to maximum compromise probability or minimum attack cost. This study highlights that the dependence between random variables cannot be assumed away, because the results will be misleading.

The PMU network has been utilized to monitor the system operation of a smart grid in recent decades. This brings a significant cyber risk for the power grid as the attacker can manipulate the PMU network to introduce the false positive and false negative observation errors. A novel risk model is proposed for the PMU networks by considering the observation errors. It is discovered that ignoring the due observation errors can severely underestimate the PMU risks as shown by the theoretical and simulation studies. The risk mitigation strategies for improving the safety levels of PMUs with the observation errors are studied. It is found that the optimal mitigation strategy can be different when the observation errors are present. Numerical examples are presented for illustrations as well.