Search

In this meta-analysis, we investigated whether people with narcissistic traits are less likely than others to take advice. Additionally, we checked whether this would be independent of the advice giver's expertise and explored other potential moderators. Previously published and unpublished research has produced contradictory results, which motivated this pre-registered meta-analysis (k = 11, total number of participants = 2697) on the relation between narcissism and advice taking. We found a stable and robust, small, negative relation. Neither expertise of the advice giver nor other moderators were significant. We included robustness checks regarding participants, report characteristics, as well as operationalization of narcissism and advice taking. Theoretical, methodological and practical implications (for example, possible consequences of having people with narcissistic traits in positions of responsibility) are discussed and future research directions are outlined. • People high in narcissism take less advice than others. • The finding that narcissists take less advice than others is stable and robust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jumping to conclusions and bias against disconfirmatory evidence are two cognitive biases common in people with psychotic-like experiences and psychosis. However, many participants show comprehension problems doing traditional tasks; new paradigms with additional applied scenarios are thus needed. A large MTurk community sample (N = 1422) was recruited and subdivided into participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences (at least 2 SD above the mean, n = 79) and participants with low levels of psychotic-like experiences (maximum 0.5 SD above the mean, n = 1110), based on the positive subscale of the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE). In the context of a judge-advisor system, participants made an initial estimate and then received advice that was either confirmatory or disconfirmatory. Participants then gave a new, possibly revised estimate and were allowed to seek additional advice. Participants with high levels of psychotic-like experiences gave their final assessment after receiving significantly less advice and were significantly more confident in their decision than participants with low psychotic-like experiences, in line with previous studies on jumping to conclusions and overconfidence. Contrary to the hypothesis and earlier studies, however, no deficit in belief revision was found. In fact, participants with high psychotic-like experiences weighted advice significantly higher in the condition with disconfirmatory advice, but only for the first advice they received. The increased weighting of a single piece of disconfirmatory advice can be explained by the hypersalience of evidence-hypothesis matches theory, according to which more weight is attached to the most recently available information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigated whether Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) influences social validation as measured by a Judge-Advisor task. In contrast to healthy controls and patients with their DBS OFF, patients with their stimulation switched on do not experience a gain of confidence after receiving competent advice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To use ERPs to investigate the impact of advice distance on advice taking in the Judge-Advisor System (JAS) paradigm, behavioural and ERP data were recorded from 20 subjects. The behavioural discrepancies and EEG characteristics of advice taking, as affected by the advice distances, were compared. The results showed that the relationship between the modification rate of a decision maker's initial estimation and the advice distance exhibited an inverse U-shaped curve. During the advice evaluation stage, different advice distances induced the feedback-related negativity (FRN) and subsequent P300 components. The amplitude of the FRN increased as the advice distance increased, while the amplitude of P300 in the zero distance condition was significantly larger than those in the intermediate and far distance conditions. These findings indicate that the advice evaluation process of a decision maker is related to conflict perception, prediction error and motivational or affective significance. • A inversely U-shaped relationship between advice distance and the degree of advice taking was found. • The amplitude of the FRN increased and that of the P300 gradually decreased as the advice distance increased. • Advice evaluation process of a decision maker is related to conflict perception, prediction error and motivational or affective significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although there is a lot of research on advice and its utilization, little research on advice has examined the effect of computer mediated communication (CMC) on advice outcomes. Emoticons, which are graphic representations of facial expressions, are unique to CMC and commonly used as a substitute for nonverbal cues that are missing from CMC. We explored the relationship between emoticons in advice messages and advice utilization. Because emoticons convey emotional information, the effects of emoticons on advice utilization may be higher when the receiver is less willing or able to analyze the message more systematically. Therefore, we examined two moderators that affect message processing: involvement and need for cognition. Two experiments tested our hypothesis. In Study 1, emoticons increased intention to utilize advice, but only under conditions of low involvement. Study 2 replicated the effects of Study 1 but also found that emoticons had a stronger effect when participants had a low need for cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decision makers typically integrate multiple pieces of information to make predictions and decisions. They also sometimes receive algorithmic advice, but often discount such advice. This usually results in less consistent and less accurate predictions than consistently using the advice. We hypothesized that individual differences on psychological traits such as dutifulness (a facet of conscientiousness), decision-making styles, and predictor validity beliefs are related to the consistent use of algorithmic advice, judgment consistency, and predictive validity. We sampled participants with hiring experience (N = 308) who predicted the performance of job applicants based on test scores and interview ratings, and they also received algorithmic advice. The results showed that more dutiful participants and participants with more accurate predictor validity beliefs used the algorithm more, and made more consistent and more accurate predictions. We did not find evidence that an intuitive decision-making style was related to these outcomes. Exploratory analyses showed that cognitive ability was positively related to the consistent use of algorithmic advice and judgment consistency, but not significantly related to predictive validity. Furthermore, the other conscientiousness facets and the general factor were similarly related to the outcome variables as dutifulness. Organizations may want to hire conscientious decision makers, and decision makers with accurate predictor validity beliefs. In addition, organizations could provide training on predictor validities. • Decision makers often discount valid algorithmic advice when making predictions. • Individual differences on psychological traits predict use of algorithmic advice. • Organizations could select on conscientiousness and predictor validity beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The experience of agency refers to the phenomenal experience of being the causal source of one's own actions, and through them, the course of events in the outside world. This experience is crucial for the production of adaptive actions, and for the adequate communication of felt action control to peers. The present study examines the possibility that, on certain occasions and under specific internal and external constraints, people rely on explicit social information provided by their peers to revise their self-reports of perceived control, i.e., their judgment of agency. To test this hypothesis, we adapted a task based on an interactive computer game. We manipulated well-known sensorimotor agency cues related to action control, as well as social information communicated to participants by two advisors. We measured the contribution of social and non-social sources of information to agency judgments. We found that at the single-trial level, participants align their JoA with advisor feedback based on their own performance during the task, the type of feedback provided by advisors, and the interaction of this social feedback with the sensorimotor agency cues. At the same time, JoA alignment in previous trial also predicted participants' tendency to revise their JoA after social feedback. Overall, these results demonstrate that agency judgment is subject to social influence. This influence is the result of the integration of social and non-social information at the scale of a single judgment, while also being driven by repeated past interactions with peers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Today''s business environment provides tougher competition than ever before, stressing the important role played by information and forecasts in decision-making. The scenario method has been popular for focused organizational learning, decision making and strategic thinking in business contexts, and yet, its use in communicating forecast information and advice has received little research attention. This is surprising since scenarios may provide valuable tools for communication between forecast providers and users in organizations, offering efficient platforms for information exchange via structured storylines of plausible futures. In this paper, we aim to explore the effectiveness of using scenarios as channels of forecast advice. An experimental study is designed to investigate the effects of providing scenarios as forecast advice on individual and group-based judgmental predictions. Participants are given time series information and model forecasts, along with (i) best-case, (ii) worst-case, (iii) both, or (iv) no scenarios. Different forecasting formats are used (i.e., point forecast, best-case forecast, worst-case forecast, and surprise probability), and both individual predictions and consensus forecasts are requested. Forecasts made with and without scenarios are compared for each of these formats to explore the potential effects of providing scenarios as forecast advice. In addition, group effects are investigated via comparisons of composite versus consensus predictions. The paper concludes with a discussion of results and implications for future research on scenario use in forecasting. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Humans and other animals rely on social learning strategies to guide their behaviour, especially when the task is difficult and individual learning might be costly or ineffective. Recent models of individual and group decision-making suggest that subjective confidence judgments are a prime candidate in guiding the way people seek and integrate information from social sources. The present study investigates the way people choose and use advice as a function of the confidence in their decisions, using a perceptual decision task to carefully control the quality of participants' decisions and the advice provided. The results show that reported confidence guides the search for new information in accordance with probabilistic normative models. Moreover, large inter-individual differences were found, which strongly correlated with more traditional measures of metacognition. However, the extent to which participants used the advice they received deviated from what would be expected under a Bayesian update of confidence, and instead was characterised by heuristic-like strategies of categorically ignoring vs. accepting advice provided, again with substantial individual differences apparent in the relative dominance of these strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• Research merges trust-in-informants and information-board paradigm. • Majority of 6-y.-olds and about 60 % of 9-y.-olds neglect probabilities in choice, but the majority of preschoolers utilizes probabilities in judgment. • Probability neglect in choice is not caused by deficits in learning probabilities. When adapting to a risky world, decision makers must be capable of grasping the probabilistic nature of the environment. Developmental research on the ontogeny of the ability to use probabilities thus far has used different paradigms and revealed inconsistent findings. Merging two paradigms (choices based on probabilistic inferences; trust-in-informants decisions), we tested whether procedural differences are responsible for the inconsistent findings. 6-, 9-, and 22-year-olds (N = 108) learned the relative accuracy of three informants in a labelling task commonly used in trust-in-informants research. Informants differed with regard to their validity (rates of being correct = 0.17; 0.34; 0.83). Subsequently, participants were presented with an information board typically used in research on probabilistic-inference choices. Prior to choosing between two options, they were allowed to inspect informants' predictions regarding choice outcomes. After choices, participants indicated which informant they would trust in other domains (e.g., biology, arts). A large contrast effect between trust decisions and choices indicates that the utilization of probabilities develops more slowly in probabilistic-inference choices than in trust decisions: 6-year-olds and a portion of 9-year-olds did not rely on the predictions of the high validity informant in their choices even though they trusted the informant in other domains. In adults, that pattern was reversed. We discuss our findings while considering the possibility that structural differences of the paradigms may impose different constraints on cognitive processing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]