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• We study cooperation in a social dilemma experiment: the governance game. • Our between subjects' factorial design compares three institutions (Random replacement of rules, Referendum, and Voting) to a Baseline condition in which the ruler is never replaced. • Contribution levels are not significantly different across conditions, but voters retain a larger proportion of the surplus generated by the game in democratic regimes (Voting and Referendum). • Voters tolerate the electoral uncertainty associated with Referendum as rulers strategically learned to use transfers to stay in power. In this paper we study electoral systems in an experimental governance game in which citizens contribute to a public good and policymakers decide how to distribute it. In the Voting condition, citizens receive information about the policymaker performance (how much she shared of the public good with individual participants), her skills and her altruism, and vote directly for a policymaker for the next election cycle. In the Referendum condition voters receive information about the policymaker's performance before deciding whether to remove her from office in a simpler binary choice (in or out). If they decide to remove the incumbent, a new policymaker is chosen randomly from the remaining group members, in the spirit of referendums like Brexit or the plebiscite about the peace agreements in Colombia. We compare these two electoral mechanisms with two baselines in which the policymaker is never replaced (Baseline) and another one (Random) in which the policymaker is always randomly replaced by another participant. Our results show that both electoral mechanisms are largely effective in improving citizens' earnings by generating more equitable sharing rules. Citizens in Voting and Referendum extract greater surplus from policymakers than in the other conditions and voting against a candidate (Referendum) is more effective in increasing surplus than voting for a candidate (Voting). Contributions to the public good and conditional cooperation patterns remain strikingly similar in democratic (Referendum and Voting) and non-democratic (Baseline and Random) conditions. Empirical expectations about contributions of other citizens are similar as well. However, we show that policymakers distribute the public good differently in democratic institutions, and more effectively in Referendum than in Voting , as policymakers use clientelist transfers to avoid being replaced. Overall, both democratic institutions are effective in improving citizens' payoffs by indirectly limiting policymakers' surplus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Direct democracy allows citizens to reverse decisions made by legislatures and even initiate new laws which parliaments are unwilling to pass, thereby, as its proponents argue, leading to more representative policies than would have obtained under a purely representative democracy. Yet, turnout in referendums is usually lower than in parliamentary elections and tends to be skewed towards citizens of high socio-economic status. Consequently, critics of direct democracy argue that referendum outcomes may not be representative of the preferences of the population at large. We test this assertion using a compilation of post-referendum surveys encompassing 148 national referendums held in Switzerland between 1981 and 1999. Uniquely, these surveys also asked non-voters about their opinion on the referendum's subject. Comparing opinion majorities in the surveys against actual referendum outcomes we show that representativeness increases slightly in turnout as well as over time. However, we find only few cases where the outcome would have been more representative even under full turnout vis-a vis a counterfactual representative outcome. Thus, our results are in line with research on the turnout effect in elections: Higher turnout would not radically change the outcome of votes. On balance we find more cases where referendums provided more representative outcomes than cases where the outcome was unrepresentative vis-a-vis representative democracy. Hence, we conclude that, overall, direct democracy seems to improve representation in Switzerland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political contexts affect the degree to which traditional campaign methods like door knocking and leafleting affect referendum outcomes. Campaign methods are most effective when issues are of low salience and political parties provide unified cues to their supporters. In this paper, I draw on Zaller's model of opinion formation to derive some theoretical expectations about the effectiveness of campaign contact in referendum campaigns when the issue is highly salient but the political parties provide mixed cues, arguing that prior voting intention, rather than partisan identity, should affect receptiveness to campaign messages. I test these expectations with regression analysis of British Election Study panel data, using propensity score matching to mitigate selection bias. My results suggest that the effects of campaigning during the Brexit referendum were mostly small, but differed significantly according to an individual's political attention and, contrary to the theoretical expectations, their partisan identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do electoral laws prohibit political advertisement right where voters cast their ballots? Apparently, it is assumed that the deliberate and intentional decision of voters can be swayed at the last minute, thereby compromising free and fair elections. While traditional approaches to electoral behaviour typically fail to recognise such influences, evidence from behavioural psychology suggests that subtle primes can indeed automatically trigger individual action. This paper therefore argues that voting, too, is subject to unsuspected primes. In particular, we analyse whether the innocuous environmental setting of the polling place can influence vote choice. Whether priming effects extend to political behaviour presents a puzzle that is yet not sufficiently investigated. On the one hand, two recent studies do show such behavioural priming effects for the USA. On the other hand, however, there is a serious debate about behavioural priming in general questioning the replicability of earlier studies. Against this background, our paper presents the first replication outside the USA of previous findings, and furthermore extends behavioural priming to other instances. Specifically, we address three questions. First, can behavioural priming of vote choice be replicated or are findings specific to the context of the USA? Second, does behavioural priming of vote choice also occur in elections in multi-party systems? And third, how do ambiguous primes affect decisions in votes, in which the prime does not correspond directly to favouring one choice over another? Using precinct level data from two federal city-states of Germany, Hamburg and Berlin, we find that results of popular votes and elections do, in fact, differ depending on the polling place being situated in a school. Our findings are not only relevant to the theoretical conception of vote choice and contribute to psychological accounts of political behaviour, but they also have practical implications for the design of electoral institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article makes a distinction between the attitude component of campaigns and the knowledge component and argues that a campaign that influences knowledge of a proposal can be quite successful in influencing the vote. On June 12th 2008 Irish voters voted against ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Perceptions, and especially misperceptions, of the Treaty played an important role in the referendum. The campaign focused in particular on influencing voters' perceptions of, rather than attitudes towards the Treaty. This article examines the interaction between knowledge, campaigns, and perceptions of the Treaty, in the referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referendums often fail to live up to a deliberative standard, with many characterised by low levels of knowledge, disinterest and misinformation, negativity, and a focus on extraneous issues to which voters are voting. But social media offers new avenues for referendums to incorporate a greater deliberative dimension. Through a content analysis of BBC discussion forums, we test whether online discussion of the Scottish independence referendum has deliberative characteristics. Results suggest a mixed picture with conversation displaying some deliberative features (low incidences of flaming/discussion of referendum issues). However, low levels of discussion intensity, dominance by a few, little knowledge exchange, and high gender inequality illustrate that online referendum discussion lacks deliberative characteristics, implying that social media are not a panacea for referendum deliberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is about comparative voting behaviour in referendums on the EU and explores variation within one country rather than variations across countries. This enables us to control for broad national context while allowing variations in the immediate referendum context, in terms of campaign intensity and incumbency. It analyses voting behaviour in the many referendums that have taken place in Ireland. The major part of the analysis deals with the five referendums since 2001, as this allows the use of the same measurement of EU support and the use of post referendum surveys. Most attention is paid to attitude to the EU, party support and satisfaction with the incumbent government, reflecting the main debates in the literature on the issues and party cues. The relative importance of each is said to depend on contextual factors such as campaign intensity and economic strength. We find both party cues and issues matter consistently, and suggestive evidence that incumbency matters to the effectiveness of cues given by the two main pro-EU parties but the major finding is that variations in the factors driving voting behaviour in different Irish polls on Europe are slight and barely significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referendums are often viewed as a threat to the rights of minorities. Empirical studies, so far, have tried to deal with the impact of referendums on minorities and civil rights at the subnational level by comparing either referendum or policy outcomes across subnational units. These units are, however, often constrained by the national level of government. Hence, to understand the full effect of referendums on minority policies, cross-national comparisons are required. Based on existing game-theoretical models, we argue that referendums and initiatives push policies towards the voters' preferences, either by protecting minority rights or reducing them. We test this proposition with national-level information on preferences and institutions as well as minority policies from countries spanning the whole globe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Integrity of elections relies on fair procedures at different stages of the election process, and fraud can occur in many instances and different forms. This paper provides a general approach for the detection of fraud. While most existing contributions focus on a single instance and form of fraud, we propose a more encompassing approach, testing for several empirical implications of different possible forms of fraud. To illustrate this approach we rely on a case of electoral irregularities in one of the oldest democracies: In a Swiss referendum in 2011, one in twelve municipalities irregularly destroyed the ballots, rendering a recount impossible. We do not know whether this happened due to sloppiness, or to cover possible fraudulent actions. However, one of our statistical tests leads to results, which point to irregularities in some of the municipalities, which lost their ballots: they reported significantly fewer empty ballots than the other municipalities. Relying on several tests leads to the well known multiple comparisons problem. We show two strategies and illustrate strengths and weaknesses of each potential way to deal with multiple tests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of referendum voting follows much the same format as for general election voting. Influences on vote, however, are likely to differ significantly. Referendums decide issues, while general elections determine which party or parties will form the government. Parties are often divided on referendum issues and these issues tend to be of low salience. General elections, however, are contested by long-established parties on highly salient issues. Using panel data from the British Election Study and the 2011 Alternative Vote Referendum Study, we find that voters place different weights on party identification, issue positions, government and leader evaluations when voting in general elections and referendums, but the evidence for differential campaign effects is limited. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

At the 2010 UK election, Labour proposed a referendum on changing the House of Commons electoral system from single member plurality to the Alternative Vote. Subsequently, a coalition was formed between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, yet it was Labour's policy on electoral reform that was implemented. The paper explains why this proved to be politically convenient for Labour's opponents. At the same time, however, holding the referendum reflected an emergent de facto convention that significant constitutional change should only be introduced after it has secured popular endorsement. The paper assesses whether the dynamics of public opinion during the AV referendum suggests that voters' eventual decisions about constitutional questions reflect their views about the merits of the relevant arguments. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

How can we determine which arguments in a referendum are most persuasive? We show that the Bradley–Terry model has several features that make it well-suited to this task, and thus preferable to other, more conventional approaches. Using a survey experiment conducted during an electoral reform referendum in Ontario, Canada in October 2007, we demonstrate how unstructured and structured Bradley–Terry models can be straightforwardly fitted and interpreted. In doing so, we gain insight into the factors which determine support for electoral reform. We identify a status quo bias and find that power varies with mention of fairness, local control over candidate selection, and the role of political parties. We conclude by discussing the limits, extensions and further applications of such models in electoral studies and political science more broadly. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Countries engaged in transitions from Communist rule to democracy and market economies face a considerable challenge to foster tax morale and to reduce tax evasion. Tax evasion, however, severely limits the capacities of these reformed states, which reduces in a vicious circle the citizens'' incentives to pay taxes. The question then arises how this vicious circle may be broken. Several authors suggest that political institutions may do the trick. Based on insights that institutions allowing a direct say on policy issues (especially tax questions) may increase tax morale, we propose to study comparatively how the link between trust and tax morale is affected by these institutions. We find that allowing for referendums strengthens the link between trust and tax morale, but that this effect depends on the nature of the institutions. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Whether from a sincere belief in the ability of the body politic to arrive at optimal decisions, or in an instrumental attempt to generate legitimacy for policy choices, a large number of jurisdictions use the referendum to settle political questions. This practice relies on assumptions about voter interest and competence that merit empirical testing. We conduct a series of survey experiments that leverage variation in wording from a set of arcane ballot provisions from elections in Texas. We find that (1) voters are largely confused about the meaning of such ballot provisions; (2) efforts to improve the wording of such provisions and educate voters has minimal impact on their comprehension; (3) voters are easily persuaded to change their vote when given the chance; and (4) voters rely heavily on default answers (especially "yes") in casting their votes. On the whole, the evidence suggests that narrow referendum questions that lack clear ideological or informational cues overwhelm the limits of citizen competence, and are thus likely to result in unstable and unreliable decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Referendums are often seen as a means to legitimize the outcome as the new norm and increase acceptance of the outcome. Do referendums actually have these effects? More precisely, do voters recognize the referendum result as the new norm? And do voters go as far as to change their own minds in accord with the referendum result? We explore these questions using a panel survey that we conducted in Ireland before and after the abortion referendum that was held on May 25, 2018. We find that, after the referendum, voters updated their norm perceptions in the direction of the referendum result. However, we find inconsistent evidence that the referendum convinced voters to change their personal opinions about abortion. The findings provide insights on the power and the limit of referendums in increasing policy agreement among voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under what conditions do citizens favor deciding political issues by popular vote? Models of support for popular vote processes usually consider the influence of individual attitudes such as political trust and interest in politics. But much less is known about the effect of institutional variables on support for popular vote processes. This article builds on research showing that disaffection with elected officials shapes support for referendums by considering the influence of the party system. First, an analysis of multilevel data from twenty-four European democracies indicates that individuals are more supportive of referendums in countries with fewer effective political parties. Second, a mediation analysis provides evidence that the number of parties influences referendum support through individual-level political trust and external efficacy. Where there are fewer viable parties, feelings that elected officials are unresponsive tend to increase popular support for referendums. These findings suggest a trade-off between available representation by political parties and support for direct influence over public policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Western democracies, many citizens support the use of referendums. However, as referendums create satisfying outcomes for citizens with majority views, they could generate ambivalent feelings among voters for the minority option. Little is known about the effects of winning or losing a referendum for citizens' referendum support. This article analyses multiple-wave survey data from five referendums in Bavaria (Germany), Finland and the Netherlands. The findings show that losers' referendum support decreases in nearly all cases, but there is very limited evidence for an increase of winners' referendum support. Nevertheless, the results clearly indicate a winner-loser gap, suggesting that referendums have relatively more positive effects for winners' than for losers' referendum support. As such, this article extends previous findings of the non-stability of referendum support. As the legitimacy of democratic institutions depends upon losers' consent, these findings have important implications for the democratic potential of referendums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcomes of two recent Irish referendums - on marriage equality in 2015 and abortion in 2018 - have placed contemporary Irish voters in sharp contrast with their long-standing conservative Catholic reputation. These referendums also stand out internationally because of an associated deliberative innovation. This paper aims to explain the watershed abortion vote drawing on theories of generational change, issue-voting, cue-taking and deliberative democracy, using data from an exit poll at the 2018 abortion referendum. We show that cleavage and age effects are key to understanding the referendum outcome. These results offer insight into how societal processes such as rapid secularisation, generational replacement and democratic innovations shape politics. Moreover, voters who were aware of the deliberative innovation were more likely to support the liberal referendum option. To increase willingness to deviate from the status quo, engaging citizens actively in the debate is a fruitful approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]