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ObjectiveOn April 15, 2013, two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) exploded at the Boston Marathon and 264 patients were treated at 26 hospitals in the aftermath. Despite the extent of injuries sustained by victims, there was no subsequent mortality for those treated in hospitals. Leadership decisions and actions in major trauma centers were a critical factor in this response.MethodsThe objective of this investigation was to describe and characterize organizational dynamics and leadership themes immediately after the bombings by utilizing a novel structured sequential qualitative approach consisting of a focus group followed by subsequent detailed interviews and combined expert analysis.ResultsAcross physician leaders representing 7 hospitals, several leadership and management themes emerged from our analysis: communications and volunteer surges, flexibility, the challenge of technology, and command versus collaboration.ConclusionsDisasters provide a distinctive context in which to study the robustness and resilience of response systems. Therefore, in the aftermath of a large-scale crisis, every effort should be invested in forming a coalition and collecting critical lessons so they can be shared and incorporated into best practices and preparations. Novel communication strategies, flexible leadership structures, and improved information systems will be necessary to reduce morbidity and mortality during future events. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2015;9:489–495)

In January 1729 a paper written by James Bradley was read at two meetings of the Royal Society. On a newly discovered motion of the fixed stars, later described as the theory of the aberration of light, it was to transform the science of astrometry. The paper appeared as a narrative of a programme of observation first begun at Kew and finalized at Wanstead, but it was, in reality, a careful reconstruction devised to enhance his reputation in response to a recognition that the programme was initially conducted in terms that were inimical to what he conceived to be his interest. The planned attempt to repeat Robert Hooke's celebrated experiment by James Pound, Samuel Molyneux and George Graham was set up at Molyneux's residence in Kew with James Bradley replacing Pound after his untimely and sudden demise. The unexpected and counterintuitive behaviour of the object star γ Draconis and the eradication of any suspicion of instrumental or systemic error led to the abandonment of the attempt to measure annual parallax and the initiation of new conjectures. An annual nutation was proposed but after the observation of a control star, 35 Camelopardalis, this conjecture was abandoned. Unknown to Bradley and Graham a premature approach was made by Molyneux to Newton claiming that the ‘nutation’ negated the whole of Newton's system. In the abandonment of the nutation yet another conjecture opposed to Newtonian theory was proposed and abandoned. Bradley determined to use his own instrument designed on different principles by Graham to observe the phenomenon in Wanstead. At Wanstead Bradley observed many stars to determine the parameters of the phenomenon. With the law of the motion described, Bradley proposed a hypothesis to explain it. Drawn from his earlier work on the ephemerides of Jupiter's satellites his hypothesis of the ‘new-discovered motion’ was quickly presented to the Royal Society as Bradley was working on a later and more definitive version of his paper. It is this later, third, unpublished version that is commonly referred to throughout this essay. It issued a challenge to ‘anti-Copernicans’ to offer an explanation of the observed phenomenon in geostatic terms. One such astronomer, Eustachio Manfredi, had examined the phenomenon of ‘aberrations’ in detail, the term being his. It was Bradley who first applied the term to the ‘new-discovered motion’ and within a short time ‘aberration’ was being applied by astronomers in the reduction of their observations. Annual aberration was widely accepted as evidence of the motion of the Earth. The paper enhanced Bradley's reputation and projected him into the forefront of European astronomers.

Le but de l'article est d'analyser et de developper les differents choix de strategies utilisees pour eradiquer la pneumonie pleurale bovine, principalement les programmes d'abattage et la vaccination au 19 e siecle en Europe occidentale

The deference shown by English tenant farmers to their landlords was the despair of English radicals in the nineteenth century. This was especially the case for Cobden and Bright, the leaders of the Anti-Corn Law League. As firm believers in Ricardo's theory of rent, according to which only landowners gained from the Corn Laws, they felt that tenant-farmers should have been the natural allies of the League. Unfortunately, they proved unable to convince farmers of this logic. Their attempts to drive a wedge between landlord and tenant remained unavailing – until 1845, when John Bright raised the question of the game laws in the Commons. The select committee that followed tapped a rich vein of farmer resentment and hostility, one that led nowhere at the time but remained to be exploited for the next forty years.

This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty of Peru during the four years between the arrival of Jose de San Martin's invasion force in September 1820 and the battle of Ayacucho of December 1824. It pays particular attention to royalist policy from July 1821, when viceroy Jose de la Serna evacuated Lima, the viceregal capital, leaving the city open to San Martin, who declared independence there on 28 July. Its focus differs, therefore, from that of most previous commentators on Peru's transition to independence, who have tended to neglect royalist policy and activity during these crucial final years in favour of a concentration upon the activities of San Martin, Antonio Jose de Sucre, Simon Bolivar and their Peruvian allies. The article begins with a brief contextual discussion of the historiography of Peruvian independence and subsequently analyses the main features of historical developments in the viceroyalty in the period 1810–20. Following substantive discussion of the period 1820–4, it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in 1822–4.

This article analyses, first, the principal features of Spain's commercial policies towards Spanish America in 1797–1820, and, second, the value, nature and distribution of the trade that survived in this period, despite prolonged international warfare, the admission of neutral shipping, and internal strife from 1808 in both Spain and America. Like the author's earlier studies of ‘free trade’ in the period 1778–96, its principal sources are shipping registers and associated inter-ministerial correspondence in the Archivo General de Indias of Sevilla. Its main conclusions are that: (1) despite ambivalence and uncertainty in Spain about commercial policy, trade with Spanish America was more buoyant in 1797–1820 than previously realised; (2) nevertheless, by the first decade of the nineteenth century most parts of Spanish America were enjoying de facto, if not de jure, free trade with foreigners; (3) consequently, commercial discontent was not a key factor in the process of emancipation from Spain, particularly in the viceroyalties of New Spain and Peru which received some 70% of exports from Spain in this period.

Walking across a Chinese campus with a friend in 2006, we met a Shih Tzu, a breed much favoured by the local teachers (its great feature is that it doesn't bark). Much to my surprise, Shao Peng backed away, muttering imprecations and making negative and ineffectual gestures at the dog. Afterwards he explained that you could not be too careful where dogs were concerned, however harmless they might appear. They might bite, and their bite could give you a horrible disease. Rabies is enzootic in China, but its incidence is negligible in the north where we lived (and the dog was hardly behaving strangely). Reading Mad dogs and Englishmen reminded me of the incident; despite what sometimes seems the authors’ view, it is not just the English who are subject to phobias about this disease (and I remain to be convinced that they are peculiarly attached to dogs). Rabies has always understandably attracted universal horror. While consensus on the need for control and the desirability of eradication can readily be achieved, its variability and uncertainty over the incubation, symptoms and transmission have always resulted in uncertainty and arguments over its incidence and how to meet it. These features figure largely in the excellent overview provided by Pemberton and Worboys of the history of rabies, and of human attitudes to rabies, in England during the past two centuries. They set out to address four main themes: changes in the medical understanding of rabies (primarily in the nineteenth century), the differences between professional and lay understanding, the role of the state in meeting the disease and aspects of the history of dogs in Britain. Their account is particularly good on the manner in which, before the first Reform Act, fears of lower-class upheaval ran parallel with concern over the rabid dogs of the latter. As befits social historians, they are careful not to be judgemental—although some aspects could warrant rather more comment. Thus, late-nineteenth-century control measures exempted foxhounds from muzzling—but not sheep-dogs and other farm dogs. Mad dogs and Englishmen is social rather than medical or veterinary history. Modern findings on the aetiology and pathology of rabies are revealed only near the end, while epidemiology is hardly touched upon (a short article by Henry Carter on ‘The history of rabies’ in volume 9 of Veterinary History, can be recommended in this respect). The authors argue that this allows the reader to “better appreciate past ideas and actions in context” (p. 3), and this may be so. At the same time, it can be frustrating. According to Carter, rabies was always epizootic rather than enzootic in Britain; Pemberton and Worboys offer no opinion, although, if it was so, it represents a critically important context to their story. They do offer a judgement on the efficacy of “muzzling” dogs in eradicating rabies at the turn of the century. It was unlikely to have been as great as claimed by contemporary bureaucrats and politicians: “the muzzle was a cumbersome piece of technology. It was of little use as a restraint on a rabid dog” (p. 162). Further, although the authors do not stress this, eradication was made relatively easy because rabies was not enzootic in Britain, and port controls were likely to be more effective than border controls in continental Europe. Finally, rabies never became enzootic in British foxes, as it did on the continent (that would have posed an interesting conundrum for foxhunting politicians). Strict quarantine may now seem outmoded, but it had its value in the recent past against this zoonosis. A final point: at £45, the publishers should have been able to include a bibliography and avoid the abundance of typographical errors in this book.

It has always seemed anomalous that the world's leading research laboratory into foot and mouth disease (FMD) for most of the twentieth century, the Pirbright Institute, was located in Britain. There was little of a tradition of veterinary research here, while, given the extreme infectiousness of FMD, such a centre seemed incompatible with a long-standing commitment to the prevention of the introduction of FMD into the country (and there were in fact outbreaks traceable to Pirbright). An explanation for this conundrum (concerns over germ warfare in the 1930s led to ample funding from the Ministry of Defence) can be found in the work under review. And Abigail Woods provides cogent explanations for many of the other peculiar features of the struggle against FMD over the 150 years of its incidence in Britain. The most important of these, her central theme, was the manner in which what was for many years regarded as a relatively minor ailment, an occupational hazard of livestock production, became a “plague” from the late nineteenth century, to be “stamped out” whenever it appeared (as it did with frequency). This stress on “stamping out”, on the slaughter of infected and contact stock, was not merely the necessary outcome of scientific or even economic logic, although these played their part. Rather, it was as much if not more the result of an alliance between the official veterinary services, for whom “stamping out” became an article of faith, and a small group of politically influential livestock breeders. Over time, “stamping out” was adopted by the National Farmers' Union even more fervently than by official veterinarians, as was so graphically demonstrated in the epidemic of 2001, despite the costs it imposed on the mass of farmers directly affected by FMD outbreaks. Dairy farmers in Cheshire, so often the epicentre of FMD epidemics, suffered especially, and came to regard FMD as a plague more because of the rigour of control policies than because of the nature of the disease. They occasionally rebelled, but while their protests had no effect, the obeisance paid to exclusion and “stamping out” by veterinary officials could be modified when other economic and political considerations were paramount for their political masters. During the inter-war years, chilled meat from Argentina became identified as the chief source of continuing FMD outbreaks. However, this meat was so substantial a proportion of domestic consumption that its exclusion would have led to a politically unacceptable rise in prices. In these circumstances, as Woods demonstrates, veterinary officials colluded in obfuscating the evidence against Argentine meat in the interest of maintaining an essential source of supply. As is evident from the examples above, this book is “a history of politics, society and knowledge” (p. xvi) in relation to FMD. This makes for a dense text; there is an extraordinary amount of material packed into 151 pages. However, both the context and the results of the intense primary research that inform each episode or theme are presented concisely and with great clarity. Above all, Woods shows that history matters. The disasters of the 2001 FMD epidemic, the focus of the last two chapters, were due in part to inadequate resources and a slow response. As is amply demonstrated here, they were also due to a poor appreciation of the lessons of history, of the manner in which policy needs to be constantly adapted to changing circumstances.

The present study comprises the results of the second stage of a research project into the general question of trade between Spain and its American empire in the period 1778–96. The historiographical context of the project, and the significance of the time scale, were explained in an article published in 1981, which analysed the consequences for Spain's economy, its regions, and its major ports of the greater freedom to export to America provided by the decree of free trade of 1778. Using as its basic source the registers of 3,809 ships which sailed from Spanish ports for America between 1778 and 1796, that work produced the following principal conclusions, (i) Free trade promoted a massive expansion in the value of exports from Spain to America. The rise was uneven, but in the period 1782–96 as a whole their average annual value was 400 % higher than in the base year of 1778. (ii) The share of Spanish products in total exports from Spain to America rose from 38% in 1778 to an average of 52% in 1782–96. (iii) Despite the impossibility of measuring with precision the relative importance of Spanish manufactures and agricultural goods in exports, it seems that agricultural producers were more responsive than industrialists to the wider opportunities in the American market offered by free trade.

It has been traditional for students of the Hispanic world in the eighteenth century to identify the introduction of ‘free trade’ between Spain and her American empire as the cornerstone of the Bourbon programme of economic reform. The reasons which they cite are subsumed with admirable clarity by the preamble to the famous Regiamento para el comercio libre of October 12, 1778 itself: the king was convinced, it explained, that ‘only a free and protected Commerce between European and American Spaniards can restore Agriculture, Industry, and Population in my Dominions to their former vigour.