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The result of increased integration for welfare were considered, based on the simple trade-offs on different grounds. An attempt has been made to provide some insight on the continuing globalization debate. It reveals that, integration may increase utility of the poor and decrease world output.

An economy of two regions inhabited by similar individuals and where interregional migration is expensive is presented. First best-efficiency, with migration controls, and federal efficiency, sans migration controls, were correlated. It was demonstrated that first-best efficiency, unlike federal efficiency, needs optimization of the total product net of migration cost. Moreover, it was established that decentralized equilibrium allocations are federally efficient but not necessarily first-best efficient.

The effects of a federal political system on economic efficiency and welfare in a society characterized by a mobile population are addressed. A model is adopted and then examined using varied objective functions. The model is built on the Mansoorian and Myers model (1993), wherein residents have varying extent of loyalty to two regions. Among the objective function methods used, the representative resident's utility (RU) method has no equal. The RU approach is solely dependent on resident utility. The government optimization of the RU approach illustrates an effective Nash equilibrium in the model.

Corrective policies can be assigned without cost to the lowest level of government that does not produce public sector externalities at that level. This is true as public sector externalities are distinguished from private sector externalities. The former arises from the effect of the choices of regional governments on other regional governments, while the latter results from the effect of the choices of private agents on other private agents.

The effect of imperfect population mobility on capital tax competition and the efficiency of different tax regimes was examined. Results revealed that direct taxation regimes are constrained efficient, that capital and direct taxation regimes are inefficient when jurisdictions are asymmetric and that capital taxation regimes are generally inefficient. These indicate that local control and over capital taxation result in inefficiency. Results also showed that externalities arising from capital tax competition can be offset by a decentralized jurisdiction, when population mobility is involved.

A second source of inefficiency exists in capital tax competition models with asymmetric non-price-taking jurisdictions. This inefficiency is unlike that identified by D.E. Wildasin, which takes place in a price-taking environment. The newly determined inefficiency is set off when a jurisdiction raises its capital taxation. In this manner, it cuts the equilibrium capital price, eventually damaging the condition of other jurisdictions' residents, without giving consideration to these external impacts in its decision making. To attain an efficient allocation, this pecuniary externality should be corrected with a device that both corrects for the fiscal externality identified by Wildasin and addresses each jurisdiction with a distinct component that serves as the Pigovian correction for the pecuniary externality.

A model is derived to show the efficiency properties of an economy with competing regions and in which individuals have an attachment to their homes. The standard fiscal externality economy is extended by assuming that individuals get a non-pecuniary benefit from living their home. This reduces the incentive of regional authorities to transfer propulations. It is found that all Nash equilibria are efficient but the model, while consistent with the fiscal externality economy, does not show any inefficiency associated with decentralized regional taxation in the presence of migration.

The introduction of head and land taxes into a decentralized urban context results in fiscal inequivalence that results in a Pareto inefficient equilibrium different from that of laissez-faire. In a model characterized by identical individuals, costless migration between a center and a suburb and land ownership ranging from rent sharing to absentee landlordism, local governments use such taxes to prevent resource outflows from their jurisdictions and redistribute such revenues to their residents. Areas with high per head revenues become overpopulated, and interjurisdictional transfers are then required to equalize these subsidies. Free mobility compels local government cooperation, thereby making the resulting Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient and superior to that of laissez-faire.

We present a time-series analysis of the asynchronous polar CD Ind, using fast cadence TESS photometry. A similar analysis is performed using ground based photometry of BY Cam. These asynchronous polars show remarkably similar light curves and enigmatic timing characteristics. A pair of competing models for the assignment of the white dwarf spin period have been presented for both binaries. TESS allows for the breaking of this degeneracy by providing continuous coverage over several beat-cycles. The CD Ind light curve displays a super-orbital period of 7.2 days due to beat-phased modulation of the accretion rate onto a permanently visible spot. This (main) accretion region is active for 3/4 of the beat-cycle. The dominant photometric signal is at 109.654(4) min and is identified as a side-band related to the white dwarf spin and the binary orbit, analogous to that found in BY Cam. We obtain the white dwarf spin period of CD Ind as 110.820(5) min and an orbital period of 111.952(8) min. The TESS light curve supports a pole-switching scenario for CD Ind, with a total of 4 alternating, and oppositely positioned accretion regions. This inclination of CD Ind is estimated as i = 65 ° ± 10 °. One accretion region remains in view of the observer at all times. In addition, two pulsed accretion spots each accrete for just less than 1/2 of the beat-cycle. These alternating spots are orthogonal to the main accretion region (which is always in view), and are found to be roughly 180 ° apart in longitude. Finally, since the mean flux drops by a factor of 2 for about 1/4 of the beat-cycle and the dominant accretion region turns off during this time, we hypothesize the existence of a fourth (permanently hidden) accretion region opposite to the one permanently in view. Photometric models for the 2- and 4-pole accretion configurations are developed and only the 4-pole model is consistent with the observed periodogram for CD Ind. We conclude that complex magnetic fields affect accretion flow onto these white dwarf stars. In particular, the magnetic field of the white dwarf in both of these binaries is inconsistent with either a centered or an offset dipole configuration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]