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Most theoretical accounts in the current literature on North American integration consider the implementation of side and parallel environmental agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) and their corresponding institutions either a side-effect of the national governments' pursuit of their economic interests or the result of successful pressure by non-governmental organizations to include their socio-environmental demands in the treaty. These opposite explanations closely resemble liberal intergovernmentalist and transnational-focused accounts used to explain the occurrence and progression of regional integration in Europe. This article reviews and challenges both accounts and argues that they both assess inadequately the interests of governmental and transnational actors and their roles and relative influence in determining the outcome of the negotiations of the nafta side and parallel agreements on the environment. It proposes that a revised liberal intergovernmentalist account that considers the non-economic national interests of nation-states would explain better the pursuit and negotiation of nafta's environmental side and parallel agreements and the institutional structure that resulted from them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numerous scholars argue that the rules, mechanisms, and bodies established under NAFTA'S Chapter 11 for the settlement of foreign direct investment disputes have undermined the policymaking capabilities of governments in the U.S., Mexico, and Canada for promoting public welfare in their countries. This article argues that Chapter 11 has instead contributed to reaffirming governments' power to enact and uphold social-oriented domestic laws. It demonstrates that Chapter 11's dispute settlement mechanisms were created and operate according to the interests of the national governments in facilitating and increasing the flows of trade and capital investment between countries without compromising their sovereignty and policy-making powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]