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To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2005.11.010 Byline: Danny Dolev (a), Sugih Jamin (b), Osnat (Ossi) Mokryn (c), Yuval Shavitt (c) Keywords: Directed graph; AS relationships; Valley free routing Abstract: We investigate the resiliency of the Internet at the Autonomous System (AS) level to failures and attacks, under the real constraint of business agreements between the ASs. The agreements impose policies that govern routing in the AS level, and thus the resulting topology graph is directed, and thus the reachability between Ases is not transitive. We show, using partial views obtained from the Internet, that the Internet's resiliency to a deliberate attack is much smaller than previously found, and its reachability is also somewhat lower under random failures. We use different metrics to measure resiliency, and also investigate the effect of added backup connectivity on the resiliency. Author Affiliation: (a) School of Engineering and Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem 91904, Israel (b) Department of EECS, University of Michigan, Michigan, United States (c) School of Electrical Engineering, Tel Aviv University, Ramat Aviv 69978, Israel Article History: Received 4 August 2004; Revised 26 June 2005; Accepted 7 November 2005 Article Note: (miscellaneous) Responsible Editor: J. Hou