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This paper discusses an example of Scottish-Polish cooperation on research, undertaken at the turn of the twentieth century, into the dialogues and philosophy of Plato. Two scholars were involved in this research: the Scottish classical scholar and historian of ancient philosophy, Lewis Campbell (1830–1908), and the Polish Plato scholar and philosopher, Wincenty Lutosławski (1863–1954). Their research on the chronology of Plato's dialogues is analysed and the reception of their works discussed. The paper is enriched with some excerpts from their correspondence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a re-articulation of Derridean différance, Bernard Stiegler claims that the human is defined by an originary default that displaces all psychic and social life onto technical supplements. His philosophy of technics re-articulates the logic of the supplement as concerning both human reflexivity and its supports, and the history of the différance of life itself. This has been criticised for reducing Derrida's work to a metaphysics of presence, and for instituting a humanism of the relation to the inorganic. By refuting these claims, this article will show that Stiegler's doubling of différance enables him to articulate the human as constituted by both the individuation characteristic of ' life', and that of a technical, psychic, and collective individuation. Putting forward a reading of the logic of the trace in life, and emphasising the aspects of Leroi-Gourhan, Simondon, and Canguilhem that Stiegler uses in his reading of Derrida, I will demonstrate that the political stakes of adaption and adoption in his Noopolitics require this re-articulation of différance. Technics shapes the human future, arising from this differential mutation; marking the invention of the human as the site of the political. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article attempts to sort out the misunderstandings between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy surrounding the question of the animal as they come to the fore in the conversations published in For Strasbourg. While Derrida finds the lack of animals in Nancy's world puzzling, Nancy criticises Derrida's blurring of the border between the human and the animal for inadvertently reinstating a scale or a difference, if not between humans and animals, at least between the living and the non-living. Though this criticism appears misguided at first, I argue that Nancy's recasting of finitude in terms of the limit as the place of exposure undoes the phenomenological, or more precisely Heideggerian, understanding of sense and world, which Derrida still attributes to Nancy. Ultimately, what we have in both thinkers is a radically different account of plurality. Whereas Derrida emphasises the abyss between singularities and places faith, engagement, and responsibility at the origin of the world, for Nancy the edges between singularities always already hold any inside in contact with an outside, any one in contact with the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one of the closing paragraphs of Treatise Book 1, Hume provocatively concludes: 'Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous' (THN 1.4.7.13: 272). Unlike the first clause, the meaning of the second clause is far from obvious. I claim that errors in philosophy are 'only ridiculous' for Hume in the sense that - unlike errors in religion - they fail to disturb us psychologically or in practical life. The interesting question, however, is why they fail to disturb us. I suggest that it is their critical role in resolving the psychological instability brought on by philosophical reflection that makes errors in philosophy quite helpful to us and necessary for re-stabilising ourselves. In recognising a positive role for philosophical errors, my account challenges the standard interpretation of Hume's claim according to which 'ridiculous' philosophical errors play the merely negative role of being innocuous or safely dismissed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are faith and knowledge mutually incompatible in the sense that it is not possible for someone both to know something to be the case and also, and at the same time, to accept as a matter of faith that it is the case? Robert Baron, one of the group of early seventeenth-century Episcopalians known as the 'Aberdeen doctors', examines this question and provides an answer full of philosophical interest. This article discusses his answer, focusing in particular on his account of the nature of and the relation between the assent of knowledge, assent of faith, and assent of will. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As long as the market is said to be based on the motive of self-interest, any argument in favor of expanding the market will have to be seen as an argument in favor of self-interest. Such an argument, however, clearly conflicts with the notion that this motive, when viewed from a practical-political point of view, must be deemed a vice and thus, at best is something to be tolerated. As long as the market is seen as presupposing the motive of self-interest, as the currently dominating interpretation of Adam Smith implies, it therefore appears virtually impossible to see how Smith - or anyone else for that manner - can possibly justify extending the market in practical-political terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I suggest two main ways of interpreting Reid's analysis of the perception of the quality of hardness: (1) Reid endorses two distinct concepts of hardness. The distinction between the two lies in a profoundly different relation between the sensation of hardness and the concept of hardness in each of them. The first concept, which I term as a 'sensation-laden concept', is 'the quality that arises in us the sensation of hardness.' The second concept, which I call a 'non-sensational concept', is 'the cohesion of the parts of the body with more or less force.' (2) Reid is thinking like a developmental psychologist and postulates what I consider as a gradual development from one concept to the other according to which the initial sensation-laden concept of hardness, which we form during our early childhood, gradually develops into a mature non-sensational concept of hardness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The maturity and cohesion of the field of sound design is examined through anecdotal and thematic analysis of three sound design symposia which took place in 2013. Through the themes encountered, sound design is considered as a healthy, young, expansive and inclusive practice, immanently resistant to formulation and control. Differences are highlighted between the European school of sound design, rooted in historic practices in sound arts and theatre, and a US American Hollywood interpretation of sound design more narrowly focused on film post-production. Sound design is examined as a broad 'horizontal' discipline, which obtains strength from a plurality of perspectives, and as a body of practice undergoing changes through the psycho-dynamic metaphor of a growing organism. An intentionally gonzo-academic account, this personal essay absolves itself of all claims to objectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Locating the history of male honour in the perspective of his philosophical anthropology, Mandeville is able to show that the rituals of modern honour are an exemplary expression of that spontaneous, artificial order stemming out of a natural disposition of human passions. For Mandeville, duelling provides decisive evidence that the desire for approval from others, even at the cost of one's life, is a dominant motive in man's behaviour. The aim of this paper is to review selected Scottish responses to the questions raised by Mandeville's views on 'Modern Honour' and his provocative defense of duelling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers re-assessment of Scottish Common Sense rhetoric and its relationship to pluralist practice and philosophical method. It argues that the rhetorical texts of George Campbell, Hugh Blair, and Alexander Bain can be read as a practical application of Scottish Common Sense philosophy. This offers a novel means of examining the relationship that Scottish rhetoric has to the philosophy of David Hume and also its own innovative philosophy of language. Finally, I argue that Scottish rhetoric makes a unique contribution to rhetorical methodology's key place in the creation of social and moral consensus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]