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Recently the medical profession has faced increased outside pressure to reform postgraduate medical training programs to better equip young doctors for changing health care needs and public expectations. In this article we explore the impact of reform on professional self-governance by conducting a comparative historical-institutional analysis of postgraduate medical training reform in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. In both countries the medical training regime has shifted from professional self-regulation to coregulation. Yet there are notable differences in each country that cannot be explained solely by diverging institutional contexts. They also result from the strategic actions by the actors involved. Based on an assessment of the recent literature on institutional transformation, this article shows how strategic actions set negotiating authority processes into motion, producing new and sometimes surprising institutional arrangements that can have profound effects on the distribution and allocation of authority in the medical training regime. It stresses the need to study the interactions among political context, the properties of institutions, and negotiating authority processes, as they are crucially important to understanding institutional transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We are at the beginning of an era in which the pressure to secure the biggest possible "bang" for the health care "buck" is perhaps higher than it ever has been, on both sides of the Atlantic, and within the health policy discourse, incentives, for both professionals and patients, are occupying an increasingly prominent position. In this article, we consider issues related to motivating the professional and the patient to perform targeted actions, drawing on some of the evidence that has thus far been reported on experiences in the United Kingdom arid the United States, and we present an admittedly somewhat speculative taxonomy of hypothesized effectiveness for some of the different methods by which each of these two broad types of incentives can be offered. We go on to summarize some of the problems of, and objections to, the use of incentives in health and health care, such as those relating to motivational crowding and gaming, but we conclude by positing that, following appropriate consideration, caution, and methodological and empirical investigation, health-related incentives, at least in some contexts, may contribute positively to the social good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]