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In many social situations, a discrepancy arises between an individual's private and expressed opinions on a given topic. Motivated by Solomon Asch's seminal experiments on social conformity and other related socio-psychological works, we propose a novel opinion dynamics model to study how such a discrepancy can arise in general social networks of interpersonal influence. Each individual in the network has both a private and an expressed opinion : an individual's private opinion evolves under social influence from the expressed opinions of the individual's neighbours, while the individual determines his or her expressed opinion under a pressure to conform to the average expressed opinion of his or her neighbours, termed the local public opinion. General conditions on the network that guarantee exponentially fast convergence of the opinions to a limit are obtained. Further analysis of the limit yields several semi-quantitative conclusions, which have insightful social interpretations, including the establishing of conditions that ensure every individual in the network has such a discrepancy. Last, we show the generality and validity of the model by using it to explain and predict the results of Solomon Asch's seminal experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes a nonlinear opinion dynamics model which generalizes the DeGroot model by introducing a bias parameter for each individual. The original DeGroot model is recovered when the bias parameter is equal to zero. The magnitude of this parameter reflects an individual's degree of bias when assimilating new opinions, and depending on the magnitude, an individual is said to have weak, intermediate, and strong bias. The opinions of the individuals lie between 0 and 1. It is shown that for strongly connected networks, the equilibria with all elements equal identically to the extreme value 0 or 1 is locally exponentially stable, while the equilibrium with all elements equal to the neutral consensus value of 1 2 is unstable. Regions of attraction for the extreme consensus equilibria are given. For the equilibrium consisting of both extreme values 0 and 1, which corresponds to opinion polarization according to the model, it is shown that the equilibrium is unstable for all strongly connected networks if individuals all have weak bias, becomes locally exponentially stable for complete and two-island networks if individuals all have strong bias, and its stability heavily depends on the network topology when individuals have intermediate bias. Analysis on star graphs and simulations show that additional equilibria may exist where individuals form clusters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, and inspired by the recent discrete-time model in Parsegov et al. (2017) and Friedkin et al. (2016), we study two continuous-time opinion dynamics models (Model 1 and Model 2) where the individuals discuss opinions on multiple logically interdependent topics. The logical interdependence between the different topics is captured by a "logic" matrix, which is distinct from the Laplacian matrix capturing interactions between individuals. For each of Model 1 and Model 2, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for the network to reach to a consensus on each separate topic. The condition on Model 1 involves a combination of the eigenvalues of the logic matrix and Laplacian matrix, whereas the condition on Model 2 requires only separate conditions on the logic matrix and Laplacian matrix. Further investigation of Model 1 yields two sufficient conditions for consensus, and allows us to conclude that one way to guarantee a consensus is to reduce the rate of interaction between individuals exchanging opinions. By placing further restrictions on the logic matrix, we also establish a set of Laplacian matrices which guarantee consensus for Model 1. The two models are also expanded to include stubborn individuals, who remain attached to their initial opinions. Sufficient conditions are obtained for guaranteeing convergence of the opinion dynamics system, with the final opinions generally being at a persistent disagreement. Simulations are provided to illustrate the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]