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Der Beitrag beschreibt die Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung einer automatisierten Übernahme aller über Publikationsgelder finanzierten Open-Access-Zeitschriftenartikel in institutionelle Repositorien. Sind Verlags-Dashboards, die den wissenschaftlichen Einrichtungen im Rahmen von Vertragsvereinbarungen für die Bearbeitung der eingehenden Verifizierungsanfragen zur Verfügung gestellt werden, in diesem Zusammenhang hilfreich? The article discusses the complexities of implementing the automatic import of Open Access journal articles with a publication grant into institutional repositories, and asks whether publisher dashboards provided to academic institutions as part of contract agreements on the management of incoming verification requests are a useful tool to deal with the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this contribution is to discuss the extent of the Union's competence to adopt a comprehensive instrument of substantive contract law in light of the options set forth in the Commission's 2010 Green Paper on European contract law, with a view to exploring the limits of, and the relationship between, certain prominent Treaty provisions in the debate -- namely, Articles 114, 115, 81, 169 and 352 TFEU (ex Articles 95, 94, 65, 153 and 308 EC, respectively) -- and the roles played by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality in guiding the exercise of Union competence inside, as well as outside, the EU decision-making process. Moreover, given the reference to certain American techniques in the Green Paper, this contribution seeks to facilitate discussion of the comparative dimensions of the constitutional assessment of contract law in the European Union and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Journal of European Tort Law published two special issues based on papers presented at a conference held at the University of Geneva in September 2022. The conference aimed to create a dialogue between specialists from outside the European Group on Tort Law (EGTL) and its members. The papers demonstrate that the idea of drafting European Principles of Tort Law is widely supported, although improvements can be made. The EGTL is currently revising its Principles and the papers provide valuable input for this process. The issue of strict liability, particularly in road traffic cases, is a key focus, and new provisions on strict liability are being drafted. The EGTL will also examine other areas that have developed rapidly in recent years. [Extracted from the article]

Although based on academic background and literature, my answer to the questions posed by the European Commission turns out to be rather political as from my point of view it is impossible to address those questions in a purely technical way. Although there are other, probably more relevant, obstacles to the internal market, I consider that there is enough evidence to assume that different legislation is an obstacle well worth looking at. I begin with the discussion of goals, strictly connected to the scope of application, and move to the debate on formal/informal harmonisation of contract law. As on one side there is not enough evaluation to sustain solidly that harmonisation or unification is better that diversity that meets local preferences, and on the other side liberty, subsidiarity and proportionality claim for parties' freedom to opt for their better solution, I support the view that Member States must be able to maintain their internal law but at the same time must wide the parties' scope of options with the approval of a Regulation on European contract law. In any case, a lot of assessment should still take place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces two-player bargaining problems allowing for asymmetric subjective uncertainty about factors that determine whether agreement is achieved, focusing on surprising events, i.e. events believed possible by only one player. A ‘subjective Nash’ solution is proposed, in which a bargaining outcome is defined as immune to all possible appeals given the subjective uncertainty of disagreement. In addition to Pareto optimality and independence of irrelevant alternatives, the main axiom in the solution characterization is ‘subjective symmetry’. The solution is shown to be equivalent to a specific, non-symmetric, Nash solution, with preference dependent weights that equal the subjective probability players assign to the intersection of their belief supports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ronald Coase (1937), in his article "Nature of the Firm," argued that if the price mechanism is used, a factor of production (owner of the firm) would need to negotiate a series of contracts separately with each of the factors with whom he is co-operating; these contract negotiation costs could be reduced by organizing a firm because the owner-entrepreneur of the firm is able to direct resources within the firm, hence saving some transaction costs. Furthermore, Coase used a von Thünen concentric circles diagram to depict a single-product firm, as it expands, grows into a multi-product firm. My theory of the ethnically homogeneous [Chinese] middleman group/EHMG (Landa 1981), argued that the EHMG is an organization which reduces the transaction costs of contract enforcement. Using a von Thünen concentric circles diagram, I showed how a rational trader chooses his trading partners, moving from the innermost circle (most trusted partners) outwards to the ethnic boundary as he expands the size of this trading network. The aggregative result of all rational traders' choice of trading partners is the spontaneous emergence of the EHMG. My 1981 papers together with subsequent published papers on the EHMG have been reprinted in my book, Economic Success of Chinese Merchants in Southeast Asia (Landa 2016); these papers created the "Economics of Identity," a new subfield, while carrying on the Coasian transaction costs tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Article 18, paragraph 1, of Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy gives the bankruptcy trustee the right to rescind the performance of executory contract. It also stipulates the time limit and legal effect, but it does not further set standards and restrict the rescission of specific contracts. The purpose of This Paper is to explore and establish norms for the exercise of bankruptcy trustee's rescission rights under different situations to meet the practical needs. Based on the research results of domestic and foreign scholars, this paper puts forward the standard of "Special Interest Protection for Specific Creditors" to balance the interest conflicts between individual creditors, debtors and other creditors. Finally, this paper argues that it is necessary to set certain standards and make appropriate restrictions on the exercise of the bankruptcy trustee's right to rescission the contract and improve the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The purpose of this paper is to explore how sharecropping contracts are chosen over fixed-rent contracts. There are two concerning issues. First, theoretical explanation has been criticized for not providing a satisfactory answer to the question as to why share contracts are chosen. Second, among the existing empirical studies, there are great controversies about the impact of variance of output. Inspired by the latest insights from (Cheung, S. N. S. 2014. Economic Explanation. Hong Kong: Arcadia Press.), this paper not only provides an explanation for the choice of share contract that is suitable for empirical testing, but also solves the puzzle over variance of output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

What is the place of voluntary self-regulation in today's international trade? Can we continue to understand the contract in its relation to the historical unity of state and law considering the massive transformation of the closely related dichotomies between national and international, public and private, and hard law and soft law? What is the role of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the contemporary debate over global value chains (GVCs)? This paper addresses on the role of law in societal challenges arising from the kaleidoscopic view of globalization. GVCs operate through interdependent contracts and in relation to multiple normative orders that impose moral, economic, and legal obligations. This paper seeks to re evaluate the role of contract law in its relation to sustainable and ethical global trade. The perspective it develops prioritizes the interaction between extra-legal considerations in contract law and the momentum of CSR as well as the historical dynamics of law, economics, and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper examines the use of the nonprofit organizational form to mitigate the impact of incomplete contracts in the public sector Transaction costs economics (TCE) predicts that the expense of incomplete contracts will rise with contract complexity and asset specificity. Previous research shows that government agencies increase their use cost-plus style contracts to economize on these costs. However, cost-plus style contracts may also increase the propensity to inflate procurement costs, also known as gold-plating, when relationally specific investments are required. Consistent with this expectation, we find that federal agencies reduce their use of cost-plus style contracts as asset specificity rises. The paper then explores the use of nonprofit organizations as an alternative tool to reduce contracting costs. Using data from the Federal Procurement Data System, we examine the choice of organizational form by federal agencies, as contracts become more or less incomplete. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that the use of nonprofit organizations increases with contract complexity. In contrast to cost-plus style contracts, we find that the use of nonprofits also increases with asset specificity. We apply this finding to support the conjecture that the nonprofit organization form is used by government agencies to mitigate contract incompleteness without the associated risk of cost inflation. We conclude by offering suggestions for why nonprofit contracts appear relatively infrequently in federal procurement data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Automatisierungstechnik is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Ancient law can be analyzed using economic tools. With a renewed interest from the political class to make the ancient Laws of Manu (Manu's Dharmaśāstra) more relevant to modern Indian law, the economic analysis of the Laws of Manu regarding contracts allows us to look at the issue from an efficiency standpoint. The paper will look at both regular contracts and marriage contracts. Surprisingly, many of the ancient laws are like the modern law of contracts especially in areas of contract breach. However, when considering marriage contracts, the bargaining position of men is stronger than women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Recurrent difficulties are delaying what for the time being are still modest applications of blockchain. This paper identifies what value this new technology adds to the contractual and property processes, exploring its potential and analyzing the main difficulties it is facing. Paying particular attention to the distinction between contract (personal or in personam) rights and property (real or in rem) rights, it first examines the difficulties for trading contract rights through blockchain-based applications, mainly those to complete contracts ex ante without relying on third-party enforcers. Second, it explores the difficulties faced by blockchain to enable trade in property rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Concepts of pre-contractual good faith, culpa in contrahendo and promissory estoppel have received increasing attention from legal scholars, law makers and practitioners. Those concepts appear as fundamental in all civil and common law systems and yet as ones whose nature and contents are still ill-defined. Moreover, recent doctrinal developments in Chinese and in the modernized French Law of contracts call for further systematic assessment. This paper fills the gap by providing an evaluation of the English, French, German and Chinese law of contracts. It offers a comparative law and economics evaluation and argues that those duties serve as a multi-functional judicial mechanism enabling ex post screening between socially desirable and undesirable behavior. They set the behavioral standards and serve as deterrence mechanisms that attempt to discourage certain socially undesirable behaviour in the course of the negotiations. The paper seeks to find out what new light the comparative law and economic analysis can shed on the issues of pre-contractual good faith, culpa in contrahendo and promissory estoppel to help to clarify it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper we investigate non-rationality of divisors on 3-fold log Fano fibrations (X , B) → Z under mild conditions. We show that if D is a component of B with coefficient ≥ t > 0 which is contracted to a point on Z, then D is birational to ℙ1 × C, where C is a smooth projective curve with gonality bounded depending only on t. Moreover, if t > 1/2, then genus of C is bounded depending only on t. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Urbanization is a process in which separated and dispersed property rights become concentrated in a specific location. This process involves a large volume of contracts to redefine and rearrange various property rights, producing various and high transaction costs. Efficient urbanization implies the reduction of these costs. This paper studies how efficient urbanization reduces transaction costs in the real world, based on a series of contracts rather than the coercive power. Specifically, this paper shows that Jiaolong Co. built a city by being a central contractor, which acquired planning rights by contract, and signed a series of tax sharing contracts with government, farmers, tenants, and business enterprises. These contractual arrangements greatly reduced the transaction costs and promoted the development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Corporate executive compensation in Canada, as in many developed economies, has risen significantly since the 1980s relative to that of the average worker. This has posed an issue for corporate governance due to concerns that the trend may not be serving the corporation and its stakeholders well, and also an issue for society as a whole due to its impact on income inequality more generally. This has raised interest in the role played by institutions in shaping executive pay decisions and also in what role they might play in resolving these issues. This paper looks at the role played by one such institution, the courts, with two ends in mind. The first is to gain an empirical understanding of what the courts actually do with respect to executive pay disputes. It does so by examining a set of decisions by Canadian courts between 1876 and 2018 collected by the author in which the claim of a corporate executive to their pay was at issue in order to get a better picture of how the courts are accessed, who relies on them, what rules they use, how the courts respond and how trends in these have evolved over time. It finds that the litigation of executive pay disputes has varied widely over time with a variety of stakeholders using a variety of legal areas – corporate law, contract law and bankruptcy/arrangement law in particular – to dispute the entitlement of executives to their pay. In recent years however litigation has come to be dominated by oppression remedy applications, with plaintiffs being successful in challenging pay in a majority of decisions. This paints a significantly different picture of the role of the courts than that developed in the American literature which focuses almost exclusively on shareholder use of derivative actions to monitor pay decisions. The second is to examine how better use might be made of the courts in order to remedy the broader problems for corporate stakeholders and society as a whole that corporate executive pay practice presents. It suggests that an expanded role for the oppression remedy by corporate employees should be considered as a policy option which would better reflect a stakeholder model of governance and address broader inequality concerns at the same time. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper challenges Peter Benson's claim that his theory of justice in transactions can provide a public basis of justification in the Rawlsian sense specifically worked out for contract law. It argues that Benson's distinct conception of the contracting parties and their relationships makes it an unlikely candidate for public justification in contemporary liberal democracies that are characterized by the fact of a reasonable pluralism of worldviews. Moreover, Benson's method of deriving principles of contractual justice from existing contract law doctrines and principles risks pre-empting any critical potential for normative contract theory. In addition, its quasi universalism seems difficult to match with the political autonomy of citizens in democratic societies. Finally, Benson's understanding of contract law as separate from politics appears at odds, not merely with Rawlsian political justice, but with the very idea of public justification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

. Consider a principal-agent relationship in which more effort by the agent raises the likelihood of success. This paper provides conditions such that no success bonus induces the agent to exert more effort and the optimal contract is independent of success. Moreover, success bonuses may even reduce effort and thus the probability of success. The reason is that bonuses increase the perceived income of the agent and can hence reduce his willingness to exert effort. This perceived income effect has to be weighed against the incentive effect of the bonus. The tradeoff is determined by the marginal effect of effort on the success probability in relation to this probability itself ( success hazard-rate of effort). The paper also discusses practical implications of the finding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that when a product innovation is protected by both patents and trade secrets, under U.S. law the innovator can be induced to license a rival even if patent protection is very broad and there are no partially competitive older products. This opportunity may benefit society. Nevertheless, some legal restrictions in force at the moment do not permit society to reap all potential gains. Since incentive and efficiency considerations suggest that a socially optimal contract should provide for both a negative fixed fee and post-patent royalties at the same unit level as before a patent’s expiration, we conclude that per se prohibitions of these practices are unjustified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a key function of contracts is to provide incentives, the incentives of judges to enforce the terms of a contract have rarely been examined. This paper develops a simple model of judicial agency in which judges are corrupt and can be bribed by contracting parties. Higher-powered contracts expose contracting parties to more frequent and more severe corruption, which in turn lessens the incentives actually provided by the contract. Consequently the model predicts that individuals will commonly refrain from writing high-powered contracts, even when such contracts would be valuable absent judicial agency. I show that similar implications can also be obtained by considering other forms of imperfection in contract enforcement, such as variable expenditures on legal representation. I use the model to develop implications for the optimal punishment of individuals who are extorted by corrupt judges, and to establish circumstances under which a right-of-appeal is optimal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Review of Contract Law is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests efficiently when each seller offers latent contracts designed to exclude any other seller from trade (i. e. most intense competition). Because competition among sellers allows the buyer to appropriate part of the gains from his investment, the hold-up problem vanishes for most of the buyer's investment costs. However, the seller appropriates more than his marginal contribution to the gains from trade, and over-invests, when a group of sellers does not offer latent contracts (under less intense competition). Therefore, efficient investments can only be implemented when competition is at its most intense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the choice of deductible in insurance contracts that insure against a risk that, as is common, might materialize more than once during the life of the policy. As was established by Arrow (1963), from the perspective of risk-bearing costs, the optimal contract is one that uses an aggregate deductible that applies to the aggregate losses incurred over the life of the policy. Aggregate deductibles, however, are uncommon in practice. This paper identifies two disadvantages that aggregate deductibles have. Aggregate deductibles are shown to produce higher expected verification costs and moral hazard costs than contracts that apply a per-loss deductible to each loss that occurs. I further show that each of these disadvantages can make an aggregate deductible contact inferior to a contract with per loss deductibles. The results of the analysis can help explain the rare use of aggregate deductibles and, in addition, might explain why umbrella policies that cover all types of losses are rarely used. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is striking about I Untitled i is not only that "Fraser brutally links (female) prostitution and art-making with (male) power and art collecting", as McClean makes clear; it is also the folding of the contract for sale into the process of I making i the work which inverts the temporality of process, the resulting artwork, and a subsequent sale. The addition of the formal conceit of the contract has a recursive and redoubling effect, so that the form of the artwork I is i the contract and vice-versa, and the subject matter of the contract is the very relation that it enables: not the work of art. 6 In the Aftermath of Legal Positivism Piper's and ACW's contract artworks might be located, in an art-historical register, as research-based work that leverages the conditions of contemporary art towards a subjective aesthetic (and material) experience of legal form. Keywords: art/law; contract art; material jurisprudence; Adrian Piper; A Constructed World EN art/law contract art material jurisprudence Adrian Piper A Constructed World 247 270 24 08/09/22 20220901 NES 220901 1 Introduction There is a now an established practice in contemporary art of taking law, legal materials, legality or transgression of the law as central to the meaning or matter of artworks. [Extracted from the article]

This article reveals the different formative layers at work in a mixed system of law, such as that of private law in the United Arab Emirates (uae), by focusing on the lack of coherence between competing 'architectural principles'. This experience of friction is regularly encountered by a skilled interpreter of the law, in the course of his/her activity of ensuring predictable and appropriate legal responses to practical problems. Specifically, this piece tracks the interpretive difficulties surfacing in cases of supervening impossibility of performance for loss or damage to a necessary item, when that loss or damage originates in a causal factor outside of the defendant's sphere of control ('extraneous cause'). In such cases, the contract is terminated and the legal question shifts to one of awarding compensation for the loss or damage suffered by the item. In the face of this question, two competing criteria for assigning liability come into play. On the one hand, the civil law distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts, meaning contracts giving rise to obligations upon only one or both parties to the contract. On the other hand, the categories of trust-based, liability-based and mixed possession in Islamic law. Here, liability is assigned based on the material circumstances that define the manner of possession, as opposed to looking at the abstract scheme of performance and (if available) counter-performance. The categories drawn from Islamic law have the potential to unify a number of apparently scattered provisions in the uae Civil Code: for this reason, the article puts forth a recommendation to follow the approach of the Iraqi Civil Code and acknowledge those categories as an explicit organising principle for assigning liability in the presence of an extraneous cause. The paper makes an additional recommendation to treat the classification of possession (as trust-based or liability-based) as a matter of public policy, unavailable for the parties' consensual deviation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two other contributions investigate the regional legal regime of the EU and the social justice scope of its judiciary. This observation leads to a question of central importance in the field of courts and social justice: who brings social justice claims before the Court of Justice? I Virginia Passalacqua's i contribution to this special issue focuses on the legal actors who have a decisive influence on which cases that are brought to CJEU and thereby the possibility for the court to address social justice issues in its case law and in this study specifically migration. [Extracted from the article]

I study the general equilibrium of the housing market in an economy populated by overlapping generations of households. A contribution of the present paper is to solve for the housing market equilibrium in the presence of aggregate (interest rate) uncertainty with a realistic mortgage contract. In addition, households also face idiosyncratic uncertainty resulting from stochastic changes over the lifecycle in tastes (or needs) for housing. In this environment, profit-maximizing banks offer fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) contracts to homebuyers. As seems plausible, each housing market transaction is subject to a fixed cost, which gives rise to S-s policy rules for housing transactions: existing homeowners change the size of their houses only if there is a sufficiently large change in the state of the economy (i.e., in interest rates, in their taste for housing, etc.). A plausibly calibrated version of the model is consistent with three empirically documented features of the housing market: (i) highly volatile housing prices and transaction volume, (ii) a strong positive correlation between transaction volume and housing prices, and (iii) a significant negative relationship between interest rates and housing prices, which can rationalize a large part of the recent boom in housing prices in the US and around the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to show that, among the main conceptions of contract in civilian legal traditions, some of them remain ideologically grounded on a proprietary concept that cannot be reduced to the right of property, legally speaking. This proposal starts with the observation that in contract law, there are some rules, some interpretations, some theoretical discourses and intellectual constructions that imply 'property structures'. What I mean by a property structure is a theoretical structure that has to do with the idea of property but which is not considered as a right of ownership and, furthermore, which is not to be legally treated as such. Property structures have other functions apart from those usually associated with the issues raised by the right of property, although they are vehicles of proprietary ideas in contract law. Property structures have underlying functions. They inform contract law with a system of values. They draw invisible guidelines for contract law interpretation. In this paper, two occurrences of property structures are identified: property structures underlying the concept of contract as a transfer of rights and damages for breach of contract. Ce texte tente de montrer que certaines des conceptions dominantes du contrat dans les traditions juridiques civilistes reposent sur un concept propriétaire qu'on ne saurait réduire au droit de propriété entendu strictement. Une telle proposition se fonde sur l'observation de ce qu'il existe en droit des contrats des règles, des interprétations, des discours théoriques et des constructions intellectuelles qui supposent une structure propriétaire. Par 'structure propriétaire', j'entends une structure théorique qui a à voir avec la propriété mais qui ne saurait être assimilée au droit propriété et, surtout, qui n'a pas à être juridiquement traitée comme tel. Les structures propriétaires me semblent avoir d'autres fonctions que celles associées au droit de propriété, quoiqu'elles soient bien des véhicules de l'idée propriétaire en droit des contrats. Leurs fonctions sont, en quelque sorte, architecturales. Elles informent le droit des contrats d'un système de valeur et elles constituent des lignes directrices de l'interprétation. Dans ce texte, deux occurrences de ces structures propriétaires sont identifiées: celles qui soutiennent le concept de contrat conçu comme un transfert de droit ainsi que les dommages et intérêts dus en cas d'inexécution. Der Beitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass unter den verschiedenen Vertragskonzepten, die man in den verschiedenen Zivilrechtstraditionen antrifft, einige ideengeschichtlich in einem Eigentumskonzept gegründet erscheinen, wenn auch in keinem im engen sachenrechtlichen Sinne. Ausgangspunkt dieser These ist, dass gewisse Regeln im Vertragsrecht ebenso wie gewisse Auslegungsergebnisse oder vertragsrechtstheoretische Aussagen eine Struktur haben, die sich an Eigentumscharakteristika orientiert. Damit ist gemeint eine Denkform, die eigentumsartig ist, jedoch ein Recht betrifft, das nicht als sachenrechtliches Eigentum zu verstehen ist und rechtlich auch nicht also solches behandelt wird. Solche eigentumsartigen Strukturen haben auch nicht die gleichen Funktionen, wie sie ihnen im Sachenrecht zugeschrieben werde, bilden jedoch das Vehikel, um im Vertrag eigentumsähnliche Rechtsfolgen nach sich zu ziehen. 'Eigentumsstrukturen' haben besondere Funktionen und vermitteln dem Vertragsrecht auch besondere Werte. Sie bilden auch (unsichtbare) Interpretationsleitlinien im Vertragsrecht. In diesem Beitrag werden zwei Arten von Eigentumsstrukturen diskutiert: diejenige, die dem Konzept der Abtretung zugrunde liegt, und diejenige, die man im Schadensrecht konstatieren kann. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]