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Le Protocole I additionnel aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 est un produit du milieu des années 70. Il reflète l'esprit de l'époque: l'atmosphère de confrontation de la guerre froide; la défiance ressentie vis-à-vis de l'Ouest par un «tiers-monde» soudain sûr de lui et temporairement uni; la tendance, au sein d'une majorité inébranlable dans les organisations et les enceintes internationales, à ne faire preuve d'aucune tolérance à l'égard des voix dissidentes d'une minorité importante et influente; enfin, le sacrifice cynique du bon sens (et du bon droit) sur l'autel de l'opportunisme politique.

Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 is a product of the mid-1970s. It reflects the then-prevailingZeitgeist: the confrontational mentality of the Cold War; the defiance of the West by a suddenly assertive and temporarily united “Third World”; the tendencies on the part of an entrenched majority in international organizations and forums to show no tolerance for the dissenting voices of a large and influential minority; and the cynical sacrifice of good sense (and good law) on the altar of political expediency.

El Protocolo adicional I a los Convenios de Ginebra de 1949 es un producto de mediados de los años setenta. Refleja el espíritu de la época que predominaba entonces: la mentalidad de confrontación de la guerra fría; el desafío a Occidente por parte de un «Tercer Mundo» repentinamente asertivo y temporalmente unido; las tendencias de una mayoría inamovible en organizaciones y foros internacionales, intolerante frente a las opiniones discrepantes de una gran minoría influyente; y el cínico sacrificio del sentido común (y del derecho bien fundado) en aras de la conveniencia política.Muchos de los entonces expertos en derecho internacional humanitario, habiendo dedicado mucha energía a elaborar trabajosamente el texto del Protocolo, antes y después de las difíciles sesiones de la Conferencia Diplomática de los años 1974–1977, se engañaban a sí mismos creyendo que el proceso de elaboración de leyes había concluido finalmente y que todo el mundo viviría feliz con los resultados. Evidentemente, era un cuento de hadas. Por regla general, los cuentos de hadas finalizan con las alentadoras palabras, «los protagonistas vivieron felices». Pero, la vida real comienza precisamente donde termina el cuento de hadas. La cuestión fundamental es saber cómo los protagonistas consiguen vivir tras los festejos. En las relaciones internacionales, el aspecto clave de la elaboración de tratados es la aplicación. Y, desde el punto de vista de la aplicación, evaluada a la luz de veinte años de experiencia, es evidente que el Protocolo ha sido un fracaso.

The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was indubitably right when he stated: The duties and rights of States are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them.That is to say, in actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and collectively. In other words, the individual human being is not merely the object of international law, but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international corporate entity.

MOST international rights are conferred by international law on corporate entities. First and foremost among these entities are States, but international rights are also enjoyed (when certain conditions precedent are met) by international organisations 1 as well as by political units (such as colonies or protectorates) which are actually States in statu nascendi.2 Corporate entities benefit from a legal personality, yet, of course, they do not exist in reality. If we pierce the corporate veil of the legal personality, we find behind it the physical personalities of human beings serving as organs of the States or the other entities. Indirectly, therefore, State rights are human rights. In the final analysis, human beings are the subjects of all international rights. This, however, is not what is meant when we refer to international human rights. The rights which we have in mind are exceptional within the international legal system. They are accorded to human beings directly, without the interposition of the legal personality of a corporate entity. International law thereby protects the interests of the human being as such, and in fact protects them vis-a-vis a corporate entity, namely, the State. Human rights imply corresponding duties which devolve on States: direct rights of human beings infer limitations on the powers of States. Any subject-matter which comes within the ambit of international human rights is automatically excluded from the domain reserved for the domestic jurisdiction of States.

Aircraft hijacking projects a vexing problem of criminal jurisdiction. In order to comprehend the ramifications of the problem fully let us take a model case. Suppose that the control over a commercial aircraft—registered in Brazil and leased to an Israeli airline—is forcibly seized, in the course of flight over France, by an Arab nationalist who is a citizen of Jordan, and the aircraft is hijacked to Algeria. The act described is an international offence, as defined by Article 1 of the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft: Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act commits an offence (hereinafter referred to as ‘the offence’).