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Context • Some scholars have put forward constructivist world models in which the purported external world is constructed from experience (i.e., there is a constructive relation between them). However, scholars disagree about whether experience is generated by the brain and results from the perception of the purported external world (i.e., whether there are generative relations and perceptual relations). > Problem • Do we need to maintain perceptual relations or generative relations in a constructivist world model? > Method • I propose a world model where our world is composed of a large number of screen creatures, and this is compared with the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory. There is a constructive relation in both world models, but only the second world model contains generative and perceptual relations. I provide reasons to doubt that the world model in the irrealist virtual world theory can provide sufficient reasons for involving generative or perceptual relations. > Results • We should accept the world model composed of screen creatures as the model of our world; we do not need to retain perceptual or generative relations in a constructivist world model. > Implications • This article points out that perceptual relations stem from a misunderstanding of certain correlations between experiences. This will generate some new ideas when considering the mind-matter problem. > Constructivist content • This article discusses how to deal with generative and perceptual relations using constructivist world models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

García's and Oblak's reviews of my book Enactive Psychiatry open up some fundamental debates with regard to my use of the term "enactive" for the kind of approach that I develop. Is my account still properly "enactive" (García) and how does my approach compare to the extended mind theory on the one hand and to constructivism on the other hand (Oblak)? In this response, I argue that (a) adding an existential dimension to enactivism is necessary to do justice to our way of being in the world and our specific sense-making and its problems; and (b) that this dimension can be incorporated within enactivism without giving up on either enactivism's commitment to naturalism or the enactive lifemind continuity thesis. My "existentialized" enactivism is very much enactive in that it adopts the thoroughly relational perspective that forms the core of enactivism. This relational perspective is also what distinguishes enactive theory from both extended mind theory and constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Addressing methodological issues, I try to clarify relations between radical constructivism and the theories used as a basis of study by describing how social influences experienced by individuals are constructed. Also, I welcome the way other methodological questions may enrich future research by raising the issue of personal contact and inclusion of the first-person perspective in the construction of autism. Next, I discuss (a) the need to rethink the contemporary psychiatric/diagnostic category of autism; (b) some strong and weak points of the enactivist perspective; (c) the issue of inclusion of the “self–illness” relation in research on autism, as well as the validity of the term “illness” in this concept; and (d) the possibility of thinking about autism from the phenomenological perspective inspired by Heidegger’s category of understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the example of X-phemisms, I focus on the major epistemological difference radical constructivism makes to the theory of language and communication. Along these lines, I reflect on the relationship between values, affect and words as well as on the meta-communicative aspect of experience construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

> Context • Assuming upon the suggestion of dictionary makers and language theorists that some words are more pleasant than others and that it affects the way we should communicate, we put the cart before the horse and make a big categorial mistake. > Problem • Negative and positive emotional reactions to words are not something that can be deduced from words themselves and predicted before the communicative interaction. Instead, it is when, where and who utters these words that makes them sound good or bad for us, as observers. > Method • Based on the methods of experiential linguistic analysis of observational data I investigate philosophical roots and empirical manifestations of good and bad language in communicative interactions. > Results • I formulate and prove the hypothesis that euphemisms and dysphemisms are experiential factors of our dynamic situational construction of others. Our construal of some words as good or bad depends upon the experience we have of another person with whom we interact in situ. > Implications • Findings of my research illuminate the inherently experiential nature of language, which might lead sociologists and linguists to reconsider the way they approach the power of good and bad words. Moreover, it is argued to be neither possible nor necessary for scholars to make lists of euphemisms or dysphemisms, at least for non-written communication. > Constructivist content • I rely upon the concepts of radical constructivism such as experience construction, experiential field, construction of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context * Radical constructivism prioritises the processes by which people make sense of their experience and people construct different worlds based on their individual experiences. Problem * It follows naturally from this that people may disagree about how they understand sustainability issues. Method * I consider a number of issues related to sustainability and examines processes by which they may have been constructed. Results * Examination of the processes of construction shows that shortcuts in thinking known as heuristics play a role in thinking about sustainability. Focusing on these shortcuts and the role they play in thinking offers a way to deconstruct thoughts produced in discussions. Implications * Understanding why people hold different views on sustainability makes it possible to open discussions on the viability of these views. The hope is that discussions about these issues in a context of mutual respect will facilitate an emerging consensus. Constructivist content * Radical constructivism has prioritised rational scientific processes in the emergence of an individual's constructions of their reality. However, two aspects of this process constrain changes in cognitive constructions. First, individuals regularly construct thoughts that are based on heuristics rather than assessed on the basis of evidence. Second, ways an individual perceives peers' constructions of their "realities" play a role in her identity and canalise how constructions change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • Mitterer's non-dualism is considered to be a major conceptual alternative to (naïve as well as hypothetical as well as internal) realism and to (moderate as well as radical) constructivism and idealism - with more sympathies towards (radical) constructivism. For von Glasersfeld non-dualism is the "third conceptual revision" in philosophy, while for others it is the "most radical position," even more radical than radical constructivism. While outside of philosophy non-dualism is sometimes applied emphatically, in mainstream philosophy it is ignored. > Problem • My two questions are: (a) Is Mitterer's critique on dualistic philosophy consistent (in Mitterer's view, all variants of realism and constructivism are dualistic philosophy)? (b) Is Mitterer's non-dualism consistent? > M ethod • I critically reflect on central theses of non-dualism with the help of established concepts of contemporary philosophy such as the distinctions between object language and metalanguage, and between benign and vicious infinite regresses. > Results • The non-dualistic critique of dualism seems to be misleading. Central arguments of the non-dualistic alternative to dualism are self-contradictory. Even worse, non-dualism could lead to solipsism. > I mplications • Non-dualism has so far been discussed in various disciplines such as communication science, geography, and even informatics. It is important for all these disciplines to reflect the arguments developed in this article to prevent non-dualism from being applied uncritically. > C onstructivist content • At the moment, non-dualism does not seem to be a viable alternative to either realism or (radical) constructivism due to the inconsistencies unveiled in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concepts of euphemism and dysphemism are based on the very common distinction between “good” and “evil,” of which Druzhinin does not attempt any analysis. A rough analysis is easy for some parts, but it also faces the immense problem of phenomenal consciousness or qualia, in front of which even constructivism (like any other approach) is powerless. However, constructivism allows us to frame the problem of qualia better than other approaches. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In building a constructivist view of language, the inherently experiential nature of language should not be absolutized but seen rather as depending on the overlap between the first-order and the second-order consensual domains as the sources of experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Druzhinin adopts the perspective of radical constructivism to approach the use and comprehension of euphemisms and dysphemisms in communicative interactions, and makes a convincing case in favor of the deeply experiential nature of language. My point is not to dispute the relevance of this perspective, but rather to ponder about (a) the difference between written and spoken communication, and (b) how a radical constructivist perspective may underestimate the diversity of the cognitive processes possibly at work in linguistic interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oblak et al. portray perceptual presence (PP) as an individually driven reflective operation. I question their account and suggest that PP involves a socially induced pre-reflective awareness of the lived environment. Within this primary framework, the wholeness of things is available to the subject, and deeper examination of perceived objects (if needed) comes to the fore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context • This target article combats some psychologists' and phenomenologists' blind stereotyped vision of Piaget's ideas on early development and the growing ignorance of his works. > Problem • The article tackles the issue of the body in Piaget's manuscript works on infants in comparison to the contemporary theories endorsed by Gallagher. > Method • I analyze an unknown source, Jean and Valentine Piaget's manuscript notebooks on their first child, and compare it to the contemporary theories. > Results • The method revealed itself as largely heuristic. Piaget built new relevant categories during the investigation, such as observing the child's gaze, and the main category of observation was longitudinal paths of behavior. He carefully observed transformations in the specific behaviors of each path that led to stabilize imitation in infants and he discussed self-cognition of the body, i.e., the child's knowledge of her body, as either a curious object or her own body. > Implications • Comparing the contemporary nativist approach on early competences and Gallagher's phenomenology to Piaget's constructivist approach highlighted the contrast between several categories, competence versus paths and age versus processes. The investigation detected implicit epistemologies relying on priority given to age and competences over processes and path in the nativist approach, while Piaget adopted an explicit epistemology prioritizing processes and path over age and competence. A strong implication is the need to look below the surface and go beyond stereotypes towards a complex metaphor for qualifying Piaget's works. Against stereotypes and reification, Piaget worked mainly on paths and processes and the best metaphor to capture his conception of development is to conceive it as a temporal puzzle with new fitting pieces that shape the human subject as a multilinked network of paths. > Constructivist Content • Analyzing the founder of constructivism's early works with a historical constructivist method led me to propose the temporal puzzle as a cognitive metaphor that synthesizes his early-development constructivist approach, both methodological and theoretical. Moreover, since Piaget's experimental system has never been reproduced as a whole and early development follows an implicit epistemology that is the opposite of Piaget's, his constructivist multiple longitudinal approach remains unchallenged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · Realism has difficulty using the language of mind-independent dynamics to explicate autonomous cognition. Constructivism has difficulty locating the purposive originator of adaptive cognitive reconstruction. Enactivism derives purpose from self-maintaining dynamics, but has difficulty describing how the autopoietic subject emerges. Problem · We seek to resolve these difficulties by asking: What kind of dynamically embodied system could ever be autonomous in the sense of being the causally accountable originator of its own purposeful, yet spontaneous, cognitive constructions· Method · We identify causal accountability as the key obstacle to naturalizing autonomy, and employ a multi-level selection argument from evolutionary theory to overcome it. We demonstrate the feasibility of our solution in a computer simulation model. Results · Our argument leads us to postulate the Stabilization Thesis: Autonomy, learning, evolution and life are expected properties of dynamical systems whose structure upwardly conditions their dynamical flow, and whose flow downwardly selects their structural variation. Such systems exhibit stabilization - the spontaneous, purposeful construction of hierarchical modularity. This generates three claims: no pre-programmed behavior, architecture or learning rules can implement autonomy; autonomy entails non-local flows that establish identity by downwardly stabilizing its structure against exogenous irritations; constructivism's postulate of a cognizing subject entails a view of concepts as fundamentally dynamical skills (as opposed to categories). I mplications · Flows establish a causally accountable identity that defines the originator of meaning-construction, and their self-stabilization enables the enactive emergence of autopoietic, and hence autonomous, systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Attempts to conceive artificial agents are manifold. Often, however, basic aspects are overlooked, which in this case seem to be implemented already in current technologies. Problem: Agency is often conceived individualistically. Agents are seen as separate entities. This contribution sets out to conceive agents as emerging from the interaction of a multitude of agents. I claim that, somehow paradoxically, agents become agents only in the course of interaction. Method: A conception for conceiving constructivist agents illustrated with multi-agent simulations and artificial neural networks. I stress three aspects: double (or multiple) contingency, plasticity and granularity, which I consider relevant for conceiving artificial constructivist agents and which seem to find certain analogies in the methodology of artificial neural networks. Results: Constructivist agents should be conceived as emerging concurrently as a multitude of agents, providing one another with "irritations" to which agents need to adapt in order to evolve agency. In order to facilitate adaptation, they need what I call plasticity. In its turn, in order to guarantee sufficient adaptability, plasticity needs a certain degree of granularity. Implications: Researchers involved in the technical development of contemporary machine learning methods may not be aware that fundamentals of their methodology conform well to the epistemology of constructivism, just as constructivists may not be aware that their epistemology finds analogies in the technique of artificial neural networks. This contribution tries to raise these awarenesses. Constructivist content: Agents are conceived as developing agency (that is, they are developing themselves) on the basis of their on-board means. There is no need for assuming any "outside" but only "irritations" generating dissonances in the on-board means. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: In this article we match machine learning (ML) and interactive machine learning (iML) with radical constructivism (RC) to build a tentative radical constructivist framework for iML; we then present a pilot study in which RC-framed iML is applied to assistive robotics, namely upper-limb prosthetics (myocontrol). Problem: Despite more than 40 years of academic research, myocontrol is still unsolved, with rejection rates of up to 75%. This is mainly due to its unreliability - the inability to correctly predict the patient's intent in daily life. Method: We propose a description of the typical problems posed by ML-based myocontrol through the lingo of RC, highlighting the advantages of such a modelisation. We abstract some aspects of RC and project them onto the concepts of ML, to make it evolve into the concept of RC-framed iML. Results: Such a projection leads to the design and development of a myocontrol system based upon RC-framed iML, used to foster the co-adaptation of human and prosthesis. The iML-based myocontrol system is then compared to a traditional ML-based one in a pilot study involving human participants in a goal-reaching task mimicking the control of a prosthetic hand and wrist. Implications: We argue that the usage of RC-framed iML in myocontrol could be of great help to the community of assistive robotics, and that the constructivist perspective can lead to principled design of the system itself, as well as of the training/calibration/co-adaptation procedure. Constructivist content: Ernst von Glasersfeld's RC is the leading principle pushing for the usage of RC-framed iML; it also provides guidelines for the design of the system, the human/machine interface, the experiments and the experimental setups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Philosophical and - more recently - empirical approaches to the study of mind have recognized the research into lived experience as crucial for the understanding of their subject matter. Such research is faced with selfreferentiality: every attempt at examining the experience seems to change the experience in question. This so-called "excavation fallacy" has been taken by many to undermine the possibility of first-person inquiry as a form of scientific practice. Problem: What is the epistemic character and value of reflectively acquired phenomenological data? Can the study of experience, despite the excavation fallacy, rely on the act of reflection on lived experience and make sense and use of its results? Method: Through a philosophical discourse, informed by empirical first-person inquiry, we explore the experiential structure of the act of reflection and the formation of the corresponding belief about past experience. Results: We present a provisional first-person model of the experiential dynamics of retrospective reflection, in which the reflective act is characterized as enaction of belief about past experience that co-determines - rather than distorts - its results. From a constructivist perspective on the inevitable interdependence between the act of observing and the observed, the excavation "fallacy" is recognized as an intrinsic characteristic of reflection. Reflection is described as an iterative, self-referential process, guided by a context- and subject-specific horizon of expectations. Implications: Knowing the characteristics of the formation of beliefs about experience is essential for understanding first-person data and for the possibility of their acquisition and use in scientific practice, particularly in the context of second-person approaches to the study of experience. Constructivist content: We relate the proposed understanding of reflection to constructivist epistemology and argue that constructivism provides an epistemological foundation for the empirical study of experience more suitable than the traditional epistemological objectivism of cognitive science. We suggest that the constructive nature of the process of reflection calls for a collaboration between the fields of constructivism, phenomenology, and first-person research, and points towards the potential for their mutual enrichment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Constructivist epistemology is not a doctrinal set of clear and consistent theses and assumptions but a movement full of tensions, with minimally integrated lines of discussions. Problem: This situation explains why it is so difficult to come up with a general definition of constructivist epistemology that could serve as a starting point to study its several research programs systematically and comparatively. Method: We compare the constructivist epistemologies of Jean Piaget, Ernst von Glasersfeld, Humberto Maturana, and Niklas Luhmann regarding tensions between knowledge/reality and individual/society. Results: Our comparison leads to a general definition of constructivist epistemology as a heterogeneous movement problematizing certain dualities - such as subject/object, knowledge/reality, or individual/society - that have been shown to be central for epistemological inquiry. We argue that such dualisms can be used as dimensions for critical analysis, comparison, and discussion among the different research programs, and that, at the same time, they would allow us to analyze the general strategies characterizing such programs. The comparative and critical analysis of the programs by way of the aforementioned tensions results in an organized presentation highlighting their convergences, divergences, and singularities. Implications: The framework presented for evaluation (and further elaboration) can be useful to elucidate the standpoints of constructivist epistemology's research programs, and thence consolidate lines of dialogue among them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I consider two problems arising in the context of Goodmanian constructivism as discussed by Bin Liu: the question of solipsism and the status of immaterial minds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context · In the past three decades, the work of Varela has had an enormous impact on current developments in contemporary science. Problem · Varela's thought was extremely complex and multifaceted, and while some aspects - notably his contributions to the autopoietic theory of living and enactivist approach to cognition - have gained widespread acclaim, others have been ignored or watered down. Method · We identify three dimensions of Varela's thought: (a) anti-realism of the "middle way"; (b) anti-foundationalism of the circular onto-epistemology; and (c) ethical/social implications of the circularity. The discussion of these dimensions is followed by a concise overview of the individual target articles in this issue and the topics they cover. Finally, we discuss in what ways the articles extend and relate to Varela's work. We do this by means of a concrete example: the relation between "enaction" and "enactivism." Results · We show that the ignoring-cum-watering-down process of Varela's contributions to science is at least partly linked to these three dimensions of Varela's thought. On the basis of our examination, we also find that the more narrow research topics are always interrelated with broader philosophical reflection. Researching into ignored and watered-down aspects of Varela's work enables us to not only gain fresh insights into Varela's overall philosophy and rekindle interest in the topics and themes that have been brushed aside, but also cast a fresh light on those that are currently flourishing. Implications · Reviving interest in Varela's work in toto could lead to fruitful research and discussion in numerous scientific fields. To illustrate this idea, we delineate, tentatively, three domains - theoretical, empirical, and existential - where Varela's contribution to philosophy and science could instigate a productive exchange of views. Constructivist content · All three dimensions of Varela's philosophy have strong affinities with the radical constructivist critique of realism and some of its epistemological and ethical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context: Von Foerster's concept of eigenbehavior can be recognized against the broader context of enactivism as it has been advocated by Varela, Thompson and Rosch, by Noë and recently by Hutto and Myin, among others. This flourishing constellation of ideas is on its way to becoming the new paradigm of cognitive science. However, in my reading, enactivism, putting stress on the constitutive role of action when it comes to mind and perception, faces a serious philosophical challenge when attempting to account for the way we actually perceive our environments, most importantly for the fact that we perceive things or objects. Von Foester's eigenbehavior is understood here as a concept supposed to take on this challenge. Problem: In this article I tackle the following issues: (1) Enactivism must be able to account for the apparent stability of the perceived world: this is not a realm of a never-ending flux of stimuli; it is a realm of stable things. (2) Enactivism is committed to the anti-Cartesian endeavor seeking to bridge the gap between the inner and the outer; between the subjective and the objective. Now, these two points constrain each other so that one cannot address (1) simply by regarding the apparent stability of things as a projection that springs out of the internal machinery binding inputs with outputs. This is because the very idea of such an internal machinery opposes (2), i.e., it employs the Cartesian dichotomy. So, enactivism is in need of an account of (1) that would not oppose its anti-Cartesian commitment. Method: I introduce the ontology of location and niche theory, as it has been brought forth by Varzi, Casati, and Smith, and develop it so that it can be used in the philosophy of mind. This is a conceptual, semi-formal philosophical analysis. Results: I shall come up with the idea of object conceived of a product of action, and - drawing on von Foerster's central idea - as a product of coordination of perceptions. Yet, it is not coordination of stimuli but coordination of cognitive connections. The notion of connection is thus articulated in the article and cast as the central concept in my proposal. Implications: We are able to account for both (1) and (2). The apparent stability of the perceived world is due to the setting up and maintaining of connections between the perceiver and the things perceived, resulting in the establishment of what I call a cognitive niche. Constructivist content: Constructivism, broadly construed, takes, in my reading, a negative stance in the first place. Namely, it opposes what I call the metaphysics of the ready-made world. So, it holds that there is no ready-made reality; however it remains open when it comes to positive claims: a mind-independent reality does not exist at all or it does exist but it is not ready-made and as such it must be brought to completion, so to speak, or enacted, as Varela et al. would say, by a cognitive subject. In this article, I follow the latter and address one specific issue: how the enacted world gains its relatively stable architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I revisit the basic assumptions of constructivism on which the solutions presented in the target article rest, and argue that communication is difficult to understand until the cognitive autonomy of individuals resulting from operational closure is adopted as the point of departure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interest of communication scholars in (radical) constructivism is fuelled by the need to radically rethink the theoretical assumptions that have governed most media and communication research for the past three or four decades. > Problem On at least two points, constructivism poses difficulties that need to be overcome by scholars of communication. These are the attitudes of many radical constructivists towards reality and the constructivist position with regard to society. The article seeks to clarify the constructivist position with regard to social interaction and society by determining how successful communication among individuals is possible, despite their cognitive autonomy. > Method In order to contribute to a discussion about the current situation in communication and media studies, the article takes up the authors argument that communication cannot be understood unless models describing it are centred on the individual. Based on this conceptualisation, considerations about the ontological assumptions of constructivism and the constructivist position with regard to social interaction are revisited. > Results It is argued that (a) cognition is not pure self-reference; (b) society cannot be considered simply as an individual construct; selforganisation also occurs at the supra-individual level, where shared knowledge and socio-cultural meanings emerge in the operatively closed motion of the successive communicative elements. > Implications Clarifying the constructivist position with regard to society can contribute to innovative theory building and research in communication science, and in the social sciences more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Circularity is multifarious indeed. Some aspects, however, seem related to current developments and therefore may deserve more attention than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

> Context • The relationship between design and science has shifted over recent decades. One bridge between the two is cybernetics, which offers perspectives on both in terms of their practice. From around 1980 onwards, drawing on ideas from cybernetics, Glanville has suggested that rather than apply science to design, it makes more sense to understand science as a form of design activity, reversing the more usual hierarchy between the two. I return to review this argument here, in the context of recent discussions in this journal regarding second-order science (SOS). > Problem • Despite numerous connections to practice, second-order cybernetics (SOC) has tended to be associated with theory. As a result, SOC is perceived as separate to the more tangible aspects of earlier cybernetics in a way that obscures both the continuity between the two and also current opportunities for developing the field. > Method • I review Glanville's understanding of design, and particularly his account of scientific research as a designlike activity, placing this within the context of the shifting relation between science and design during the development of SOC, with reference to the work of Rittel and Feyerabend. Through this, I summarise significant parallels and overlaps between SOC and the contemporary concerns of design research. > Results • I suggest that we can see design research not just as a field influenced by cybernetics but as a form of SOC practice even where cybernetics is not explicitly referenced. > Implications • Given this, design research offers much to cybernetics as an important example of SOC that is both outward looking and practice based. As such, it bridges the gap between SOC and the more tangible legacy of earlier cybernetics, while also suggesting connections to contemporary concerns in this journal with SOS in terms of researching research. > Constructivist content • By suggesting that we see design research as an example of SOC, I develop connections between constructivism and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several letters to the editor are presented in response to the article "Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction," by Martin Fultot, Lin Nie and Claudia Carello in a 2016 issue.

Several letters to the editor are presented in response to the article "Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology," by Urban Kordes in a 2016 issue.

ontext ? The dominant approach to the study of perception is representational/computational, with an emphasis on the achievements of the brain and the nervous system, which are taken to construct internal models of the world. Alternatives include ecological, embedded, embodied, and enactivist approaches, all of which emphasize the centrality of action in understanding perception. > Problem ? Despite sharing many theoretical commitments that lead to a rejection of the classical approach, the alternatives are characterized by important contrasts and points of divergence. Here we focus on the enactive and ecological approaches, in particular, on how they construe the status of the environment and the content of perception. > M ethod ? We begin with a review of James Gibson's ecological psychology, highlighting it as a psychology for all organisms not just humans. Against this backdrop, we consider enactivist arguments against direct perception - a central assertion of the ecological approach - and in favor of interpreting the activity of perceptual agents as a kind of construction of a perceptually meaningful world. > Results ? We assess the merits of this interpretation and we conclude that it cannot be grounded on fundamental principles such as thermodynamics and organism-environment mutuality. > I mplications ? As a consequence, enactivism remains close to representationalism and entails a form of dualism. > C onstructivist content ? We advance a criticism of the constructivist foundations of the enactive approach to perception. Perception-action mutuality at the heart of enactivism does not require mental construction; indeed, perception-action mutuality obviates construction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context ? Epistemologically, constructivism has reached its goals, particularly by emphasizing the idea of participatory observation, circularity, and the fact that construction is based on experience. However, rather than research, the main occupation of constructivists and second-order cyberneticians seems to lie in making the case for their epistemological idea, which has been exhausted in many aspects. > Purpose ? To counteract this exhaustion and an increasingly apparent lack of energy, it is argued that constructivism requires a dedicated field of research, a field where it would be possible to test constructivist concepts empirically and thus go beyond mere theoretical discourse. > Method ? Based on a review of basic constructivist premises and a critical examination of the field of empirical phenomenological research, the article connects their respective findings. > Results ? The article proposes that empirical research on lived experience (i.e., empirical phenomenology) requires a constructivist epistemological foundation and might therefore be a logical continuation of constructivist endeavours. In such a way, both fields might benefit considerably. Not only would constructivism acquire an empirical tool for testing its ideas, such a partnership might also provide empirical phenomenology with a more suitable epistemological platform than the realism-based research framework of cognitive science (of which it has become an integral part). The possibilities and problems of introducing empirical research into constructivism are also discussed. > Implications ? The article presents an opportunity to re-think the role and future of constructivism. It suggests educating a new generation of constructivist researchers whose principal goal would be the attempt to study lived human experience. That could also open a path to the experimental grounding of many constructivist insights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context ? Distributed language and interactivity are central members of a set of concepts that are rapidly developing into rigorous, exciting additions to 4E cognitive science. Because they share certain assumptions and methodological commitments with enactivism, the two have sometimes been confused; additionally, while enactivism is a welldeveloped paradigm, interactivity has relied more on methodological development and on a set of focal examples. > P roblem ? The goal of this article is to clarify the core conceptual commitments of both interactivity-based and enactive approaches to cognitive science by contrasting the two and highlighting their differences in assumptions, focus, and explanatory strategies. > M ethod ? We begin with the shared commitments of interactivity and enactivism - e.g., antirepresentationalism, naturalism, interdisciplinarity, the importance of biology, etc. We then give an overview of several important varieties of enactivism, including sensorimotor and anti-representationalist enactivism, and then walk through the history of the "core" varieties, taking care to contrast Maturana's approach with that of Varela and the current researchers following in Varela's footsteps. We then describe the differences between this latter group and interactivity-based approaches to cognitive science. > Results ? We argue that enactivism's core concepts are explanatorily inadequate in two ways. First, they mis-portray the organization of many living systems, which are not operationally closed. Second, they fail to realize that most epistemic activity (i.e., "sense-making") depends on engagement with non-local resources. Both problems can be dealt with by adopting an interactivity-based perspective, in which agency and cognition are fundamentally distributed and involve integration of non-local resources into the local coupling of organism and environment. > I mplications ? The article's primary goal is theoretical clarification and exposition; its primary implication is that enactive concepts need to be modified or extended in some way in order to explain fully many aspects of cognition and directed biological activity. Or, read another way, the article's primary implication is that interactivity already provides a rich set of concepts for doing just that, which, while closely allied with enactivism in several ways, are not enactivist concepts. > Constructivist content ? The article consists entirely of a comparison between two constructivist fields of theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Context ? Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception (which is a specific development of Gibsonian approaches to perception) initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. > Problem ? I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and direct realism complement each other, and that the result is a philosophically radical, but fully scientifically realised, theory of perception. > Method ? The article uses (non-reductive) philosophical analysis and discussion. It also draws on empirical evidence from the relevant cognitive sciences. > Results ? Direct realism can be augmented by sensorimotor theory to become a scientifically tractable alternative to the mainstream, representationalist research programme within cognitive science. > Implications ? The article aims to further clarify the philosophical importance of the sensorimotor approach to perception. It also aims to show that the apparently radical claim that we perceive objects themselves is amenable to normal scientific study. > Constructivist content ? Objects are analysed as a kind of collaboration between the world and the perceiver. On this account, we can never perceive outside the categories of our own understanding, but we do perceive genuinely outside our own heads. Thus, the approach here is not exactly constructivism, though it shares many goals and results with constructivism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on an article on Plato and Leibniz metaphysics of perception and guarding constructivism through transcendentalism by Konrad Werner. Topics discussed include actual potential distinction, and conceptualises perception in terms of actualisation of reality; contemporary philosophy and cognitive science and embedding of radical constructivism; and offering the appropriate level of analysis and explanation of the problem of perception.

The article reviews several books and articles related to constructivist approaches including an article on autogenesis by Milan Zeleny, the book "Constructive Adpositional Grammars: Foundations of Constructive Linguistics" by Federico Gobbo and Marco Benin and an article on qualitative geometry.

The article comments on the article "What Can the Global Observer Know?" by Diana Gasparyan published in the current issue of the journal. Topics include key notions of radical constructivism, elimination of notions including omniscient interpreter, and the doubt created by constructivism due to how it describes one's relationship with reality.

The article presents the authors' response to commentaries on their article on the failure of the media to represent reality. They cite several references for their radical constructivist approach including the works of Humberto Maturana, Klaus Krippendorff and Siegfried J. Schmidt. The authors also discuss several studies on media coverage which include a study on German and U.S. media coverage of the subject of climate change.