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Students who perform better academically are generally more accurate in assessing their performance. In other words, they are better calibrated, showing smaller discrepancy between their predicted and actual performance. Research into contextual variables related to performance has shown that students sitting position may be related to their performance in class. In the current study we attempted to bring several lines of research together and examine whether there are differences in academic performance, calibration, and confidence judgments among students who choose various sitting positions in the classroom. 130 college students (M = 21.52, SD = 1.59; 103 female) attending courses at the University of Jaen in Spain participated. Results revealed that students' calibration differed depending on their preferred sitting position. We found that students in middle rows were optimally calibrated, students in the front rows overestimated their performance, and those in the back rows tended to underestimate their performance. Furthermore, students in the front rows were the most confident in their estimates, whereas students in the middle and back rows were less confident, suggesting the manifestation of the Dunning-Kruger effect. Future directions for contextual variables contributing to students' optimal calibration are discussed. • Students who perform better academically are generally better calibrated. • Students' sitting position may be related to their performance in class. • Students' calibration differed depending on their preferred sitting position. • We show evidence of the Dunning-Kruger effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To effectively self-regulate learning, children need to self-evaluate whether they meet learning goals. Unfortunately, self-evaluations are often inaccurate, typically, children are overconfident. We investigated two explanations for developmental progression in self-evaluations related to children's (48 5/6-year-olds and 53 7/8-year-olds) interpretations of performance: Improved reliance on item difficulty, and reduced sensitivity to self-protection biases. Self-evaluations were more accurate for 7/8-year-olds than for 5/6-year-olds. There was no developmental increase in reliance on item difficulty; even 5/6-year-olds made adaptive use of this cue. Both age groups were overconfident for incorrect responses, but were able to use performance feedback to improve confidence judgments. However, when self-rewarding, 5/6-year-olds were less likely to take negative performance feedback into account than 7/8-year-olds. The 5/6-year-olds were able to base confidence judgments on performance feedback, but did not use feedback to the same extent when self-rewarding. This may indicate that self-protective biases are an important cause of overconfidence in children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research examining models of memory has focused on differences in the shapes of ROC curves across tasks and has used these differences to argue for and against the existence of multiple memory processes. ROC functions are usually obtained from confidence judgments, but the reaction times associated with these judgments are rarely considered. The RTCON2 diffusion model for confidence judgments has previously been applied to data from an item recognition paradigm. It provided an alternative explanation for the shape of the z-ROC function based on how subjects set their response boundaries and these settings are also constrained by reaction times. In our experiments, we apply the RTCON2 model to data from associative recognition tasks to further test the model’s ability to accommodate non-linear z-ROC functions. The model is able to fit and explain a variety of z-ROC shapes as well as individual differences in these shapes while simultaneously fitting reaction time distributions. The model is able to distinguish between differences in the information feeding into a decision process and differences in how subjects make responses (i.e., set decision boundaries and confidence criteria). However, the model is unable to fit data from a subset of subjects in these tasks and this has implications for models of memory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This study investigated whether participants can improve the accuracy of their confidence judgments by making second-order judgments, and whether advice (attend both to correct and incorrect items and consider the remember/know quality of the item), and “try more” instructions can help increase participants' accuracy. The participants (n =220) made confidence judgments of their answers to 50 recall questions on a video clip. Next, all the participants were asked to try to increase the accuracy of their confidence judgments by modifying those they believed showed poor realism. Although the participants did increase the accuracy of their confidence judgments, neither the advice nor the “try more” instructions improved their accuracy. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Magnitude understanding and metacognition are important in life and for academic achievement. In two studies, we examined children's and adults' metacognitive awareness of their whole-number and fraction magnitude estimates. There were few differences between grades or numerical ranges in third through fifth graders' (8–12-year-olds') and adults' (18–59-year-olds') item-by-item confidence and familiarity judgments, even when there were differences in estimation precision. A brief experience with unfamiliar fractions did not lead to greater familiarity or confidence, likely because of participants' extensive prior experiences with numbers. Monitoring accuracy was poor across grades and number types, suggesting it may be limited in number-line estimation. Additionally, participants relied on their familiarity to monitor their performance more during fraction than whole-number estimation, likely because people thought many large whole numbers were equally unfamiliar. Our data suggest people use different cues to monitor their fraction and whole-number magnitude estimation performance, yet monitoring accuracy is similar across grades and number types. • Metacognitive monitoring involves recognizing things one knows more or less well. • Numerical magnitude knowledge is important for math achievement. • We investigated cues people used to accurately monitor their estimation performance. • Children and adults had poor monitoring accuracy during magnitude estimation. • Familiarity was a stronger cue for fractions compared to whole-numbers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As time passes, people often remember the gist of an event though they cannot remember its details. Can rememberers exploit this difference by strategically regulating the "grain size" of their answers over time, to avoid reporting wrong information? A metacognitive model of the control of grain size in memory reporting was examined in two experiments, iii which memory for quantitative information contained in a fictitious eyewitness transcript was tested either immediately, or after 1 day or 1 week. Given control over the grain size of their answers, participants' report accuracy still declined with delayed testing, but at a slower rate than when forced to provide only precise answers, remaining stable between the 1-day and 1-week tests. The observed pattern of change and stability in chosen-grain report accuracy was traced to the use of a stable control policy in the face of less effective monitoring judgments at delayed testing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]