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In contrast to Western platforms, which are dominated by crowdsourced labour, China's food-delivery platforms rely heavily on outsourced couriers to provide high-quality services. The conflicts emerging from outsourced labour relations have been inadequately examined. Based on extensive fieldwork in south China, this study reveals an intriguing fact: the outsourcing model frequently triggers yet largely conceals couriers' strikes. This study uses the work regime approach and labour bargaining power theory to analyse the complex dynamics created by the platforms. By scrutinizing state institutions, relationships among various organizations and workplace interactions, this study finds that the platform firms have dominant power but that inherent tensions exist between outsourcing platform firms, outsourced agencies, human supervisors and workers, forming a regime that this study calls "contentious despotism." Importantly, labour conflict is alive and potentially enduring in China's gigantic platform economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper augments the DMP model with large firms and intrafirm wage bargaining by an endogenous decision to become an entrepreneur that is based on heterogeneous entrepreneurial abilities. If workers' wage bargaining power is not too large and the match efficiency is not too low, the decentralized market equilibrium features an inefficiently high number of entrepreneurs, because they appropriate large parts of the surplus from matches. A realistic calibration with empirically plausible parameters shows this case to be the relevant one. Consequently, introducing a tax on the profits of entrepreneurs restores the constrained first-best allocation by affecting occupational choices. It drives rather unproductive entrepreneurs out of the market since the marginal entrepreneur is affected and not the average one. Thus, the negative effects on job creation are small. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bismarckian health systems are mainly governed by social health insurers, but their role, status, and power vary across countries and over time. We compare the role of health insurers in three distinct social health insurance systems in improving health systems' efficiency. In France, insurers work together as a single payer within a highly regulated context. Although this gives insurers substantial bargaining power, collective negotiations with providers are highly political and do not provide appropriate incentives for efficiency. Both Germany and the Netherlands have introduced competition among insurers to foster efficiency. However, the rationale of insurer competition in Germany is unclear because contracts are mostly concluded at a collective level and individual insurers have little power to influence health system efficiency. In the Netherlands, insurer competition is substantially more effective, but primarily focused on price and cost containment. In all three countries, the role of insurers has been transforming slowly to respond to common challenges of assuring care quality and continuity for an ageing population. To assure sustainability, they need to ensure that care providers cooperate with the same quality and efficiency objectives, but their capacity to do so has been limited by insufficient support to enforce public information on provider quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What determines the bargaining power of states in international trade negotiations? The literature focuses predominantly on economic strength as the determinant of bargaining power. However, this explanation neglects the reality of modern trade, which is characterized by the globalization of production and high levels of economic interdependence. I argue that this interdependence undermines the effect of economic strength on the bargaining power of states. Specifically, I hypothesize that the effect of economic strength declines when a country's companies rely on inputs for their production from a negotiation partner because they are integrated into global value chains. The more a country's firms are dependent on a partner country, the less that country is able to coerce concessions from the partner country by bringing to bear its economic strength. To test this hypothesis, I use a dataset covering concessions on liberalization of the services sector made by 54 countries in 61 preferential trade agreements. By calculating the relative concessions of each partner, I construct a quantitative indicator of the outcome of trade negotiations. This indicator should reflect the underlying bargaining power of each negotiating party. The results of a regression analysis of these negotiation outcomes mostly support my hypotheses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Europe's aggravating housing crisis lies in the blind spots of law. While central in constructing housing both as a home and as an asset, law bears the task of mediating between housing's multiple - social, economic, and cultural - dimensions. However, inner-legal fragmentation and a legal imaginary of property, the nation state, and its welfare system have depoliticized, deflected and rendered inaccessible the 'housing question'. Turning to tenancy contract law in particular, this article argues that the 'social' orientation of this early example of a 'materialised' field of contract law is not only ill-suited to reflect the recent structural shifts in the housing market brought about through financialisation. Tenancy contract law has effectively taken a conservative drift by claiming to adequately administer the bilateral landlord-tenant relation while being insensitive to macro-level developments. Tenancy contract law reindividualises tenant responsibility in the eye of hardships whose roots lie outside the contractual sphere and thereby furthers, rather than curtails, neoliberal housing policies. As a reaction, the article proposes political economy as a conceptual vantage point from which to develop a 'holistic housing law'. Such a perspective combines a concern for democratic and collective agency with careful attention to law's tacit and technical role in shaping the flow of finance and the techniques of landlords' governmentality. Part of this is a 'transformative tenancy law', to be reformulated to protect not against landlord bargaining power in the first place but against a hegemonic and expansive market rationality that structurally corrupts the social and material meaning of housing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In "Prestige, Manipulation, and Coercion: Elite Power Struggles in the Soviet Union and China after Stalin and Mao," Joseph Torigian examines the dynamics of power struggles in authoritarian regimes. Through case studies of the Soviet Union and China, Torigian argues that leadership prestige and the ability to mobilize coercive agencies were key factors in determining the outcome of power struggles. The book challenges the prevailing focus on formal institutions and coalition formation in the literature on authoritarian politics. While Torigian's analysis is persuasive, some scholars argue that institutions still played a role in these power struggles. The book provides valuable insights but leaves some questions unanswered, such as the role of the police and secret police in post-Mao China. Overall, it is an important work of scholarship for researchers interested in China and the Soviet Union. [Extracted from the article]

We introduce business-to-business (B2B) relationships into an otherwise standard model to revisit two aspects of price dynamics in a unified analysis. On one side, the pass-through of cost shocks to prices is empirically incomplete. On the other side, the literature contains conjectures that long-term relationships may reduce the allocative role of price changes. After a partial equilibrium analysis of these aspects, we consider the general equilibrium effects. The formation of B2B relationships implies that the trade of intermediate goods depends on search, bargaining, and the adjustment along the intensive margin as opposed to the extensive margin. We find that, when this adjustment is costly, retailers have a relatively high bargaining power, and mismatch shocks are possible, the model can account for the second moments of the US producer price index and other variables. In this case, although its allocative role is low, the intermediate goods price affects the allocation of goods through the search externalities and is sufficiently volatile. The analysis includes several sensitivity tests and comparisons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An important field of the political economy literature examines the mechanism of property rights commitments in authoritarian regimes where formal political constraints are absent. While many of the existing studies focus on how domestic autocratic institutions shape the formation of property rights regimes, this paper takes an open-economy approach and examines the compound effect of global economic integration and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) on property rights protection in authoritarian regimes. We propose that the domestic presence of foreign factors of production is positively associated with more credible property rights commitments in authoritarian economies. Moreover, this association is moderated by authoritarian regimes' participation in institutionalized IGOs, which enhance the organizational capacity of these foreign owners of production factors. Through the transnational networks of production integration, international institutions indirectly alter the domestic distribution of bargaining power between the authoritarian government and private economic actors, rendering the commitment to property rights protection more credible. An analysis of a panel dataset consisting of 105 authoritarian regimes yields preliminary evidence supporting our proposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article develops and advances a liberal ideal of equality for evaluating the lawful scope of employer control over employees. It argues that, in addition to attending to discrimination and bargaining power asymmetries, we should ensure that our laws treat workers as the moral equals of their bosses more broadly—as people with equally weighty claims to exercising agency over their own values and lives. To illustrate, the article explains that employer control over workplace expression can preclude colleagues from communicating with each another as moral equals and can compromise employees' abilities to exercise agency over their own characters. It then discusses how our agential interests in workplace expression can guide legal reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores mobilization to reduce the deepest inequalities in the two largest democracies, those along caste lines in India and racial lines in the United States. I compare how the groups at the bottom of these ethnic hierarchies—India's former untouchable castes (Dalits) and African Americans—mobilized from the 1940s to the 1970s in pursuit of full citizenship: the franchise, representation, civil rights, and social rights. Experiences in two regions of historically high inequality (the Kaveri and Mississippi Deltas) are compared in their national contexts. Similarities in demographic patterns, group boundaries, socioeconomic relations, regimes, and enfranchisement timing facilitate comparison. Important differences in nationalist and civic discourse, official and popular social classification, and stratification patterns influenced the two groups' mobilizations, enfranchisement, representation, alliances, and relationships with political parties. The nation was imagined to clearly include Dalits earlier in India than to encompass African Americans in the United States. Race was the primary and bipolar official and popular identity axis in the United States, unlike caste in India. African Americans responded by emphasizing racial discourses while Dalit mobilizations foregrounded more porously bordered community visions. These different circumstances enabled more widespread African American mobilization, but offered Dalits more favorable interethnic alliances, party incorporation, and policy accommodation, particularly in historically highly unequal regions. Therefore, group representation and policy benefits increased sooner and more in India than in the United States, especially in regions of historically high group inequality such as the Kaveri and other major river Deltas relative to the Deep South, including Mississippi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent proliferation of China's railways has posed challenges to the dominance of the national-level railway authority on railway development. Since the 2000s, the planning of new railways has evolved into a politics of scale in which actors across multiple scales of government have bargained over railway alignment and station siting for their respective interests. This politics is shaped by the uneven bargaining powers of the contending state agents over railway planning. Interscalar division of regulatory oversight over strategic resources for railway development enables state agents at some scales to bargain more successfully, whereas variations in administrative and economic standing further differentiate the interscalar bargaining powers of municipal governments. Different results of bargaining across scales for each city have produced, as intercity railway planning in the Pearl River Delta illustrates, significant intercity variations in average travel times to the stations for the new railways that these cities share. Owing to the peculiar scalar distribution of the costs and benefits of the new railways, municipal governments with greater bargaining power have, contrary to traditional wisdom, bargained for less accessibility to intercity railway stations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many developing countries the rural poor often depend on patrons to act as brokers in order to get public provision from the government. The broker facilitates provision in return for securing peasants' votes for politicians. Yet, low bargaining power of peasants allows patrons to appropriate public resources for themselves. I propose increasing peasants' bargaining power by connecting them to markets outside their village. Making use of a natural experiment found in the construction of a motorway in Pakistan, I find public provision to be significantly higher in connected villages when compared to those which are isolated. Moreover, I find that the beneficial impact of connectivity is felt most strongly by the lower classes, who are most vulnerable to exploitation when isolated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the impact of gender differences in the desire for sex and the distribution of power in the household on the onset of the demographic transition and the take-off to growth. Depending on the price and efficacy of modern contraceptives, the gender wage gap, and female bargaining power, the economy assumes one of two possible equilibria. At the traditional equilibrium, contraceptives are not used, fertility is high and education and growth are low. At the modern equilibrium, contraceptives are used, fertility is low and further declining with increasing income, and education and growth are high. The theory motivates a "wanted fertility reversal": At the traditional equilibrium, men prefer more children than women, whereas at the modern equilibrium, men prefer fewer children than women. Female empowerment causes households to provide more education for their children and leads to an earlier uptake of modern contraceptives and an earlier onset of the demographic transition and the take-off to modern growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Unhealthy food and drink consumption is associated with a range of physical and mental health concerns. In response, public health policies have been developed targeting a reduction in obesity in particular. In the present commentary we argue that government-industry partnerships have reduced the effectiveness of resultant policies and explore why.Design: Perspectives of authors.Setting: UK.ParticipantsPopulations in the UK; UK Government.Results: Industry involvement has presented three interrelated challenges for the UK Government: (i) balancing collaboration while maintaining appropriate distance from industry stakeholders; (ii) resultant production of 'watertight' and effective legislation or intervention; and (iii) actual or perceived limited sanctioning or bargaining power.Conclusions: Industry involvement in public health policy making has led to weak action. Support with policy implementation (rather than development) and genuine 'buy-in' from industry could accelerate the pace of public health improvement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We use experimental methods to investigate subsidy incidence, the transfer of subsidy payments from intended recipients to other economic agents, in privately negotiated spot markets. Our results show that market outcomes in treatments with a subsidy given to either buyers or sellers are significantly different from both a no-subsidy treatment and the competitive prediction of a 50% subsidy incidence. The disparity in incidence across treatments relative to predicted levels suggests that incidence equivalence does not hold in this market setting. Moreover, we find no statistical difference in market outcomes when benefits are framed as a "subsidy" versus a schedule shift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a new theoretical framework aimed at understanding the link between technological change, skill premium, and employment. We build an endogenous growth model of directed technological change with vertical research and development (R&D) in which low-skilled workers might be organized in a trade union. This union can act as a monopoly seller of labor and decide unilaterally the low-skilled wage, or as a managerial union that bargains wage and employment with the employers' federation, i.e., firms. Our results suggest that (i) the impacts of trade unions on technological-bias and on the level of (un)employment crucially depend on their type and preferences; and (ii) trade unions can actually increase low-skilled wages and employment if they have some bargaining power and are employment-oriented. Furthermore, our framework provides some highlights to explain the relationship between wage dispersion and the deunionization process that occurred in the United Kingdom and the United States during the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents' electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The farm-gate price of raw milk in Iran is determined annually in negotiations among representatives of dairy processors, milk producers, and government officials. This study estimates the average bargaining power of dairy farmers and processors, through applying the generalized axiomatic Nash approach in a bilateral bargaining model. We employ annual data from 1990 to 2013 to estimate econometric representation of a bilateral bargaining model using a Monte Carlo expectation maximization algorithm. Results imply a higher bargaining power of 0.69 for processors, compared with 0.31 for farmers. This asymmetry of bargaining power causes unequal allocation of gains in the milk market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one broad construal, corruption consists of deriving benefit from power over others in morally objectionable ways. The charge that capitalism is corrupt is usefully understood as a claim that modern capitalist economies inevitably and pervasively generate corrupt gains, in this sense, through conduct that does not transgress capitalist norms for individuals' economic conduct. Modern capitalism has two features that would figure prominently in such an indictment: gains from the inferior bargaining power of most workers and gains from the superior political influence of those in the best economic situations. The taint of corruption should be reduced by political measures that move capitalist commerce toward Adam Smith's commercial ideal of gains from exchanging help for help and that show appreciation of the equal importance of everyone's presumed desire to have a life shaped by directives that he or she willingly accepts. Through such measures, capitalism could, in principle, become non-corrupt. In practice, unequal political influence will prevent this. Ending the corruptness of capitalism is an unattainable yet productive goal of reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though Fumero is quick to recognize that federation failed, she compellingly suggests that unionist politicians envisioned a more inclusive political structure that would shape political ideals in the isthmus in the years ahead. Patricia Fumero Vargas provides an effective isthmus-level analysis of Central America's 1921 centenary celebrations. As Fumero documents, elites increasingly pointed to the restoration of the Federal Republic of Central America as a means of confronting these threats. [Extracted from the article]

Cross-border surrogacy transactions [CBST] entail several risks for the participants and the resulting child and, consequentially, for their states. In the absence of clear standards or coherent legal rules, the global industry depends on private contracts, the result of negotiations between parties from different countries with unequal bargaining power, which distributes risks and benefits unfairly. In this article I suggest a Fair Trade model as an instrument for the regulation of these transactions. The Fair Trade model addresses market failures and the externalization of risks. The basic principles of Fair Trade include trading process according to proper standards of quality and ethics based on a certification mechanism, a minimum price to producers, direct purchasing, transparent rules and fair distribution. In addition to quality and ethics, Fair Trade is a developmental tool, ensuring more of the economic benefits to producers in the global south. Applying these elements on the cross-border surrogacy market can be fruitful for the regulation of risks entailed in CBST. Certification of surrogacy services can ensure proper medical standards and fundamental rights, and decrease health risks; direct purchasing through democratically elected surrogates' co-operatives could improve the surrogates' power of negotiation and decrease contractual risks; a minimum price could guarantee a greater income to surrogates, and social premium could be used to fund communal projects and help surrogates to improve their social position. Finally, transparency can address administrative risks and ensure that children's rights are not violated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents an explanation for the breakdown of dominant party systems. In contrast to previous works that examine how ruling parties lose their dominant position as a result of interparty competition, this paper focuses on how they are undermined from within by factional conflict. Through an overview of dominant party systems in the postwar world, we show that most of the ruling parties suffered from major splits that significantly reduced their electoral strengths before their final electoral defeat. In order to explain why large groups of politicians decide to leave dominant parties that are likely to remain in power, we develop simple game-theoretic models of intraparty bargaining between party factions over the distribution of benefits from office. Our results suggest two mechanisms through which dominant parties break up. First, factional defections from dominant parties are likely to occur when they are experiencing a significant decline in public support. Second, factional defections are likely to occur when a non-mainstream faction is rapidly losing its bargaining power against the party leadership. Importantly, our results show that under certain conditions, dominant parties will break up even when their electoral prospects are much better than the opposition. We briefly discuss how these mechanisms can be applied to actual cases of dominant party systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes North-South negotiations over climate change abatement. We consider that northern countries have an incentive to negotiate over a transfer to the southern countries in exchange for their abatement efforts rather than reducing their emissions at home. We study the incentives for northern and southern countries to form negotiation-coalitions at each side of the bargaining table and the impact of these negotiation-coalitions on the final outcome. We show that the incentives can be separated into direct efficiency gains, as fixed costs savings, and indirect bargaining power gains. Depending on the relative values of these gains, we determine the equilibrium of the game. We also show that bargaining power gains encourage southern countries to negotiate separately while they encourage northern countries to unite, and that this hinders the formation of the grand coalition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper establishes a model for analyzing the dynamics of the host state-international oil company (IOC) bargaining relationship. Theoretically, the model advances our ability to investigate bargaining dynamics between host states, oil companies and other stakeholders in the oil industry. It is a sophisticated mechanism which identifies the complex array of relationships and bargains within which the host state-IOC bargaining relationship is nested. The model builds on and leverages the key contributions of earlier bargaining models. It enables us to integrate relevant ideas from existing scholarship on host state-MNC bargaining while also taking into account other actors and bargains at domestic and international levels that affect bargaining between an IOC and a host state. Practically, the model will help actors choose strategies more systematically, leading to higher relative bargaining power that may translate to preferable bargaining outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]