1. On (Subgame Perfect) Secure Equilibrium in Quantitative Reachability Games
- Author
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Hugo Gimbert, Julie De Pril, Thomas Brihaye, and Véronique Bruyère
- Subjects
FOS: Computer and information sciences ,TheoryofComputation_MISCELLANEOUS ,Computer Science - Logic in Computer Science ,Computer Science::Computer Science and Game Theory ,General Computer Science ,Computer science ,Open problem ,0102 computer and information sciences ,02 engineering and technology ,01 natural sciences ,Theoretical Computer Science ,Subgame perfect equilibrium ,symbols.namesake ,Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory ,Reachability ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,D.2.4 ,ComputingMilieux_PERSONALCOMPUTING ,TheoryofComputation_GENERAL ,Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO) ,010201 computation theory & mathematics ,Nash equilibrium ,symbols ,020201 artificial intelligence & image processing ,Mathematical economics ,Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) - Abstract
We study turn-based quantitative multiplayer non zero-sum games played on finite graphs with reachability objectives. In such games, each player aims at reaching his own goal set of states as soon as possible. A previous work on this model showed that Nash equilibria (resp. secure equilibria) are guaranteed to exist in the multiplayer (resp. two-player) case. The existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case remained and is still an open problem. In this paper, we focus our study on the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also introduce the new concept of subgame perfect secure equilibrium. We prove the existence of subgame perfect equilibria (resp. subgame perfect secure equilibria) in multiplayer (resp. two-player) quantitative reachability games. Moreover, we provide an algorithm deciding the existence of secure equilibria in the multiplayer case., Comment: 32 pages. Full version of the FoSSaCS 2012 proceedings paper
- Published
- 2013
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