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Although the UK's exit from the European Union – 'Brexit' – has overwhelmingly dominated the national political discourse since 2016 to the expense of nearly every other domestic issue, the policy agenda in the wake of this process is beginning to emerge. This paper examines this agenda, ostensibly supporting a programme of 'levelling up' which responds to the perceived root-causes of Brexit. In doing so, we consider the funding streams proposed by the UK Government – namely the Towns Fund, Shared Prosperity Fund and Levelling Up Funds – and examine the extent to which the rhetoric aligns with the reality of their allocation. In doing so, we also consider how, if at all, these schemes correspond to the European Structural Investment Funds (ESIF) they are intended to replace. This paper examines this period of change to consider how the Brexit process is mirroring, and indeed entrenching, these processes of uneven development. We find that the early indications suggest that the UK government is proceeding with funding allocations in a way which can overlook places which meet the technical funding criteria, and therefore indicates political favouring is at play. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to Bathelt and Li's (2020) call for selecting more appropriate methods and improving their rigour by evaluating the feasibility of using factorial surveys to anticipate future relocation behaviour. By utilising a case study approach, focussing on Brexit and the UK FinTech industry, the paper examines to what extent business managers' relocation intentions are driven by factors similar to those known to drive actual relocation behaviour and compares business managers' relocation intentions with their companies' actual relocation outcomes. We use a factorial survey conducted in 2018, which allows us to quantitatively analyse the impact of different Brexit scenarios and selected company characteristics on business managers' likelihood to intend to relocate their UK business unit (or some functions thereof) to the EU and/or the US. Additionally, we collected qualitative secondary data on the actual relocation outcomes of the surveyed companies in February 2022 by investigating online platforms, such as LinkedIn, Companies House, and Crunchbase, as well as company webpages. The results of this mixed-methods approach highlight a significant variation in business managers' intentions, and the importance of geographical and institutional proximity for relocation intentions and outcomes. We show that business managers' relocation intentions are driven by factors similar to those known to drive actual relocation behaviour, such as their perception of the economic consequences of different Brexit scenarios, their territorial embeddedness, as well as their nationality. Most importantly, our findings indicate that, although factorial surveys are only moderately accurate when predicting the exact extent and destination of actual relocation, they are highly accurate when predicting whether a company relocates or not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks whether the UK can maintain its insolvency and restructuring pre-eminence post Brexit i. e. after Britain's departure from the European Union (EU). In the past 20 years or so, the UK is said to have become the insolvency and restructuring capital of Europe or in less politically correct terms, the bankruptcy brothel of Europe. In part, this is because of the European Insolvency Regulation which provides for automatic recognition of insolvency proceedings opened in a EU Member State in the other EU Member States. Such proceedings may make provision for the discharge of debts and the restructuring of financial obligations.The specific insolvency law regime is part of a more general European Private International Law framework. With Brexit, the UK has now left this framework without any negotiated replacement agreement, a so-called 'skinny' Brexit. The loss of the ability to deal with insolvencies and corporate restructurings through a single process, with automatic recognition across the EU, may make it more complex, lengthy and expensive to resolve cross-border cases. It gives rise to the prospect of parallel proceedings in different jurisdictions. The paper also addresses how any disadvantages associated with the 'skinny' Brexit may be alleviated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the shortcomings in the UK government's Brexit negotiation strategy which reflected Prime Minister Theresa May's weak political leadership which focused on securing the short-term political survival of her government amidst turbulent and fractious domestic politics, over negotiations with the EU27. Brexit negotiations were poorly planned, and the UK government was woefully unprepared. Brexit also threatened a serious re-opening of old wounds in Northern Ireland, as debate grows around the prospect of a united Ireland inside the EU. UK politics is in turmoil and in a chronic crisis. What route the Brexit saga takes next is uncertain. But the crossroads is approaching – either the UK leaves by 31 January 2020 with no deal or passes the deal the Boris Johnson has negotiated with the EU27. The Brexit process has revealed the weakness of Westminster's insular politics seemingly incapable of running a modern economy and society. Westminster's politics are becoming more not less dysfunctional. The phenomenon of British exceptionalism towards the EU is set to take a new dramatic turn, while the UK's chaotic political divisions will not disappear any time in the foreseeable future. The result of the 12 December 2019 General Election may even complicate the Brexit Conundrum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This editorial offers a comprehensive introduction to the economic geographies of Brexit. It reviews the state of research on the multiple causes and consequences of the 2016 UK referendum and highlights the role of geographical context in the way that these factors interact in affecting voting behaviour and economic impact. Departing from an appraisal of the literature, we discuss the scope of six original studies collected in the special issue that, each using different analytical methods, present evidence on the impact of Brexit on the relocation of financial services firms, the recoupling of London with the other European financial centres, differences in regional productivity across the UK, as well as on the potential of UK regional policy to offset the disadvantages of financial decoupling from the European Union. Recognizing signs of political and economic disintegration beyond Europe, we conclude by highlighting a need for further research on the economic geographies of de- and recoupling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The non-EU exports were treated in exactly the same way, starting with UK aggregate non-EU goods exports, and using data on regional non-EU export shares for 2017 to estimate region-specific non-EU export series. 13 Based on 100 Bootstrap replications, with null distribution mean = -0.0004 and null distribution standard error = 0.0569 14 According to HM Revenue and Customs (11/02/2022), in the year to December 2021 EU goods exports amounted to £155bn and non-EU goods exports were £185bn. This reflects central London's relatively low regional goods exports (by value) to the European Union as a proportion of its total goods exports (EU plus non-EU), as highlighted by Figure 6. However a 33 % reduction in EU goods exports assumes that all of the decline in total goods exports is attributable to EU exports, which account for about 45 % of total goods exports. [Extracted from the article]

After Brexit, the United Kingdom will become a third State to all effects. As far as insolvency is related, this will imply substantial changes regarding the recognition and enforcement of the UK insolvency proceedings. This paper purports to analyze the consequences a Hard-Brexit will have on insolvency-related matters, by describing the effects that should be expected with regard to the recognition in Spain of each of the proceedings that the UK legislation foresees for financially distressed debtors, namely administration, winding-up, voluntary agreements, bankruptcy and schemes of arrangement (which are dealt with separately due to their hybrid nature). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among wealthier, so-called "developed" nations, a consistent and shared policy orientation on trade has generally prevailed over the last three quarters of a century. This consensus has been hallmarked by the promotion of freer trade facilitated by a state-centric, rules-based legal system. While most wealthy countries appear to desire a continued fidelity to that policy orthodoxy, the United Kingdom's (UK's) 'Brexit' decision and the United States' (US') increasingly antagonistic stance toward World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement beg the question as to whether fissures in the consensus are forming. This paper examines the depth of the perceived consensus and the degree to which US and UK actions signify a turning point. As part of this examination, populism's role in promoting change in the US, UK and beyond, is explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the potential consequences of Hard Brexit for the economy of the United Kingdom. From the theoretical and empirical literature, there are no reasons to expect good performances in the medium long term for the British economy. The Hard Brexit scenario will damage the UK perspectives of growth by increasing costs of production, difficulties to export, a quantitative and qualitative deterioration in labor force, the escape of financial operators and of the legal offices of multinationals from the London square, the isolation of UK in the international geopolitical context and riskiness for the same integrity of United Kingdom. After the vote, we can observe a resilience of the UK economy that could be determined by the accumulation of stocks in anticipation of a traumatic exit, but also, to an important depreciation of pound that is producing inflation and losing value of real wages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we outline the impact and likely future impact of Brexit on the pound. We argue that Brexit implies a significant depreciation of the pound and the degree of depreciation required is heavily linked to whether there will be a soft or hard Brexit. We find that the pound has had broadly similar depreciations to date against both the dollar and the euro. Brexit has considerably raised UK economic policy uncertainty and this, in turn, has at times led to an significant increase in future implied volatility of the pound. While there is an overall link between the state of the ongoing Brexit negotiations with the European Union and movements in the pound in the foreign exchange market, the link is not especially strong unless the perception that the negotiations are going badly has exceeded 60%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because Brexit has implied a surge of relocation decisions by financial service firms during a short period of time, we examine the locational decisions of the financial industry in Europe. Adopting a relational perspective we analyze the association between similar relocation decisions of UK-based banks and the connectivity of their decision boards. Based on an analysis of relocation announcements in the media, press releases, and annual reports, as well as of interlocking directorships within the financial sector, our study connects research streams on relocation and internationalization with cross-board memberships and interlocks. Our findings suggest that the higher the competition between two banks and the stronger the connectivity in interlocking board memberships between them, the more likely are these banks to announce different relocation decisions. We interpret these robust findings as a behavior that effectively reduces competition for limited localized resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at the emerging departures in IT (Information Technology)-Law of the U.K. post Brexit. Topics include the data protection reform by the U.K. authorities to emphasize separation from the laws and policies of the E.U. (European Union); the excessive concern of the GDPR ( E.U. General Data Protection Regulation, 2016) with bureaucracy; and the threats to individual privacy due to the amount of sensitive personal data available from devices such as mobile phones.

2016 is likely to be recalled – in Europe, at least – as a temporal bordering, after a majority in the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. The "Brexit" referendum result has been pinned on the rise of populist politics and the revenge of so-called "left behind" places. Regardless of reasons, the referendum left the UK with fraught politics and protracted negotiations, especially over how to re-border with a Europe that has held the dismantling of borders at the heart of its philosophical project. While Brexit has already become a byword, an earlier referendum on British borders has long slipped from international note. In 1997, a majority in Wales (one of the four constituent countries of the UK), voted for devolution from central government in Westminster. Like the Brexit referendum twenty years later, the majority in favor of devolution was slight, exposing uneasy fractures and internal cleavages as it opened fresh questions of governance and geography. By attending to a small country at the periphery of Europe, we seek to destabilize the assumption of shared markers of global bordering (1989, 2001), revealing instead the palimpsests of identity and territoriality across which re-made borders run "all over." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Faustian bargain at the heart of Brexit can be portrayed as a trade-off between enhanced control and economic benefits. Most commentators expect the UK economy to take some sort of hit from leaving the UK, but in the words of one prominent 'leave' supporter, it would be a 'price worth paying', to regain control over decision-making. https://www.politicshome.com/news/europe/eu-institutions/news/73963/arron-banks-%C2%A34300-loss-price-worth-paying-brexit. For convinced Brexiteers, a UK unshackled from the EU will rapidly transform itself to be able to take advantage of opportunities in emerging markets and other dynamic parts of the global economy, while 'remainers' see distancing the UK from its largest market as an egregious act of self-harm. Both sides have been culpable of misleading statements. Similar dissembling occurred in relation to the public finances. The article explores how competing, poorly understood and often incoherent interpretations of economic propositions fed into Brexit, leading to misguided policy decisions and confusion in the debates around how to reset the UK's economic relationship with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The government of Boris Johnson has restarted negotiations with the EU over the proposed Withdrawal Agreement. If these fail the UK will exit without an agreed trade deal. This exit would not however be 'lawless', with unknown and chaotic consequences. Trade is governed in both the UK and the EU by WTO rules and these are highly prescriptive, preventing both sides from imposing border hold-ups and imposing arbitrary new standards on exporters whose products have long satisfied existing standards. Chaos produced by such state behaviour would be illegal and so is highly unlikely. Consequently such a 'no deal' would lead to the speediest Brexit, and avoid any UK financial contribution. It would also allow the rapid conclusion of FTAs with the US and other major trading partners, driving UK prices to world levels rapidly. Without an EU FTA tariffs would have to be imposed by both sides; their incidence would fall on EU traders who would have to match the world prices now prevailing in the UK market. Technically therefore no deal is the UK's best option while it is damaging to the EU. However undoubtedly the UK would welcome a deal for reasons of good neighbourliness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Key aspects covered refer to the cost of leaving the EU and in particular the implications for corporate bond risk premiums in the UK and the Eurozone: The gap between the interest rates of corporate bonds and government bonds could increase in the UK and Eurozone, respectively, as a result of BREXIT where the 2016 BREXIT referendum itself is considered to be a first BREXIT event (see the empirical findings), followed by the main BREXIT event, namely the day of officially leaving the EU – possibly as a No-deal BREXIT. It is as yet not clear what type of BREXIT will be implemented – hard versus soft – and it is also unclear what type of free trade agreement the EU and the UK could accomplish post-BREXIT. However, it is obviously necessary to carefully consider the background of the BREXIT dynamics and to then refer to various versions of BREXIT if one is to understand the inherent politico-economic dynamics of BREXIT – with a No-deal case representing an analytical benchmark which most politicians in the British Parliament obviously would want to avoid; a simple way to indeed avoid this case, with obvious high costs for the British economy, is not easy to discern as the UK's political system is fractured. If the safe-haven status of the UK should be impaired by BREXIT, the rise of government bond interest rates by 0.3 percent would stand for the same burden as the net UK contribution to the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reports that the EU privacy law is materially changing: The legislators in the EU are about to harmonize the legal data protection framework. As of 25 May 2018 the new data protection rules under the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 2016/679 ("GDPR") will apply. The EU Commission ("Commission") intends that on the same date new and stronger privacy rules for electronic communications enter into force.