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A study on stability of natural resource cartels in oligopolistic markets is presented.

The impact of financial intervention is examined in the light of internal market variations, in the light of the decrease in the amount of capital invested due to technological success.

A two-class model is discussed in which sufficient conditions for the final distribution of wealth to be independent of the initial distribution and conditions for saddle-point stability are given. This model focuses mainly on status-seeking out of the other factors like distribution of abilities, social prejudice, and racial discrimination.

A model of depreciation includes current flow variables and current stock, enabling a company to remain consistent in their depreciation policy despite any tax changes.

A set of differential games with transition dynamics and constraints that are homogenous of degree one were analyzed to overcome its limitations. It was shown that linear homogenous are the most effective approaches to linear homogenous Markov strategies. Such approaches become appropriate only when the objective function's integrand is homogenous of a specified degree.

The existence and dynamic characteristics of the cooperative solution, two kinds of Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) and a trigger strategy equilibrium are examined in a simple capital accumulation game. In the cooperative solution as well as the first MPE, the stock always assumes a steady state. On the other hand, the second MPE leads to complex dynamics. A Pareto comparison demonstrates that the strict MPE can be dominated by the other MPE for particular parameter constellations while the strict MPE is the dominated entity for other parameter values.

The effects on equilibrium output and profits of modifying the resource endowments in a nonrenewable resource duopoly, wherein one of the firms exhausts its endowment in finite time and the initial stock is not necessarily equally distributed, is examined. Results indicate that industry output and profits are not independent of the distribution of the initial share of the total resource endowment, as they sometimes are for some important classes of characteristics in one-shot Nash equilibria.

A simple dynamic game is used to model international pollution control between two adjacent countries, with noncooperative and cooperative governmental pollution control policies featured. Both countries are shown to lose through noncooperative behaviour when the governments only use linear policies. A differentiable subgame-perfect equilibrium can be used to support a steady-state Pareto-efficient pollution stock, however, when the governments employ nonlinear Markov-perfect policies.

It is often impossible to prevent poachers from encroaching on a nation's fisheries. Assuming a long-run non-cooperative solution, the home nation can successfully deter poachers under an open-access policy which restricts vessels, making the poachers costs higher than the home nation, and therefore making poaching unprofitable. It is not sure whether consumers under this model will gain or lose.

An analysis of egalitarian economies is presented. The analysis considers strictly egalitarian economies where equilibrium conditions are set and social well-being is maximized. It is shown that such conditions persist independent of returns to scale standards. In addition, egalitarian economies are unaffected by variables of monopoly, externalities of consumption or production, commodity taxes or public goods provision.

This paper explains why under laissez-faire the financing of higher education is both inefficient and inequitable. It is argued that a government-run scheme of income contingent loans (ICLs) for higher education would achieve superior outcomes. We advocate a refinement of existing ICLs schemes. Following Apps, Long and Rees (2014), the paper proposes a piecewise-linear repayment schedule that serves both equity and efficiency objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The adverse effect of intragenerational redistribution policies on economic development is analyzed. The analysis centers on redistributions that reduce incentives for education and acquisition of skills, and thus have a negative impact on the economic growth rate. To illustrate the moral hazard problem in education, a basic model of a closed economy that produces only one consumption good and its extension to a one-sector model with a standard neoclassical production function and a two-sector economy engaged in international trade is presented.

Research was conducted to examine a cost-of-adjustment model of investment with distinguishable characteristics. A new form of hysteresis that results from conflicting incentives to misrepresent costs for certain types was the most remarkable. The model provides a new interpretation of Tobin's q under asymmetric information and explains some results of the mergers and acquisition literature.

Research is presented concerning the development of a model which features an economy consisting of a small endowment of agricultural land and a large endowment of forest. The perpetual cycle of clearing and sale of marketable timber is discussed.