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Tailings storage facilities (TSFs) are being built globally for containing the chief solid waste stream from mining industry. Catastrophic TSF breach accidents have occurred frequently since the beginning of the 21st century, causing severe impacts on the environment, economy and community safety. The recent example is the 2019 Brumadinho accident in Brazil that released 12 million m3 of tailings and killed more than 249 people. The foreknowledge of the TSF breach run out overland flow can be crucial to prevent or minimize possible losses. Using the Digital Surface Model (DSM) terrain data and the smoothed particle hydrodynamics (SPH) numerical method, this study proposed a procedure to predict the routings of hypothetical TSF breach run out flow over downstream complex terrain. A case study of a planning TSF site in Guizhou Province of China was carried out to evaluate its applicability. The results suggested that the maximum routing distance of the TSF breach run out flow was 1.45 km. At 240 s, the run out flow began to impact the downstream viaduct piers with the maximum submerged depth of 3.3 m and the maximum impact force of 21.8 kPa. Essential protective measures were recommended before the TSF site construction. The proposed procedure is then recommended for the safety management of the TSFs globally.

To persistently eavesdrop on the mobile devices, attackers may obtain the elevated privilege and inject malicious modules into the user devices. Unfortunately, the attackers may not be able to obtain the privilege for a long period of time since the exploitable vulnerabilities may be fixed or the malware may be removed. In this paper, we propose a new data hijacking attack for the mobile apps. By employing the proposed method, the attackers are only required to obtain the root privilege of the user devices once, and they can persistently eavesdrop without any change to the original device. Specifically, we design a new approach to construct a shadow system by hijacking user data files. In the shadow system, attackers possess the identical abilities to the victims. For instance, if a victim has logged into the email app, the attacker can also access the email server in the shadow system without authentication in a long period of time. Without reauthentication of the app, it is difficult for victims to notice the intrusion since the whole eavesdropping is performed on other devices (rather than the user devices). In our experiments, we evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attack and the result demonstrates that even the Android apps released by the top developers cannot resist this attack. Finally, we discuss some approaches to defend the proposed attack.