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In a rapidly changing and diverse world, the ability to reason about conflicting perspectives is critical for effective communication, collaboration, and critical thinking. The current pre-registered experiments with children ages 7 to 11 years investigated the developmental foundations of this ability through a novel social reasoning paradigm and a computational approach. In the inference task, children were asked to figure out what happened based on whether two speakers agreed or disagreed in their interpretation. In the prediction task, children were provided information about what happened and asked to predict whether two speakers will agree or disagree. Together, these experiments assessed children's understanding that disagreement often results from ambiguity about what happened, and that ambiguity about what happened is often predictive of disagreement. Experiment 1 (N = 52) showed that children are more likely to infer that an ambiguous utterance occurred after learning that people disagreed (versus agreed) about what happened and found that these inferences become stronger with age. Experiment 2 (N = 110) similarly found age-related change in children's inferences and also showed that children could reason in the forward direction, predicting that an ambiguous utterance would lead to disagreement. A computational model indicated that although children's ability to predict when disagreements might arise may be critical for making the reverse inferences, it did not fully account for age-related change., (Copyright © 2024 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Behavioral economics research has revealed that our decision-making can be biased by default settings. That is, all other things being equal, adults tend to choose default options even when the effort involved in choosing other options is minimal. Extensive evidence shows that default settings can systematically influence adult decisions in a wide variety of domains (e.g., pension choices, organ donation), but little is known about their developmental origin. Of interest in the present research is whether default settings can influence young children's decisions about whether to be honest. We investigated this question in two studies of 5- and 6-year-old Chinese children (total N = 120; 60 girls; M age  = 5.81, SD age  = 0.14). Each study used a specially designed device that allowed children to play a guessing game in either a Cheating Default condition in which they would cheat by doing nothing or in an Honesty Default condition in which they would be honest by doing nothing. In each condition, they had the option of taking a trivially easy action to override the default (pushing a button in Study 1 or moving a screen in Study 2). In both studies, children decided to cheat significantly more often in the Cheating Default condition than in the Honesty Default condition. Additionally, overall cheating rates were significantly higher in Study 2 than in Study 1 (55% vs. 25%), which suggests that even though the default setting effect generalized across different actions, the specific action in question can also affect the cheating rate. Taken together, these results indicate that default setting effects that have been observed in adults have origins in childhood, and they point toward new ways to use nudges to promote positive social development and moral decision-making., (Copyright © 2023. Published by Elsevier B.V.)

Reasoning about modesty was examined among adolescents and young adults in China and the U.S. Participants made moral judgments of story characters who did a good deed and either truthfully accepted credit for it, or falsely denied having done it. The social context in which statements occurred was manipulated, with some made in private and others in front of a class. Chinese participants judged accepting credit for good deeds less favorably and lying in the service of modesty more favorably than did participants from the U.S. In each country, older participants judged modesty-based lies more favorably when they were told in public. Additionally, a high collectivist orientation and low individualistic orientation was associated with higher ratings of modesty-based lying in public, which provides the first direct link between endorsement of these values and moral judgments about lie-telling., (Copyright © 2010 The Foundation for Professionals in Services for Adolescents. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.