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Abstract: Magnetoencephalography (MEG) was recorded to detect the 40 Hz component in auditory steady-state responses (ASSRs) to Dau''s chirp sound regularly repeated 40 times/s. The phase coherence of the 40 Hz component increased with the chirp intensity until the latter reached about 30 dB above its absolute hearing threshold and then saturated. We constructed a differential-equation model for the phase dynamics which showed similar behavior to the experimental result in terms of the phase coherence. One of the two parameters in the model was seen to be influenced by the stimulus intensity while the other seemed unaffected. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: With respect to the specificity and structure of epistemological beliefs, we contend that beliefs about knowledge are reflective of the multidimensional, multilayered, and interactive nature of knowledge. Here we present a model of the nested and reciprocal relations between domain-general and domain-specific epistemological beliefs. Additionally, we present evidence in support of three claims related to that model. Those claims are that domain-specific beliefs: (a) emerge when beliefs are assessed at a more precise level; (b) are differentially related to motivation; and (c) develop from more general beliefs. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Research on epistemological beliefs has clearly increased in the last decade. Even though the construct is clearer and relevant data are being collected, there are important theoretical and methodological issues that need further clarification. One of them is the debate about the domain generality–specificity of epistemological beliefs. I argue that there are both theoretical and methodological difficulties that hinder a more fruitful approach of the domain generality–specificity debate. Differences in goals and scope of the diverse conceptualizations about epistemological beliefs and how they devise the role of content-domain and context are a major source of difficulties. Methodological problems such as whether such epistemological beliefs can be measured “in isolation”—free of content and context influence—or the impossibility of collecting direct measures of epistemological beliefs may influence how the domain generality–specificity question is approached. Some suggestions about how these difficulties may be overcome are developed. The relevance of exploring epistemological beliefs across domains and across contexts is emphasized. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]