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In this article, I will argue that various scholars of kalām unanimously agree that sense-perception is something beyond the physical processes in the sense organs. There may be something happening in our eyes when we see a red apple, but seeing a red apple is not tantamount to it. We will see that some scholars of kalām argue that sense-perception is akin to being aware or conscious of the object of perception, and, hence, distinct from the physical process in the sense organs. One group will go so far as to accept that sense-perception is not even dependent on any physical processes in the body. Another group will accept that sense-perception presupposes that various physical conditions obtain, yet still regard sense-perception as something distinct from the occurrence of those conditions. I am suggesting that these nonreductive theories of sense-perception are the reason why Arabic-Islamic philosophers, starting from the eleventh century CE, consistently reject the Aristotelian-Avicennian theory of sense-perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom's notion of material inference and Greg Restall's bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical virtues play an important role in the acceptance and belief of theories in science and philosophy. Philosophers have well-developed views on which virtues ought and ought not to influence one's acceptance and belief. But what do scientists think? This paper presents the results of a quantitative study with scientists from the natural and social sciences and compares their views to those held by philosophers. Some of the more surprising results are: (i) all three groups have a preference order regarding theoretical virtues, making theory choice a much more determinate matter than what has sometimes been suggested; (ii) the preference orders are very similar for the three groups; (iii) simplicity is viewed as an epistemic virtue particularly by social scientists (but not by philosophers); and (iv) syntactic parsimony is preferred to ontological parsimony by all three groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political theory and philosophy need to widen their view of the space in which what matters politically takes place, and I suggest that integrating the conditions of sustainability of all affected—that is, all participants in nature's relations—is a necessary first step in this direction. New materialists and posthumanists have challenged how nature and politics have traditionally been construed. While acknowledging the significance of their contributions, I critically examine the ethical and political implications of their ontological project. I focus particularly on how the decentering of human agency that they advocate for raises a set of concerns that need to be addressed in developing an appropriate ecological ethics. I argue that the latter must be attuned to the vulnerability of living beings who participate in relationships that sustain life on earth. This brings me to conclude that qualitative distinctions between the worlds of bios and techne are necessary. This is because we need to think critically about ways of evaluating types of relationships so that we can assess them and establish which are worth nurturing and protecting and which are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on French philosopher Michel Foucault's contributions to the subject of organizational ethics. It analyzes Foucault's work on control and discipline and also examines later works on ethics. It suggests that Foucault's later works give an important contribution to theories on business ethics, ethical practices, and pedagogy. It claims that Foucault's work offers alternative approaches to the traditional normative ethical theories. It states that by demonstrating the conditions where freedom can be exercised in organizations and by situating ethics as self-practices, Foucault's ethics tries to connect a personal project of self with an understanding and a critique of power.

Ethical theory in business ethics texts lacks sufficient specificity to be used as a tool of analysis. The result is that business faculty do not see the course in business ethics as helpful to their students, and the students do not see the course as helpful in their careers. A further difficulty is the inclusion of material which is not seen by business faculty, as appropriate or germane to the practice of decision-making. Issues such as the legitimacy of the corporation, or capitalism versus Marxism, are of little interest or help to the person in business. Finally, the text cases are too often of a policy nature, and do not deal with issues faced by a majority of those in business. The result is the lack of engaging the moral imagination of the students. Unless the course is redesigned so that it is seen by business faculty as more relevant, it will continue to be required by only a small number of business programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the paper "The Course in Business Ethics: Why Don't the Philosophers Give Business Students What They Need?" by Laurie Pamental in which Pamental discusses the ineffectiveness of business ethics education. Pamental suggests students are frustrated by the presentation of numerous ethical theories that do not apply to real-world situations properly. The author disagrees with Pamental's suggestion that students be presented with a heuristic method to analyze ethical problems and suggests that concepts of the philosopher Aristotle promote the idea that ethical theories are not merely tools to analyze situations but unique ideas on what is good. Pamental suggests that cases presented as examples to students focus on less relevant issues.

The author responds to an article by Hugh Miller regarding business ethics education. He notes Miller's view that ethics educators should present their own theories to students or risk students becoming confused by the number of different ethical theories presented. The author notes how the scientific method requires that theories be modified to fit data but comments that ethics research has no corresponding method to interpret data into theories. He discusses how he encourages students to develop their own ethical viewpoints.

Agreement between "independent" measurements of a theoretically posited quantity is intuitively compelling evidence that a theory is, loosely speaking, on the right track. But exactly what conclusion is warranted by such agreement? I propose a new account of the phenomenon's epistemic significance within the framework of Bayesian epistemology. I contrast my proposal with the standard Bayesian treatment, which lumps the phenomenon under the heading of "evidential diversity." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article proposes a way of understanding Kantianism, act-utilitarianism and some other important ethical theories according to which they are all versions of the same kind of theory, sharing a common structure. I argue that this is a profitable way to understand the theories discussed. It is charitable to the theories concerned; it emphasizes the common ground between them; it gives us insights into the differences between them; and it provides a method for generating new ethical theories worth studying. The article briefly discusses the relationship between these ideas and some other recent proposals that emphasize the common ground between Kantianism and versions of consequentialism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I argue that, in causal inference from many observational studies, the piecemeal collection of data can cause underdetermination, even if arbitrarily large amounts of reliable data are available. Two theorems reveal that, for any variable set V, there are causal theories over V that can be distinguished if and only if all variables are simultaneously measured. These results entail that, a priori, one cannot know which observational studies will be most informative with respect to the true causal theory describing V. Hence, scientific institutions may need to play a larger role in coordinating differing research programs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the role of bridge laws in intertheoretic relations? An assumption shared by many views about these relations is that bridge laws enable reductions. In this article, I acknowledge the naturalness of this assumption, but I question it by presenting a context within thermal physics (involving phase transitions) in which the bridge laws, puzzlingly, seem to contribute to blocking the reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the question of whether we should conceive of mechanisms as productive of change in a regular way. I argue that, if mechanisms are characterized as fully regular, on the one hand, then not enough processes will count as mechanisms for them to be interesting or useful. If no appeal to regularity is made at all in their characterization, on the other hand, then mechanisms can no longer be useful for grounding prediction and supporting intervention strategies. I conclude that, if the New Mechanistic Philosophy is to be successful, a stochastic characterization of mechanisms must be adopted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific realists endeavor to secure inferences from empirical success to approximate truth by arguing that, despite the demise of empirically successful theories, the parts of those theories responsible for their success do, in fact, survive theory change. If, as some antirealists have recently suggested, successful theory parts are only identifiable in retrospect, namely, as those that have survived, then the realist approach is trivialized, for now success and survival are guaranteed to coincide. The primary aim of this article is to counter this argument by identifying successful theory parts independently from their survival. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford's argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue that Stanford does not provide evidence that there are likely scientifically plausible unconceived alternatives to scientific theories accepted now and in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I argue that uneliminated idealizations pose a serious problem for scientific realism. I consider one method for "de-idealizing" models--robustness analysis. However, I argue that unless idealizations are eliminated from an idealized theory and robustness analysis need not do that, scientists are not justified in believing that the theory is true. I consider one example of modeling from the biological sciences that exemplifies the problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific realism is the position that success of a scientific theory licenses an inference to its approximate truth. The argument from pessimistic metainduction maintains that this inference is undermined due to the existence of theories from the history of science that were successful but false. I aim to counter pessimistic metainduction and defend scientific realism. To do this, I adopt a notion of success that admits of degrees and show that our current best theories enjoy far higher degrees of success than any of the successful but refuted theories of the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to analyze the role of the distinction between principle and constructive theories in the question of the explanatory power of special relativity. We show how the distinction breaks down at the explanatory level. We assess Harvey Brown's claim that, as a principle theory, special relativity lacks explanatory power. We argue that this claim is based on an unrealistic picture of the kind of explanations provided by principle (and constructive) theories. Finally, we argue that the structural account of explanation captures the explanatory success of special relativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article encourages the use of explicit methods in linguistics by attempting to estimate the size of a linguistic data set. Such estimations are difficult because redundant data can easily pad the data set. To address this, I offer some explicit operationalizations of the data and their features. For linguistic data, negative associations do not indicate true redundancy, and yet for many measures they can be mathematically impossible to ignore. It is proven that this troublesome phenomenon has positive Lebesgue measure and is monotonically increasing and that these two features hold robustly in four different ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the theory of composite substances of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, an orthodox school composed of philosophers of Indian thought. It compares the theory with Aristotle's definition of a substance as expressed in his "Categories" as well as the theory's advantages over the latter. It explores several concepts of the theory, such as category inherence. It also discusses the evanescence objection on the theory and the modification made to such theory.

The article focuses on the propositions derived from multilevel theory which offer ways to develop an understanding of how employee overqualification impacts an organization, as reflected in the analysis of B. Erdogan and colleagues. It says that the results of overqualification should be evaluated at multiple levels of analysis, along with the overqualification itself. It cites that the moderators of the relationships between overqualification-outcome should be measured at multilevel approach.

This article discusses L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being as authentic happiness. I distinguish between extreme and moderate versions of subjectivism and argue that Sumner's characterization of the conditions of authenticity leads him to an extreme subjective theory. More generally, I also criticize Sumner's argument for the subjectivity of welfare. I conclude by addressing some of the implications of my arguments for theories of well-being in philosophy and welfare measurement in the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the philosophical conceptions of knowledge and beliefs. It connotes the epistemological and ethical theories of beliefs and notes the reliabilism of these lores. It cites the conflict of ideas between acts and beliefs, in terms of analogy. Moreover, the value cited over the possession of beliefs, is also mentioned.

In his landmark paper, 'The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories', Michael Stocker introduces an affliction that is, according to his diagnosis, endemic to all modern ethical theories. Stocker's paper is well known and often cited, yet moral schizophrenia remains a surprisingly obscure diagnosis. I argue that moral schizophrenia, properly understood, is not necessarily as disruptive as its name suggests. However, I also argue that Stocker's inability to demonstrate that moral schizophrenia constitutes a reductio of modern ethical theories does not rule out the possibility that he has identified a noteworthy psychological phenomenon. Stocker is, in my opinion, correct to note that balancing our broad ethical obligations with authentic personal motives is a non-trivial psychological challenge, even if this challenge is not equivalent to a mental disorder. Hence, I conclude that proponents of modern ethical theorists should not be complacent about the burdens associated with implementing a 'schizophrenic' moral psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the geo-political implications of neo-universalist tendencies in current Chinese political philosophy. It is stated how Chinese philosophy can contribute to overcome a 'clash' theory of intercultural relations. The author underlines that the growing economic and political role of China in this century forces China to develop a real global world-view tradition, and discusses Zhao Tingyang's philosophy of Tian-xia as a paradigmatic example of such new universalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented about John Locke's thought on private society and the liberal public good. The essay investigates and expounds Locke's theory of private society and provides details regarding Locke's criticism on freedom of association, religious freedom, and the political concepts which surround his philosophy.

The article discusses the Kantian perspective of moral construction as a task. It aims to put the Kantian elements together to build an account on appropriate deliberative perspective to address more specific moral issues. The article cites several questions that arise in debates about moral relativism and objectivity. It also outlines the Kantian perspective to assess specific moral principles. Moreover, it describes the grounds of philosopher Immanuel Kant for rejecting previous moral theories.

The article discusses philosopher Ayn Rand's evaluative concepts on moral objectivity. It elaborates some aspects of Rand's thought in the areas of objectivity and morality. The article explores some issues on the epistemology of Rand as well as her views of moral objectivity.The general views of Rand on the canons of objective judgment including an objection that her views may elicit are included. Rand's account of moral objectivity that depends on features of her epistemological views is also presented.

The article discusses the two functions of philosophy in relation to the moral thinking that philosophers and nonphilosophers practice. It cites that philosophy provides metaethical commentary on the nature of mental thought and builds on the moral thinking of people about moral issues. The article also states that methaethics accepts a lot of attention among philosophers but substantive moral theory accepts less. It also explores the general characterization of metaethics, reasons to seek out a substantive moral theory as well as some of its well-established styles.

The article discusses the meaning of subject in objective morality, and explores the difference of objective from intrinsic value. It elaborates on the conception of philosopher Ayn Rand on moral objectivity that offers a debate between subjectivism and objectivism. The article also describes the distinction between objectivism and intrinsicism to clarify the distinctive nature of the moral objectivity that Rand adopts. Rand's view of moral intrinsicism and her own view of the nature of moral objectivity are also presented.

The author reflects on the integration of the ethical theory introduced by Immmanuel Kant. He stresses the adoption of such principle among philosophers as background in understanding underlying principles of abortion. Further, he emphasizes that such theory manifests formula for better understanding of universal law in the application of method in evaluating associated issues on abortion.

Academic study has become a more significant part of a conservatoire education in recent times, but it has not always informed performance as effectively as it might. There is a need for further development of an academic curriculum that is specifically relevant to performers, in which the links between theory and practice are made explicit rather than expecting students to construct these for themselves. This article reports on research into the integration of theory and practice at Leeds College of Music, UK, using jazz improvisation as a case study. Pilot teaching sessions within two modules explored ways in which students can be encouraged to engage actively with an appropriate academic curriculum that is embedded within a holistic learning experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides a discussion of the appeals of Structural Scientific Realism. It is mentioned that such realism maintains that it is reasonable to believe that the successful scientific theories are in approximation, structurally correct. The article is divided into four parts, the first one being an explanation of the meaning of Structural Scientific Realism and an outline of the reasons why the thesis seems very appealing. The second portion provides an outline of several criticisms against structural scientific realism in recent literature. The third and fourth sections argue that despite the troubling effect of such criticisms, the position remains practical.

Through a close reading of Klein and Irigaray's work on the mother-daughter relationship via the Electra myth, Jacobs diagnoses what she considers a fundamental problem in psychoanalytic and feminist psychoanalytic theory. She shows that neither thinker is able to theorize the mother-daughter relationship on a structural level but is only able to describe its symptoms. Jacobs makes a crucial distinction between description and theory and argues that the need to go beyond description and phenomenology toward the creation of a structural theory is the only way that feminist philosophy and psychoanalysis can avoid reproducing the terms of the male imaginary. The essay concludes by arguing that theorization of the mother-daughter relationship can only be achieved if we analyze manifestations of the mother-daughter relationship in clinical, cultural, and mythical material through the framework of a foreclosed or absent underlying maternal law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the recent emphasis on models in philosophy of science has been an important development, the consequence has been a shift away from more traditional notions of theory. Because the semantic view defines theories as families of models and because much of the literature on "scientific" modeling has emphasized various degrees of independence from theory, little attention has been paid to the role that theory has in articulating scientific knowledge. This paper is the beginning of what I hope will be a redress of the imbalance. I begin with a discussion of some of the difficulties faced by various formulations of the semantic view not only with respect to their account of models but also with their definition of a theory. From there I go on to articulate reasons why a notion of theory is necessary for capturing the structure of scientific knowledge and how one might go about formulating such a notion in terms of different levels of representation and explanation. The context for my discussion is the BCS account of superconductivity, a 'theory' that was, and still is, sometimes referred to as a 'model'. BCS provides a nice focus for the discussion because it illuminates various features of the theory/model relationship that seem to require a robust notion of theory that is not easily captured by the semantic account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relation between coherence and truth? This paper rejects numerous answers to this question, including the following: truth is coherence; coherence is irrelevant to truth; coherence always leads to truth; coherence leads to probability, which leads to truth. I will argue that coherence of the right kind leads to at least approximate truth. The right kind is explanatory coherence, where explanation consists in describing mechanisms. We can judge that a scientific theory is progressively approximating the truth if it is increasing its explanatory coherence in two key respects: broadening by explaining more phenomena and deepening by investigating layers of mechanisms. I sketch an explanation of why deepening is a good epistemic strategy and discuss the prospect of deepening knowledge in the social sciences and everyday life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a stronger version of 'inference-to-the-best explanation' scientific realism. I argue against three standard assumptions of current realists: (1) realism is confirmed if it provides the best explanation of theories' predictive success; (2) the realist claim that successful theories are always approximately true provides the best explanation of their success; and (3) realists are committed to giving the same sort of truth-based explanation of superseded theories' success that they give to explain our best current theories' success. On the positive side, I argue that (1) the confirmation of realism requires explaining theories' explanatory success, not just their predictive success; (2) in turn this task requires a richer realist model of explanation that brings into the explanans both (a) successful theories' epistemic virtues (e.g., unification and simplicity) and (b) the standards governing these virtues, as well as truth; (3) this richer realist model is further confirmed because it can better explain the success of theories in gaining wide acceptance among scientists; and (4) the model is further supported because it is superior to 'preservative realism' in providing a plausible rebuttal of the pessimistic meta-induction from the many past successful-but-false theories to the likelihood that our best current theories are likewise false. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Comparing alternative scientific theories obviously is relevant to theory assessment, but are comparativists (like Laudan/correct when they also make it necessary? This paper argues that they are not. Defining rationality solely in terms of theories' comparative problem-solving strengths, comparativist philosophers of science like Laudan subscribe to what I call the irrelevance claim (IC) and the necessity claim (NC). According to IC, a scientific theory's being well or poorly confirmed is "irrelevant" to its acceptance; NC is the claim that "all evaluations of research traditions and theories must be made within a comparative context," how any theory "compares with its competitors" (Laudan 1977, 21, 120). Using current competing theories (T1 and T2) of population viability assessment (PVA) for the Florida panther, the paper investigates IC/NC. In part because dominant T2 panther biologists accept IC/NC (which T1 theorists reject), the paper argues that they appear both to have accepted flawed T2 and to have contributed to flawed panther science and policy. Correcting Laudan's Comparativist Philosophy of Science (LCPS), underlying the T1-versus-T2 debate, thus may hold promise for helping resolve both the scientific and policy controversy over panther PVA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initially, models of chemical systems displaying oscillatory behavior were judged successful if they could show how such behavior was even possible. Recently, however, reaction mechanisms for chemical oscillators have been subjected to more stringent experimental tests. I examine strategies for model testing that flow from theoretical considerations, in particular, the types of feedback relations between chemical species required to produce oscillatory behavior in mechanistic models. These theoretical considerations allow chemists to work around important practical considerations such as an inability to measure certain species in the experimental system. These sorts of testing strategies illuminate chemists' desiderata for a "good model." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with the view that methodological constraints depend upon the nature of the system investigated, a tripartite division between theoretical, semitheoretical, and empirical discoveries is made. Many nanosystems can only be investigated semitheoretically or empirically, and this aspect leads to some nanophenomena being weakly emergent. Self-assembling systems are used as an example, their existence suggesting that the class of systems that is not Kim-reducible may be quite large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Should philosophers of science be paying attention to developments in "nanoscience"? Undoubtedly. it is too early to tell for sure. The goal of this paper is to take a preliminary look. In particular. I look at the use of computational models in the study of nanosized solid-state materials. What I find is that there are features of these models that appear on their face to be at odds with some basic philosophical intuitions about the relationships between different theories and between theories and their models. My conclusion is that developments in nanoscience are not an unlikely place for novel insights in the philosophy of science to emerge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central concern of this article is whether the semantic approach has the resources to appropriately capture the core tenets of structural realism. Chakravartty (2001) has argued that a realist notion of correspondence cannot be accommodated without introducing a linguistic component, which undermines the approach itself. We suggest that this worry can be addressed by an appropriate understanding of the role of language in this context. The real challenge, however, is how to incorporate the core notion of 'explanatory approximate truth' in such a way that the emphasis on structure is retained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What does it mean to embed the phenomena in an abstract structure? Or to represent them by doing so? The semantic view of theories runs into a severe problem if these notions are construed either naively, in a metaphysical way, or too closely on the pattern of the earlier syntactic view. Constructive empiricism and structural realism will then share those difficulties. The problem will be posed as in Reichenbach's The Theory of Relativity and A Priori Knowledge, and realist reactions will be examined, but they will be argued to dissolve upon scrutiny. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I begin by distinguishing two notions of model, the notion of a truth-making structure and the notion of a mathematical model (in one specific sense). I then argue that although the models of the semantic view have often been taken to be both truth-making structures and mathematical models, this is in part due to a failure to distinguish between two ways of truth-making; in fact, the talk of truth-making is best excised from the view altogether. The result is a version of the semantic view which is better supported by the direct evidence offered for it, better equipped to achieve its avowed aims, and, I think, closer to the intentions of the original proponents of the view in many ways, despite some of their own declarations to the contrary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Let the Guidance Constraint be the following norm for evaluating ethical theories: Other things being at least roughly equal, ethical theories are better to the extent that they provide adequate moral guidance. I offer an account of why ethical theories are subject to the Guidance Constraint, if indeed they are. We can explain central facts about adequate moral guidance, and their relevance to ethical theory, by appealing to certain forms of autonomy and fairness. This explanation is better than explanations that feature versions of the principle that 'ought' implies 'can'. In closing, I address the objection that my account is questionable because it makes ethical theories subject not merely to purely theoretical but also to morally substantive norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the significance of the core claim of the Relevant Alternatives (RA) theorists. The RA theory is somewhat unsatisfactory, but their core claim is entirely the product of responsiveness requirement, together with fallibilism about knowledge. Philosophers argue because they do believe that their knowledge may be erroneous. Moreover, a lot of philosophers reject the responsiveness requirement on knowing because they disagree if it is enough to convert belief into knowledge.

The author reflects on the skepticism of various philosophical theories. She discusses the role of the theory of knowledge in the affirmation of the value of admitting ambiguity into epistemology and moral-political philosophy. The author also outlines the possibilities of acknowledging ambiguity and practicing an active skepticism count. She also explains why many of the conceptual and theoretical-methodological characteristics of philosophies are labeled as continental.

The article focuses on examples and experiences on the uncertainty of medicine, based on accounts of medicine by non-medical writers, Michel de Montaigne and Francis Bacon. De Montaigne offered his views of medical theory and medical practice, while Bacon made proposals for renovating both medical theory and practice, in which the claims of individual sufferers are set against the normativity of medicine as a whole.

Comments on the book "Three Faces of Desire," by Timothy Schroeder. Contribution of the book to naturalistic philosophy of mind; Implication of taking desires as propositional attitudes; Importance of the concept of representation to Schroeder's reward theory of desire.