Search

Introduction: The first cases of COVID-19 arrived in Israel in March 2020. In Israel, the first known cases were Israeli patients diagnosed with COVID-19 aboard the Diamond Princess which were repatriated. Shortly later, additional cases were found in increasing numbers constituting the "first wave". The high number of patients put significant strain on Israeli hospitals. The initial wave was later followed by additional surges in the number of patients further straining the system. At the peak, hospitals with a total bed capacity of 800 had 135 covid-19 patients with 21 of them requiring ventilatory support. Method: Daily and weekly multidisciplinary meetings were held and daily reports were composed. Following each wave, lessons learned and recommendations for improved preparedness were formulated. The following results and conclusion sections summarize some of the main insights and recommendations. Results: The main challenges in Beilinson hospital during the "first wave" were a shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE) and how to best utilize the existing supplies, uncertainty regarding infectiveness, best management practices and uncertainty regarding the expected magnitude and duration of the pandemic. In retrospect, the major insights were the need for a flexible and divisible ED to safely care for changing loads of suspected and verified COVID-19 patients as well as COVID-19 negative patients. Increasing the in-hospital stockpile of PPE as well as the regional and national stockpile and creating local production capacities. The importance of the daily multidisciplinary managerial meeting was to improve situational awareness and allow improved decision making. Staff briefing occurred on a daily basis and during times of high uncertainty at the beginning of every shift. Conclusion: Performing structured and frequent debriefing and analysis to achieve clinical and operational insights is crucial for improved short-term performance as well as improving preparedness for future challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The Emergency Department (ED) is the hospital's main gateway, as well as the initial site for diagnosis and emergency medical care. In recent years, ED overcrowding is worsening in Israel and world-wide. Overcrowding has been shown to adversely affect patient service and care, fostering patient and caregiver dissatisfaction, as well as lowering quality of care and even increasing mortality. A main driver of ED overcrowding is ED patient boarding due to limited inpatient bed availability in conjunction with hospital policy. Measuring median length of ED stay (LOS) for admitted vs. discharged patients can serve as a simple indicator for the severity of the access block over time and between facilities. Method: ED operational data from the computerized system of four hospitals in Israel were collected over a year and analyzed. In parallel data was collected regarding hospital capacity and ED volumes. Data were analyzed using SPSS. Results: The Mean ED LOS was significantly higher for ED patients needing admission in all hospitals. Mean ED LOS for admitted vs. discharged patients was 227 min vs.431 in hospital A, 215 min vs. 222 in hospital B, 198 min vs. 440 in hospital C and 167 min vs. 190 in hospital D. The discrepancy in LOS for admitted patients was not related to the total hospital bed capacity or the hospital ED patient volume. Conclusion: ED boarding is a major challenge for ED's and hospitals worldwide and a significant contributor to ED overcrowding. A tool to assess boarding is proposed. The tool calculates the ratio of median ED LOS between patients admitted to the hospital and those discharged. Slightly higher LOS among those admitted is to be expected, considering the fact that they usually present with more complex medical problems. In this study the LOS ratios were 1.03, 1.12, 1.90 and 2.22. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews the literature describing four chemical and nuclear accidents and the lessons learned from each regarding the evacuation of civilian populations. Evacuation may save lives however, if poorly orchestrated, it may cause serious problems. For example, an inaccurate assessment of danger may lead to the evacuation of the same population twice, as the area requiring evacuation becomes larger than originally expected. Evacuation programs should focus on the vulnerable components of the populations, such as the elderly, children, and the disabled, and also should include plans for the care of pets and other animals. Training programs for civilians living near industrial centers and other high-risk areas should be considered. Finally, pre-event planning and preparation can improve the evacuation process and prevent panic behavior, and thus result in fewer casualties.

Introduction: The classical doctrine of mass toxicological events provides general guidelines for the management of a wide range of "chemical" events. The guidelines include provisions for the: (1) protection of medical staff with personal protective equipment; (2) simple triage of casualties; (3) airway protection and early intubation; (4) undressing and decontamination at the hospital gates; and (5) medical treatment with antidotes, as necessary. A number of toxicological incidents in Israel during the summer of 2005 involved chlorine exposure in swimming pools. In the largest event, 40 children were affected. This study analyzes its medical management, in view of the Israeli Guidelines for Mass Toxicological Events., Methods: Data were collected from debriefings by the Israeli Home Front Command, emergency medical services (EMS), participating hospitals, and hospital chart reviews. The timetable of the event, the number and severity of casualties evacuated to each hospital, and the major medical and logistical problems encountered were analyzed according to the recently described methodology of Disastrous Incident Systematic Analysis Through-Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR)., Results: The first ambulance arrived on-scene seven minutes after the first call. Emergency medical services personnel provided supplemental oxygen to the victims at the scene and en route when required. Forty casualties were evacuated to four nearby hospitals. Emergency medical services classified 26 patients as mildly injured, 13 as mild-moderate, and one as moderate, suffering from pulmonary edema. Most children received bronchodilators and steroids in the emergency room; 20 were hospitalized. All were treated in pediatric emergency rooms. None of the hospitals deployed their decontamination sites., Conclusions: Event management differed from the standard Israeli toxicological doctrine. It involved EMS triage of casualties to a number of medical centers, treatment in pediatric emergency departments, lack of use of protective gear, and omission of decontamination prior to emergency department entrance. Guidelines for mass toxicological events must be tailored to unique scenarios, such as chlorine intoxications at swimming pools, and for specific patient populations, such as children. All adult emergency departments always should be prepared and equipped for taking care of pediatric patients.

Introduction: A mass-casualty incident (MCI) can occur in the periphery of a densely populated area, away from a metropolitan area. In such circumstances, the medical management of the casualties is expected to be difficult because the nearest hospital and the emergency medical services (EMS), only can offer limited resources. When coping with these types of events (i.e., limited medical capability in the nearby medical facilities), a quick response time and rational triage can have a great impact on the outcome of the victims. The objective of this study was to identify the lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist attack that occurred on 05 December 2005, in Netanya, a small Israeli city., Methods: Data were collected during and after the event from formal debriefings and from patient files. The data were processed using descriptive statistics and compared to those from previous events. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology., Results: Four victims and the terrorist died as a result of this suicide bombing. A total of 131 patients were evacuated (by EMS or self-evacuation) to three nearby hospitals. Due to the proximity of the event to the ambulance dispatch station, the EMS response was quick. The first evacuation took place only three minutes after the explosion. Non-urgent patients were diverted to two close-circle hospitals, allowing the nearest hospital to treat urgent patients and to receive the majority of self-evacuated patients. The nearest hospital continued to receive patients for >6 hours after the explosion, 57 of them (78%) were self-evacuated., Conclusion: The distribution of casualties from the scene plays a vital role in the management of a MCI that occurs in the outskirts of a densely populated area. Non-urgent patients should be referred to a hospital close to the scene of the event, but not the closest hospital. The nearest hospital should be prepared to treat urgent casualties, as well as a large number of self-evacuated patients.

Introduction: Mildly injured and "worried well" patients can have profound effects on the management of a mass-casualty incident. The objective of this study is to describe the characteristics and lessons learned from an event that occurred on 28 August 2005 near the central bus station in Beer-Sheva, Israel. The unique profile of injuries allows for the examination of the medical and operational aspects of the management of mild casualties., Methods: Data were collected during and after the event, using patient records and formal debriefings. They were processed focusing on the characteristics of patient complaints, medical response, and the dynamics of admission., Results: A total of 64 patients presented to the local emergency department, including two critical casualties. The remaining 62 patients were mildly injured or suffered from stress. Patient presentation to the emergency department was bi-phasic; during the first two hours following the attack (i.e., early phase), the rate of arrival was high (one patient every three minutes), and anxiety was the most frequent chief complaint. During the second phase, the rate of arrival was lower (one patient every 27 minutes), and the typical chief complaint was somatic. Additionally, tinnitus and complaints related to minor trauma also were recorded frequently. Psychiatric consultation was obtained for 58 (91%) of the patients. Social services were involved in the care of 47 of the patients (73%). Otolaryngology and surgery consultations were obtained for 45% and 44%, respectively. The need for some medical specialties (e.g., surgery and orthopedics) mainly was during the first phase, whereas others, mainly psychiatry and otolaryngology, were needed during both phases. Only 13 patients (20%) needed a consultation from internal medicine., Conclusions: Following a terrorist attack, a large number of mildly injured victims and those experiencing stress are to be expected, without a direct relation to the effectiveness of the attack. Mildly injured patients tend to appear in two phases. In the first phase, the rate of admission is expected to be higher. Due to the high incidence of anxiety and other stress-related phenomena, many mildly injured patients will require psychiatric evaluation. In the case of a bombing attack, many of the victims must be evaluated by an otolaryngologist.

Introduction: Medical systems worldwide are facing the new threat of morbidity associated with the deliberate dispersal of microbiological agents by terrorists. Rapid diagnosis and containment of this type of unannounced attack is based on the knowledge and capabilities of medical staff. In 2004, the knowledge of emergency department physicians of anthrax was tested. The average test score was 58%. Consequently, a national project on bioterrorism preparedness was developed. The aim of this article is to present the project in which medical knowledge was enhanced regarding a variety of bioterrorist threats, including cutaneous and pulmonary anthrax, botulinum, and smallpox., Methods: In 2005, military physicians and experts on bioterrorism conducted special seminars and lectures for the staff of the hospital emergency department and internal medicine wards. Later, emergency department senior physicians were drilled using one of the scenarios., Results: Twenty-nine lectures and 29 drills were performed in 2005. The average drill score was 81.7%. The average score of physicians who attended the lecture was 86%, while those who did not attend the lectures averaged 78.3% (NS)., Conclusions: Emergency department physicians were found to be highly knowledgeable in nearly all medical and logistical aspects of the response to different bioterrorist threats. Intensive and versatile preparedness modalities, such as lectures, drills, and posters, given to a carefully selected group of clinicians, can increase their knowledge, and hopefully improve their response to a bioterrorist attack.

Introduction: Mass-casualty incidents (MCIs) can occur outside of major metropolitan areas. In such circumstances, the nearest hospital seldom is a Level-1 Trauma Center. Moreover, emergency medical services (EMS) capabilities in such areas tend to be limited, which may compromise prehospital care and evacuation speed. The objective of this study was to extract lessons learned from the medical response to a terrorist event that occurred in the marketplace of a small Israeli town on 26 October 2005. The lessons pertain to the management of primary and secondary evacuation and the operational practices by the only hospital in the town, which is designated as a Level-2 Trauma Center., Methods: Data were collected during the event by Home Front Command Medical Department personnel. After the event, formal and informal debriefings were conducted with EMS personnel, the hospitals involved, and the Ministry of Health. The medical response components, interactions (mainly primary triage and secondary distribution), and the principal outcomes were analyzed. The event is described according to Disastrous Incidents Systematic Analysis Through Components, Interactions, Results (DISAST-CIR) methodology., Results: The suicide bomber and four victims died at the scene, and two severely injured patients later died in the hospital. A total of 58 wounded persons were evacuated, including eight severely injured, two moderately injured, and 48 mildly injured. Forty-nine of the wounded arrived to the nearby Hillel Yafe Hospital, including all eight of the severely injured victims, the two moderately injured, and 39 of the mildly injured. Most of the mildly injured victims were evacuated in private cars by bystanders. Five other area hospitals were alerted, three of which primarily received the mildly injured victims. Two distant, Level-1 Trauma Centers also were alerted; each received one severely injured patient from Hillel Yafe Hospital during the secondary distribution process. Emergency medical services personnel were able to treat and evacuate all severely and moderately injured patients within 17 minutes of the explosion. A total of 12 of the 21 ambulances arriving on-scene within the first 20 minutes were staffed by EMS volunteers or off-duty workers., Conclusion: When a MCI occurs in a small town that is in the vicinity of a Level-2 Trauma Center, and located a > 40 minute drive from Level-1 Trauma Centers, the Level-2 Trauma Center is a critical component in medical management of the event. All severely and moderately injured patients initially should be evacuated to the Level-2 Trauma Center, and given advanced, hospital-based resuscitation. The patients needing care beyond the capabilities of this facility should be distributed secondarily to Level-1 Trauma Centers. To alleviate the burden placed on the local hospital, some of the mildly injured victims can be evacuated primarily to more distant hospitals. The ability to control the flow of mildly injured patients is limited by the large percentage of them arriving by private cars. The availability of EMS in small towns can be augmented significantly by enrolling off-duty EMS workers and volunteers to the rescue effort. Level-2 hospitals in small towns should be prepared and drilled to operate in a "selective evacuation" mode during MCIs.

A simplified, four-step approach was used to establish a medical management and response plan to mega-terrorism in Israel. The basic steps of this approach are: (1) analysis of a scenario based on past incidents; (2) description of relevant capabilities of the medical system; (3) analysis of gaps between the scenario and the expected response; and (4) development of an operational framework. Analyses of both the scenario and medical abilities led to the recommendation of an evidence-based contingency plan for mega-terrorism. An important lesson learned from the analyses is that a shortage in medical first responders would require the administration of advanced life support (ALS) by paramedics at the scene, along with simultaneous, rapid evacuation of urgent casualties to nearby hospitals by medics practicing basic life support (BLS). Ambulances and helicopters should triage casualties from inner to outer circle hospitals secondarily, preferentially Level-1 trauma centers. In conclusion, this four-step approach based on scenario analysis, mapping of medical capabilities, detection of bottlenecks, and establishment of a unique operational framework, can help other medical systems develop a response plan to mega-terrorist attacks.

Introduction: A mass toxicological event (MTE) caused by an act of terrorism or an industrial incident can create large numbers of ambulatory casualties suffering from mild intoxication, acute stress reaction (ASR), and exacerbation of chronic diseases or iatrogenic insult (such as atropine overdose). The logistical and medical management of this population may present a challenge in such a scenario. The aim of this article is to describe the concept of the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) of a "Mild Casualties Center" (MCC) for a chemical scenario, and to analyze the results of two large-scale drills that have been used to evaluate this concept., Methods: Two large-scale drills were conducted. One MCC drill was located in a school building and the second MCC drill was located in a basketball stadium. These medical centers were staffed by physicians, nurses, and medics, both military (reservists) and civilian (community, non-hospital teams). Two hundred simulated patients entered the MCC during each of the drills, and drill observers assessed how these patients were managed for two hours., Results: Of the casualties, 28 were treated in the "medical treatment site", 10 of which were relocated to a nearby hospital. Only four casualties were treated in the large "mental care site", planned for a much higher burden of "worried well" patients. Documentation of patient data and medical care was sub-optimal., Conclusion: A MCC is a logistically suitable solution for the challenge of managing thousands of ambulatory casualties. The knowledge of the medical team must be bolstered, as most are unfamiliar with both nerve gas poisoning and with ASR. Mild casualties centers should not be located within hospitals and must be staffed by non-hospital, medical personnel to achieve the main task of allowing hospital teams to focus on providing medical care to the moderate and severe nerve gas casualties, without the extra burden of caring for thousands of mild casualties.

Introduction: Quarantelli established criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of disaster management., Objectives: The objectives of this study were to analyze the response of the healthcare system to the Tsunami disaster according to the Quarantelli principles, and to validate these principles in a scenario of a disaster due to natural hazards., Methods: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command Medical Department sent a research team to study the response of the Thai medical system to the disaster. The analysis of the disaster management was based on Quarantelli's 10 criteria for evaluating the management of community disasters. Data were collected through personal and group interviews., Results: The three most important elements for effective disaster management were: (1) the flow of information; (2) overall coordination; and (3) leadership. Although pre-event preparedness was for different and smaller scenarios, medical teams repeatedly reported a better performance in hospitals that recently conducted drills., Conclusions: In order to increase effectiveness, disaster management response should focus on: (1) the flow of information; (2) overall coordination; and (3) leadership.

Introduction: On 26 December 2004 at 09:00 h, an earthquake of 9.0 magnitude (Richter scale) struck the area off of the western coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia, triggering a Tsunami. As of 25 January 2005, 5,388 fatalities were confirmed, 3,120 people were reported missing, and 8,457 people were wounded in Thailand alone. Little information is available in the medical literature regarding the response and restructuring of the prehospital healthcare system in dealing with major natural disasters., Objective: The objective of the study was to analyze the prehospital medical response to the Tsunami in Thailand, and to identify possible ways of improving future preparedness and response., Methods: The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command Medical Department sent a research delegation to study the response of the Thai medical system to the 2004 earthquake and Tsunami disaster. The delegation met with Thai healthcare and military personnel, who provided medical care for and evacuated the Tsunami victims. The research instruments included questionnaires (open and closed questions), interviews, and a review of debriefing session reports held in the days following the Tsunami., Results: Beginning the day after the event, primary health care in the affected provinces was expanded and extended. This included: (1) strengthening existing primary care facilities with personnel and equipment; (2) enhancing communication and transportation capabilities; (3) erecting healthcare facilities in newly constructed evacuation centers; (4) deploying mobile, medical teams to make house calls to flood refugees in affected areas; and (5) deploying ambulance crews to the affected areas to search for survivors and provide primary care triage and transportation., Conclusion: The restructuring of the prehospital healthcare system was crucial for optimal management of the healthcare needs of Tsunami victims and for the reduction of the patient loads on secondary medical facilities. The disaster plan of a national healthcare system should include special consideration for the restructuring and reinforcement prehospital system.

The Phi Phi Islands are isolated islands located about one hour by ship from the mainland in Krabi province of Thailand. There is a small medical facility where the director is the one physician that provides care to residents and tourists. This small medical facility faced an enormous mass casualty incident due to the 2004 Tsunami. The hospital was damaged by the Tsunami wave and was not functional, one crew member died and another was injured. Medical care and evacuation posed a unique problem in the Phi Phi Islands due to remoteness, limited medical resources, lack of effective communication with the main land and the large number of victims. An alternative medical facility was located in a nearby hotel. The crew included the medical director, two nurses, two additional staff members, 10 local volunteers, and hotel staff members. The medical crew had to treat 600-700 casualties in 24 hours. Most of the victims were mildly injured, but approximately 100 (15%) of the victims could not walk due to their injuries. The medical director, made a conscious decision to initially treat only circulation ("C") problems, by controlling external hemorrhages. This decision was driven by the lack of equipment and personnel to deal with airway ("A") and breathing ("B") problems. In the post-disaster debriefing, the Phi Phi Island hospital physician noted five major lessons concerning disaster management in such extreme situation in a small facility located in a remote area: (1) effective resistant communication facilities must be ensured; (2) clear, simple "evacuation plans" should be made in advance; (3) plans should be made to ensure automatic reinforcement of remote areas with evacuation vehicles, medical equipment and medical personnel; (4) efficient cooperation with medical volunteers must be planned and drilled; and (5) every team member of such a hospital must participate in an educational program and periodic drills should be done to improve the disaster and emergency medicine capabilities. This case report is an example for caregivers all over the world, of an amazing lesson of leadership and courage.

The disaster caused by the Tsunami of 26 December 2004 was one of the worst that medical systems have faced. The aim of this study was to learn about the medical response of the Thai hospitals to this disaster and to establish guidelines that will help hospitals prepare for future disasters. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) Home Front Command (HFC) Medical Department sent a research delegation to Thai hospitals to study: (1) pre-event hospital preparedness; (2) patient evacuation and triage; (3) personnel and equipment reinforcement; (4) modes used for alarm and recruitment of hospital personnel; (5) internal reorganization of hospitals; and (6) admission, discharge, and secondary transfer (forward management) of patients. Thai hospitals were prepared for and drilled for a general mass casualty incident (MCI) involving up to 50 casualties. However, a control system to measure the success of these drills was not identified, and Thai hospitals were not prepared to deal with the unique aspects of a tsunami or to receive thousands of victims. Modes of operation differed between provinces. In Phang Nga and Krabi, many patients were treated in the field. In Phuket, most patients were evacuated early to secondary (district) and tertiary (provincial) hospitals. Hospitals recalled staff rapidly and organized the emergency department for patient triage, treatment, and transfer if needed. Although preparedness was deficient, hospital systems performed well. Disaster management should focus on field-based first aid and triage, and rapid evacuation to secondary hospitals. Additionally, disaster management should reinforce and rely on the existing and well-trusted medical system.

Introduction: Large-scale, terrorist attacks can happen in peripheral areas, which are located close to a country's borders and far from its main medical facilities and involve multi-national casualties and responders. The objective of this study was to analyze the terrorist suicide bombings that occurred on 07 October 2004, near the Israeli-Egyptian border, as representative of such a complex scenario., Methods: Data from formal debriefings after the event were processed in order to learn about victim outcomes, resource utilization, critical events, and time course of the emergency response., Results: A total of 185 injured survivors were repatriated: four were severely wounded, 13 were moderately injured, and 168 were mildly injured. Thirty-eight people died. A forward medical team landed at the border town's airport, which provided reinforcement in the field and in the local hospital. Israeli and Egyptian search and rescue teams collaborated at the destruction site. One-hundred sixty-eight injured patients arrived at the small border hospital that rapidly organized itself for the mass-casualty incident, operating as an evacuation "staging hospital". Twenty-three casualties secondarily were distributed to two major trauma centers in the south and the center of Israel, respectively, either by ambulance or by helicopter., Conclusion: Large-scale, terrorist attacks at a peripheral border zone can be handled by international collaboration, reinforcement of medical teams at the site itself and at the peripheral neighboring hospital, rapid rearrangement of an "evacuation hospital", and efficient transport to trauma centers by ambulances, helicopters, and other aircraft.