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PurposeObjective measures of listening effort have been gaining prominence, as they provide metrics to quantify the difficulty of understanding speech under a variety of circumstances. A key challenge has been to develop paradigms that enable the complementary measurement of subjective listening effort in a quantitatively precise manner. In this study, we introduce a novel decision-making paradigm to examine age-related and individual differences in subjective effort during listening.MethodOlder and younger adults were presented with spoken sentences mixed with speech-shaped noise at multiple signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs). On each trial, subjects were offered the choice between completing an easier listening trial (presented at +20 dB SNR) for a smaller monetary reward and completing a harder listening trial (presented at either +4, 0, −4, −8, or −12 dB SNR) for a greater monetary reward. By varying the amount of the reward offered for the easier option, the subjective value of performing effortful listening trials at each SNR could be assessed.ResultsOlder adults discounted the value of effortful listening to a greater degree than young adults, opting to accept less money in order to avoid more difficult SNRs. Additionally, older adults with poorer hearing and smaller working memory capacities were more likely to choose easier trials; however, in younger adults, no relationship with hearing or working memory was found. Self-reported measures of economic status did not affect these relationships.ConclusionsThese findings suggest that subjective listening effort depends on factors including, but not necessarily limited to, hearing and working memory. Additionally, this study demonstrates that economic decision-making paradigms can be a useful approach for assessing subjective listening effort and may prove beneficial in future research.

One of the central processes of language acquisition is word learning. While many species have been shown to learn word-object associations (e.g., Lyn & Savage-Rumbaugh, 2000; Kaminski, Call, & Fischer, 2004), humans understand the meanings of words and know that that words refer to certain objects, actions, or ideas, not merely recognize associative pairings. This paper explores the role of socially contingent responsivity in the development of the referential understanding of words.

Hallucinated voices cause high levels of distress and disability. Current theories suggest that insight-related beliefs, about internal or external origin, perceived source location, and appraisals of controllability are important in mediating the impact of these experiences but previous findings have been mixed. We report two open code and open data network analytic studies of items in the Psychotic Symptoms Ratings Scale for auditory verbal hallucinations (PSYRATS-AH) in a large sample of patients with hallucinated voices to examine the network structure of items at (1) first assessment, and (2) differences over two consecutive assessments during a wait-list period. Networks were generated using least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) and extended Bayesian information criterion (EBIC) with node predictability. In Study 1 (N = 386), we report that insight-related items made a negligible contribution to hallucinated voices and the controllability appraisal made at most a modest contribution. Items relating to distress and negative content were the most central and most predicted by the wider network. In Study 2 (N = 204), we tested the longitudinal stability of the structure of hallucinated voices over a period of several months, finding a small change in total hallucination score and global strength but no clear evidence for an alteration in the structural relationship. The insight-related and controllability items remained as least influential over time. Insight-related beliefs and controllability appraisals may contribute less than previously thought to distressing hallucinated voices although we do not discount that other appraisals may remain important. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1007/s00406-020-01166-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

With the rise of experimental research in the social sciences, numerous methods to elicit and classify people’s risk attitudes in the laboratory have evolved. However, evidence suggests that attitudes towards risk may vary considerably when measured with different methods. Based on a within-subject experimental design using four widespread risk preference elicitation tasks, we find that the different methods indeed give rise to considerably varying estimates of individual and aggregate level risk preferences. Conducting simulation exercises to obtain benchmarks for subjects’ behavior, we find that the observed heterogeneity in risk preference estimates across methods is qualitatively similar to the heterogeneity arising from independent random draws from the choice distributions observed in the experiment. Our study, however, provides evidence that subjects are surprisingly well aware of the variation in the riskiness of their choices. We argue that this calls into question the common interpretation of variation in revealed risk preferences as being inconsistent. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (10.1007/s10683-020-09674-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

The goal of this paper is to shed new light on the relation between dream recall and dream experiences by providing a thorough analysis of the process that leads to dream reports. Three crucial steps of this process will be distinguished: dream production (the generation of a conscious experience during sleep), dream encoding (storing a trace of this experience in memory), and dream retrieval (accessing the memory trace upon awakening). The first part of the paper will assess how major theories think about the relationship between dream reports and these distinct steps. The second part will systematise how trait and state factors affecting dream recall — given different theoretical assumptions — might interact with dream production, encoding and retrieval. Understanding how the distinct steps of dream recall can be modulated by different factors is crucial for getting a better grip on how to acquire information about these steps empirically, and for drawing methodological conclusions with regard to the tools dream research relies on to collect subjective data about dream experiences. The third part of the paper will analyse how laboratory reports, logs and retrospective scales interact with the different factors that affect the distinct steps leading to dream reports, and will argue that prospective methods provide more direct access to data regarding dream production and encoding than retrospective methods, which — due to their inability to provide systematic control over the factors affecting the retrieval stage screen-off the variability in the production and the encoding of dreams.

The latent constructs psychologists study are typically not directly accessible, so researchers must design measurement instruments that are intended to provide insights about those constructs. Construct validation—assessing whether instruments measure what they intend to—is therefore critical for ensuring that the conclusions we draw actually reflect the intended phenomena. Insufficient construct validation can lead to the jingle fallacy—falsely assuming two instruments measure the same construct because the instruments share a name (Thorndike, 1904)—and the jangle fallacy—falsely assuming two instruments measure different constructs because the instruments have different names (Kelley, 1927). In this paper, we examine construct validation practices in research on listening effort and identify patterns that strongly suggest the presence of jingle and jangle in the literature. We argue that the lack of construct validation for listening effort measures has led to inconsistent findings and hindered our understanding of the construct. We also provide specific recommendations for improving construct validation of listening effort instruments, drawing on the framework laid out in a recent paper on improving measurement practices (Flake & Fried, in press). Although this paper addresses listening effort, the issues raised and recommendations presented are widely applicable to tasks used in research on auditory perception and cognitive psychology.

Across every area of our culture, the distinction between influential people and those below them is normal. There are figures of authority who conduct duties every day for us, and yet we are also lazy. In this paper, participants face the same order but of two distinct individuals-figures ofauthority or ordinary citizens-to test the difference in responses. The responses when the authority figure is specific are also checked. We seek to get the common public to address figures of authority in the Indian sense. Individuals appear to be more likely, without any proofor test, to obey certain rules and submit to certain individuals.This paper will bring out the biases and change in behavior of people, when encountered with authority figures, but of different genders.

A previous study we reported in this journal suggested that left and right handers may differ in their patterns of lateralisation for different language tasks. However, it had too few left handers (N=7) to reach any conclusions. For this update paper, further participants were added to the sample to create separate groups of left (N=31) and right handers (N=43). Two hypotheses were tested: 1) that lateralisation would be weaker at the group level in left than right handers; and 2) that left handers would show weaker covariance in lateralisation between tasks, supporting a two factor model.All participants performed the same protocol as in our previous paper: lateralisation was measured using functional transcranial Doppler sonography during six different language tasks, on two separate testing sessions. The results supported hypothesis 1, with significant differences in laterality between groups for four out of six tasks. For hypothesis 2, structural equation modelling showed that there was stronger evidence for a two factor model in left than right handers; furthermore, examination of the factor loadings suggested that the pattern of laterality across tasks may also differ between handedness groups. These results expand on what is known about the differences in laterality between left and right handers.

In this paper I postulate that the processing of concepts which are deemed controllable is rooted in neurological machinery located in the posterior parietal cortex specialised for the processing of objects which are immediately actionable because they are within reach. This is demonstrated with reference to the near-miss effect in gambling behaviour, where it is argued that the configurative proximity of the near-miss outcome to the win outcome creates the impression that the win outcome is ‘almost within reach’ or controllable. The perceived realisability of the desired outcome increases subjective reward probability and the associated expected action value, which impacts decision-making and behaviour. When extended to substance addiction, this novel hypothesis adds fresh insight into understanding the motivational effects associated with cue-exposure and opportunity for drug-taking. Moreover, by postulating that a perception of control can be generated to minimise unpleasant affective states, it can also reconcile contrasting models of decision-making and provide a neurological explanation for the efficacy of mindfulness-based techniques in treating addictions. With reference to the previously-hypothesised link between the self and control, these ideas can provide an explanation for the increased subjective value of self-associated concepts in the ‘endowment effect’, as well as a neurological correlate for the concept of the ‘narrative self’. This paper therefore provides an innovative and unifying perspective for the study and treatment of behavioural and substance addictions as well as contributing to our neurological understanding of philosophical approaches to the self.

This paper investigates experimentally the relationship between inequality in endowment and deception. Our basic design is adopted from Gneezy (2005): two players interact in a deception game. It is common knowledge that player 1 has private information about the payoffs for both players of two alternative actions. Player 1 sends a message to player 2, indicating which alternative putatively will end up in a higher payoff for player 2. The message, which can either be true or false, does not affect the payoffs of the players. Player 2 has no information about the payoffs. However, player 2 selects one of the two alternatives A or B, which is payoff-relevant for both players. Our paper adds value to the literature by extending Gneezy (2005) in two ways. First, we systematically vary the initial endowment of players 1 and 2 (common knowledge to both of them). Second, we do not limit ourselves to the standard population of university students but also recruit chess players that are not enrolled in any degree program. Doing so, we want to find out if our results remain robust over a non-standard subject population which is known to be experienced to some extent in strategic interactions. Our main findings are: (i) non-students behave more honestly than students, (ii) students are more likely to trust the opponent’s message, and (iii) students and non-students behave differently to variation in initial endowment.

The concept of successful psychopathy has been debated for years, however, there is yet no unified approach to its definition and conceptualisation. Such individuals are said to encompass the core traits associated with psychopathy, whilst continuing to function in society, potentially having superior levels of functioning. This review assimilates the existing literature related to successful psychopathy in the general population. An extensive systematic review was performed using four databases, and two key concepts; namely success and psychopathy. After removing duplicates and articles deemed irrelevant, 180 papers were appraised against the review’s inclusion and exclusion criteria. The remaining 19 papers underwent quality control by two raters. A narrative synthesis was performed. The key factors associated with the successful psychopathy construct were fearlessness, stress immunity, social potency, normal or superior cognitive performance, professional achievement, stable socioeconomic status, leadership, pride, and aversion to punishment during conflict. Inconsistent findings were considered a result of the variations in psychopathy measurements used, and a lack of an agreed definition of success. Recommendations are provided for the establishment of a unified framework, and the need for a moderated measure of successful psychopathy to allow more systematic research into the notion of successful psychopathy in the general populations.

According to the Cue integration theory, the Sense of agency (SoA) is a resultant of both motor as well as non-motor cues, and these multiple cues are integrated based on their reliability or invariance estimate. However, the cue integration theory fails to make a distinction between perception and judgment, when it attributes (multisensory) perceptual character to non-motor cues like affect, effort, competition, fluency, familiarity, expertise, sleep, meditation, primes, and previews of actions, etc. Thus, my paper criticizes the experimentally operationalized cue-integrated SoA by arguing that: (a) there is uncertainty in the cue-integrated SoA experimental operationalization (making the participants prone to judgment effects); (b) the cue integration theory faces a problem of explaining how non-motor cues acquire interface, intentionality, and accuracy about agency; (c) the SoA reports are influenced by heuristic responding pattern (under uncertainty); (d) the cue-integrated SoA operationalizations had ‘inaccuracy standard’ for measuring perception of agency; (e) under certainty, the (nonveridical) SoA reports might not have occurred at all. This paper concludes that the reported heuristic responses (under uncertainty) of SoA can be parsimoniously accounted by compositionality nature of thought/judgment rather than the cue-integrated perception, and thus, the cue-integrated SoA reports are not instances of perceptions but are judgments.

The strength of research conclusions must follow from the strength of evidence. In this commentary I raise several issues with a recent paper “Brain structure changes induced by attention bias modification training” (Abend et al. 2019). I follow the paper’s five highlights to discuss; the absence of discussion of negative ABM results, the low power of the study itself. Centrally, I raise the concern that the conclusions rest all their weight on a single statistically significant group x time interaction form brain-wide analysis. Most importantly, this test is not internally consistent following statcheck. The reported result requires checking, and potentially a correction that would shift the results entirely.

After two decades of research on implicit social cognition, it has become clear many of the field's theories and practices need to be redressed. Addressed in the present paper are the assumptions and memetic ideas embedded in the language, theory, and measurement tools of so-called implicit social cognition, their historical and contemporary shortcomings, and solutions to avoid these shortcomings and improve scholarship in this field. Specifically, the present paper recommends researchers and theorists adopt more accurate and epistemically honest language in their work, and determine what measures of implicit social cognition measure through experimental research rather than through empirically unjustifiable assumptions. Contributing to this endeavour, the present paper includes an experiment testing whether performance on the Implicit Association Test (IAT) can be changed through the indirect activation of complex associations. Here it is demonstrated that performance on IAT appears to be unaffected by indirectly activated complex associations, ruling out a possible cognitive mechanism that could contribute to performance on the IAT.

In this paper, we propose a novel model – the TWAIN-model – to describe the durations of two-step actions in a reach-to-place task in human infants. Previous research demonstrates that infants and adults plan their actions across multiple steps. They adjust, for instance, the velocity of a reaching action depending on what they intend to do with the object once it is grasped. Despite these findings and irrespective of the larger context in which the action occurs, current models (e.g., Fitts’ law) target single, isolated actions, as for example pointing to a goal. In the current paper, we develop and empirically test a more ecologically valid model of two-step action planning. More specifically, 61 18-month-olds took part in a reach-to-place task and their reaching and placing durations were measured with a motion-capture system. Our model explained the highest amount of variance in placing duration and outperformed six previously suggested models, when using model comparison. We show that including parameters of the first action step, here the duration of the reaching action, can improve the description of the second action step, here the duration of the placing action. This move towards more ecologically valid models of action planning contributes knowledge as well as a framework for assessing human machine interactions. The TWAIN-model provides an updated way to quantify motor learning by the time these abilities develop, which might help to assess performance in typically developing human children.

In several recent papers and a monograph, Andreas Stokke argues that questions can be misleading, but that they cannot be lies. The aim of this paper is to show that ordinary speakers disagree. We show that ordinary speakers judge certain kinds of insincere questions to be lies, namely questions carrying a believed false presupposition the speaker intends to convey. These judgements are robust and remain so when the participants are given the possibility of classifying the utterances as misleading or as deceiving. The judgements contrast with judgements participants give about cases of misleading or deceptive behaviour, and they pattern with judgements participants make about declarative lies. Finally, the possibility of lying with non-declaratives is not confined to questions: ordinary speakers also judge utterances of imperative, exclamative and optative sentences carrying believed-false presuppositions to be lies.

Psychological science is experiencing a rise in the application of complex statistical models and, simultaneously, a renewed focus on applying research in a confirmatory manner. This presents a fundamental conflict for psychological researchers as more complex forms of modeling necessarily eschew as stringent of theoretical constraints. In this paper, I argue that this is less of a conflict, and more a result of a continued adherence to applying the overly simplistic labels of exploratory and confirmatory. These terms mask a distinction between exploratory/confirmatory research practices and modeling. Further, while many researchers recognize that this dichotomous distinction is better represented as a continuum, this only creates additional problems. Finally, I argue that while a focus on preregistration helps clarify the distinction, psychological research would be better off replacing the terms exploratory and confirmatory with additional levels of detail regarding the goals of the study, modeling details, and scientific method.

Previous research has shown that Attentional blink (AB) data can differ between tasks, or subjects and it can be challenging to interpret these differences. In this paper, we provided a ready-to-use tool that allows researchers to map their data onto the episodic Simultaneous Type, Serial Token (eSTST) model. This tool uses the Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithm to find the best set of 3 model parameters to simulate a given AB pattern. These 3 parameters have cognitive interpretations, such that differences in these parameters between different paradigms can be used for inferences about the timing of attentional deployment or the encoding of memory. Additionally, our tool allows for a combination of quantitative fitting against the overall pattern of data points, and qualitative fitting for theoretically important features. We demonstrate the algorithm using several data sets, showing that it can find cognitively interpretable parameter sets for some of them, but fails to find a good fit for one data set. This indicates an explanatory boundary of the eSTST model. Finally, we provide a feature to avoid overfitting of individual data points with high uncertainty, such as in the case of individual participant data.

Introduction: N, N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT) is an endogenous serotonergic psychedelic capable of producing radical shifts in conscious experience. Increasing trends in its use, as well as new trials administering DMT to patients, indicate the growing importance of a thorough elucidation of the phenomenology the drug may occasion. This is particularly in light of the hyper-real, otherworldly, and often ontologically challenging yet potentially transformative, nature of the experience, not least encounters with apparently non-self social agents. Laboratory studies have been limited by clinical setting and lacking qualitative analyses, while online surveys’ limitations lie in retrospective design, recreational use, and both of which not guaranteeing ‘breakthrough’ experiences. Methods: We report on the first naturalistic field study of DMT use including its qualitative analysis. Screened, healthy, anonymised and experienced DMT users (40-75mg inhaled) were observed during their non-clinical use of the drug at home. Semi-structured interviews using the micro-phenomenological technique were employed immediately after their experience. This paper reports on the thematic analysis of one major domain of the breakthrough experiences elicited; the ‘other’. Thirty-six post-DMT experience interviews with mostly Caucasian (83%) males (8 female) of average 37 years were predominantly inductively coded. Results: Invariably, profound and highly intense experiences occurred. The main overarching category comprised the encounter with other ‘beings’ (94% of reports), with further subordinate themes including the entities’ role, appearance, demeanour, communication and interaction; while the other over-arching category comprised experiences of emerging into other ‘worlds’ (100% of reports), in turn consisting of the scene, the content and quality of the immersive spaces. Discussion: The present study provides a systematic and in-depth analysis of the features of the otherworldly encounter within the breakthrough DMT experience, as well as elaborating on the resonances with both previous DMT studies and other types of extraordinary experiences which also entail entity encounters. These include the alien abduction, folkloric, shamanic and near-death experience. Putative neural mechanisms of these features of the DMT experience and its promise as a psychotherapeutic agent are discussed in light of such findings.

Adolescent risk-taking, including sensation seeking (SS), is often attributed to developmental changes in connectivity among brain regions implicated in cognitive control and reward processing. Despite considerable scientific and popular interest in this neurodevelopmental framework, there are few empirical investigations of adolescent network connectivity–let alone examinations of its links to SS behavior. The studies that have been done focus on mean-based approaches and leave unanswered questions about individual differences in neurodevelopment and behavior. The goal of this paper is to take a person-specific approach to the study of adolescent functional connectivity during reward processing, and to examine links between connectivity and self-reported SS behavior in 104 adolescents (MAge=19.3; SDAge=1.3). Using group iterative multiple model estimation (GIMME), person-specific connectivity during two neuroimaging runs of a monetary incentive delay task was estimated among 12 a priori brain regions of interest representing reward, cognitive, and salience networks. Two data-driven subgroups were detected, a finding that was consistent between both neuroimaging runs, but associations with SS were only found in the first run, potentially reflecting neural habituation in the second run. Specifically, the subgroup that had unique connections between reward-related regions had greater SS and showed a distinctive relation between connectivity strength in the reward network and SS. These findings provide novel evidence for heterogeneity in adolescent brain-behavior relations by showing that subsets of adolescents have unique associations between neural reward processing and SS. Findings have broader implications for future work on reward processing, as they demonstrate that brain-behavior relations may attenuate across runs.

Optimal performance in time-constrained and dynamically changing environments depends on making reliable predictions about future outcomes. In sporting tasks, performers have been found to employ multiple information sources to maximize the accuracy of their predictions, but questions remain about how different information sources are weighted and integrated to guide anticipation. In this paper, we outline how active inference, a unifying account of perception and action, explains many of the prominent findings in the sports anticipation literature. Active inference proposes that perception and action are underpinned by the need to minimize prediction errors and optimise a predictive model of the world. To this end, decision making approximates Bayesian inference and actions are used to minimize future prediction errors. Using a series of Bayesian neurocomputational models based on a partially observable Markov process, we demonstrate that key findings from the literature can be recreated from the first principles of active inference. In doing so, we formulate a number of novel, empirically falsifiable hypotheses about human anticipation capabilities which could guide future investigations in the field.

Listening to music is an enjoyable activity for most individuals, yet the factors that relate to aesthetic preferences are not completely understood. In the present paper, we investigate whether the absolute tuning of music influences listener evaluations of music. Across three experiments, participants rated musical excerpts, tuned conventionally (A4 = 440 Hz) versus unconventionally (± 50 cents from conventional tuning), in terms of aesthetic preference. In Experiment 1, participants rated single MIDI piano excerpts on each trial in terms of liking, interest, and unusualness. In Experiments 2 and 3, participants heard two versions of the same excerpt on each trial, only differing in terms of tuning, and made a forced-choice judgment as to which version they preferred. Experiment 2 used the same piano excerpts as Experiment 1, whereas Experiment 3 introduced both highly familiar and unknown song excerpts by professional recording artists. Overall, the results suggest that absolute tuning influences aesthetic preferences under limited circumstances. Although there was no strong evidence for tuning influencing judgments in either Experiments 1 or 2, we found a robust effect in Experiment 3 depending on the familiarity of the recording. Whereas participants clearly preferred the conventionally tuned version for highly familiar recordings, they tended to prefer the version that was highest in absolute pitch if the recording was unfamiliar. Overall, these results suggest that absolute tuning can influence musical preferences, although the specific nature of the effect depends on familiarity.

In a previous paper, we reported substantial relationships between phenomenological control (trait response to imaginative suggestion) and responses to the rubber hand illusion, vicarious pain, and mirror synaesthesia. We argued that these responses may reflect phenomenological control rather than, or in addition to, other mechanisms. Ehrsson et al disagree with our claims regarding the rubber hand illusion. They provide analyses which replicate and extend our results, but which they argue undermine our claims. Here, we explain why our claims remain justified, drawing attention to the fact that comparing synchronous and asynchronous stroking in the rubber hand illusion is confounded by demand characteristics. Altogether, reported experience of ownership in the rubber hand illusion may be entirely attributable to phenomenological control, compliance and bias effects. Future experiments, with adequate control conditions, are needed to establish whether other mechanisms are involved.

A large interdisciplinary literature on the relationship between age and subjective well-being (happiness) has produced very mixed evidence. In this paper we argue that this is due to potential sources of bias that may distort the assessment of the age-happiness relationship. Most biases tend to produce a spuriously U-shaped age trajectory. In contrast, applying our suggested specification to German panel data we find a (nearly monotonic) declining age happiness trajectory.

In this paper, we introduce a new generative model for an active inference account of preparatory and selective attention, in the context of a classic ‘cocktail party’ paradigm. In this setup, two talkers speak simultaneously and an instructive spatial cue directs attention to the left or right talker. We use this generative model to test competing hypotheses about the way that human listeners direct preparatory and selective attention. We show that assigning low precision to words at attended—relative to unattended—locations can explain why a listener reports words from a competing sentence. Under this model, temporal changes in sensory precision were not needed to account for faster reaction times with longer cue-target intervals, but were necessary to explain ramping effects on event-related potentials—resembling the contingent negative variation (CNV)—during the preparatory interval. These simulations demonstrate that behavioural and electrophysiological correlates of voluntary attention emerge from neuronally plausible belief updating or message passing and, crucially, distinguish between the effects of deploying precision in different parts of a generative model.

Background: Based on the idea that music acts as a mnemonic aid, musical mnemonics (i.e., sung presentation of information, also referred to as ‘music as a structural prompt’), are being used in educational and therapeutic settings. However, evidence in general and patient populations is still scarce. We investigated whether musical mnemonics affect working and episodic memory performance in cognitively unimpaired individuals and persons with Alzheimer’s dementia (AD). Furthermore, we examined the possible contribution of musical expertise.Methods: We comprehensively searched the PubMed and PsycINFO databases for studies published between 1970 and 2022. Also, reference lists of all identified papers were manually extracted to identify additional articles. Findings: Of 1,126 records identified, 37 were eligible and included. Beneficial effects of musical mnemonics on some aspect of memory performance were reported in 28 of 37 studies, including nine on AD. Nine studies found no beneficial effect. Familiarity contributed positively to this beneficial effect in cognitively unimpaired adults, requiring more extensive investigation in AD. Musical expertise generally did not lead to additional benefits for cognitively unimpaired participants, but may benefit people with AD. Interpretation: Musical mnemonics may help to learn and remember verbal information in cognitively unimpaired individuals and individuals with memory impairment. Here, we provide a model on the possible underlying mechanisms of musical mnemonics, building on previous frameworks. We also discuss the implications for designing music-based mnemonics.

Decades of psycholinguistic research have attempted to determine whether a “bilingualadvantage” exists for cognitive abilities (e.g., Bialystok & Craik, 2010; Cummins, 1977; for a metaanalysis,see Grundy & Timmer, 2017). More recent work has shifted away from investigating thebroader matter of cognition and working memory to focus on specific domains within those capacities(e.g., Linck et al., 2014). Despite countless studies, however, the existence of thisphenomenon remains unconfirmed. This paper examines evidence for and against the presence of a“bilingual advantage” in multiple tasks of working memory and cognitive control, reviewing studies thatcompare monolingual and bilingual performance. It further looks at populations that are understudied inrelation to these questions (i.e., L2 learners and heritage speakers). Finally, the topic of L2 attrition isdiscussed, alongside a novel perspective that may explain the inconsistencies in bilingual-monolingualcomparisons of performance on cognitive tasks.

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific “historical” way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit‐based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention‐based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members.

Memes are a viral phenomenon in the contemporary digital culture. The modern, digital definition of memes depicts them simply as pictures with texts circulated in social media platforms that tackle a particular issue in a humorous way (Chen, 2012; Rogers, 2014; Shifman, 2014). Due to its growing popularity, memes have been considered as a tool to negotiate cultural-social norms especially among teenagers (Gal, Shifman & Kampf, 2016). However, not much research has been done on memes in relation to other fields. Therefore, it is important to examine how the educational field could benefit from utilizing memes in discourse analysis and English teaching. To be more specific, the study aims at investigating the perceptions of Omani students at Middle East College of the utilizations of memes in the education. The present study seeks to answer the question: how do Omani undergraduate students perceive the use of memes inside the classroom? Primarily, data was collected through observing 29 semester three students in a higher education institute by giving them five different memes to infer their pragmatic meaning. After the observation, a short questionnaire was distributed to students to investigate their perception of memes. The findings revealed that most students were able to infer the pragmatic meanings embedded in memes. In addition, students held positive attitudes towards the use of memes in their study. The paper concluded with some practical implications on the best methods to utilize memes in education, and suggestions for future research. This exploratory study was significant since it contributed more to the body of literature that is done on the field of discourse analysis and memes.

Empathy is usually deployed in social interactions. Nevertheless, common measures and examinations of empathy study this construct in isolation from the person in distress. In this paper we seek to extend the field of examination to include both empathizer and target in order to determine whether and how empathic responses are affected by feedback and learned through interaction. Building on computational approaches in feedback-based adaptations (e.g., no feedback, model-free and model-based learning), we propose a framework for understanding how empathic responses are learned based on feedback. In this framework, adaptive empathy, defined as the ability to adapt one’s empathic responses, is a central aspect of empathic skills, and can provide a new dimension to the evaluation and investigation of empathy. By extending existing neural models of empathy, we suggest that adaptive empathy may be mediated by interactions between the neural circuits associated with valuation, shared distress, observation-execution and mentalizing. Finally, we propose that adaptive empathy should be considered as a prominent facet of empathic capabilities with the potential to explain empathic behavior in health and in psychopathology.

This paper considers the phenomenology of depersonalisation disorder, in relation to predictive processing and its associated pathophysiology. To do this, we first establish a few mechanistic tenets of predictive processing that are necessary to talk about phenomenal transparency, mental action, and self as subject. We briefly review the important role of ‘predicting precision’ and how this affords mental action and the loss of phenomenal transparency. We then turn to sensory attenuation and the phenomenal consequences of (pathophysiological) failures to attenuate or modulate sensory precision. We then consider this failure in the context of depersonalisation disorder. The key idea here is that depersonalisation disorder reflects the remarkable capacity to explain perceptual engagement with the world via the hypothesis that “I am an embodied perceiver, but I am not in control of my perception”. We suggest that individuals with depersonalisation may believe that ‘another agent’ is controlling their thoughts, perceptions or actions, while maintaining full insight that the ‘another agent’ is ‘me’ (the self). Finally, we rehearse the predictions of this formal analysis, with a special focus on the psychophysical and physiological abnormalities that may underwrite the phenomenology of depersonalisation.

In a thought-provoking article, Guy (2013:63) claims that “lectal coherence ... [implies] that variables are correlated; if they are not, the cognitive and social reality of the ‘sociolect’ is problematic.” Considerable linguistic research has established that, for structural reasons, variables are correlated; however, structural correlation does not imply sociolectal coherence. Thus the question arises: do multiple variables cluster or correlate, loosely, tightly, or not at all, based on social factors, such as age, gender, community belonging, salience, prestige/stigma, or other external factors (Guy and Hinskens 2016)? This paper explores the unresolved question of cognitive sociolectal coherence by investigating a panel of 20 speakers of Swabian, a dialect spoken in southwestern Germany, across a 35-year lifespan. The corpus consists of Labovian-style sociolinguistic interviews, and the data comprise 20 phonological and morphosyntactic linguistic features, coded for a binary distinction between the dialect and standard variant. In concurrence with Guy (2013), the findings support the notion that sociolectal coherence is more multi-dimensional than previously believed. However, clear patterns have emerged, indicating that sociolectal coherence may lie in more cognitive constructs such as the type, status, and stigmatisation of the variable itself.

Leading another person’s gaze to establish joint attention facilitates social interaction. Previously it was found that we look back at agents who engage in joint attention frequently and more quickly than agents who display this behaviour less often. However, it is unclear if motor behaviour mim-ics this following behaviour. This paper serves to fill in two knowledge gaps on the topic. Firstly, we examine whether this looking-back behaviour is replicated by a manual response. In an online, eyetracker-free task in which participant were asked to select one of two objects, one robot identity on the screen followed the selection most of the time, whilst the other looked at the other object most of the time. Participants moved back to the robot more quickly if the robot which most of the time followed their movement looked at the same object relative to when it did not. We found no such difference for the robot which most of the time did not follow participants. Secondly, we examined how individual differences in autistic traits and readiness to adopt the intentional stance to-ward artificial agents affect how participants’ behaviour changed over time during the experiment. The results showed that autistic traits influenced participants’ motor responses over time, independent of condition, whereas this response is only sensitive to the intentional stance when the robot usually did not follow the participant’s object selection. Taken together, this indicates that whereas individual differences may not fully predicate reflexive social behaviour, there is a potential overlap between evoked gaze behaviour and manual motor actions.

The transition to parenthood introduces changes in various life domains. In this paper, we examined whether and to what degree the transition to parenthood is related to changes in the importance of major life goals. To do this, we examined the rank-order stability, ipsative stability, and mean-level change in six life goal domains ( achievement, power, variation, affiliation, altruism, and intimacy) in a sample of 248 parents and 294 individuals in a romantic relationship without children across two time points. Overall, we found high rank-order (variable-oriented) and ipsative (person-oriented) stability, and little evidence for mean-level changes in the importance of life goals across the transition to parenthood. However, we found several selection effects suggesting that women without children tended to endorse agentic life goals ( variation and achievement) more than mothers did. Generally, our findings underline the overall stability of life goals and their role as guiding principles in life.

In the first year of life, infants' word learning is slow, laborious, and requires repeated exposure to word-referent co-occurrences. In contrast, by 14-18 months, infants learn words from just a few labeling events, use joint attention and eye gaze to decipher word meaning, and begin to use speech to communicate about absent things. We propose that this remarkable advancement in word learning results from attaining a referential understanding of words-that words are linked to mental representations and used intentionally to communicate about real-world entities. We suggest that verbal reference is supported by codeveloping conceptual, social, representational, and statistical learning capacities. We also propose that infants' recognition of this tri-directional link between words, referents, and mental representations is enabled by their experience participating in and observing socially contingent interactions. Understanding verbal reference signals a qualitative shift in infants' word learning. This shift enables infants to bootstrap word meanings from syntax and semantics, learn novel words and facts from nonostensive communication, and make inferences about speakers' epistemic competence based on their language production. In this paper, we review empirical findings across multiple facets of infant cognition and propose a novel developmental theory of verbal reference. Finally, we suggest new directions of empirical research that may provide stronger and more direct evidence for our theory and contribute to our understanding of the development of verbal reference and language-mediated learning in infancy and beyond. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Contrary to common belief, our preferences do not only shape our decisions but are also shaped by what decisions we make. This effect, known as choice-induced preference change, has been extensively studied in individuals. Here we document choice-induced preference change in groups. We do so by using the choice-blindness paradigm, a method by which participants are given false feedback about their past choices. Participants are given a second round of choices following the choice blindness manipulation´measuring preference change resulting from accepting the manipulation. In Experiment 1 (N=83), we introduce a roommate selection task used in this paper and use it to replicate choice-induced preference change using choice-blindness in individuals. In Experiment 2 (N=160), dyad members made mutual choices in the roommate selection task and then receive either veridical or false feedback about what choice they made. The majority of the false feedback trials were accepted by the dyads as their own choices, thereby demonstrating choice blindness in dyads for the first time. Dyads exhibited choice-induced preference change and were more likely to choose the originally rejected option on trials where they accepted the manipulation compared to control trials. In Experiment 3 (N=80), we show that the preference effect induced by the choice blindness manipulation at the group level does not generalize back to follow up choices made by individual participants when removed from the group. In all studies, response time analyses further support our conclusions. Choice-induced preference change exists for both individuals and groups, but the level at which the choice was made constrains the influence of that choice on later preferences.

Is brain structure related to function? Can one predict the other? These are questions that are still waiting to be answered definitively. In this paper we seek to investigate these questions, in particular, we are interested in the relation between brain structure and theory of mind (ToM). ToM is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to others. Previous studies have observed correlations between performance on ToM tasks, and gray-matter size/volume in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and precuneus (PCu). Despite these findings, there are concerns about false positive results and replicability issues. In this study we used two different tasks to evaluate ToM, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), and the Short Story Task (SST). Performance in these tasks was correlated to brain anatomy measures including voxel-based morphometry (VBM) and cortical thickness (CT) analysis, from ninety-one neurotypical participants. High-resolution structural brain images were acquired, and whole-brain and region of interest (ROI) analyses were implemented. The analyses did not show statistically significant associations between ToM performance and brain structural measures after correction. Significant associations between performance on ToM tests and a widespread array of regions loosely associated with ToM were observed only for whole brain uncorrected analysis (p < 0.001). These results do not replicate a previous study with neurotypical participants. We tested two different ToM tests, two different softwares for VBM and CT, and we used two samples, one with 91 and a sub-sample with 69 participants. Neither of these conditions made a difference in the results obtained. Consequently, these results suggest that if the population is neurotypical and homogenous, it is unlikely that a reliable association between brain anatomy measures and ToM performance, as measured with these tasks, may be found.

When novel stimuli trigger a previously learned response, this can be due to failure to perceive the novel stimulus as different from the trained stimulus (perception), or active extrapolation of learned properties from the trained stimulus (induction). To date, there has been little investigation of how individual differences in perceptual ability relate to differences in induction. In this paper, we perform cluster analysis in six datasets (four published datasets and two unpublished datasets, N = 992 total) to examine the relationship between individual differences in perception and induction, as well as the utility of perception in predicting generalization gradients. The datasets were obtained from predictive learning tasks where participants learned associations between different colored cues and the presence or absence of a hypothetical outcome. In these datasets, stimulus perception and response generalization (expectancy ratings) were assessed in separate phases. Using cluster analyses, we identified similar subgroups of good and bad perceivers in all six datasets, with distinct patterns of response generalization between these subgroups. Based on the differences in stimulus perception, we could predict where across the stimulus range generalized responses would differ between subgroups as well as the direction of the difference. Furthermore, participants classified as good perceivers were more likely to report a similarity generalization rule than a relational or linear rule, providing evidence that individual differences in perception predict differences in induction. These findings suggest that greater consideration should be given to inter-individual variability in perception and induction and their relationship in explaining response generalization.

Although mental imagery is crucial for creativity in many domains, its links with creative abilities are ambiguous. This paper, based on five studies (total N > 3,600), reports the development of the Polish version of the VVIQ-2 (VVIQ-PL), examines its validity and reliability, as well as tests the relationships between mental imagery and creativity. Based on the results of the confirmatory factor analyses, we demonstrated the single-dimensional structure of VIVIQ-PL and measurement invariance concerning participants’ gender. The VVIQ-PL showed excellent test-retest reliability, high internal consistency reliability, and adequate construct validity. As expected, art students were characterized by a higher level of mental imagery than ‘non-artist’ groups. Finally, however, although the vividness of visual imagery turned out to be positively correlated with creativity (creative abilities, creative imagery, and creative self-concept), the strength of these correlations was weak-to-moderate. We discuss these findings alongside future research directions.

Word learning is a crucial aspect of human development that depends on the formation and consolidation of novel memory traces. In this paper, we critically review the behavioural research on sleep-related lexicalization of novel words in healthy young adult speakers. We first describe human memory systems, the processes underlying memory consolidation, then we describe the Complementary Learning Systems account of memory consolidation. We then review behavioural studies focusing on novel word learning and sleep-related lexicalization in monolingual samples, while highlighting their relevance to three main theoretical questions. Finally, we review the few studies that have investigated sleep-related lexicalization in L2 speakers. Overall, while several studies suggest that sleep promotes the gradual transformation of initially labile traces into more stable representations, a growing body of work suggests a rich variety of time-courses for novel word lexicalization. Moreover, there is a need for more work on sleep-related lexicalization patterns in varied populations, such as L2 speakers and bilingual speakers, and more work on individual differences, to fully understand the boundary conditions of this phenomenon.

Are there any moral universals? Theories that view morality as culturally constructed do not necessarily anticipate finding moral universals. Theories that view morality as emerging from a “universal moral grammar” necessarily do. Yet, to date, there has not been sufficient evidence to confidently claim that any part of moral psychology is universal. However, a series of recent studies has shown that adults in over 40 countries use the same (perhaps surprising) moral rule: the “means principle.” Developmental evidence of the early emergence of the means principle would provide additional support that this principle is universal. In this paper, we indeed find that children (N=192 across 2 studies; Mage=5.1 yrs.) use the means principle in their moral judgments. This finding also has important implications for the understanding of moral development; it reveals that children can use an agent’s means, and not just her goal, to make a moral judgment.

Research on cross-linguistic differences in morphological paradigms reveals a wide range of variation on many dimensions, including the number of categories expressed, the number of unique forms, and the number of inflectional classes. However, in an influential paper, Ackerman and Malouf (2013) argue that there is one dimension on which languages do not differ widely: in predictive structure. Predictive structure in a paradigm describes the extent to which forms predict each other, called i-complexity. Ackerman and Malouf (2013) show that although languages differ according to measure of surface paradigm complexity, called e-complexity, they tend to have low i-complexity. They conclude that morphological paradigms have evolved under a pressure for low i-complexity. Here, we evaluate the hypothesis that language learners are more sensitive to i-complexity than e-complexity by testing how well paradigms which differ on only these dimensions are learned. This could result in the typological findings Ackerman and Malouf (2013) report if even paradigms with very high e-complexity are relatively easy to learn, so long as they have low i-complexity. First, we summarize a recent work by Johnson et al. (2020) suggesting that both neural networks and human learners may actually be more sensitive to e-complexity than i-complexity. Then we build on this work, reporting a series of experiments which confirm that, indeed, across a range of paradigms that vary in either e- or i-complexity, neural networks (LSTMs) are sensitive to both, but show a larger effect of e-complexity (and other measures associated with size and diversity of forms). In human learners, we fail to find any effect of i-complexity on learning at all. Finally, we analyse a large number of randomly generated paradigms and show that e- and i-complexity are negatively correlated: paradigms with high e-complexity necessarily show low i-complexity. We discuss what these findings might mean for Ackerman and Malouf’s hypothesis, as well as the role of ease of learning versus generalization to novel forms in the evolution of paradigms.

The epidemiology of cognitive development is an approach essentially based on large observational studies, which examines individual differences in cognitive abilities throughout childhood and their determinants. Although different in terms of methodology and main interests from developmental psychology, cognitive epidemiology offers complementary viewpoints on cognitive development and addresses fundamental research questions of interest to developmental psychologists. The present paper depicts the contributions of the epidemiological approach to the field of cognitive development and highlights the methodological advances that have made such contributions possible. We discuss the stability and developmental trajectories of cognitive functions, their main predictors, the complex interplay between environmental and genetic predictors, and the relationships between the different domains of cognition from birth to adulthood.

Symmetrical bifactor models are frequently applied to diverse symptoms of psychopathology to identify a general P factor. This factor is assumed to mark shared liability across psychopathology dimensions and mental disorders. Despite their popularity, however, symmetrical bifactor models often yield anomalous results, including but not limited to non-significant or negative specific factor variances and non-significant or negative factor loadings. To date, these anomalies have often been treated as nuisances to be explained away. In this paper, we demonstrate why these anomalies alter the substantive meaning of P such that it (1) does not reflect general liability to psychopathology and (2) differs in meaning across studies. We then describe an alternative modeling framework, the bifactor-(S − 1) approach. This approach avoids anomalous results, provides a framework for explaining unexpected findings in published symmetrical bifactor studies, and yields a general factor with well-defined meaning across studies. We present an empirical example to illustrate these points and provide concrete recommendations to help researchers decide for or against a specific variant of bifactor structures. In summary, bifactor-(S − 1) models provide an approach to answer questions posed in symmetrical bifactor models in a more comparable and replicable manner.

Individual differences in repetition priming is an often-overlooked area of research. The importance of this neglect becomes evident when considering the criticisms that priming research has received in the last decade concerning reliability. The current researched aimed to investigate whether individual differences in working memory capacity and affective states have differential effects on lexical-semantic repetition priming outcomes based on whether participants were first or second English speakers. Using logistic mixed-effects models to account for subject variation, the current paper investigated a three-way interaction between working memory capacity, negative affect score, and language on repetition priming outcomes. The results indicate that a statistically significant three-way interaction exists. We present an argument which posits that an individual’s primary language and subsequent familiarity with the primed concepts, in conjunction with individual differences in working memory capacity and mood, plays an important role in determining the most effective strategy used to complete a word-stem completion task.

Objective The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (SMIS) was developed by Aquino and Reeds with the purpose of measuring how people evaluate their private (Internalization subscale) and public (Symbolization subscale) moral identity. SMIS has become commonly and broadly used in many studies. The aim of this paper is to validate the Polish version of SMIS by analyzing its structure and relation to similar measures (such as The Moral Self-Concept Scale developed by Stake and The Moral Self-Image Scale created by Jordan, Leliveld and Tenbrunsel), declared past prosocial behaviors and readiness to donate money. Methods The translation-back-translation procedure was used to maintain semantic, idiomatic, and conceptual equivalence of the original scale. Throughout four separate studies the psychometric properties of the Polish version of the scale were assessed: Study 1 (N = 529) was carried out to derive the factor structure using the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and cross-validate it; Study 2 (N = 602) and Study 3 (N = 899) were performed to confirm and replicate the structure with the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA); gender-balanced Study 4 (N = 862) was conducted to assess measurement invariance over gender using multigroup CFA, and to normalize the scale. Validity of the scale was assessed based on each study. Results A stable two-factor structure using 10 items was replicated in four different samples. The results showed that reliability (α) was between 0.71 and 0.81 for Internalization, and 0.76 and 0.81 for Symbolization. Validity was confirmed in terms of the expected pattern of correlations with morality measures and factorial structure. Metric invariance across gender was confirmed with possible exception of factor loadings on two items regarding communication of values. Polish normalization for men and women was constructed. Conclusions Polish validation of SMIS proved to be a structurally consistent and valid measure.

It is currently difficult to test the validity of existing explanations for the emergence of context-dependent preference reversals. This is because these explanations are generally placed at the level of the process of evidence accumulation, and across experimental paradigms, this process is unobservable. In this paper, we propose a new experimental paradigm for eliciting preference reversals, wherein the process of evidence accumulation is significantly observable. Over a series of experiments, we successfully induce preference reversals for arbitrary stimuli by showing participants sequences of stimuli comparisons with pre-determined outcomes. Our findings partially support the view that context-sensitive assimilation of a history of ordinal comparisons is sufficient to explain classic context effects.

This paper introduces key concepts for studying intraindividual variability in narratives (narrative IIV). Narrative IIV is conceptualized in terms of sources of within–person variation (events and audiences) and dimensions of variation (structural and motivational/affective dimensions of narratives). Possible implications of narrative IIV for well–being and self and social development are outlined. Considering narrative IIV leads to complexity in both theory and method, raising the issue of whether some avenues might be more productive than others. Using previously collected data, we sought to evaluate the research potential of different indices of narrative IIV ( n = 106 participants; n = 1272 narratives). All analyses were preregistered: doi: 10.17605/OSF.IO/SXV4W . Findings show that narrative IIV is distinct depending on source and dimension, replicating previous work. However, narrative IIV was largely unrelated to the measures of well–being and self and social development used in the present study. These findings support the practice of aggregating across narratives in existing research, at least for these outcomes and sources of variation, and provide important guidance for investigators who remain interested in the possible insights that narrative IIV may reveal about the person. © 2020 European Association of Personality Psychology

Various cultural and emotional preferences delineate human creativity. One such set of preferences, literary inclination, impacts not only the books people choose to read but also on the way they perceive the narrative and human relationships contained within. Understanding the overall development of a plot and the evolution of relationships among different characters has significant implications for holding the reader’s attention. In this paper, we establish a computational means to derive progressions and associations among characters in a given narrative. We use two books from different cultural traditions (American popular literature and Indian Marathi literature) to validate this technique. For purposes of measuring relationships progression between different characters, we propose the Graphical Association Method (GAM). Further analysis of changes in these imaginary social relationships in relation to a reader’s literary inclinations demonstrates that this method holds promise for a more general analysis of narrative structure.

Imagining future events is a crucial cognitive process in adaptation, but impairments have been identified in a range of mental disorders. Taking a functional approach to future thinking, this paper reports on the development and deployment of a scale to assess the frequency of self-reported functions of future thinking: The Functions of Future Thinking Scale (FoFTS). In Study 1 (N = 565) items were developed and subjected to exploratory factor analysis. Ten factors were extracted representing distinct purposes of future thinking: Boredom Reduction, Death Preparation, Identity Contrasting, Negative Emotion Regulation, Social Bonding, Goal Setting, Planning, Problem-Solving, Decision-Making, and Positive Emotion Regulation. Construct, convergent and divergent validity were established. The FoFTS predicted unique variance in transdiagnostic variables even after accounting for frequency, attitudes, and clarity of future thought. In Study 2 (N = 467), confirmatory factor analysis showed the 10-factor FoFTS model was an excellent fit to the data. In Study 3 (N = 106) it was shown that participants with probable major depression, relative to non-depressed participants, reported a significantly different profile of future thinking for different purposes. In conclusion, the FoFTS can be used to examine future thinking from a functional perspective and may help enrich models of psychopathology.