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This paper studies local governments' decisions on public debt under the Financial Discipline Law for States and Municipalities (ldfem in Spanish) in Mexico. It implies distinguishing economic and political factors and their relevance within ldfem's legal framework that defines norms and limitations for Mexican subnational governments. Based on municipal data for 2017-2019, our results prove that political variables significantly impact municipal debt. This paper highlights the elections' proximity and the incumbent mayor's electoral support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the way in which the Mexican electorate modified the configuration of the party system after the 2018 election. By analyzing the structure and dynamics of electoral competition, it explores different dimensions to determine the magnitude of the electoral change and its translation in the party system after this election. For this purpose, the paper compares the results of the presidential and federal deputies' election in 2018, with the results of the elections held since the early 1990s. This research offers a historical perspective of the magnitude of the changes registered during this election in both the structure of electoral competition (the massive reorientation of the vote in a large part of the country, the re-concentration of power in a party, the reduction of partisan fragmentation and the changes in the nationalization of the vote of the main forces) and the dynamics of electoral competition (the emergence of the first government of the unified party from 1994, the effect of dragging the presidential election on legislative results). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to determine the presence of political budget cycles related to the elections of presidents in Mexico over the period 1980-2014. To do so, autoregressive and moving average models, extended to take account of economic shocks, are estimated for the total public expenditure, the programmable expenditure as well as the components of the latter. Our results suggest that economic shocks (measured by manufacturing production) play a minor role in the dynamics of public expenditure and, more important, that political budget cycles are present in total expenditure as well as current and capital expenditure, among others. This evidence reflects opportunist conducts of governments to remain in power as well as the use of public resources to benefit specific political groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Almost two hundred years after the term gerrymandering was first used in Massachusetts, redistricting remains a complex and politicized process that affects the way the legislative branches are conformed and the quality of political representation around the world. In this paper, we describe the redistricting process in California and ask how it would work if it were to be implemented by an independent agent (instead of the local legislature or a bipartisan commission). Using a simulated annealing redistricting algorithm we create a hypothetical scenario that reduces significantly partisan bias in the state. Developed by the Mexican Federal Electoral Institute in 2005, this optimization model allowed us to recreate California's 53 Congressional districts and to analyze their racial and electoral composition. We found systematic evidence that the majority party in local legislature ends up with electoral benefits every time districts are drawn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests some of the main fraud allegations of the 2006 presidential election in Mexico with the evidence from a statistical analysis of precinct-level data. First, I analyze the data flow from the quick count, the preliminary results (PREP) and the official district tally (cómputo distrital). Secondly, I analyze the size and distribution of errors in the polling-station acts and the partial recount. Lastly, I consider atypical precincts and the role of party representatives. My main conclusion is that, since most fraud allegations are not supported by the evidence, the presidential election outcome is statistically reliable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The disputed presidential elections of 2006 moved the PRI to third place of preferences. While there was a deep polarization between the parties of left and right, and errors in the PRI's campaign, it is also possible to find another cause in the process of choosing the candidate Roberto Madrazo. This paper reconstructs the nomination process of 2005, as well as the historical and short-term conditions that made it possible, the internal confrontations and recomposition of interests of political groups in the PRI, which allowed, for the first time in the history of this party, to make its leader a presidential candidate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) dominated Mexican politics for over 70 years, but its fortunes have been sliding in the past two decades, capped by its loss of the presidency in 2000. The results for the PRI were even worse in 2006, with a third-place finish in the presidential race and significant losses in both houses of the legislature. This paper examines whether or not the PRI risks going from being a dominant party to a third party in a Mexican two-party system. The results suggest that the PRI has fallen behind, but that it may have a limited window to regroup based upon comparative regional advantage in the northern and southern states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies of economic voting in Mexico have reached mixed conclusions about the role of economic performance on electoral behavior. In this paper, I argue that the effect of economic performance on voting is contingent upon two factors. First, even when voters perceive a weak economy and are dissatisfied with the incumbent, they differ on who the best replacement is. In the context of the 2006 campaign, López Obrador did not receive the support of many voters who thought the economy was weak because they perceived him as too large of a risk. Second, the impact of the economy is contingent upon its have a prominent place on the political agenda. The combination of high levels of economic vulnerability, the fall of the regime cleavage as an alternative motive for electoral choice, and the emphasis on economic issues in the campaign dialogue and advertising strategy of the major political parties in the 2006 election made economic issues especially salient. While the weak performance of the Mexican economy in 2001-2003 opened doors for the pan's challengers, the economic recovery in the second half of Fox's term thus proved sufficient to garner the narrow victory for Calderon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explains why income did not shape vote choice in the Mexican 2006 election, despite the efforts by the left party to turn this race into a referendum on inequality and widespread poverty. Logistic models of a post-election survey indicate that "false consciousness" or the inability to understand the issues at stake do not distinguish poorer from wealthier voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2000, Mexican politics has changed in two important ways. First, the PRI's defeat in the 2000 elections has ended a 70-year long one-party system. Second, the president no longer holds a majority in either chamber of a bicameral congress. In what is likely to be a new era of divided government, constitutional engineers proposed a multitude of constitutional reforms to promote good governance under a separation of powers system. While some reforms attempt to decrease the likelihood of minority presidents, others aim at strengthening the constitutional powers of the president. This paper argues that a viable and desirable strategy of constitutional change should avoid these two extremes. Instead, reforms should generate incentives to promote inter-branch cooperation during divided government. This paper discusses the benefits of a partial reform consisting of two parts: 1) electoral rules that promote correspondence between the preferences of citizens and those of policy makers and 2) constitutional powers that encourage coordination between the president and the congress in the process of policy making and cabinet formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes the continual growth in the number of women elected to legislative office in Mexico since the 1950s. We argue that the historical and institutional reforms of the 1990s best explain the gradual and constant increase in this trend. Not all institutional reforms, however, have the same effects on the election of women. Laws that clearly establish gender quota for legislative candidacies have the strongest effects. This paper uses fixed effects longitudinal regression models to test several hypotheses against Mexican legislative results from 1) 18 federal elections between 1952 and 2003 and 2) 154 subnational elections between 1991 and 2005 in 31 states and the Federal District. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]