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The Management Organization Review ‘Forum on Resilience’ was kicked off by the editors’ perspective on the lingering new normal (Välikangas & Lewin, 2020). We conclude the forum by reflecting on the persisting – perhaps hopeful, perhaps disturbing – take-aways. Not surprisingly, some companies have demonstrated resilience capabilities in quickly seizing opportunities even when faced with what initially looked like the end of business. Such determined agility represented, for example, improvising an emergent-opportunity-fitting strategy or it may have been manifested by government action (e.g., China, New Zealand, and Finland). Most famously, Zoom, the by-now ubiquitous video communications company, benefited from being in the right place at the right time, but also effectively dealt with issues such as ‘zoom bombing’, a security breach, including an upgrade of its encryption. Such successful growth strategy requires being ready for an opportunity. But the backward-looking depiction of successes also highlights the absence of a developed science of organization design underlying resilience and management practices (Lewin & Välikangas, 2020). In addition, building cognitive and stakeholder preparedness, as Zhang, Dong, and Yi (2020) and Liu and Yin (2020) point out, may be important, as well as considering leadership implications discussed by Giustiniano, Cunha, Simpson, Rego, and Clegg (2020) in the context of coping with the paradoxes unleashed by resilience. Emergency management systems become sorely tested (Cai & Ye, 2020). Do we have a new buzzword for uncertain times (Cai, 2020) or something to learn from that will help in coping with future crises or understanding the renaissance of resilience? Some themes rise above others.

For a long time, we too have been talking about ... enlisting private enterprise in the solution of our great social problems, about profi ts as the great motive power of our fantastically productive economy. What many of the black militants now are saying, in eff ect, is this: We believe you, and now we want a chance to apply those same principles in our own communities. Our reply should not be to reject this request, but to seize upon it—and to respond to it. —Richard Nixon on Black Enterprise, “Bridges to Human Dignity: A Nationwide Radio Address,” April 25, 1968

This article will give an overview of the compilation process of a Caribbean Multilingual Dictionary by describing the work of the Caribbean Multilingual Lexicography Project at the University of the West Indies at Cave Hill. The work involved, namely, the compilation of the first volume of the Caribbean Multilingual Dictionary (CMD) of Flora, Fauna and Foods (in English, French, French Creole and Spanish) is deemed to be pertinent to the development of research skills in the field of dictionary-making and provides insights into some of the problems faced by the Caribbean multilingual dictionary-maker in the chronicling of the Caribbean environment. In addition, the article also lists the wide range of users at which the CMD is aimed and illustrates its value to Caribbean systems, such as the regional education system, sectors such as the private enterprise, trade and tourism sectors and individual researchers as well as the general Caribbean public, the Caribbean diaspora in North America and Britain, and the French- and Spanish-speaking countries of the European Union.

Is China now reverting to its earlier business traditions? In the last decade, with the so-called “deepening” of the economic reforms in China, the non-state sector, led by a new breed of entrepreneurs too young to have known the pre-liberation days, has come to the fore and grown in size, both absolutely and relatively.

A report on independent ELT undertakings in the world's most populous country. The teaching of English as a foreign language in China has expanded rapidly in the last two decades. In colleges all over China, from key universities to small provincial institutions, non-English majors have to study English for at least two years and they have to pass the College English Test (CET) Band 4 before they can get their graduation certificates. In the year 2000, over 3.5 million candidates sat for the CET in the summer.

The physical forms of England's inter-war suburbs are examined, concentrating on those created by private enterprise. Attention is given to the contrasts between inter-war suburbs and those created before the First World War, and the timing of the adoption of architectural styles and other aspects of built form characteristic of the inter-war period is considered. In places, houses in Edwardian styles continued to be built well into the inter-war period. The dominant characteristic of the period was the creation of garden suburbs. The Tudor Walters Report was more an endorsement of such suburbs than a stimulus to them and many of its recommendations were not adhered to.

One of the firmest popular conceptions of the Soviet Union in the United States is of a system diat categorically banned private enterprise. Embraced by specialists and the general public alike, this conception reflects the official Soviet stance diat the private sector was eradicated during losif Stalin's “great break” of 1929-30. Indeed, over the course of diose two years, individual peasants were compelled to collectivize, private stores forcibly shut, private manufactures socialized, and even doctors and dentists pressured to cooperate or to close shop. The concept of an interdiction against all private economic activity found support in the words of the dictator–Stalin's assertions that the Soviet Union was a society “without capitalists, small or big,” that socialist, not capitalist, property was the “foundation of revolutionary legality,” and many other statements of a similar ilk. Stalin proved his commitment to this model by his readiness to resort to coercion against its violators: at his instigation, repressive laws threatened entrepreneurs with five to ten years in prison camp for profitable private business. Such developments appeared as unequivocal as they proved lasting; when commentators discussed perestroika in the late 1980s, the only historical precedent they could identify was Lenin's New Economic Policy six decades before.

This article explores the origins and development of the Kuomintang (KMT, the Chinese Nationalist Party) party's enterprises in Taiwan. Because the KMT party's enterprises are categorized in the private sector in all the statistical data, we should be very careful when we discuss the contributions of private enterprise to economic growth in Taiwan.This article aims to inspect the scale of the party's enterprises, the reasons why KMT runs its own enterprises, and what influence they exert on the economic growth and political democratization of Taiwan. Obviously, these questions are significant for further economic and political reforms in Mainland China.

This paper examines the relationship of the Rio de Janeiro Tramway, Light and Power Company and the municipal council in the provision of streetcar services in Rio de Janeiro, 1903–1920. Using archival materials collected in Brazil and Canada, it demonstrates that the utilities company lost the contest for control of Rio de Janeiro's mass transit system to the municipal authorities. Although it had the advantages of capital, technology and skill, this Canadian enterprise did not dictate its demands to an acquiescent municipal council. Rather, the municipal council and prefecture managed to extract an expensive streetcar system from the company to service its growing city.

Most studies have concentrated on the Muslim League's political activities and objectives. It is generally believed that it lacked a distinctive economic programme and unequivocally favoured private enterprise. The radical economic ideas produced by its Punjab and Bengal branches are attributed to a handful of activists who received short shrift from the High Command. The League's stance is thus contrasted with the Congress which addressed economic issues from a largely Socialist perpective.

In May 1992, Pedro Collor de Mello accused his brother and then-president of Brazil, Fernando Collor de Mello, of involvement in an extensive corruption scheme operated and directed by his former campaign manager, Paulo César Farias. Pressured by opposition forces, the Brazilian Congress set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the widely publicized charges. Despite a combination of both passive resistance and active harassment on the part of government, the commission began a searching probe into Farias' diverse and shady dealings. Following leads uncovered by investigative journalists, the commission found conclusive evidence that Farias had, indeed, paid for many of the president's personal expenses, up to and including a $2.5 million landscaping job for the Collor mansion grounds. Much of this money came from the private enterprise sector in return for favors, like government contracts, which Farias was able to obtain by using his influence with the Collor administration.

This paper examines some of the main arguments relating to the effect of privatisation on efficiency. It is concerned with both narrow economic issues and wider political issues. After a critical examination of some theories, which assert that private ownership is intrinsically more efficient than public ownership, it is argued that for large scale enterprise there are no strong economic reasons for believing in the superiority of private enterprise. As long as the government in question has the will and the power to make a public enterprise function in a socially efficient fashion, the public enterprise may be just as efficient as private enterprise whilst offering additional economic and social advantages.

The kingdom of Dahomey is often presented as the classic instance of the operation of a royal monopoly of the Atlantic trade in West Africa. Detailed study establishes, however, that there was never any such royal commercial monopoly in Dahomey, although there were attempts to establish such a monopoly in the 1780s and in the 1850s. The kings of Dahomey enjoyed a number of commercial privileges, and controlled the distribution of the war captives taken by the Dahomian army, but they were never the sole sellers of slaves. There was always an important group of private merchants in Dahomey, who were mainly concerned with marketing the slaves imported into the kingdom from the interior. The replacement of the slave trade by the palm oil trade in the nineteenth century strengthened the position of the private merchants, since they were able to move into the production of oil as well as marketing it. The kings of Dahomey also engaged in the production of oil for export, but were not able to establish as complete control of the production of oil as they had exercised over the ‘production’ of slaves.

In the past decade or so there have been several critical revisions of the long-accepted view of the important role of the state in Japan's economic development and programme of modernization generally. Professor Harry Oshima has attempted to demolish the argument that the Meiji governments' policies were at all economically beneficial. On the contrary, he has said, those policies retarded growth, particularly through their neglect of agriculture. Professor Hugh Patrick has cautioned us against giving the Meiji governments too much credit for the development of the banking system. Private enterprise, he has insisted, was also important. Most recently, Professor Kozo Yamamura has delivered yet another broadside against what he considers the myths of Japanese economic history. This time he criticizes the view that the government, by intervening and pioneering model plants, played a significant role in Meiji Japan's industrial dcvelopment.

Multinational private enterprise is perhaps the most prominent transnational organization active in world politics today. Increasing attention has been paid to the challenge to state sovereignty posed by multinational enterprise, either as an autonomous actor or as an instrument in interstate conflict. This question is of particular relevance to Canadian-American relations, because of the central role of foreign-owned (and especially American-owned) firms in the Canadian economy. This essay assesses the impact on the host Canadian government of the 27 identifiable cases of politicized conflict that have been generated in Canada by the activities of United States-owned multi-national enterprise from 1945 through 1971, and which are publicly known to have occurred.

The establishment of marketing boards in British West Africa in the 1940s was heralded at the time as a drastic, perhaps revolutionary change in the produce trade. The political implications were undoubtedly great: public enterprise (the marketing boards) had replaced private enterprise (a number of trading companies), and the ongoing debate on their relative merits made a colourful excursion to West Africa in the 1950s because this region offered a clear-cut case for comparison.1 The differences between the organisations were thus inevitably highlighted.

In 1874 a handful of men met in the Ukrainian town of Khar'kov to establish what eventually became the Association of Southern Coal and Steel Producers. The organization's birth corresponded with that of the great Donbas coal and steel industry, and its story illuminates the exhilaration and the frustration of those who aspired to create an industrial Russia with a liberal face. The association grew prominent over the next forty years, guided by a unique group of men who advocated speedy economic modernization for their country and who embraced such imported liberal visions as private enterprise and individual liberty.

From an examination of the available data it appears that the present Workmen's Compensation system in the United States is providing a deprivation livelihood for the work-injured and their survivors and is failing to meet its objectives as a service delivery system because it results in a gross misallocation of public costs. It is not providing coverage at all to many workers most exposed to industrial injury and is not getting benefits to an important proportion of those entitled to them. At the same time, it is providing dependable but undisclosed profits to private insurance carriers.

In 1930, Congress passed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, the last of the major tariff bills that redistributed millions of dollars from consumers to domestic manufacturers. The Smoot-Hawley bill, E. E. Schattschneider observed, arose not from a process that was open and attentive to all but from “a free private enterprise in pressure politics which administered itself”, a process accessible only to protected industrialists and their congressional and bureaucratic allies. The outlines of public policy, he concluded, mirrored the membership of this “private enterprise”: “The nature of public policy is the result of ‘effective demands’ upon the government”.

In 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende, presidential candidate of theUnidad Popularcoalition, won a plurality — but not a majority — of votes from the Chilean electorate. Consequently, and in accord with Chilean electoral laws and constitution, the Chilean Congress was called upon to vote for the president, and it selected Dr. Allende as the country's new president. Soon thereafter a wave of opposition to his administration developed among business and middle-class sectors: Rightist political movements and parties, entrepreneurial associations, some white-collar unions, as well as groups representing both commercial interests and those of small business. Eventually this opposition determined that “the government of Allende was incompatible with the survival of freedom and private enterprise in Chile, (and) that the only way to avoid their extinction was to overthrow the government” (Cauce, 1984).

Malaysia's planning organization has become the institutional centrepiece of that country's development effort. Indeed, Malaysia ranks as one of the non-Communist developing countries where planning is most highly institutionalized. Malaysian planning evolved as an effective policy mechanism for directing the authoritative allocation of public resources towards declared developmental objectives. Despite this attachment to national planning, Malaysia remains a staunchly market-oriented, open, and predominantly private enterprise economy. Nevertheless, as the role of planning expanded, private sector activity became increasingly subject to policy interventions predicated upon the politically-determined goals of development planning.

After unsuccessful introductions of reindeer into Canada during the early decades of this century, a herd brought from Alaska in 1935 was maintained successfully under government management (latterly under the Canadian Wildlife Service) for almost 40 years in the Mackenzie Delta region, Northwest Territories. Sold in 1974 into private ownership, the herd has since increased substantially in size; new management techniques have been developed to herd, handle and slaughter the animals. Meat, antlers in velvet and skins are the main products of a small but profitable local industry under native ownership. Currently numbering some 16 000 animals, the herd now justifies new management decisions affecting its future size and the scope of the enterprise.

Clearly, private business is but one agent for the diffusion of technology. Yet it is an important one. In the normal pursuit of business, technological knowledge and skills pass over political boundaries and private enterprise takes part in the international diffusion of technology. In this paper I want to try to delineate the means by which private companies have shared in the international diffusion of technology in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I will note briefly the “imitation lag” and then what I want to call the “absorption gap.” From generalizations, I will turn to some explicit examples and analysis. Finally, in conclusion, I want to return to my concept of the absorption gap and the role of private enterprise in bridging that gap.

In January, 1926, Major Buchanan gave a lecture before this Society on the Schneider Trophy Race for 1925. He then gave a very complete history of the race and full information about the machines up to that period. I propose to give a brief description of the development which has taken place since then in the design of British high–speed seaplanes.After the failure of the British team to win the race in America in 1925 it was brought home to all interested that our machines were a long way inferior to the American machines, and that if we wished to again hold our own in this important field of aviation we should have to treat the matter much more seriously. Furthermore, it became obvious to all that machines could no longer be entered for these races by private enterprise. It is true that the Air Ministry had loaned the machines for the race, but very little opportunity had been given for research and experimental work, and the engine designers and aircraft designers had been working independently.

The paper is based upon research over a rather long period into the public activities in railroad construction in the southern states. Table I-A presents a quantitative summary of public contributions in cash, bonds, and other securities; government-endorsed bonds; remission of Federal import duties; and estimated realized values of Federal land grants prior to 1861. It represents an attempt to give a preliminary summary of the public effort. The estimates on public land grants are tentative, and other items are subject to further refinements through additional studies. It does not represent the total of the public effort, since no account is taken in this summary of the investment values of the many important public and quasi-public contributions in services, the uses of public streets and other properties, tax exemptions, and banking privileges. An adequate appraisal of these must await further research. The summary does reflect, however, some of the outstanding features of the public railroad-building effort, which will supply a useful background for the consideration of the main problem of this paper.

The twenty-first British Commonwealth Lecture, “Private Enterprise in British Air Transport”, was given before the Society by F. A. Laker, ARAeS, on 14th October 1965 in the Lecture Theatre, 4 Hamilton Place, London W.1. The Chair was taken by the President, Sir George Gardner, KBE, CB, HonDSc, BSc, HonFRAeS. Introducing the Lecturer, Sir George said that after a brief start in automobile engineering, Mr. Laker had switched in 1938 to aircraft—with Short Brothers. He thought that Mr. Laker really came into prominence in 1947 when he formed Aviation Traders Ltd, and not long afterwards Air Charter Ltd, which later merged with the Airwork Group. Mr. Laker had kept on expanding his interests and formed British United Airways of which, as they knew, he was Managing Director. Mr. Laker was a qualified pilot, as well as an engineer and flew his own Cessna aircraft round the various bases of his organisation. He was also President of the Society of Licensed Aircraft Engineers and Technologists.

I take it as a truism that for at least the past half century the relations between government and private enterprise in Europe have irregularly evolved in such a manner as to expand the role of government policy and action. Leaving aside the European countries which now have Communist governments and almost wholly socialized economies, this trend has been, in only small part, a matter of conscious or ideological development. Primarily, it has been the consequence of piecemeal adaptation of societies to the specific pressures and problems with which they have been confronted, latterly the problems of world depression, of war, and now of postwar adjustment.

The problem to which this paper addresses itself may be posed as follows: What part in bringing about the phenomenally rapid industrial growth of Germany between about 1890 and 1914 was played by governmental activities; what part was played by the private enterprise of businessmen; and what was the relative importance of each?

The Zurich Association for study in Economic History was founded in 1950 by various trade associations, businessmen, and historians. At the time, Swiss postwar prosperity stimulated considerable discussion of the distribution of wealth and many responsible groups felt further government interference in this matter was probable but unwelcome. Founders of the Association hoped to “regain territory for the idea of private enterprise,” by giving an historical dimension to economic affairs.

The Nebraska public-power paradox is more than a case study of the elimination of private enterprise. It illustrates how, in a seemingly homogeneous economic setting, familiar social, political, economic, and geographic factors can blend uniquely to produce a nonconformist entity, explicable only in terms of its history.

In this country, we are in general agreement that high-level production and employment should be sought for in the framework of a private-enterprise economy. This is specifically acknowledged in the “Full Employment Act” now before Congress, which said in its earliest version under Sec. 2(a): “It is the policy of the United States to foster free competitive enterprise and the investment of private capital in trade and commerce and in the development of the natural resources of the United States.” Declarations to a similar effect are to be found in other parts of the bill.At the present writing, the bill is not yet law, and in what form it may emerge for final vote, if it does emerge, is not clear. There will doubtless be a considerable number of changes, some of them important, but it is not probable that major dependence will be asserted on anything except private enterprise. This position is not merely that reflected in the pending legislation. It accords also with the belief and practice of an overwhelming majority of the people of the country, as is evidenced by political action and by popular polls. Thus we face no practical necessity for defending private enterprise as compared with other forms of economic and political organization.

There has not been an adequate development of systematic programs of salvage archaeology on privately financed construction work. As a consequence, the great majority of building projects are undertaken without any effort being made to save the historic and scientific resources that may be destroyed during the course of construction. Salvage archaeology on privately financed projects is largely restricted to public lands. Because of a favorable industrial and public attitude toward salvage archaeology, this would appear to be an appropriate time to initiate a major campaign to extend salvage programs to other construction operations, particularly those on nonpublic lands. Four specific steps are proposed to expand salvage archaeology into the major unprotected areas.