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The paper is based on the experience of creating and piloting a functioning 'Incubator' crowdsourcing platform for designing public spaces in an estate regeneration project in South London. The paper uses a cybernetics framework to analyse and present the way the platform itself was created and how issues of effectiveness, efficiency and equity were dealt with. It explores the generic qualities of interface and reviews applications of variety reduction in established crowdsourcing CS) models. It briefly presents the legal and socio-spatial parameters (like property rights) associated with the creation of the Incubators platform as well as the generic rules applicable to human-spatial relationships, based on studies exploring human-spatial interactions. Practical constraints including costs, catchments, life-span and meaningful feedback are looked into, followed by a discussion on social and political limitations associated with this form of public participation. The paper explains how those constraints where taken into account when establishing the operational parameters of the software platform and the experiences gained from the operation of the platform. Challenges and complications, such as the exclusion of actors, are identified together with the responses encountered in practice. While the Incubators platform succeeded in attracting younger planning participation demographics, older demographics were marginalised by the platform's graphical user interface and social networking features. These findings highlight why, in spite of what it promises, 'crowdsourced urbanism' is prone to similar traits with those of analogue participation. In that sense, creating a CS platform which could convey the grass-roots ideas of actors and users of urban spaces in an efficient way that could be applied to a broad range of planning systems, appears to be a challenge. • A crowdsourcing platform could structurally marginalise older, poor and less IT-skilled people. • Efforts to increase inclusiveness could negate the cost and time efficiencies of crowdsourcing. • Mainstreaming crowdsourcing would require digital credentials issued to the entire population. • There is a trade-off between CS process manageability and the quality of design outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper explores the transformations of the housebuilding industry under the policy requirement to build on previously developed land (PDL). This requirement was a key lever in promoting the sustainable urban development agenda of UK governments from the early 1990s to 2010 and has survived albeit somewhat relaxed and permutated in the latest National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). The paper therefore looks at the way in which the policy push towards densification and mixed use affected housebuilders’ business strategy and practices and their ability to cope with the 2007 downturn of the housing market and its aftermath. It also points out the eventual feedback of some of these practices into planning policy. Following the gradual shift of British urban policy focus towards sustainability which started in the early 1990s, new configurations of actors, new skills, strategies and approaches to managing risk emerged in property development and housebuilding. There were at least two ways in which housebuilders could have responded to the requirements of developing long term mixed use high density projects on PDL. One way was to develop new products and to employ practices and combinations of practices involving phasing, a flexible approach to planning applications and innovative production methods. Alternatively, they could approach PDL development as a temporary turn of policy or view mixed use high density schemes as a niche market to be explored without drastically overhauling the business model of the entire firm. These transformations of the UK housebuilding sector were unfolding during a long period of buoyancy in the housing market which came to an end in 2007. Very little is known both about how housebuilder strategies and production practices evolved during the boom years as well as about how these firms coped with the effects of the 2007 market downturn. The paper draws on published data (company annual reports, government statistics) and primary material (stakeholder interviews, planning applications, unpublished project specific information) to explore two different approaches that two major housebuilders (the Berkeley Group and George Wimpey – now Taylor Wimpey) followed during the boom years in response to the changing requirements, risks and uncertainties embedded in the residential development process. The recent turmoil in the property markets acted as an ‘acid test’ to business models and practices and not all firms survived it. What is more, the UK government is now embedding some of those business practices into policy, thus completing one loop in a co-evolving feedback spiral between planning policy and business strategy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]