Search

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.02.001 Byline: Hideo Konishi (a), M. Utku Anver (b) Abstract: It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching problems, pairwise-stable matchings may not be immune to group deviations, unlike in many-to-one matching problems (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we show that pairwise stability is equivalent to credible group stability when one side has responsive preferences and the other side has categorywise-responsive preferences. A credibly group-stable matching is immune to any 'executable' group deviations with an appropriate definition of executability. Under the same preference restriction, we also show the equivalence between the set of pairwise-stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition-proof Nash equilibria of an appropriately defined strategic-form game. Author Affiliation: (a) Department of Economics, Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Ave., Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA (b) Department of Economics, Koc University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer, 34450 A[degrees]stanbul, Turkey Article History: Received 3 February 2004; Revised 1 February 2005 Article Note: (footnote) [star] This paper has been circulated under the title 'Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems.' We are most grateful to two anonymous referees of the journal for their exceptionally high-quality services. One referee pointed out an error in one of our results in the first version. The other referee's detailed constructive criticisms led to a completely revised version. Conversations and communications with Al Roth and Federico Echenique were very useful. We thank Bhaskar Dutta, Jordi Masso, Eiichi Miyagawa, William Thomson, Anne van den Nouweland, and the participants of conferences and seminars at BC, Rochester, UBC, Duke, Rice, SMU, Toronto, Brown, Osaka, and Montreal. We also thank Margarita Sapozhnikov for her research assistance. Any errors are our own responsibility. Anver gratefully acknowledges the support from the NSF.

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2005.08.005 Byline: Hideo Konishi Keywords: Consumer search; Market size effect; Price cutting effect; Taste uncertainty Abstract: The geographical concentration of stores that sell similar commodities is analyzed using a two-dimensional spatial competition model. A higher concentration of stores attracts more consumers with taste uncertainty and low price expectations (a market-size effect), while it leads to fiercer price competition (a price-cutting effect). Our model is general enough to allow for the coexistence of multiple (possibly) asymmetric clusters of stores. We provide sufficient conditions for the nonemptiness of equilibrium store location choices in pure strategies. Through numerical examples, we illustrate the trade-off between the market-size and price-cutting effects, and provide agglomeration patterns of stores in special cases. Author Affiliation: Department of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, 02467, USA Article History: Received 25 January 2005; Revised 28 July 2005

A process of coalition formation (PCF) is connected with unique absorbing state to the core, and equilibrium PCFs with multiple absorbing states to the largest consistent set. PCF is an ongoing , dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup.

Tiebout feels that, if public goods are provided locally, equilibrium will exist and will be Pareto efficient. The equilibrium must be stable against credible coalitional deviations. Hence, a new equilibrium notion called migration-proof Tiebout equilibrium is introduced, which will resist all deviations.

This paper presents a model of the primary and secondhand markets for a consumer durable with a transaction cost and with the consumer holding or replacing it. Depreciation, competition, equilibrium and other concepts are considered in the analysis.

A three location transportation development model is presented, explaining the emergence of transportation hub cities on rivers and coasts. It specifies transportation costs, assumes no demand externalities, and posits a prominent role for import substitution.

The tax level in a local public goods economy tend to change with the rate of consumer movement and jurisdictional preferences. Under conditions where a finite number of consumers exists, the presence of Nash equilibra may be negated by adopting a proportional income tax scheme. On the other hand, economies that employ poll tax scheme are likely to witness the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium, although the Nash condition may manifest unsubstantial efficiency.

Three assumptions are needed to be satisfied by individuals' preferences for a non-cooperative game with a finite set of players and common finite strategy sets to yield a strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The anonymous assumption, the independence of irrelevant choices assumption, and the partial rivalry assumption yield the existence of a pure strategy strong Nash equilibrium and the equivalence of the sets of Nash and strong Nash equilibria in pure strategies.

The Greenberg and Shitovitz majority voting approach is extended to prove the existence of equilibrium in a local public good economy. The new model allows free mobility, multiple commodities, consumer preference of jurisdiction and population distribution externalities. Although the extended model has proven the existence of a voting market equilibrium, the conclusion can still be improved by providing for empty jurisdictions with reasonable tax policies.

The welfare effect of commodity tax reform in economies with nonlinear income taxes is studied. Results show that a tax reform program may be developed to improve the Pareto principle on consumer utility if economic efficiency loss is not minimized due to incentive compatibility. A proposed tax reform policy may be applied to a diversified economic class that has arbitrary smooth income taxes. The analytical process is enhanced via the expenditure function approach. The role of commodity taxation in mixed economies and past studies on optimal tax and tax reform theory are discussed.

A model of the role of marketplaces or trading centres in the agglomeration of population as cities is presented. It is demonstrated that gains to trade, location-specific production and the setup expenses of marketplaces and a mass transportation system can be used to produce agglomeration and city formation.

An explanation for the Anchor store phenomenon is provided. The other type of store mentioned is retail shop and it is compared with the latter one.

An analysis investigated three issues regarding the structure of the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games. The first concerns the use of varying conceptualizations of a coalitional deviation, namely strict deviation and weak deviation. The second issue focuses on the conditions where some or all the coalition-proof Nash equilibria of a common agency game are strong as discussed by Aumann (1959). Finally, this study examines the link between the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the set of Pareto undominated Nash equilibria.