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China's 2010 Defense White Paper provides relatively little new data and less information about Chinese military capabilities and modernization efforts than previous editions. Consistent with past white papers, this one does not provide any information about specific weapon systems or about nuclear forces and modernization efforts. An INSS methodology for evaluating military transparency indicates that China's 2010 white paper receives lower transparency ratings than the 2008 edition and provides less information than defense white papers of other major Asia-Pacific powers. China emphasizes the importance of transparency about strategic intentions rather than capabilities. Although Chinese military officers state that increased transparency is intended to reassure neighbors about China's benign intentions, efforts to downplay China's expanding military capabilities suggest that the 2010 Defense White Paper will make little progress toward this goal. This monograph presents a table of overall transparency ratings for China's Defense White Papers dating from 1998 to 2010. In the accompanying analysis, the authors provide the rationale for why each of the 19 categories in the 2010 white paper received its specific transparency rating.

In preparation for the October 2000 Defense Ministerial of the Americas (DMA) in Manaus Brazil and at the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) studied the global trend toward the creation of Defense White Papers. The study aimed to understand the nature of these documents in order to prepare the U.S. delegation to discuss the tendency in Latin America and the Caribbean during the DMA. The INSS study team found no agreement about what constitutes a 'white paper' other than each is a consensus statement on a topic. The team examined 15 defense documents worldwide and interviewed participants in the development process and independent analysts.

In response to the extraordinary international developments of the past few years, the Secretary of the Air Force published a white paper, The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach--Gobal Power in June 1990. Secretary Rice's paper describes a planning framework to develop Air Force capabilites which, combined with the capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Marines, will underwrite U.S. national security strategy. The changing environment offers significant challenges to the analysis commuity. To meet these challenges, the Air Force Center for Studies and Analyses is developing an analytical framework and a methodology for analyzing Air Force capabilities to provide Global Reach--Global Power.

The United States government needs to plan for and prepare against terrorist attacks. Terrorism, when combined with weapons of mass destruction, increases the planning complexity. In the event of a nuclear terrorist attack, the government will need to conduct consequence management in the affected areas, govern the non-affected areas, and prevent future attacks. This paper examines what actions, following a nuclear terrorist attack on domestic soil, produce the broadest and deepest results and what options the President has to address such a national emergency. The federal government must address the national effects caused by the attack itself as well as the anticipated results caused by communities enacting protective measures at the detriment of their neighbors. To produce the list of coordinated actions and options, this paper uses a scenario where a terrorist loads a 10-kiloton (kt) weapon into a truck, drives it to the nation's capital, and detonates it. After detonation, the government must attempt to mitigate the weapon's real and perceived effects. A review of the mitigating responses reveals that some actions are nearly impossible without prior planning and coordination. Additionally, the government must operate within a framework of constitutionally granted authorities. Continuity of government is assumed sufficient to exercise command and control and is beyond the scope of this paper. It is also beyond the scope of this paper to present more than a cursory overview of preventing a subsequent attack.

Information as Power is a refereed anthology of United States Army War College (USAWC) student papers related to information as an element of national power. It provides a medium for the articulation of ideas promulgated by independent student research in order to facilitate understanding of the information element of power and to better address related national security issues. The anthology serves as a vehicle for recognizing the analyses of Army War College students and provides a resource for USAWC graduates, senior military officers, and interagency national security practitioners concerned with the information element of national power.

The United States requires a national security strategy and a force posture that reflect the nation's economic and emotional capacity to implement the strategy. Recently published strategic concepts fail to accommodate these requirements. Current Secretary of Defense guidance to the Services is to develop a strategically balanced joint force capable of spanning the full spectrum of conflict. The U.S. Joint Forces Command interpretation of the Department of Defense vision is to expand military capability in an economic environment where defense budgets will almost certainly contract. In response, U.S. Joint Force and Army Capstone Concepts articulate development of a force that is not optimized toward specific threats but rather depends on rapid adaptability to threats as they are revealed. These concepts demand vigorous debate on their risk and affordability implications. This paper explores a risk-based approach to a strategically balanced force that assesses alternative postures and the viability of competing force concepts in mitigating national risk in a resource-constrained environment. This assessment also examines alternate definitions of balance and the continued relevance of U.S. conventional capabilities and nuclear deterrence.

The National Security Strategy of the United States cites sustained economic growth and prosperity as a vital national objective. Key to economic growth and prosperity is a healthy financial services sector. History shows that a weak financial sector can exacerbate economic downturns. Weaknesses in the US banking system greatly aggravated the United States' difficulties during the Great Depression. Other historical examples include Mexico, Russia, Argentina, and Japan; in all cases, weak financial systems have contributed significantly to economic problems and overall loss of influence on the world stage. Therefore, assessing the health of the financial services industry is an important step in assuring continued U.S. national power, prosperity, influence, and security. The research supporting this paper included individual examination of key issues facing the industry by the 16 seminar members as well as field research in Washington, D.C., New York, Chicago, Hong Kong, and Tokyo. The seminar visited financial institutions that make up the industry, governmental, quasi-governmental, other regulatory agencies, and financial industry associations in order to get a complete picture of the complicated, highly interconnected structure of the industry. The paper begins by describing the basic components and health of the financial services industry. It continues with a discussion of the major challenges facing the industry, what role the government plays in the industry, and the outlook for the future. Short essays addressing the most pressing issues facing the industry, both domestically and internationally, precede an overall conclusion.

With the creation of United States Africa Command and the resurrection of Seventeenth Air Force, some Airmen responded with trepidation. The African continent seemed truly unknown territory, and many believed that the United States had little prior experience conducting flight operations in the region. But as Maj Paul F. Spaven points out, such concerns are largely groundless. Airmen have been operating in Africa for decades, and rich possibilities exist for crafting an air strategy to serve US interests in the region. This groundbreaking study offers a thorough analysis of the context for USAF strategy making in Africa, followed by a synthesis of what that strategy might look like. The analysis occurs in three chapters, covering the geography of Africa, the complex and varied history of US- and European-air operations in the region, and current US activities and strategic guidance pertaining to Africa. The synthesis occurs in three chapters, covering the conditions the USAF can expect to encounter in Africa, a discussion of how Airmen should think about the area of responsibility, and an examination of the ends, ways, and means of a proposed African strategy. The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest ends that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited ways and means be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen.

Homeland security is the most complex endeavor this nation has ever faced. Some see this new mission as just an evolutionary step in the national security process. This is not the case--it is a change in kind, not degree. For most of our history, national security took place in Washington, D.C. and overseas. The key players were all in the federal government, most notably, the Departments of Defense, State, and the Intelligence Community. Today there are 57 federal agencies, 50 states, 8 territories, and 3,066 counties involved in U.S. homeland security. In fact, there are 87,000 different governmental jurisdictions that will play roles in homeland security Furthermore, the private sector will play a major role in homeland security, and this role will not be limited to logistical support. Corporate America will be required to play a major operational role in homeland security. The changes that have and will continue to occur make it difficult to even decide which questions to ask, much less, how to answer them. Perhaps the first step will be to change how we think about security in the twenty-first century. If we are to secure the American homeland from 21st century threats, we must learn to do something that is very difficult...we must change the way we think. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to help the readers change the way they think about homeland security, no easy task.

The Information in Warfare Working Group of the U.S. Army War College is pleased to present this anthology of selected student work from Academic Year 2006 representing examples of well-written and in-depth analyses on the vital subject of Information in Warfare. The charter of the working group calls for it to coordinate and recommend the design, development and integration of content and courses related to the information element of power into the curriculum to prepare students for senior leadership positions. This publication is an important component of that effort. Interestingly, one needs to go back to the Reagan administration to find the most succinct and pointed mention of information as an element of power in formal government documents. Subsequent national security documents allude to different aspects of information but without a specific strategy or definition. Still, it is generally accepted in the United States government today that information is an element of national power along with diplomatic, military and economic power...and that information is woven through the other elements since their activities will have an informational impact. Increasingly, however, the United States finds itself falling behind in its ability to wield the information element of power. And, while it certainly is a military superpower one has to question whether the United States maintains that same status with regard to information. The current information environment has leveled the playing field for not only nation states, but nonstate actors, multinational corporations and even individuals to affect strategic outcomes with minimal information infrastructure and little capital expenditure. Anyone with a camera cell phone and personal digital device with internet capability understands this. On the other hand, the United States military has increasingly leveraged advances in information infrastructure and technology to gain advantages on the modern battlefield.

In this study Lt Col Joseph M. Codispoti, USAF, describes an emerging partnership between two long-time allies of the United States: Turkey and Israel. On the surface this Muslim-Jewish partnership seems unlikely, particularly on the fringes of the Arab world. A closer examination, however, reveals a number of mutual security interests and a shared sense of isolation at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Colonel Codispoti begins his study by examining relations between Turkey and Israel from the founding of Israel in 1948 through the 1980s. While relations vacillated during these early years, the foundation was built for deeper and more significant ties. The advent of post-Cold War instability in the arc of crisis served as the catalyst for growing and extensive political, military, and economic links between the unlikely partners. This study concludes by addressing future possibilities for and barriers to the emerging Turco-Israeli partnership, as well as its far-reaching potential to bring stability or conflict to the region. The Turco-Israeli partnership has important national security implications for the United States. Working in tandem, these allies can promote the American vision for the region by fostering democracy, peace, and free markets in the region. This study should prompt critical analysis and discussion of a significant and relevant topic and, as with all Maxwell Papers, is provided in the spirit of academic freedom, open debate, and serious consideration of the issues.

Agribusiness is a vital segment of US commerce, a critical part of American infrastructure, and an often overshadowed component of our national security strategy. Its importance to the US has been likened to that of oil to the Middle East. History demonstrates that a nation able to feed its own citizens is inherently stronger and thus able to provide a safer and more secure society. US agribusiness leads the world, yet faces continued competition in an environment of technological change and global agribusiness consolidation. This report assesses the entire industry while focusing on four key areas: water use, land management, grains and fibers, and food safety and security.

Political scientist Angelique Haugerud has lived or worked in Kenya for 25 years and posits that those seeking even a shallow understanding of Kenyan politics must first appreciate the role of "baraza." At one level baraza is simply the omnipresent gathering of Kenyans, met for the purpose of interaction between the governed and the governors, be it the village conclave chaired by elders or the national address delivered by the president. But a baraza, typically unstructured in content yet stylized in form, reflects the tensions of Kenyan society and politics, a ying and yang of "security and danger, predictability and surprise, cohesion and conflict, conformity and creativity." The error, Haugerud argues, is that too often observers of Kenya will focus on one side of the baraza writ large. When Kenya in the 1970's and 1980's drew fulsome praise as a stable "island" in the sea of African continental turmoil, its internal social turbulence was ignored. Then, when political/social conflict surfaced in the 1990's, commentators suggested Kenya was in irreversible decay, overlooking the nation's considerable cohesiveness. In analyzing Kenya politics, allow for the mirror reflection, the apposite tendency that marks Kenyan political intercourse, and provides it a Carollian twist.

Agribusiness is a critical component of U.S. commerce. In fact, some have argued that agribusiness is as politically and strategically important to the U.S. as oil is to the Middle East. Agribusiness is a diverse industry that feeds the nation and resources the national strategy. While U.S. agribusiness is the world's leader, it is challenged by global competition and dynamic changes in technology and structure. The security posture of the United States depends on a safe, reliable, and plentiful global food supply. U.S. national security strategists must recognize the industry's global role, and the challenges facing this vital industry.

On April 11-13, 2000, the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute sponsored a major conference that examined what the Department of Defense must do "to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence . . ., given the increasing contemporary threats to the U.S. homeland. This book highlights the issues and themes that ran through the conference. As such, it is not a comprehensive record of the proceedings. It is organized as an anthology of the best of a series of outstanding conference presentations, revised in light of the discussions that took place there. Finally, the anthology is complemented by an overview and four specific recommendations. Those recommendations look to the future and place emphasis on the transformation strategy that conference participants considered essential to safeguard the American homeland now and into the future.

The tactical doctrine of the US Army changed considerably between 1946 and 1976. The changes which took place were influenced by a variety of factors, including improved conventional weapons, increased mobility, the development of nuclear weapons, the desires of different military leaders, wartime demand, parochial clashes between various branches, interservice rivalry and evolving national security policy. The competing or conflicting demands of these various influences often affected the formulation and dissemination of tactical doctrine. Army doctrine evolved amid great cycles of change, with new methods appearing only to be overwhelmed by the resurgence of older methods or the appearance of even newer methods. Although Europe remained the center of its primary concerns, virtual revolutions in tactical doctrine occurred in the late 1950s, early 1960s and early 1970s, as the Army shifted the focus of its doctrine from conventional, to nuclear, to counterinsurgency, to conventional operations. The combination of these changes has contributed to modern Army tactical doctrine being more complex than at any other time in American history. The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the major trends in Army doctrine since World War II. While the development of doctrine for individual branches is important, this study avoids a detailed analysis of the narrower aspects and concentrates on broader themes or issues in the evolution of US Army tactical doctrine. Since the development of tactical organization and equipment cannot be separated artificially from tactical methods, the study also describes the major organizational and weaponry changes which were an integral part of doctrinal innovations.

This paper will analyze World War II U-boat operations against Allied sealift with focus on the period from May 1943 to the end of the war. It will show the relevance of the operational and strategic decisions of this historical campaign to the challenges of today's potential regional conflicts. In 1943, Allied technological innovations and convoy employment precipitated a decline in U-boat successes and changes to the final portion of the U-boat campaign produced fewer U-boat victories, yet remained an effective operational scheme. It is relevant that the inability of Allied forces to consistently thwart successful U-boat attacks, along their own coastlines, emphasizes a weakness in our Naval Strategy Today, insufficient and usually lightly protected sealift. The Navy and Marine Corps joint White Paper, from the Sea, articulates Navy support of the National Security and National Military Strategies of the United States with a commitment to concentrate more on capabilities required in the complex operating environment of the 'littoral' or coastlines of the earth.

Utilizing the Navy white paper "From the Sea" as the basis, Navy Logistics and the Joint Logistics Over the Sea System were examined to highlight logistical difficulties in carrying out littoral warfare as envisioned. Port accessibility to prepositioned shipping in Africa was reviewed to point out the probability of having to off load in stream and the potential difficulties this would impose on the theater commander. Lastly, suggestions were offered that may minimize potential difficulties involved in sustaining forces without the use of a port facility.

Navy and Marine Corps forces available today and those programmed through the mid 1990s were conceived in an era of global confrontation. For decades, these naval forces have deployed globally to regional theaters to deter Soviet adventurism and to support allies and friends. Fortunately, the capability to deploy and sustain forward sea-based forces means that a great majority of the capabilities resident within today's Navy and Marine Corps forces are directly applicable to regionally-focused littoral operations described in the 'National Military Strategy' and the new Navy/Marine Corps White Paper '...From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century'. Consequently, while today's Navy and Marine Corps are being restructured and reorganized for new national needs and positive global change, the security environment for the United States military is a familiar one to the Navy and Marine Corps

Late on an April afternoon in 1988, the long awaited word from the White House reached the U.S. national security bureaucracy: President Reagan had approved the transfer of U.S.-developed nuclear submarine propulsion technology to Canada and would inform Prime Minister Brian Mulroney during his visit to Washington later that month. The opponents of the transfer, the Department of Defense, the United States Navy and the Department of Energy (the home of naval reactors), were stunned. In spite of lukewarm support from State, the NSC staff, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) for approval, how, in the face of seemingly compelling national security arguments against it, could the President say yes? Yet it had happened and there were to be no appeals. The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy were instructed to negotiate the necessary agreements to allow the transfer-- conditioned only to protect classified nuclear technology design information. It appeared that the issue had been lost--or had it? The dance which was to follow between the bureaucracies of the United States and Canada, and to a lesser extent the United Kingdom and France, eventually was to result in a decision by Mr. Mulroney not to seek nuclear submarines at all. What follows is an analysis of the issues involved in the approval and the final Canadian decision. The matter began in June, 1987, with the publication of a Canadian White Paper on Defense which announced that Canada would spend $8 billion to build 10 to 12 nuclear attack submarines (SSN's) to defend the Arctic against the Soviet submarine threat, and, importantly, for patrolling the Northwest Passage and territorial waters over which it claimed sovereignty. Canada, not wanting to design an SSN from the keel up, would buy existing hull and nuclear propulsion technology designs and build them under license in Canadian shipyards.

How can the Intelligence Community (IC) utilize personal electronic devices, specifically cameras and posted images, for intelligence including access to denied areas; how feasible is this collection tool to operationalize; how do analysts analyze an overwhelming volume of data; and what are the implications legally and ethically? As new technology that allows the exploitation of personal electronic devices becomes more integrated into the IC, more powerful analytic tools must be developed to assist the intelligence analyst manage the overwhelming amount of data in order to provide any useful analytic value. This paper will examine the intelligence value of wireless data sources and cyber cameras mounted on personal devices, security and maintenance systems, and photo trawling the internet. It will also look at the legal and ethical issues of employing such a collection strategy in the realm of national security then the feasibility of integrating and processing collected data into finished intelligence in an ever expanding world more data being collected than can be processed.This paper is divided into three sections each focusing on technology and the problems associated with the exploitable nature of personal electronic devices, mainly devices with camera. The first section examines the domestic surveillance camera and privacy issues of electronic devices and technology within the realm of the criminal justice system in the United States. The second section examines how electronic devices can be utilized as covert collection platforms outside the United States to gather useful information for the intelligence community. The third section looks at the processing, exploitation, and dissemination problems the intelligence community faces with the vast amount of international information collected.

The National Security Agency, established in 1952 by President Truman, has continued its cryptologic heritage in both the Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance missions. These missions entail collecting foreign intelligence for U.S. Government decision makers, from the President to senior civilian and military leaders. NSA s SIGINT information is used to protect the U.S. military and allies, to fight terrorism, and to support diplomacy. Its Information Assurance mission protects national security information and ensures that government leaders receive this information securely and reliably. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, NSA, as well as the U.S. Intelligence Community, Military and other Government Agencies, were called upon to prevent future terrorist attacks. The ensuing Global War on Terror required increased intelligence gathering. Throughout its history, NSA has periodically weathered public criticism. Recent releases of volumes of classified information has caused ongoing criticism and examination despite having inflicted grave damage to U.S. National security. Moreover, recent public debates, while a necessary, integral part of our American democratic society, put untold stress on NSA employees, who traditionally, necessarily work in silence. The intent of this paper is to urge NSA leaders to use new positive mechanisms, in addition to established legal and punitive means, to strengthen employee accountability and trust as releases of classified information continue and once-secret tools and techniques are examined publicly. This paper proposes that NSA establish a Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct to strengthen team cohesion and help employees resolve dilemmas about mission. It argues that articulating a Code of expected and aspirational behaviors will improve workforce resilience and thus protect against possible future releases of classified information.

The leadership of the U.S. Army is often criticized for its failure to anticipate the next conflict and structure itself accordingly. Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan serve to many as examples of conflicts for which the U.S. Army was woefully unprepared and forced to pay a steep price in terms of blood and treasure for that unpreparedness. Additionally, many assert that we are at an historical inflection point and the U.S. Army should divorce itself from Cold War thinking and organize to meet these new threats. Are such claims valid or are they merely the flavor of the day? This paper explores recent scholarship on the future of conflict to attempt to discern if the character of warfare is indeed changing and what those changes mean. It then continues to consider how those charged with providing for our nation's defense view future threats to U.S. security. Lastly, based on this exploration, it considers various threat orientations upon which to base the structure of the U.S. Army and some of their implications. This paper is written during a time of budgetary austerity and decreased funding for our nation's military. This austerity requires important decisions on the part of our military and national leaders. However, as resources remain finite under all economic circumstances, this paper seeks to address questions of capability as opposed to those of capacity. The capacity of the U.S. Army can and will fluctuate with the strategic and economic times. But capabilities are the important question here. Can the army of the most powerful nation in the world afford to seek efficiencies of cost and scale by eliminating its ability to conduct certain kinds of conflict? Or is it required instead to maintain the ability to act across the entire continuum of conflict?

Much has been written about the who and how of special operations. To date very little more than a paragraph has been devoted to what special operations are and how they fit into a nations grand strategy; not only during times of war but during those periods between the wars. This paper was written with the mindset of taking a fresh look at the employment of special operations forces (SOF) at the political level of warfare in a time when financial austerity comes to the forefront of policy makers decisions. In the twenty-six years since the stand-up of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) global threats have morphed. The world has evolved from a bi-polar conflict characterized by the Cold War through what may be the end of major conventional operations such as Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom I. Today it continues to evolve into an even more uncertain and complex state of radicalized extremist threats. SOF has the unique capability of operating in a pre-crisis capacity to enhance regional security by working with allies and partners, in less obvious ways, to enhance regional partners. It can act as a preventative mechanism that helps build the community of nations and create a more stable and thus, prosperous, world. This paper sets the strategic context for future operations, defines the domain of special operations and provides recommendations for the operational employment and education and guidance needed to achieve a security enhancing situation. It is only by taking a fresh look at a collective image of what special operations are that they can be used for the maximum effect in support of America's national security strategy.

This paper discusses and analyzes the use of biometrics within refugee communities of sub-Saharan Africa. The paper also examines the potential benefits of biometrics use within these communities, beyond the civil purposes of voter registration and food security. It also considers the issue of rebel and militia group recruitment within the refugee communities and the benefit biometrics could present in terms of proactive engagement in improving homeland defense and regional security.

This paper evaluates the current and future state of biometric modalities with application to national security operations on a global basis. The technical evaluations are compared for likelihood of significant breakthrough within the next five to ten years. Next Generation Genomic Analysis, also characterized as Next Generation DNA biometrics, stand out in terms of breakthrough potential in enabling national security operations and countering networked actors and 21st Century security threats. The paper further develops and assesses the breakthrough implications in applied scenarios, or use cases, for national security operations. An evaluation of United States national security policy, presidential directives and law demonstrates a gap in terms of policy scope and applicability to these breakthroughs. The paper provides recommendations to the user and policy community to close these gaps ahead of the coming technology advances in order to ensure the nation s national security posture retains the advantage through use of these capabilities, continuing to ensure the rights, confidences and protections of American Citizens.

This Defense Technology Paper provides the results of an organizational analysis conducted in 2011-2012 of STAR-TIDES, a special project of the National Defense University s (NDU) Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). STAR-TIDES (Sharing to Accelerate Research Transformative Innovation for Development and Emergency Support) is an open network organization with members around the world who share an interest in finding new, and more effective and sustainable solutions for populations affected by disasters, conflict, and other life-threatening scenarios. A special focus of the organization is to bring useful information in these areas to the attention of U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) policy makers so as to enhance national security efforts. Our analysis sought to develop a thorough understanding of the STAR-TIDES organization, and provide practical recommendations for strengthening its performance and viability. In doing this, we applied the McKinsey 7-S Framework which identifies seven key areas (Strategy, Structure, Systems, Staffing, Skills, Style, Shared Values) that are essential for all organizations, and that must be aligned or mutually reinforcing in order for the organization to succeed.1 The paper provides some background and history on the STAR-TIDES organization, describes our methodology, and presents findings for each of the 7-S factors. While our results are somewhat specific to STAR-TIDES, such networked organizations are becoming more common in a world that is increasingly interconnected. Thus, this report should be relevant and valuable to many organizations that share features of an open network.

al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain a threat to the US and US interests abroad. Their consistent expansion into failed and failing states and other ungoverned regions creates potential safe havens from which the organization can plan and prepare future operations. This paper proposes that Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations represent an enduring approach to denying safe haven to transnational terror organizations like al-Qaeda, by developing the capabilities of partner nation security forces to control activities within their borders and secure their populations. SFA also presents an opportunity for increased employment of Regionally Aligned, US Army Conventional Forces in support of security cooperation efforts. This paper provides a summary of the threat and the conditions of failing states and safe havens. It addresses the recent evolution of SFA doctrine, guidance and authorities, and the role of interagency cooperation related to the future operating environment and security assistance missions. The paper argues that SFA is a relevant military approach and not at odds with historic foreign military assistance efforts. It concludes with recommendations for organizing and training Conventional Force SFA units.

The President s National Security Strategy strongly emphasizes fundamental efforts that the United States will focus on to contribute to a better world by advancing its interests and values. The list includes: engagement, a just international order, and the promotion of American values. This paper addresses the concern that current domestic practice and the global projection of American values regarding human life are flawed. The paper provides evidence within multiple disciplines concerning human life; analyzes future trends concerning the promotion of universal rights; and provides a recommendation for a new era of life. It asserts that the projection of the new American value of human life will ultimately distinguish our nation, renew its legacy, and elevate its moral leadership.

The purpose of this Strategic Research Project is to examine the current geopolitical situation and provide guidelines for the development of the security of the Republic of Bulgaria. This project will explore the relationship between different geopolitical positions of major global players and the current global situation. The focus will be on: Eurasian space between Black Sea-Caspian region, United Europe, Russia, the United State and the Balkans. This paper will define the place of Bulgaria in the current geopolitical situation, revealing the advantages and disadvantages derived from this. The research will present the effects of the current geopolitical situation on the security policy of the Republic of Bulgaria and the protection of the country's interests set out in national strategic documents. Due to the large volume of the subject matter this paper will only examine those states and unions whose geopolitics have decisive influence on Bulgaria.

The Arab Spring revolutions in the Middle East are creating a new, complex environment with significant ramifications for both regional and international players. The family of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and its loyalists have ruled the country since 1970, oppressing the Sunni majority. In March 2011, opposition groups rebelled against the regime, with the conflict now entering its third bloody year. Faced with a continuously escalating and increasingly ambiguous situation on the ground in Syria, President Obama and his administration have struggled to find reasonable and actionable choices. What is clear is that the Syrian conflict is a destabilizing influence on the region and is a direct threat to US interests. In this paper we review current US policy towards Syria, and articulate three potential options for US involvement. Ultimately the administration has to choose between 1) intervention, 2) military aid to the rebels, or 3) renewed diplomacy. This paper advocates a new approach to diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.

Mexico began an all-out offensive against Mexico's transnational drug cartels in 2006, calling the Army and Navy to assist police with law and order. After six years the Mexican cartels still threaten U.S. interests and remain a national security threat to the United States. The U.S. and Mexico are inextricably linked economically, geographically, and culturally and threats to U.S. interests posed by the cartels require focused attention. While significant spill-over violence has not yet reached the U.S., the cartels have expanded operations in the U.S. and their brutal violent acts in Mexico impact U.S. interests. This paper argues that the war on drugs in Mexico has been a failure and that a new approach is needed. The United States and Mexico must continue to work together in order to diminish the levels of violence within Mexico, prevent spillover violence into the United States, and diminish the influence of the cartels. Finally, this paper will recommend changes to the current strategy to achieve those ends.

Finland's current security strategy will not prove beneficial for the nation without profound and concrete changes. Nordic and EU cooperation have been presented as alternatives to NATO membership. The complexity of taking into account the public opinion, Finnish political relation and the economic relations of both to Russia and the EU is point of the equation. As an EU-member state it cannot ignore any of these factors and it has to reconsider its foreign and security policy to coordinate the upcoming decisions over the European security arrangements. This paper examines different strategic security possibilities for Finland: 1) to rely on EU resources as a primary means for national security, 2) to rely on NATO capabilities, and 3) to rely on Nordic cooperation. The solution can also be a practical combination of all three. This paper concludes with recommendations based on consequences of each option.

Over the past decade, the cyber threat to critical infrastructure has grown to potentially catastrophic dimensions. Critical Infrastructure protection has become a matter of national security, public safety, and economic stability. It is imperative the U.S. Government (USG) examine current responsibilities, develop a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy, cybersecurity regulations, impose standards, and enforce the strongest security measures possible to protect the Nation from cyber attacks to critical infrastructure. This paper provides a background of what constitutes national critical infrastructure and Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), discusses the immense vulnerabilities, threats, and risks associated in the protection of critical infrastructure, and outlines governance and responsibilities of protecting vulnerable infrastructure. Finally, the paper will make recommendations for federal responsibilities and legislation to direct nation critical infrastructure efforts to ensure national security, public safety and economic stability.

Diplomacy, development and defense form the three primary pillars of US foreign policy used to engage and shape a global strategic environment. Over the past decade, a variety of critics have noted the lack of US interagency coordination in its international engagement and shaping efforts. This paper contends that although formal interagency structures and processes have improved and do exist at the national and country team level, the lack of an authoritative interagency mechanism at the regional level inhibits unified action in the conduct of shaping operations. To develop this argument, this paper focuses on the challenges of policy development, and subsequent implementation at our US Missions abroad. This paper highlights attempts to improve interagency collaboration and recommends potential courses of action. Recommendations include: a reconfiguration of the Unified Command Plan from a DoD-centric, to an NSC-lite centric organization, a revamped approach to planning at the Embassy level, and consideration of an interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act.

This paper examines the potential for assurance guarantees to drive nuclear proliferation. In their quest to better understand nuclear nonproliferation, scholars often isolate their analytic focus to the effectiveness of assurances at preventing an allys acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not consider how these assurances can simultaneously compel an adversary to proliferate. Assurance of the ally can exacerbate a security dilemma between the U.S. and an adversary to a point that increases an allys incentive to possess a nuclear weapon. Paradoxically, this could then mean that an initially effective assurance guarantee can compel the assurer to invest even more time and resources into assuring the ally to further nonproliferation ad infinitum. This paper provides a deductive evaluation of existing nonproliferation models and then demonstrates the argument through historical analysis of U.S. policy decisions on the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-India alliances. A discussion on the application behavioral economics in national decision making is proposed to explain why the U.S. responds to allies that are notoriously insecure about our commitment to their defense.

The United States military's use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) has skyrocketed since 2001. Many military analysts believe this trend will continue, with unmanned systems representing the future of aerial warfare. In fact, in the near future, RPA operations may not exclusively be a virtual away game. While RPA employment to date has focused on non-state actors and terrorists, operations against other sovereign states render the US RPA infrastructure a legal and legitimate target. This papers thesis addresses this fact and the related implications of placing personnel, property, and civilians near RPA garrisons at risk.The paper first describes the key operational elements of the RPA enterprise, demonstrating it is a system of systems including air, space, and cyber operations spanning the continental US (CONUS) and other countries. The paper then introduces an analytical framework for determining the legality and legitimacy of target sets using the Articles of the Geneva Convention, US and international case law, and just war theory. Through this analysis, it demonstrates that the preponderance of the CONUS RPA infrastructure is both a legal and legitimate target for sovereign states engaged in conflict with America. The paper then documents that neither Department of Defense nor service policy has addressed this vulnerability by providing specific examples of the alarming degree to which US combat capability would be degraded by adversary attacks on RPA operations in the homeland. It then presents several detailed prescriptions for consideration and action. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of some related implications of geographically dislocated warfare.

On 21 November 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan, defeated the Afghan Army, and installed a new government. Over the following years Afghan resistance grew, ultimately resulting in British withdrawal. Years later the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, seized control of the central government, and replaced it with a socialist regime. Thereafter the Mujahadeen resistance grew, forcing the Soviets withdrawal in 1989. Two decades later a US-led coalition overthrew the Taliban and supported establishment of a democratic government. Over the next eleven years, the resistance has grown and now, in 2013, the conclusion of another conflict in Afghanistan is unclear.As the Coalition enters its thirteenth year in Afghanistan, there are questions about our objectives, the approach, and chances for success. This paper seeks to answer these questions. It argues that Afghan stability will only be achieved through a long-term approach using a single, small, civil-military command, supporting civilian-led efforts to improve governmental capacity, linking the central government to rural Afghans.It does so by explaining why continued Coalition efforts in Afghanistan are so important, in light of an unstable region with violent extremists, and nuclear weapons. This work then describes the current situation in Afghanistan and bordering Pakistan; both countries having inept, corrupt governments, Islamic fundamentalists, and ungoverned areas. This paper continues by describing previous attempts at stabilizing the region by the Soviets. This includes their approach to security, military advisory missions, developmental efforts, educational programs, and governmental reform. The ongoing conflict, spanning multiple decades, is examined, describing the numerous factors which have torn the fabric of Afghan society, leaving a fractured state in its wake.This paper compares Soviet methods and results to those of the current coalition, showing they mirror one another in many ways.

American foreign policy elites are engaged in a national debate to define U.S. grand strategy specific to the Asia-Pacific region. This shift in U.S. focus has been referred to as a pivot or rebalance. The Asia-Pacific region is rife with potential challenges, the greatest of which comes from a rising China. In the nascent phase of strategy-crafting, decisionmakers are cognitively inclined to select analogies to help decipher complex problems. However, overemphasis on a single or incomplete analogy can lead to policy inefficiencies and at times, outright disaster. The use of analogies in foreign policy is irresistible and persistent. This paper analyzes the usefulness of the three prevalent historical analogies pervading thought in policy-making debate about China. These analogies posit China in the frameworks of Cold War containment, pre-WWI Wilhelmine Germany, and pre-WWII Munich. This paper proposes that the implications from each analogy is incomplete in framing the strategic environment and, if adopted by U.S. policy elites, will increase the potential for conflict. The conclusion is that the challenge modern China presents the U.S. is instead sui generis, defying previous foreign policy blueprints. Two analogies from Chinas own history are presented to offer broader frameworks for focusing the U.S. pivot.

Advocates have recently proffered the Global Zero Commission (GZC) proposal as an alternative US nuclear strategy. The potential impact of the GZC proposal warrants a thorough examination of its background, theoretical roots, assumptions and impacts to include a comparison to US strategy. This papers analysis finds the overall GZC framework to be insufficient and potentially harmful to US national security.The GZ recommends an aggressive advance toward nuclear weapons elimination and proposes short-term reductions well beyond current US plans. The proposal presumes significant international cooperation. The most appealing GZC recommendation is for a de facto minimum deterrence model en route to GZ. To its detriment, however, the GZC proposal relies on the implausibility of future nuclear conflict with Russia or China and that a reduced US arsenal will remain a capable, credible deterrent. Ironically, the GZC touts superior conventional forces and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems as a replacement for a US nuclear deterrent even as these capabilities appear to fuel further nuclear arms races. A final GZC proposal shortcoming is the lack of any definitive recommendations specifically addressing continued nuclear proliferation by rogue states.Finally, this paper provides three recommendations: 1) US arsenal size considerations must be driven by a resolute prioritization of national security maintenance and not devolve into a utopian pursuit of numerical reductions 2) BMD deployment must be tempered to prevent global strategic disruptions 3) a coherent strategy to counter nuclear proliferation by rogue nations must be developed, socialized, and pursued.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology requested that the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) suggest approaches to evaluating the quality of the current U.S. Army Science and Technology (S&T) portfolio and the quality of its execution. This paper contains the results of both studies. There are two aspects of the U.S. Army S&T program that are evaluated in this paper: the portfolio and the quality of its execution. This paper poses the questions that should be asked. Emphasis for the analysis of the portfolio is on program content, the distribution of resources over the component parts of the portfolio, and the priorities among the parts. Normally in an assessment of this type it is necessary to identify the principal stakeholders and customers for the research and development program. In the case of Army S&T, the stakeholders are the senior leaders of the Army, DOD, Congress, and, ultimately, the American taxpayer. The customers are the U.S. Army warfighters. The study begins by outlining a clear statement of the vision and mission of the parent organization the U.S. Army. We continue by describing in detail the needs and requirements of the U.S. Army by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the Army senior leadership, and from various intermediary customers such as the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command and its components, and the Program Executive Offices and the Program Managers of the acquisition community. The discussion then turns to the mechanisms by which the portfolio is assembled and approved, as well as the limitations posed by the realities of the budget details of resource allocation.

Additive manufacturing (AM) - commonly referred to as three-dimensional or 3D printing - is a prospective game changer with implications and opportunities that affect not just the Department of Defense (DOD) but the economy as a whole. The technology allows the art to part fabrication of complex objects from a computer model without part-specific tooling or human intervention. AM has already impacted a variety of industries and has the potential to present legal and economic issues with its strong economic and health-care benefits. Because of its remarkable ability to produce a wide variety of objects, AM also can have significant national security implications. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general introduction to these issues for nontechnical readers through a survey of the recent history and the current state of technology. Included in this paper is a brief review identifying key individuals and organizations shaping developments as well as projected trends.

In 2008, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative listed "expanded cyber education" as one of its key recommendations. In 2009, the Partnership for Public Service produced a report stating that the current pipeline of cybersecurity workers into the government was inadequate. (1) In the same year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the military was "desperately short of people who have the capabilities [to operate in cyberspace]." (2) And in 2011, the Inspector General of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported that 35 percent of the special agents investigating national security cyber-intrusion cases lacked necessary training and technical skills. (3) Nonetheless, the U.S. Government and private sector still seek to increase their online operations and dependency in spite of these shortcomings. An expert at the Atlantic Council of the United States sums up this problem: "cyber workforce management efforts resemble a Ferris wheel: the wheel turns on and on ... we move, but around and around, never forward." (4) This paper addresses methods to close the gaps between demand and the current existing capabilities and capacity in the U.S. cyber workforce. A large number of professionals--with not only technical skills, but also an understanding of cyber policy, law, and other disciplines--will be needed to ensure the continued success of the U.S. economy, government, and society in the 21st-century information age. Innovative methods have been developed by the government, think tanks, and private sector for closing these gaps, but more needs to be done. This paper is part of a larger discussion about the future of the U.S. cyber workforce and existing and new concepts that must be expanded to ensure continued success. The cyber revolution, part of the broader information revolution first defined in 1984, now touches virtually everyone and most aspects of life--80 percent of American adults, for example, now use the Internet, as well as over 2 billion people worldwide. (5) The future of the U.S. cyber workforce must consider this great paradigm shift. Increasingly, we encounter "cyber" in our everyday lives: newspapers are online, automobiles contain computerized systems, critical infrastructures such as water, electricity, and communications are networked. Nearly every facet of life has been digitized. Cyber applications impact Federal, state, local, and tribal governments, and businesses depend on cyber-literate employees. Therefore, this paper addresses the need to increase and improve cyber education in the United States while also assessing the centrality of cyber literacy to all levels of education and American society. Solutions to the cyber workforce problem are outlined below. The first section of this paper discusses the scope of the problem. The next section covers the paradigm shift in some detail: how existing educational and training pipelines, as well as new ways of thinking and recruiting, are needed. The third section discusses issues particular to state, local, and tribal governments. The final section deals with cyber education at the secondary and postsecondary levels. Finally, a series of initial recommendations are presented. Scope of the Problem: Existing Pipelines Within government, industry, and academia, it is universally acknowledged that the cyber workforce needs to be expanded. The 2009 White House Cyberspace Policy Review emphasized both expanding and training the workforce and improving cyber education in order to build greater domestic capacity in the digital age. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency lists building an expanded workforce as one of its 10 key recommendations and released a November 2010 report entitled A Human Capital Crisis in Cybersecurity. U.S. Strategic Command has identified the Department of Defense (DOD) cyber workforce as undersized and unprepared to meet current and future expected threats. …

In 1999, the people of East Timor voted, overwhelmingly, against a proposal that would make their island an autonomous province of the Republic of Indonesia. Though it appeared that all of the factors for a successful transition from conflict to peace and stability were present and it was expected that establishing a new state would be fairly straightforward, surprisingly, to the International Community, this was not the case. This paper examines the United Nation's (UN) efforts in Timor-Leste (formerly East Timor) as an important case for the study of SSR and postconflict stabilization and reconstruction. The authors argue that, despite presumed favorable conditions especially when contrasted against other contemporary peace support operations, the SSR program has failed. The paper begins with a brief history of the UN's efforts at SSR in Timor-Leste and then presents an analytical framework to assess these efforts based on the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction, co-authored by the U.S. Institute of Peace and U.S.

Our adversaries can exploit and paralyze our decision making by taking captive or kidnapping United States Government personnel or American civilians. To address the escalating prevalence of hostage-taking, coupled with the increased presence of Americans abroad, President George W. Bush established Annex 1 to National Security Presidential Directive - 12, United States Policy on Personnel Recovery and the Prevention of U.S. Hostage Taking and Other Isolating Events. This paper aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of personnel recovery at the strategic level. An examination of Annex 1 to National Security Presidential Directive - 12 will provide a policy understanding that incorporates personnel recovery into a holistic government approach. This paper will describe personnel recovery architecture and the two fundamental models used overseas. Finally, this paper will conclude with a recommendation to develop a national strategy for personnel recovery.

How should the United States achieve its national security objectives, given its current and projected economic condition, for the period 2015 to 2030? This paper examines the imbalance of stated United States national security objectives (ends) with the current and projected economic resources (means) to accomplish these objectives. A basic premise of this paper is the following: for the United States to preserve its ability to function as a great power within the international system of the 2030-2040 timeframe, this nation must regenerate its economic strength and recapitalize select defense capabilities during the 2015-2030 period. Not doing so risks this country's global position and power in the mid-21st century. For a successful regeneration and recapitalization effort, the 2015-2030 period will require a modification to current national security plans and policies. This examination includes a review of current U.S. grand strategy objectives, provides analysis of the current U.S. economic situation and impact on future grand strategy, includes a historical review of selected past great powers and their efforts to maintain power within the international system, and offers recommendations for designing a U.S. grand strategy for the 2015-2030 timeframe.

This paper will examine the phenomenon of migration, movement of people across national borders, into South Africa causing socio-economic challenges that negatively impact the internal defense security of South Africa. The question remains what role and how South Africa will approach neighboring countries in an effort to resolve this issue. This paper briefly explains why migration is a problem, what negative consequences it poses, and what interventions South Africa in collaboration with neighboring countries should engage to mitigate this migration phenomenon and the reduce the impact on defense and military forces. Comparisons will be made with the migration of people to the United States to see if there are any similarities and lessons learnt to be used as a basis to build and improve the security challenge imposed by migration to South Africa.

The Norwegian Armed Forces has a joint headquarters at the operational level. This paper argues that the National Joint Headquarters of Norway (NJHQ) contributes in a unique manner to the overall management of the Norwegian Armed Forces in its two main capacities of national defense and contributions to international operations. The paper describes the national security organization and states Norwegian interests and tasks to the military before engaging in a brief discussion of the origin of the operational level of war and the need for a headquarters at this level in Norway. Through a description of how the NJHQ operates up, down and laterally an understanding of how the NJHQ fills the operational level is developed. The paper ends with a discussion of alternatives and makes a few broad suggestions on how the headquarters can improve its effectiveness.