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To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.04.005 Byline: Stephen P. Ferris (a), Narayanan Jayaraman (b), Sanjiv Sabherwal (c) Keywords: Dividends; International; Catering Abstract: This study tests for the international presence of dividend catering across a sample of twenty-three countries. We find evidence of catering among firms incorporated in common law countries but not for those in civil law nations. Catering persists even after controlling for the effect of the firm's lifecycle. We conclude that when the legal regime and its accompanying set of investor protections permit, investors force dividends from managers, but they also attempt to extract such payouts indirectly by placing a high value on dividend paying firms. The relative failure of civil law firms to cater might be explained by idiosyncratic behaviors in the consumption of the private benefits of control or a lack of interest in responding to temporary market misevaluations of their equity. Author Affiliation: (a) Trulaske College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211, USA (b) College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, GA 30308, USA (c) College of Business, University of Texas at Arlington, TX 76019, USA Article History: Received 8 July 2008; Accepted 6 April 2009

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.02.008 Byline: Hyung Suk Choi (a), Jonathan Clarke (b), Stephen P. Ferris (c), Narayanan Jayaraman (b) Keywords: Analysts; Brokerage; Market share Abstract: This study investigates the effects of Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement on market share within the US securities industry as well as the determinants of market share during 1996-2004. We find that these regulations did not cause top brokers to lose market share in spite of their reduction of information asymmetries existing within the brokerage industry. They did, however, significantly reduce the quarterly variability in market share changes. We find that Regulation FD and the Global Research Analyst Settlement reduce the importance of an all-star analyst, issuer affiliation, and analyst optimism for gaining brokerage market share. We further discover that the Global Research Analyst Settlement increases the importance of coverage as a market share determinant while reducing the value of analyst experience for non-top brokers. We find that our results remain robust even when we limit our analysis to a set of pure brokerage firms. Author Affiliation: (a) College of Business Administration, Hongik University, Seoul, Republic of Korea (b) College of Management, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA, USA (c) Trulaske College of Business, University of Missouri, 404 Cornell Hall, Columbia, MO, USA Article History: Received 4 August 2008; Accepted 14 February 2009

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.12.003 Byline: Stephen P. Ferris, Xuemin (Sterling) Yan Keywords: Organizational form; Mutual funds; Agency costs Abstract: Using a comprehensive sample of mutual funds and fund families for the period 1992-2004, this study examines the impact of fund management companies' organizational forms on the level of agency costs within mutual funds. We find that, all else being equal: (1) funds managed by public fund families charge higher fees than those managed by private fund families; (2) public fund families acquire more funds than private fund families; and (3) funds of public fund families significantly underperform funds of private fund families. Collectively, these findings suggest that agency costs are higher in mutual funds managed by public fund families. Our results are consistent with the idea that the agency conflict between the fund management company and fund shareholders is more acute for public management companies because of their shorter-term focus. Author Affiliation: Department of Finance, Robert J. Trulaske Sr. College of Business, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211-2600, United States Article History: Received 5 May 2008; Accepted 17 December 2008