Search

Abstract African maritime countries take the majority of their animal protein from fish. Bound with tradition and a promise of food and other values, African fisheries also provide a source of livelihood for over 35 million coastal fishers. Yet, as in many other regions of the world, the fishing sector is plagued with policy failures, and illegal activities. This paper summarizes the key points in the evolution of African fisheries in terms of exploitation, policy, and maritime security trends. It addresses how access to fishing by the small-scale sector is increasingly hindered by the increasing power and scope of an industrial fleet often involved in Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. It also discusses the impacts of ineffective enforcement against overexploitation and illegal fishing, piracy, human smuggling and climate-change risks for coastal communities, as well as policy measures and initiatives to reverse the existing trends. Highlights • Many fish stocks are heavily exploited. • Fisheries catches are under-reported. • The status of fish stocks can be unknown. • Policy patterns are overall ineffective because of a lack of monitoring. • Ineffective policies with regards to overfishing and IUU fishing threaten social peace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Harmful fisheries subsidies contribute to overfishing leading to environmental and societal impacts. If only fisheries and ecosystems within the subsidising nations' jurisdiction were affected, then unilateral actions might be sufficient to help safeguard our ocean and the people reliant upon it. However, just as fish move between jurisdictions, so too do the subsidised fishing fleets that target them. As such, the impacts and solutions to subsidies-induced overfishing are often matters of international concern. Mapping the distribution and flows of harmful subsidies is therefore key to understanding these concerns, informing multilateral reform, and empowering impacted nations to strengthen the terms of access to their waters and resources. Here we quantify the amount of harmful fisheries subsidies that supports fishing in the high seas, domestic and foreign waters. We estimate that between 20% and 37% of all harmful fisheries subsidies support fishing in foreign waters or the high seas, that is outside the jurisdictions of the subsidising nations. We show that harmful subsidies primarily originate from nations with high-Human Development Index (HDI), strong fisheries management capacity and relatively sustainable fish stocks, yet disproportionately impact nations with low or very low-HDI, lower management capacity and more vulnerable fish stocks—40% of the harmful subsidies that support fishing in very low-HDI nations waters originate from high-HDI and very-high HDI nations. We show that Asia, Europe, and North America, are net subsidy sources; they provide more harmful subsidies to their fishing fleets than their respective ecosystems are impacted by; while Africa, South, Central America and Caribbean, and Oceania are net subsidy-sinks. This discrepancy between the source of harmful subsidies and the nations that are ultimately impacted is unsustainable and unjust. Prohibiting all harmful subsidies to distant-water fishing and fishing in the high seas—with narrow exceptions for Small Island Developing States—should be prioritised to support the advancement of sustainable and equitable fisheries worldwide. • We quantify the amount of harmful subsidies supporting fishing in the high seas, domestic and foreign waters. • Between 20% and 37% of harmful subsidies support fishing in foreign waters or the high seas. • Harmful subsidies unequally affect low or very low-HDI nations, with low management capacity and vulnerable fish stocks. • Asia, Europe and N. America are net subsidy sources; providing more harmful subsidies than their ecosystems are affected by. • Marine ecosystems within Africa, Oceania, South, Central America, and Caribbean, are net subsidy-sinks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: It has been argued that a possible root cause of Somali piracy is the (illegal) overfishing that has been taking place in the country's waters, which has deprived local fishers of their livelihoods, and which may be considered as another form of ‘piracy’. In this paper, we explore the origins of this argument using both historical and ecosystem justice frameworks, and argue that the origin of piracy in Somalia is a result of a combination of state failure, IUU fishing, toxic waste dumping and its impact on the ecosystem. We then present some potential resolutions to the problem of piracy, which requires a multifaceted approach, including (i) the establishment of a viable Somali state where the rule of law is the order of the day; and (ii) action taken to prevent illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping to provide support for the local fishing industry. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean are among the most valuable resources in the region. These fisheries, worth an estimated $4.1 billion each year, play a pivotal role in supporting incomes and development goals in the region. However, due to the twin, and potentially inter-related effects of harmful fishing practices such as the use of fish aggregating devices, overcapacity, and fisheries subsidies, many of these tuna fisheries are currently at risk of over-exploitation—putting the livelihoods of countless local fishers at risk. This study finds that government fisheries subsidies in the region represent 37% of the ex-vessel value of tuna fisheries in the region. Fuel subsidies are estimated at US$ 335 million and non-fuel subsidies are estimated at US$ 1.2 billion for the year 2009. Developed countries are responsible for more than half of the subsidies spent in the predominantly developing region, underlying the fact that the majority of tuna value extracted from the national waters of developing countries in the region benefit larger, developed countries. The total resource rent, or return to society, from tuna fisheries, once adjusted for subsidies is a net negative US$750 million in 2009. Fisheries subsidies are enabling foreign fleets to operate at sub-market rates, putting local fleets out of competition for their own fishery resources. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In line with Target 14.6 of the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations (SDGs), the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been tasked with achieving a multi-lateral agreement on eliminating harmful fisheries subsidies. Despite almost two decades of negotiations and increasing public attention, an agreement remains elusive. There are numerous roadblocks to these negotiations, but one key issue is that there is no clear metric for the potential scale and relative impact of fishery subsidies. As such, much attention has been targeted towards the provision of large sums of subsidies to industrial and distant-water fleets, and the subsidies provided by the largest subsidising countries—the top seven together provide over 65% of the global total. This large percentage justifies the focus on these countries but doing so alone and without understanding the context within which the subsidies are provided, may ignore pervasive impacts of subsidies unrelated to their scale, such as their inequitable distribution. Using recently available data and various scaling analyses we developed a series of different subsidy metrics in order to broaden our understanding of the distribution of fisheries subsidies. We show that different global regions and individual countries could be considered as 'top' subsidisers, depending on the metric used. This highlights a potential issue of focusing on the absolute amounts provided as a de facto indicator of harm alone, which can detract from efforts by developing countries to redirect their harmful subsidies towards better support for their fishers and industries. Failure to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies has ramifications across the SDGs and across global regions, regardless of the absolute amount of subsidies that are being provided therein. • Calculating subsidy intensity considers the economic context of subsidy provision and facilitates broader debate. • Different regions and countries could be considered 'large subsidisers' when considering subsidies as a proportion of catch. • Using different subsidy intensity metrics highlights that there is more to subsidisation than the absolute size of a subsidy. • Subsidy intensity metrics highlight the need for a multilateral agreement to eliminate harmful subsidies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period from 2019 to 2020 is critical in determining whether the World Trade Organization (WTO), tasked with eliminating capacity-enhancing fisheries subsidies, can deliver to the world an agreement that will discipline subsidies that lead to overfishing. Here, following extensive data collection efforts, we present an update of the current scope, amount and analysis of the level of subsidisation of the fisheries sector worldwide. We estimate global fisheries subsidies at USD 35.4 billion in 2018, of which capacity-enhancing subsidies are USD 22.2 billion. The top five subsidising political entities (China, European Union, USA, Republic of Korea and Japan) contribute 58% (USD 20.5 billion) of the total estimated subsidy. The updated global figure has decreased since the most recent previous estimate from 2009, of USD 41.4 billion in 2018 constant dollars. The difference between these two estimates can be largely explained by improvements in methodology and the difference in the actual amount of subsidies provided. Thus, we consider direct statistical comparison of these numbers to be inappropriate. Having said that, the difference between the estimates suggest that the increase in fisheries subsidies provided in the preceding decades may have halted. Still, the bulk of harmful 'capacity-enhancing' subsidies, particularly those for fossil fuels have actually increased as a proportion of total subsidies. As such, for the benefit of marine ecosystems, and current and future generations of people, all hands must be on deck in helping the WTO reach a meaningful agreement to discipline subsidies that lead to overcapacity and overfishing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recreational fishing is a vital component of the tourism economy in Baja California Sur (BCS), Mexico, although several artisanal and industrial fisheries continue to operate in the region. The commercial long-liner fleet in particular is widely held to be responsible both for diminishing shark populations and declines in billfish through bycatch. Using available fisheries and ecosystem data, we develop an Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) model to represent current ecosystem and fishing dynamics in BCS and explore the ecological and economic effects of specific fisheries policy measures. Results suggest that currently mandated bycatch limits for the longlining fleet will have little effect on marlin abundance in the area. In an overfished ecosystem, decreasing fishing effort can result in higher overall catches through population rebuilding. While perhaps ecologically justified, increases in the abundance of sharks, a top predator, can have negative effects on other valued species in the ecosystem. The effects of these trophic dynamics must not be overlooked, as they can negate or even reverse desired outcomes from fisheries management. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]